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Abstract 
 
 
    This thesis is about the space programmes of China and India, and space as 
international society. Drawing on key concepts of the English School theory, the 
argument of the thesis is twofold. First, employing international society as the central 
analytical idea, it suggests that it is possible to conceptualise space not merely as a 
system, but as an international space society with a distinct international social 
structure. This argument is developed by highlighting how the nature of space as a 
distinctive sectoral interstate society is manifested in the ways in which its primary 
institutions are differentiated from such institutions at the global level (war, 
sovereignty, law, diplomacy, balance of power, great power management, the market) 
in a historical and comparative context. This helps to highlight the constitutive impact 
of these institutions on China and India as emerging space powers. It also puts 
forward ‘techno-nationalism’ as a primary institution of international space society. 
Second, the thesis argues that the pursuit of China and India’s space programmes has 
been informed by a particular understanding of techno-nationalism in a postcolonial 
context, what I call ‘postcolonial techno-nationalism’, which is centred on the 
development of space technology as a normative indicator of the state’s power, status, 
and modernity. The enduring influence of postcolonial techno-nationalism reflects 
how technological advancement was seen to function as a sort of an informal 
‘standard of civilisation’ during the expansion of the European society of states in the 
nineteenth century. Essentially, this thesis provides a useful range of innovative 
analytical tools to consider the relationship between technology and International 
Relations and how order is constructed, maintained, and contested in space. It also 
offers a new lens though which to consider the complex dynamics that shape China 
and India as rising space powers. 
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Introduction  
 
 
A number of interrelated emerging challenges have generated a renewed interest in 
the international politics of space and space security. These include, but are not 
limited to, the following: the increasing militarisation and even weaponisation of 
space, especially in light of the George W Bush administration’s plans for the 
deployment of space-based missile defence systems and China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) 
test in 2007; the US-China rivalry in space; the institutional deadlock on space arms 
control; the spread of space debris; the Asian space race, particularly between China 
and India; the issues of frequency interference, space traffic management, and space 
situational awareness (SSA), as space becomes increasingly crowded; the regulation 
of the limited spectrum of radio frequencies and orbital slots; and the long-term 
sustainability of space activities.1 Therefore, there are concerns that space is 
transforming into a more ‘congested, contested, and competitive’ domain.2 It is in this 
reconfigured context that the behaviour of China and India as the two key rising space 
powers is an important determinant of international space order and the focus of this 
thesis.3 
   As a consequence, building on International Relations (IR) theories, there has been 
a growing body of literature that seeks to highlight certain aspects of the international 
politics of space.4 More specifically, realist accounts have called attention to the 
competitive aspects of space security, including balancing behaviour and power 
transition dynamics.5 Seen against this backdrop, some observers have suggested the 
inevitability of a space arms race and even the possibility of a conflict in space 
                                                
1 For an overview of these issues, see the contributions in Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al. (2015). 
2 The description of space as ‘congested, contested, and competitive’ was recently introduced by US 
Department of Defense officials. For an analysis of this description and its implications for US space 
policy, see Gallagher (2013).  
3 In addition to their growing profile in space, there are other good reasons for grouping China and 
India together, including their remarkable economic growth, their growing influence in international 
society, their potential to become globally important powers, geographical size and vast population, 
their shared colonial experience and its legacy, shared aspirations for great power status, and 
civilisational identity. As Gaskarth (2015: 3) notes, these common characteristics clearly differentiate 
them from other emerging states.   
4 Recent works on International Relations theory and space include: Sheehan (2007); Moltz (2008); 
Bormann and Sheehan (2009); Al-Rodhan (2012); Harding (2013); Mutschler (2013); and Wang 
(2013). 
5 Part of this debate has also been the concept of space power. One of the most influential works in this 
regard is Dolman (2002). Drawing on realism and classical geopolitics, Dolman argues for a US 
strategy that ensures space dominance through military means. On space power, see also Gray and 
Sheldon (1999); Oberg (1999); Lambakis (2001); and Lutes and Hays (2011).  
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between the United States and China (Tellis, 2007; Seedhouse, 2010). Liberal 
perspectives have highlighted the importance of the cooperative and ameliorative 
features of space security with a particular focus on regimes and space arms control.6 
Recent constructivist studies have considered the constitutive role of identities, norms, 
and culture in the social construction of the politics of space security through 
processes of interaction and socialisation.7 More recently, work has also been done 
from the perspective of securitisation, critical security studies, and critical 
geopolitics.8	   Likewise, the cases of China and India have also attracted much 
attention, especially in the context of discussing the Asian space race. In this regard, 
there is now a burgeoning literature that assesses the complex array of military, 
political, and economic factors, which has shaped the development of China and 
India’s space programmes (Lele, 2010; Sheehan, 2010; Siddiqi, 2010c; Moltz, 2012; 
Lele, 2013).     
   While these studies are a welcome contribution to our understanding of space 
security and politics in general and of the space programmes of China and India in 
particular, however, this thesis proposes an alternative way of thinking about the 
international politics of space by relating space with the analytical idea of 
international society. The aim of the thesis is to explore one central question: What 
insights, if any, can the English School theory offer to the study of the international 
politics of space generally and to the cases of China and India as rising space-faring 
states in particular?  
   In addressing this question, the argument of this thesis is twofold. First, drawing on 
key English School concepts, it suggests that it is possible to conceptualise space not 
merely as a system, but as an international space society with a distinct international 
social structure. This argument is developed by highlighting how the structure of 
space as a distinctive sectoral interstate society is manifested in the ways in which its 
primary institutions are differentiated from such institutions at the global level (war, 
law, sovereignty, diplomacy, balance of power, great power management and so on) 
in a historical and comparative perspective. It also puts forward ‘techno-nationalism’ 
as a distinctive institution of international space society. In doing so, a sectoral 
                                                
6 For a recent regime theory analysis regarding space, see Aliberti and Krasner (2016).  
7 Works that build on constructivism include: Peterson (2005); Moltz (2008); Cunningham (2009); and 
Wang (2013). 
8 On the growing securitisation of space, see Peoples (2011). Also, see Sheehan (2015). Examples of 
critical geopolitics approaches are: Macdonald (2008); Sage (2008); Havercroft and Duvall (2009); and 
Zhang (2013). 
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framework helps to illustrate the constitutive impact of these institutions on China and 
India as constructs within international space order.  
   Second, the thesis argues that China and India’s space programmes have been 
informed by a particular understanding of techno-nationalism in a postcolonial 
context, what I call ‘postcolonial techno-nationalism’, which is centred on the 
development of space technology as a normative indicator of the state’s power, status, 
and modernity. The enduring influence of postcolonial techno-nationalism reflects 
how scientific and technological attainments were seen to function as a sort of an 
informal ‘standard of civilisation’ during the expansion of the European society of 
states in the nineteenth century. The concept of techno-nationalism links the two main 
arguments of the thesis by elucidating how historically rooted conceptions about the 
role of technology still influence contemporary ideas and practices in international 
space society. This adds historical depth to the study of the international politics of 
space that is generally lacking in the relevant literature.  
   Applying this framework, the thesis will also address a set of important and difficult 
questions in the subsequent chapters: How can we relate international society to 
technology? How did China’s space programme emerge and succeed during the Cold 
War, given its limited financial and technological resources amid sustained political 
and social turmoil? How did India succeed in the pursuit of its space programme as a 
developing country? Are China and India great powers in space and how can we set a 
benchmark against which to assess that? The thesis addresses this set of questions 
with one principal audience in mind: scholars interested in the study of the 
international politics of space and space security.  
   In this regard, this thesis offers the innovative analytical concept of international 
space society that is attentive to the importance of history (including global space 
history) and change by illustrating the complex social constitution of international 
space order through the lens of primary institutions. Therefore, it provides a wide 
range of alternative analytical tools that can enrich the study of the international 
politics of space as well as our understanding of the behaviour of China and India as 
rising space-faring actors in terms of their interaction with international space society. 
This is an important consideration, not the least because most analyses on the 
international politics of space are largely descriptive and ‘undertheorised’.  
   Although the main focus of this thesis is empirical rather than theoretical, it also 
speaks to the audience of English School scholars. It offers the straightforward 
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concept of sectoral international societies by bringing technology and English School 
theory together. A sectoral approach adds a third crucial dimension to the study of 
international society at the global and regional levels by identifying how primary 
institutions are differentiated at the sectoral level. In a sense then, sectoral 
international societies cut across the global and regional levels. Despite the fact that 
my focus here is on the international space society, employing a sectoral analysis 
illuminates how certain technologies establish new domains of social interaction that 
are characterised by distinct international social structures, like the nuclear society of 
states and the cyber society of states.9 But while my analysis builds on the non-
materialist theoretical perspective of the English School, this conceptual move also 
calls attention to technology as a material-context factor that shapes and is shaped by 
international social structures.10 Moreover, a sectoral approach offers new ways for 
relating English School theory with global governance and International Security 
Studies.   
   The thesis also speaks to those interested in the theoretical and empirical study of 
China and India’s high technology projects. It does so by providing a more refined 
understanding of the concept of techno-nationalism that is more attentive to the 
colonial and postcolonial contexts of technological hierarchies in international 
society. This conceptual rethinking of techno-nationalism casts a revealing light on 
the ways in which history continues to influence contemporary conceptions about the 
role of science and technology as a principal marker of the state’s power, status, and 
modernity in international society. This is in line with the argument that the ‘global 
transformation’ of the nineteenth century still influences key understandings of the 
relationship between state, modernity and technology in the context of international 
relations (Buzan and Lawson, 2015). 
   In light of the above, essentially, the analytical framework of the thesis provides a 
useful range of innovative analytical tools to consider the relationship between 
technology and International Relations and how order is constructed, maintained, and 
contested in space. It also offers a new lens through which to consider the complex 
dynamics that shape the space programmes of China and India. I will return to the 
contributions of the analytical framework of this thesis in the final conclusion. The 
                                                
9 Ayson (2012: 62) has introduced the expression ‘international nuclear society’ based on Bull’s work 
on nuclear weapons and arms control.  
10 The material context of technology is one of the main themes in Deudney (2007).  
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rest of this introductory chapter will briefly outline some of the key English School 
concepts employed in the thesis, before identifying some of the most important 
problematic aspects of the literature that deals with the role of technology in 
International Relations. This is followed by a brief discussion of the concept of 
techno-nationalism. The final section will provide a brief overview of the subsequent 
chapters.  
 
Key English School Concepts 
 
There is no intention here of rehearsing debates about the place of the English School 
within International Relations as a discipline, but a few points are worth making about 
some key concepts employed in this thesis as they help to highlight what the English 
School can offer to the study of space politics and security.11 The English School is 
usually associated with a distinctive perspective to the study of international relations 
by interlinking three concepts: international system, international society, and world 
society. In this sense, it is seen to occupy the middle ground between the mainstream 
theories of neorealism and neoliberalism and the more radical approaches such as 
critical theories and poststructuralism (Dunne, 2013: 133). Linklater (2005: 85-6) 
captures this location nicely when he notes that what the first-wave of English School 
scholars shared in common was the idea that there was ‘more to international relations 
than the realist suggests but less than the cosmopolitan desires’. The starting point for 
this position is an account of international relations that privileges the idea of 
international society as the key English School concept (Dunne, 2013: 138). Bull and 
Watson (1984: 1) define international society as ‘a group of states (or more generally, 
a group of independent political communities) which form a system, in the sense that 
the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also 
have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the 
conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these 
arrangements’. In contrast, an international system ‘is formed when two or more 
states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one 
                                                
11 On the English School, see, inter alia, Buzan (2004); Clark (2005); Bellamy (2005); Linklater and 
Suganami (2006); Hurrell (2007); Clark (2007); Navari (2009); Buzan (2014a); and Navari and Green 
(2014). 
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another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a 
whole’ (Bull, 2002: 9).  
   But although much attention has been paid to the concept of international society as 
the key contribution of the English School to IR theory, less attention has been paid to 
world society and how it relates to international society. Until recently, as Buzan 
(2004: 44) notes, the state of the concept of world society was underdeveloped. While 
in recent years there has been a burgeoning literature on the concept of world society, 
there is less agreement about its meaning both in normative and analytical terms. The 
understanding of world society is traditionally linked with moral cosmopolitanism, 
which is reflective of the normative commitment of promoting a universal community 
of humanity. Thus, whereas international society is based upon an order-focused 
society of states, the reference point of world society is individual human beings and 
the delivery of justice (Williams, 2014: 130-1).  
   In his influential From International to World Society, Buzan (2004: 120) has 
offered a major structural revision of the concepts of international society and world 
society by introducing a new trilogy of ideal types of societies each based on a 
different unit of interaction and a different social structure: a) an ‘interstate society’ 
that is constituted by states and, thus, describes the attributes of what usually refers to 
as an ‘international society’ in the English School literature b) a ‘transnational 
society’ that refers to non-state collective actors and c) an ‘interhuman’ society’ that 
refers to individual human beings. In this revision, the concept of world society is 
redefined to describe the interplay between interstate, transnational, and interhunan 
types, whereby there is balance between the three domains and no one of the three is 
standing out as the dominant domain (Buzan, 2004: 202-3, 269). Building on Buzan’s 
structural revision, others suggest that the world society concept retains its analytical 
purchase as a distinct level of analysis that focuses exclusively on non-state actors 
(Pella, 2015: 3; Pella, 2013). Equally, Clark (2007: 6) maintains that world society 
refers to the ‘realm of the individual, of the non-official group or movement, and the 
transnational network of nongovernmental agents’.  
   Nevertheless, while some observers suggest that the concept of international society 
represents the distinctive character of the School’s approach to international relations, 
others postulate that it should be seen as one of the three domains (and concepts) that 
constitute the world political system: the system, the inter-state society, and world 
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society.12 This thinking reflects the ‘three traditions’ of international thought espoused 
by Martin Wight (1991), identified as Machiavellian (realism), Grotian (rationalism) 
and Kantian (revolutionalism). This understanding is in line with a key 
methodological orientation of the English School that favours the development of 
taxonomies as ideal-types rather than positivist approaches (Keene, 2009). However, 
in the context of discussing these three key concepts, there is also less consensus 
about the extent to which the system/society distinction is analytically useful (Reus-
Smit, 2013: 17-9).  
   A further line of argument related to these themes is the introduction of another pair 
of concepts: pluralism and solidarism.13 Pluralists and solidarists disagree about the 
normative importance of norms, rules, and institutions that constitute the structure of 
contemporary international society. On the one hand, pluralists stress the importance 
of sustaining political tolerance and cultural diversity in international society as a 
precondition for the maintenance of inter-state order.14 On the other hand, solidarists 
usually emphasise the need to transcend the state-systems or to move beyond the logic 
of coexistence to higher aims that accommodate concerns of justice in international 
society as a way to secure order. Solidarist thinking revolves around issues of justice, 
such as human rights and humanitarian intervention, which are mainly embodied in 
liberal cosmopolitan principles (Buzan, 2014a: 15-6).15 However, it is not necessary 
to treat pluralism and solidarism as mutually exclusive positions, but rather as a 
conversation that is reflective of the normative tensions embodied on the importance 
of order and justice in international society as well as how to find the proper balance 
between the two (Buzan, 2014a: 16; Hurrell, 2007: 9; Weinert, 2011).  
   Another useful English School concept employed here for the purposes of this thesis 
is the ‘institutions’ of international society. Within the idea of international society, 
institutions are not international governmental organisations, but sets of ‘habits and 
practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals’ (Bull, 2002: 71). In his 
Anarchical Society Bull identifies the balance of power, the managerial role of great 
powers, diplomacy, international law, and war as the key institutions of international 
society that help to maintain order. Buzan (2004) has introduced the terminology of 
primary institutions and secondary institutions to highlight the constitutive and 
                                                
12 On this discussion, see, for example, Dunne (2013).  
13 For an overview of the pluralist/solidarist debate, see Buzan (2014a: 16, 83-167). 
14 Prominent examples of pluralist works are: Jackson (2000); and Mayall (2000).  
15 A key reference point on solidarism is Wheeler (2000).  
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fundamental nature of the former as a way to overcome the confusion related to the 
usage of institutions in mainstream International Relations approaches. Although 
there is less agreement among English School scholars about what should be counted 
as an institution,16 there is more agreement that these are typically ‘durable and 
recognized patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the 
members of interstate societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules, and principles’ 
(Buzan, 2004: 181). Thus, primary institutions are constitutive of the identity of the 
states and international society in the sense that they shape certain conceptions of 
rightful membership of international society and what is perceived as legitimate 
patterns of conduct among its members (Buzan, 2014a: 17). It is this recognition 
among states of being bound to core principles of legitimacy that defines the existence 
of an international society (Clark, 2005: 24). The usage of the term secondary 
institutions refers to how institutions are typically understood in regime theory and by 
liberal institutionalists. These are largely intergovernmental arrangements designed to 
attain specific functional goals, such as the United Nations and the space regime, and 
they are reflective of the primary institutions of a given international society (Buzan, 
2004: 161-7; Schouenborg, 2014: 77, 80).  
   Part of this debate is also thinking about regional international society. In recent 
years, there has been a renowned interest in the formation of subglobal international 
societies, which has been largely generated by debates about the process of 
regionalism and regional cooperation.17 Not surprisingly, perhaps, much attention has 
been paid to the study of the European Union, and of Europe as a whole, as a distinct 
subglobal international society.18 However, other regions, including Southeast Asia 
(Quayle, 2013), East Asia (Buzan and Zhang, 2014), and Central Asia (Pourchot and 
Stivachtis, 2014) have attracted scholarly attention.  
   This raises the issue of how to identify the existence of regional international 
societies. One way is to analyse how regional primary institutions differ from the 
global pattern. It is in this context of differentiation that Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 
(2009) have explored the extent to which the Middle East can be seen to constitute a 
regional international society with distinctive primary institutions that present 
different interpretations from the global level. Likewise, Schouenborg (2013) has 
                                                
16 On this point, see Wilson (2012).  
17 On the place regionalism in international society, see Hurrell (2007: 239-61). 
18 See, among others, Diez and Whitman (2002); Stivachtis (2008); and Stivachtis and Webber (2011). 
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argued that there is a Scandinavian international society with distinctive regional 
institutional developments. Another way is to consider the emergence of secondary 
institutions that foster international cooperation at the regional level. A focus on 
secondary institutions, therefore, serves to highlight the degree of regional integration 
and cohesion and, more generally, the intensity of intra-state relations (Pourchot and 
Stivachtis, 2014). Differentiation is analytically useful as its helps to illustrate the 
ways in which an international space society has emerged with distinctive institutions, 
as I explain in Chapter 2. A detailed analysis of the ‘standard of civilisation’ as an 
English School concept will be taken in Chapter 3.  
 
Thinking about Technology in International Relations 
 
Despite the fact that technology, broadly defined, seems to determine virtually every 
facet of global politics, there has been little effort to theorise about its role in 
International Relations.19 Indeed, as Peoples (2009a: 559) observes, there is a 
tendency in International Relations Theory to ‘treat technology and technological 
change as a taken-for-granted ‘variable’’. Thus, it is worth briefly highlighting a few 
problematic aspects of the literature. First, as Herrera (2006: 15-30) persuasively 
demonstrates, all of the mainstream theories of International Relations regard 
technology as exogenous to the structure of the international system. Put simply, 
although technology is assumed to be ‘somewhere out there’, when it enters the 
system it has the effect of generating specific outcomes, whether it is the change of 
the distribution of military capabilities in neorealism (Waltz, 1979), the increasing 
levels of interdependence in neoliberalism (Keohane, 1984) or the construction of 
identities in social constructivism (Wendt, 1999). This is because these theories focus 
only on the material attributes of technology and, thus, fail to incorporate technology 
inside the spheres of the social and the political. However, conceptualising the role of 
technology as important, but not political, is suggestive of a deterministic 
understanding of technology in international politics. As a result, mainstream 
International Relations theories do not account for the transformative qualities of 
technology as a constitutive part of the international system (Herrera, 2006: 15-30).  
                                                
19 Exceptions are: Skolnikoff (1994); Herrera (2006); Deudney (2007); Peoples (2009b); and McCarthy 
(2013). 
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   On the other hand, one of the most influential contributions to our understanding of 
the nature of technology in science and technology studies has been provided by 
approaches that emphasise how technology is conditioned by social factors. This 
usually refers to how certain social actors and groups design strategies to shape 
technology according to their preferences, values, and goals. In contrast to 
deterministic approaches, the ‘social shaping thesis’ takes into consideration how 
technology has interpretive flexibility, in the sense that technologies can be 
understood in different ways by different users and social groups.20 In this light, as 
technology matures, it leads to the stabilisation of its meaning, given that a dominant 
view of how to interpret its use becomes widely accepted. This means that technology 
is not only socially shaped, but also shapes its social contexts. Consequently, by 
focusing solely on the micro level, that is usually the laboratory, social constructivists 
downplay how certain technologies shape society at both the meso and macro levels 
(Brey, 2003: 50-4).   
   To understand the political and social effects of technology, therefore, it is 
necessary to recognise the potential importance of the stabilisation of meaning. This 
inevitably involves acknowledging that technologies are both ‘socially constructed’ 
(constructivism) and they have social effects (determinism) (Herrera, 2006: 34). 
Studying the role of the railways and the atom bomb, Herrera (2006: 31) suggests that 
these technologies are ‘socially constructed’ by social and political choices, 
preferences, interests, and power dynamics in the early phase of their development. In 
this respect, technological systems are both social and technical, as they contain a 
‘messy’ web of connections among their technical, social, and economic components 
(Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987). When these socio-technical systems are immature 
they are more easily subject to contingencies and human agency. But as they become 
more mature and demonstrate their ramifications, they emerge as ‘an independent 
causal force’ (Herrera, 2003: 579).  
   In turn, not only does this alter the sense of space and time and state-society 
relations, but it also alters the ‘interaction capacity’ of the system, which refers to the 
speed, scale, and intensity of interactions among states. Crucially, interaction capacity 
is not an attribute of the units, but it is a quality of the system. For example, an 
                                                
20 Key studies of the ‘social shaping thesis’ include: Bijker, Hughes and Pinch (1987); MacKenzie and 
Wajcman (1999). Mack (1990) builds on this approach in her study on the LANDSAT satellite system, 
and MacKenzie (1993) in his study on ICBMs.  
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international system that is based on horses and sailing vessels as the means of 
transportation/communication is essentially different from one that is based on global 
computer networks (Herrera, 2003: 583; Herrera, 2006: 40).21  Another point to make 
is that each techno-social system has distinct characteristics and operations, and, thus, 
different implications for international relations. For example, not only do nuclear 
technology and the Internet constitute distinct techno-social systems with different 
complexes of social institutions, but also their implications for international relations 
are different in significant ways (Herrera, 2003: 564). 
   Notably, Herrera’s study has the merit of recognising that the relationship of 
technology and international relations is an inherently political and social process 
with significant implications for the transformation of the international system 
(Herrera 2006). In doing so, the author provides a theoretical framework that accounts 
for systemic change. However, his study does little to dispel the idea that technology 
does not only affect the interaction capacity of the system, but also reconstitutes and 
reshapes the interests, preferences, and goals of the units of the system (Kocs 2009: 
889). 
   This, of course, is not to say that technology alone can alter the nature of 
international politics or to reinvent the conduct and practice of foreign policy and 
diplomacy. But certainly the relationship between international relations and 
technology can transform the organisational and operational structure of the 
international system, change the character of the institutions of international society, 
establish new issue areas and strategic possibilities, and alter perceptions of power 
and shared identities at the unit level (Weiss 2005). As a result, a focus on the 
interaction capacity of the system does not take into consideration how the possession 
of specific technologies constructs distinctions between outsiders and insiders and, 
thus, defines political forms of hierarchy, power, and status in international society.  
   The general point to emphasise here is the need to move beyond the international 
system and to explore the possibility of relating the idea of international society to 
technology. As we shall see in chapter 2, it is in this context that the concept of 
sectoral international societies offers a useful way of bringing the dynamics of 
technology and international society together.  
                                                
21 The concept of ‘interaction capacity’ was first introduced by Buzan, Jones and Little (1993: 66-80).  
 
 
20 
Recasting Techno-nationalism  
 
Samuels (1994: x) has defined techno-nationalism as ‘the belief that technology is a 
fundamental element in national security, that it must be indigenized, diffused, and 
nurtured in order to make a nation rich and strong’. He also emphasises that Japan’s 
techno-nationalist ideology, as a set of ideas and beliefs, has been ‘highly contested 
and very plastic’, but its endurance and relevance can be explained because its value 
has been renewed continuously across time (Samuels 1994: x). This is useful because 
it helps to capture the ideological basis of Japanese strategic thinking about the role of 
technology in linking national security with economic development. It also serves to 
highlight that the term should not be a misnomer for associating technological 
capabilities merely with nationalism or prestige considerations.  
   But while there is still much merit in Samuel’s formulation of techno-nationalism, a 
few points are worth making here about how the concept is used in this thesis. First, 
Samuels (1994: 43) suggests that a key source of Japanese technology and security 
thinking has been the idea that Japan has to survive ‘in a hostile, Hobbesian world’. 
Likewise, whereas Johnson-Freese and Erickson (2006: 13, 15) acknowledge that 
techno-nationalism might be the equivalent of developmental nationalism stemming 
from China’s experience with colonialism, they seem to adhere to a techno-realpolitik 
approach to their analysis of China’s space programme by emphasising the 
competitive nature of the international system. 
   Second, my understanding of the term, however, although accepts the crucial 
element of competition, it also focuses attention on how ‘highly visible’ projects, such 
as space programmes, are part of ‘recognition games’, which states play in order to 
acquire the status of a great power (Suzuki, 2008).22 International Relations scholars 
have not been unaware of the possible importance of this crucial feature of techno-
nationalism. For instance, in discussing the ideas that informed Chinese techno-
nationalism associated with the strategic weapons programmes of the Mao-era, 
Feigenbaum (2003: 14) recognises the salience of ‘China’s relative standing on the 
international stage’. In this sense, my understanding of the term highlights that 
technology is not only material, but also social, political, and cultural, something 
                                                
22 The term ‘highly visible technology’ here refers to the demonstrative effect of some technologies, 
which allows for their celebration as great technological and engineering feats and consequently as an 
affirmation of national technological prowess. Nuclear and space technology can be seen in this 
context. Supercomputers might also be included in this category.  
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which points to the normative and ideational dimensions of technological prowess. In 
doing so, my formulation of the term also calls attention to the role of technological 
advancement as an informal standard of modernity and hierarchy in international 
society. 
   Third, building on Samuels’ work, recent studies on the enduring significance of 
Chinese techno-nationalism acknowledge that its origins can be traced back to the 
second half of the nineteenth century and the efforts by the champions of the Self-
Strengthening movement (Feigenbaum, 2003: 225-7; Cheung, 2009: 237; Kennedy, 
2013: 910). But there is generally little consideration in the relevant literature of how 
the emergence of Chinese techno-nationalism was largely a consequence of the 
international social pressure from European international society to introduce 
technology as a normative marker of the state’s modernity, power, and status. 
Equally, there is generally a curious neglect of the use of techno-nationalism as an 
analytical concept in the study of India. Significantly, my formulation of techno-
nationalism emphasises the importance of China and India’s colonial experience as a 
major factor in shaping an influential view about the role of technological 
achievements among Chinese and Indian policy makers. This is in keeping in line 
with a growing body of literature that focuses on the role of national identity and 
memory in international relations and illustrates the ways in which the legacy of 
colonialism still informs ways of thinking about Chinese and Indian foreign policy.23 
This is one of the key arguments that I develop in the following chapters.  
 
Outline of Chapters and Main Arguments  
      
The thesis is divided into seven chapters organised thematically rather than 
chronologically. Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the key structural and agential 
factors that shaped the emergence of the Space Age as a key feature of power, 
modernity, and progress in the twentieth century. It traces the evolution of the 
development of rocketry and spaceflight by examining how key engineers, designers, 
and space enthusiasts, who had participated in the space movement of interwar 
Europe, played a crucial role in promoting the cause of spaceflight during the space 
race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The main focus of the chapter is 
                                                
23 See, for instance, Callahan (2010); Chacko (2012); and Miller (2013).  
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on the national security, prestige, and political considerations that not only defined the 
space race between the superpowers during the Cold War, but also shaped the 
emergence of the international social and normative structure of international space 
society. As we shall see, an analysis of the ways in which the two superpowers 
utilised space during this period has also comparative significance for making sense 
of the efforts by China and India to enter into the Space Age and to gradually 
participate in the creation of international space order.  
   Chapter 2 engages with the use of international society as a central analytical idea 
and how it can help to conceptualise international space order. It is here that my 
analysis introduces what is perhaps my most ambitious and original contribution: I 
argue that a possible way to relate technology to international society is to focus on 
international society at the sectoral level, while building on the key insights developed 
by English School scholars on differentiation. This involves identifying how a distinct 
international social structure is differentiated at the sectoral level. Consequently, the 
chapter briefly sketches out the primary institutions of the international space society. 
While my intention is not to offer a comprehensive and definite account of what may 
counted as a primary institution, I look specifically at the ways in which the 
institutions of war, sovereignty, law, diplomacy, balance of power, great power 
management, the market, and environmental stewardship are differentiated from 
international society at the global level. The chapter also suggests that there are good 
reasons for including techno-nationalism as a distinct primary institution.  
   Chapter 3 deals with the origins of techno-nationalism in international society. It 
first revisits the concept of the ‘standard of civilisation’ and examines how scientific 
and technological advancement emerged as a normative measure of the level of 
civilisation in international society during the expansion of the European society of 
states in the nineteenth century. The chapter illustrates how technological attainments 
were seen to operate as an informal standard of civilisation that indicated the cultural 
superiority of European civilisation and how China and India were differentiated as 
the ‘uncivilised’ Other based on the increasing links between civilisational and 
technological hierarchies. It suggests that the formative encounter of China and India 
with the expanding European international society still informs an influential variant 
of techno-nationalism in a postcolonial context that signifies highly visible 
technological projects as markers of the state’s status, power, and modernity.  
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   Chapter 4 explores the origins and development of China’s space programme from 
the mid-1950s to the late 1980s. Most accounts of this period tend to highlight the 
impact of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Qian Xuesen on China’s space programme. 
However, the chapter’s main focus is on Marshal Nie Rongzhen, who successfully 
articulated an influential postcolonial techno-nationalist vision that shaped the pursuit 
of China’s strategic weapons programme, including the space programme. A key 
argument is that there was nothing preordained about the success of the Chinese space 
effort, especially given the political turmoil and limited financial resources in the 
Maoist era. But postcolonial techno-nationalism, as a composite and complex, but 
influential ideology rendered the development of space projects appealing to the 
Chinese political and scientific elites. Under Deng Xiaoping, postcolonial techno-
nationalism was further consolidated in the mid-1980s, epitomised in the ‘863 High-
Tech Plan’. Equally, during this period, China began engaging with the emerging 
international space society.  
   Chapter 5 examines the key external and internal factors that shaped the 
development of India’s space programme from 1955 to 1989. It briefly discusses two 
key figures that had an important influence on the place of science and technology in 
post-independent India, Jawarharlal Nehru and Homi B. Bhabha, before considering 
the crucial role of Vikram Sarabhai, who is regarded as ‘the father’ of India’s space 
programme. The chapter suggests that Sarabhai’s version of postcolonial techno-
nationalism exercised a profound and enduring influence on the direction of the space 
programme throughout this period, which largely explains the success of India’s 
forays into space. 
   Chapter 6 considers China’s engagement with international space society from 1990 
to 2016. In particular, it considers China’s interaction with the primary institutions of 
techno-nationalism, space militarisation, space diplomacy, balance of power, great 
power management and the space market. While most analyses about China tend to 
focus on certain civilian and/or military programmes, an analysis that relates space to 
international society sheds a revealing light on China’s contribution to the process of 
maintaining international space order. The chapter argues that, although China’s 
ASAT 2007 test undermined its credential as a responsible great power, there is 
evidence to suggest that it is more willing to play a constructive role in shaping 
international space order by accepting key responsibilities that are more in line with 
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its growing influence and power. Consequently, this marks the emergence of China as 
a major power and a full-fledged member in international space society.  
   Chapter 7 focuses on India’s engagement with international space society from 1990 
to 2016. In this period, India’s interaction with the key primary institutions of 
international space society has had a significant impact on its space behaviour. After 
examining in detail India’s new emphasis on highly visible space projects, such as 
space exploration missions and its growing interest in enhancing its military 
capabilities, the chapter assesses its contribution to the maintenance and enhancement 
of international space order. The chapter argues that, while India is clearly an 
emerging space power as well as a responsible member of international space society, 
it is not a great space power yet. This is because India appears reluctant to accept 
great power responsibilities that are commensurate with its growing profile in space, 
at least for now.  
   In the conclusion, I will take stock of the main arguments highlighted above. I will 
summarise the key contributions of the various lines of argument put forward in this 
thesis and assess their relevance for the study of the international politics of space and 
China and India as rising space actors. In doing so, I will also briefly discuss a 
possible agenda for further research.   
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Chapter 1. The Emergence of a New Frontier: The International 
Politics of Space in Historical Perspective  
 
 
One of the most important historical influences on the contemporary structure of 
international politics in space has been the interaction between the United States and 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War. A profound and enduring consequence of this 
period has been the establishment of a set of ideas, norms, and practices that shaped 
the existing order in space within which other space actors, including China and India, 
continue to pursue their space policies and activities, as latecomers to the Space Age.  
Yet, while it has become commonplace to acknowledge the role of national security 
considerations as well as the synergy between the development of nuclear, missile, 
and space programmes due to the inherent dual use nature of space technology, it is 
also necessary to take into account not only prestige considerations, but also the 
diffusion of norms and ideas about the utilisation and exploitation of space. In this 
regard, less attention has been paid to the intersection between processes of 
socialisation and learning associated with the social construction of space technology 
by the two leading space-faring states as a marker of global power status and 
modernity in international society.  
   Thus, to understand the impact of this key bilateral relationship on the complex 
nature of space politics and what its implications for the course of ideas, practices, 
and institutions concerning space utilisation are, we need to place this array of 
processes in its specific historical and strategic context. However, before looking at 
the distinctive set of strategic circumstances that led to the beginning of the Space 
Age with the launch of Sputnik and its significant impact on how the utilisation of 
space would be conceptualised for the most part of the Cold War, it is important to 
identify a number of key forces that made thinking about spaceflight to seem a less 
distant reality.  
 
The Origins of the Space Age 
 
One of the key aspects of the beginning of the Space Age has been the role of a 
number of space enthusiasts, amateur engineers, and science fiction writers who 
publicised the idea of spaceflight and made it seem feasible in the early twentieth 
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century. The decisive impact of the early amateur rocketeers and amateur space 
societies on the promotion of the idea of space travel is established in the space 
history literature, but it has been somewhat neglected by International Relations 
scholars. It is worth making, therefore, a few observations as this period helps to 
illustrate the combination of structural and agential factors that defined the emergence 
of the Space Age as a key feature of Western modernity and progress in the twentieth 
century.  
   This period also helps to highlight how early attempts at imagining and 
conceptualising outer space were the product of a sort of a social movement 
embedded in social and cultural norms. This movement flourished in interwar Europe, 
outside the established scientific community and without the support of the state. This 
is an especially important consideration given that, although the United States and the 
Soviet Union recognised the strategic significance of missile capabilities soon after 
the end of the Second World War, a number of key engineers, designers, and space 
enthusiasts, who had participated in the space movement of that period, played a 
crucial role in promoting the cause of spaceflight during the space race between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  
   Historically, the idea of space travel has captured the imagination of humankind for 
centuries. Indeed, the first known description of a voyage to the Moon and an 
encounter with lunar inhabitants can be found in the work of Lucian of Samosata (c. 
A. D. 120-180), a Greek novelist and rhetorician. Interest in the use of devices that 
employed the principles of rocket flight can also be traced back to ancient Greece, 
although the first use of ‘true rockets’ based on gunpowder was introduced by the 
Chinese in 1232. But it was the Copernican revolution, completed with the works of 
Joahannes Kepler (1571-1630), Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), and Isaac Newton (1642-
1727) that changed the view of the universe, and, thus, laid the foundations for 
modern rocketry. This profound transformation had also the effect of capturing public 
imagination and interest in stories of space travel (Crouch, 1999:10-8). By the late 
nineteenth century, science fiction books, like Jules Verne’s De La Terre a La Lune 
(From the Earth to the Moon, 1895) and Autour de la Lune (Around the Moon, 1870), 
and Herbert George Wells’ War of the Worlds (1898), to name just a few, had already 
communicated the dream of spaceflight. This, in turn, had a profound influence on the 
pioneers of modern rocketry (McDougall, 1997: 20).  
 
 
27 
   Three figures that worked independently from each other, but were aware of each 
other’s work, stand out as the prominent pioneers of modern rocketry: Konstantin 
Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935), Robert Goddard (1882-1945), and Hermann Oberth (1894-
1989). Born in Russia, Tsiolkovsky was a rural mathematics teacher driven by his 
vision of space travel. Tsiolkovsky’s work epitomised the intersection of theory, 
science fiction, and popular science, which was so characteristic of the popular 
fascination with the cosmos in Russian culture during the late nineteenth century. In 
this regard, Tsiolkovsky approached fiction writing as a way of popularising scientific 
ideas of space travel, which was manifested in the three space fiction novels he wrote 
(Siddiqi, 2010a: 21-2). His theoretical work focused on the development of key ideas 
of space flight and orbital mechanics. As early as 1898, he was the first to 
demonstrate in a mathematical piece that the use of multi-staged rockets powered by a 
combination of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen would provide them with the 
necessary thrust to reach orbit. This was the first thorough examination of the 
possibility of space travel (Siddiqi, 2010a: 26-7).24 
   Although Robert Goddard was not aware of Tsiolkovsky’s work, he shared his 
dream of space travel and he was also inspired by science fiction (McCurdy, 2011: 
19). In contrast to Tsiolkovsky, who was a self-educated savant, Goddard had 
received three college degrees, including a PhD in physics from Clark University, in 
Worcester, where he spent most of his career as a professor of physics. In addition, 
unlike the Russian pioneer, who established his reputation as a theorist, Goddard 
concentrated on experimental research (Crouch, 1999: 32). In 1919, the Smithsonian 
Institution published his engineering study A Method Reaching Extreme Altitudes, in 
which he put forward the notion that a rocket could carry instruments in the upper 
atmosphere. The last pages of his treatise were dedicated on his innovative proposal 
of sending a multistage rocket to the Moon. But notwithstanding that Goddard had 
based his findings on the successful testing of his rocket engines, his ideas became the 
subject of mockery in the national press, a negative experience that distressed him 
(Crouch, 1999: 35). Yet, he designed and successfully launched the world’s first 
liquid-fuelled rocket in 1926 (McCurdy, 2011: 20). What is noteworthy is that, 
although he remained a rather minor celebrity in the United States, his pioneering 
work had an impact on the other side of the Atlantic (Crouch, 1999: 41). 
                                                
24 On Tsiolkovsky’s efforts to popularise spaceflight and his legacy, see Siddiqi (2010a: 43-73). 
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   Goddard was not familiar with the work of Hermann Oberth, who wrote a letter to 
him in 1922 requesting a copy of his Smithsonian treatise. Born in the Transylvania 
region of Romania in 1894, Oberth shared with the other pioneers of modern rocketry 
the dream of space travel inspired by science fiction (Crouch, 1999: 36). Remarkably, 
although the University of Heidelberg rejected his doctoral dissertation on the 
possibility of spaceflight in 1922 because it was found to be impractical and eccentric, 
Oberth managed to turn his thesis into a short book with the title The Rocket into 
Interplanetary Space (Bainbridge, 1976: 30; Bille and Lishock, 2004: 9). The very 
fact that three editions of the book were published between 1923 and 1929 is a telling 
manifestation of the public interest it generated in Germany (McCurdy, 2011: 18).       
   Significantly, Oberth’s work had the effect of inspiring the increasing popularity of 
spaceflight in Germany. The public fascination with space exploration in the Weimar 
Republic was evident in the formation of amateur societies by space travel 
enthusiasts. Of these, the most influential was undoubtedly the Society for Space 
Travel (VfR), which was established in 1927. Some of the key members of the society 
were Oberth, Willy Ley, a popular-science writer, and a university student named 
Wernher von Braun, who volunteered to assist with rocket experiments (Crouch, 
1999: 47-58). What is noteworthy is that both Ley and von Braun would later become 
two of the most prominent advocates of human spaceflight in the United States 
(McCurdy, 2011: 24, 38, 41-54).   
   Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that the public fascination with space travel 
during that period was predominantly a social and cultural phenomenon, which 
encompassed a wide range of activities, such as books, magazines, films, 
experimental research, exhibitions, pamphlets, posters etch. Thus, to understand how 
the spaceflight movement developed, we need to give greater attention to the social 
context in which this cultural process occurred. This becomes significant when we 
think that the two most vibrant and influential space amateur societies were formed in 
Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany. More specifically, public fascination with 
cosmic travel in Russia at the turn of the century was an expression of the 
technological utopianism and mysticism that defined a transformative period in the 
history of the Russian society. The works of the Society for the Study of 
Interplanetary Communications, the world’s first space advocacy group that was 
formed in 1924 in Soviet Russia, were illustrative of this curious effort to bridge the 
mysticism of the past with the technological utopianism and fetishism of the future 
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associated with cosmic travel. This involved an effort to equate spaceflight with what 
meant to be modern, outside the parameters of the state and the established scientific 
community. Put differently, while for many centuries spaceflight was related to 
mythology, it was a vast network of amateur space enthusiasts that, after the 1920s, 
elevated space exploration to the sphere of science and technology, by seizing the 
language of modernity. Their conceptualisation of spaceflight as a marker of twentieth 
century modernity was also in line with the Bolshevik cause of transforming Russia 
into a modern, technologically advanced nation (Siddiqi, 2007: 536-7). 
   As far as the German space movement is concerned, it is plain that influential 
personalities, like Oberth, were crucial in animating the increasing appeal of 
spaceflight in the Weimar Republic. Moreover, the social insecurity and anxiety of the 
post-war period had the effect of defining the popularity of space exploration as a 
form of escapism. Neufeld (1990) identifies three cultural factors that have had a 
decisive impact on the public fascination with space travel: nationalism, the belief in 
technological progress, and the emergence of a modern ‘consumer’ culture, which 
was escapist in many respects. Yet, one might add that, like Germany’s fascination 
with aviation, spaceflight also represented a powerful symbol of national self-
assertion, modernity, and prestige in the competitive international environment of that 
period (Rieger, 2005; Fritzsche, 1992). 
   However, although it has become somewhat commonplace in the history of modern 
rocketry and astronautics to place the influence of Tsiolkovsky, Goddard, and Oberth 
on the early popularisation of spaceflight in their respective national contexts, it is 
necessary to recognise that the nature of the spaceflight movement was remarkably 
international. This has been manifested in the importance of international interaction 
and contacts that defined the spaceflight movement of the 1920s (Siddiqi, 2004; 
Geppert, 2008). Indeed, one of the most striking qualities of the spaceflight movement 
was the interaction of ideas between Tsiolkovsky, Goddard, Oberth, and the amateur 
space societies. For instance, as we saw previously, Oberh wrote to Goddard in May 
1923 asking for a copy of his Smithsonian publication, when he discovered that 
somebody in the United States was working on rocketry. In turn, Goddard received a 
book from Oberth in 1923 and went back to continue his experiments determined to 
establish his authority in the field (Crouch, 1999: 42). It is also revealing that the 
work of Goddard had an important impact on the Soviet space movement (Siddiqi, 
2004). 
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   Although it is true that public fascination with spaceflight both in Soviet Russia and 
the Weimar Republic was striking and distinctive, a spaceflight movement had 
already emerged by the early 1930s, which was of an international and cosmopolitan 
character. The spaceflight movement developed through transnational contacts among 
space enthusiasts and space engineers, who shared a common belief in interplanetary 
travel. For example, following the foundation of the Soviet and the German amateur 
clubs, the American Interplanetary Society was established in 1930, and the British 
Interplanetary Society (BIS) in 1933. Smaller amateur space groups were also formed 
in other countries (Winter, 1983: 73-111; Geppert, 2008: 266). 
   What is noteworthy in retrospect is that the transnational contacts established during 
that period were resumed after the end of the Second World War. This renewed 
enthusiasm was morphed into efforts to institutionalise and internationalise further the 
spaceflight movement. These attempts culminated in the establishment of the 
International Astronautical Federation (IAF) in 1951, consisting of 14 rocket societies 
from 10 nations with the aim to promote international cooperation in space activities 
and foster dialogue among scientists (Geppert, 2008: 280-1). The IAF is today the 
world’s leading space advocacy body with 246 members (societies, space agencies, 
institutes, companies) across 62 countries.25 Nevertheless, the advent of the Second 
World War had a profound impact on the activities of the societies.  
     
The State and the Military Enter the Stage 
 
Whatever we may think about the true motivations of the principal space enthusiasts, 
in the absence of financial resources and an institutional base to support their research 
on rocketry, the activities of amateur societies were incrementally taken over by the 
military in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. Subsequently, the beginning of the Cold 
War had the effect of altering the relationship between the state and techno-science. 
But key engineers, designers, and space enthusiasts, who had participated in the space 
movement of that period, would play a crucial role in promoting the cause of 
spaceflight during the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
                                                
25 See IAF’s official website at http://www.iafastro.com/index.php/about.  
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   Therefore, to understand the trajectory of Soviet Russia’s development of rocketry 
during that period it is useful to briefly say something about how amateur efforts 
began to interact with the state and military. More specifically, during the early 1930s, 
rocket research continued to evolve and some significant contributions were made to 
rocket technology. Around that time, Sergei Korolev, who would become the most 
prominent figure in the Soviet space programme, joined an amateur society called the 
Group for Studying Reaction Propulsion (GIRD) in Moscow. In 1932, Korolev 
resumed the leadership of the society and one year later GIRD members successfully 
launched Soviet Russia’s first liquid-fuel rocket (Winter, 1983: 53-61).  
   The amateur society soon attracted attention from the military, which eventually 
provided limited financial support to its activities. In the meantime, another key 
rocket enthusiast, Valentin Glushko, was working with the Gas Dynamics Laboratory 
(GDL) in Leningrad. Significantly, in 1933, the Moscow GIRD and GDL were 
merged under the military auspices to form the Reactive Scientific Research Institute 
(RNII) (Winter, 1983: 56, 61). Throughout the 1930s, therefore, interest in rocket 
research devoted to national defence began to take centre stage. However, rocket 
research and development suffered a serious setback in the late 1930s, when Stalin 
initiated a massive wave of purges. Korolev survived the purges, but he spent the next 
years of his life working as a military aircraft engineer in a prison camp (Bille and 
Lishock, 2004: 57-8).  
   In relation to Germany, one of the crucial factors that came to distinguish the 
development and research on rocketry in the country was, of course, the consolidation 
of the Nazi regime. Generally, it has become commonplace to argue that Germany’s 
interest in rocketry was driven by restrictions on rearmament imposed by the Treaty 
of Versailles, which did not mention the development of rockets. Of these restrictions, 
it appears that the most important was the ban on heavy artillery, given that the 
development of powerful rockets could replace other restricted weapons. In this light, 
one of the prime movers behind building rockets was the idea that they would be 
appropriate for the delivery of poison gas against enemy troops (Neufeld, 1995: 6). Be 
that as it may, by the mid-1930s, most of the members of the Society for Space Travel 
(VfR) were absorbed by the military. In 1932, the young and pragmatic von Braun 
was the first who decided to leave the society and to sign a contract as a civilian 
employee with the Germany’s army rocket programme. Few years later, von Braun 
would become the director of the newly founded rocket research facility near 
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Peenemunde. There he directed the development of sophisticated rockets. The work 
of the Peenemunde rocketeers culminated in the successful test of the infamous 
‘vengeance weapon’ or V-2 in 1942.26 This led to the mass production and 
deployment of the V-2 during the last years of the war. It is believed that roughly 
6,000 V-2s were built between 1944 and 1945 in Germany (Neufeld, 1995: 117).  
   Plainly, the V-2 rocket was unique for a number of reasons. First, following its 
ballistic trajectory at a peak altitude of 96 kilometres above the Earth, the V-2 was the 
first rocket to reach at the fringes of outer space. Second, although it has been 
estimated that the investment in the development and production of V-2s was about 
equivalent to the costs of the Manhattan Project to build America’s atomic bomb, the 
use of V-2 rockets during the Second World War was strategically insignificant, and 
thus, it was a remarkable waste of resources (Neufeld, 1995: 273-4).  
   More importantly, perhaps, the V-2 attacks against Britain (London and the 
Norwich area) and Belgium caused the loss of roughly 8,000 people (Chun, 2006: 54-
5). However, more people died as slave labourers in its production. It has been 
estimated that 60,000 inmates passed through the concentration camps linked to 
Mittelwerk, the main V-2 assembly plant. Of these prisoners, at least 10,000 did not 
survive. Thus, what also makes the V-2 rocket unique is that the number of people 
who lost their lives producing the rockets surpassed the number of people who 
perished in the V-2 attacks (Neufeld 1995: 264).  
   Nevertheless, at the strategic level, one of the principal consequences of the V-2 
rocket was that it demonstrated the military potential of the use of missiles.  By that 
time, the strategic potential of ballistic missiles was becoming apparent for American 
and Soviet strategists. With the demarcation between the communist and capitalist 
camps on the horizon, the hunt for the Nazi scientists had begun. As the Red Army 
was approaching, von Braun and his team decided to evacuate Peenemunde and 
eventually they surrendered to the Americans. Few months later, von Braun and his 
best engineers were offered contracts with the US Army Ordnance Corps. The 
‘Peenemunde team’ would prove to be a significant asset in the US efforts to develop 
missile and space capabilities (Bille and Lishock, 2004: 21-3).  
   Accordingly, although the Soviets were less successful in capturing leading German 
rocket engineers, they occupied all of the important V-2 sites and they managed to 
                                                
26 For a detailed account of German rocketry during that period, see Neufeld (1995). 
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recover German technology and to recruit available German experts who had 
remained in their country. While the extent to which German engineers and 
technology contributed to the research and development of rocketry in Soviet Russia 
remains debatable, specific designs and hardware must have been useful to the work 
of Soviet rocket designers. Ironically, perhaps, when the Soviet troops entered in 
Peenemunde, they came across a German edition of one of Tsiolkolvky’s books on 
rocketry and space exploration, which was added with notes by von Braun (Bille and 
Lishock, 2004: 23-5).  
   The implications of the growing interest in the military uses of missile technology 
and the potential utilisation of space would be determined by a number of structural 
and agential factors and their impact on the complex strategic nature of the 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus, we need to look 
closer at the historical conditions that enabled the emergence of the Space Age. 
 
The Soviet Space Programme 
 
While a detailed discussion of the drivers that shaped the Soviet activities in space is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, a few salient points can be made. First, it is clear 
that national security considerations help to explain the motivations for the pursuit of 
the Soviet missile programme. Indeed, without acknowledging the military 
requirements of the USSR in the Cold War confrontation with the United States, it is 
not possible to understand the origins of the Soviet space programme. Soviet policy 
makers and strategists recognised immediately after the Second World War that is 
was necessary to develop long-range delivery systems. But it was the development of 
the hydrogen bomb in 1953 that led the Soviets to give emphasis on the production of 
powerful intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which could deliver nuclear 
weapons against targets in the United States (Humble, 1988: 3; Sheehan, 2007: 25).  
   However, it is important to note that there was nothing preordained about the 
decision to build an ICBM. Despite the Soviet preoccupation with building delivery 
systems, there is evidence to suggest that the Soviet Party and leadership paid more 
attention to the acquisition of the atomic bomb or the development of air defence 
programmes in the late 1940s. It was only after 1953 that the development of an 
ICBM gained momentum, before becoming a national security priority two years 
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later. What is noteworthy here is that the role of designers was crucial in shaping the 
Soviet missile programme throughout the early phases of long-range missile 
development. Other key actors, such as bureaucrats, Party leaders, and the military 
industry, entered the equation only when the idea of building ICBMs had proved to be 
an effective way of carrying nuclear weapons. Consequently, the process of designing 
and building the Soviet ICBM was dependent on a series of negotiations and 
compromises between the many actors involved. Nevertheless, the impressive 
outcome of such efforts was the development of a powerful rocket codenamed R-7, 
which was lobbied and built under the leadership of designers, including Korolev and 
Glushko (Siddiqi, 2010a: 241-89). With the first successful flight test of R-7 in 1957, 
the prospect of spaceflight had now become a realistic possibility. 
   Given the nature of the Soviet regime, we might reasonably expect that the decision 
to develop the Soviet space programme and to launch Sputnik in 1957 would have 
been informed by rational calculations as part of long-term strategy with the aim to 
demonstrate the technological prowess of the Soviet Union. Yet, and this is the 
second point to make, in reality, there was no Soviet space programme at that time in 
the sense that there was no overarching body responsible for Soviet activities in space, 
nor was there a coherent space policy framework. Remarkably enough, the Soviet 
leadership would respond to the initiatives and proposals of the design bureaux in a 
reactive manner and on an ad hoc basis (Sheehan, 2007: 29; Siddiqi, 2003: 171). 
   Significantly, despite the fact that the Soviet achievements in space between 1957 
and 1964 would deliver considerable propaganda benefits in the context of the 
superpower rivalry, these were recognised and exploited by Soviet leaders only post 
facto. In the sort-term, this approach seemed to be effective, but the very fact that the 
Soviet leadership never advanced the Soviet space programme to its high priority 
meant that the Soviet Union could not lead the space race in the long-term (Sheehan, 
2007: 29).   
   Nowhere was the role of designers more clear that in the case of Sputnik.  Although 
the development of ICBM capabilities had provided the Soviet Union with the 
necessary technical means to access space, the decision to launch the first Soviet 
satellite into orbit was the product of a set of international and contingent 
circumstances. In particular, we now know that Soviet scientists began studies on the 
technical feasibility of satellites in the early 1950s. However, it was only after the 
personal initiatives of key figures of the Soviet missile programme that the Soviet 
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government decided to develop a space programme (Siddiqi, 2010a: 290-331; Bille 
and Lishock, 2004: 63).   
   The most significant attempt to promote spaceflight was a formal proposal for a 
space programme prepared by Korolev, which was submitted to the government in 
1954. Three months later, the Soviet leadership approved limited work on space 
research and the formation of the Commission for Interplanetary Communications, 
which would serve as the public face for the secret work on space technology. In early 
1956, during a visit to the organisation that was tasked with the building of long-range 
missiles by the senior Soviet leadership, Korolev seized the opportunity to press 
Nikita S. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party, for the approval of 
putting a satellite into orbit. When Korolev assured Khrushchev that the launch of a 
satellite would not interfere with the development of ICBMs, the Soviet leader 
assented, ‘if the main task doesn’t suffer, do it’ (Bille and Lishock, 2004: 63).  
   Subsequently, Korolev and his aides embarked upon a well-orchestrated effort to 
communicate the goal of spaceflight both in secret and in public in the Soviet Union 
with the aim of pushing the government to approve a dedicated satellite project. A key 
dimension of their effort was that they managed skilfully to manipulate media 
announcements to promote their cause. In 1955, for example, Korolev and other space 
activists publicised the existence of the Commission for Interplanetary 
Communications in a Moscow newspaper. The existence of the commission was 
interpreted by Western media as a clear manifestation of the Soviet interest in 
spaceflight. This had the effect of convincing leading officials within the United 
States that the Soviet Union was already committed to be the first to launch a satellite 
into orbit (Siddiqi, 2008: 533-5). 
   Consequently, these concerns accelerated the US decision to develop an American 
civilian satellite project, which was publicly announced by the Eisenhower 
administration in 1955. In turn, exploiting the new round of publicity triggered by the 
US satellite plans, again highly placed designers, including Korolev, approached the 
high echelons of the Soviet government to lobby for the creation of an artificial 
satellite. Defence, prestige, and science were usually provided as key justifications for 
undertaking such a project. This concerted effort eventually culminated in the 
government’s decision to launch Sputnik and signified the beginning of Soviet 
activities in space. Therefore, the Soviet plans in space were tied to those of the 
United States, even before the launch of Sputnik (Siddiqi, 2008: 535-7). Thus, to 
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understand the wider historical and strategic context within which the Soviet space 
effort occurred, it is important to examine some key aspects of the US space 
programme.  
 
The US Space Programme  
 
In contrast to the Soviet space programme, the US space programme has been 
subjected to extensive analysis, but it worth briefly highlighting its principal features 
as they continue to shape space policy preferences in the United States and 
elsewhere.27 A brief examination of this period can also offer a better understanding 
of the current debate over the militarisation and weaponisation of space, given that it 
appears to be a rehearsal of the debates that have defined the formation of US space 
policy since the 1950s (Kalic, 2012: 1-2).  
   Although much attention has been paid to the inadequate response of the 
Eisenhower administration to what has been described as the ‘Sputnik crisis’ and how 
the Kennedy administration restored the confidence and international prestige of the 
United States with its decision to go to the Moon, less attention has been paid to the 
ways in which this formative period of the US space policy shaped future policy 
outcomes and preferences that have had a profound impact on the normative structure 
of international space order. Thus, if we want to understand the key material and 
ideational factors that defined US activities in space, we need to place the constrains 
and possibilities that the United States confronted in their specific historical and 
strategic context.  
   Historically, the United States did not share with the Soviet Union a tradition of 
research on rocketry and space technology before the Second World War. Despite 
Goddard’s contribution to rocketry research and development, his work did not attract 
the support of the military. Nevertheless, with the V-2 missiles having demonstrated 
the potential strategic significance of ballistic missiles during the war, there was the 
recognition among US strategists of the need to develop missile capabilities. This was 
evident in the determination of the United States to find the German scientists and 
engineers who were involved in the V-2 rocket project. In July 1945, this official 
                                                
27 On key aspects of the history of the US space programme, see, inter alia, McDougall (1997); Divine 
(1993); Levine (1994); Launius (2004); DeGroot (2007); Logsdon (2010); McCurdy (2011); Kalic 
(2012); Mieczkowski (2013); and Logsdon (2015).  
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effort, which was initially codenamed ‘Operation Overcast’ and later changed to 
‘Operation Paperclip’, resulted in the capture of top V-2 personnel that were brought 
to the United States and recruited by the US Army. In addition to the German rocket 
engineers, it has been estimated that roughly 14 tons of paperwork, along with V-2 
rockets and other hardware were also moved to the United States (Bille and Lishock, 
2004: 23).  
   One of the most important aspects of this period was the reconfiguration of the 
pattern of US science and technology research through the formation of research 
institutions and organisations usually funded by government resources in the service 
of national defence. The Manhattan Project served as the model of this process (Bille 
and Lishock, 2004: 27-8). Accordingly, the recognition of the military potential of 
missiles by the US armed forces led to modest steps towards the design and 
application of rockets based on V-2 launches between the mid-1940s and early 1950s. 
Meanwhile, the US armed forces began to investigate the possibility of a satellite 
vehicle (Bille and Lishock, 2004: 30-4).   
   As early as 1946, a now infamous RAND report suggested that the launch of a 
satellite might be possible. The RAND report identified a number of reasons for the 
development of a satellite, including the following: a satellite would be ‘one of the 
most potent scientific tools in the twentieth century’; the launch of a satellite ‘would 
inflame the imagination of mankind, and would probably produce repercussions in the 
world comparable to the explosion of the atomic bomb’; and a satellite would 
demonstrate that the United States is the world’s technological leader. The report also 
highlighted the military uses of satellites for reconnaissance, navigation, intelligence 
gathering, communications, and targeting, all of the main military functions of today’s 
satellites (Kalic, 2012: 8-10). 
   However, a number of factors had the effect of impeding these efforts. First, the 
goal of the Truman administration and Congress to keep the military budget 
comparatively low in the post-war period meant that the availability of financial 
resources to rocket and space technology research was limited (Moltz, 2008: 84). 
Second, the interservice rivalry between the three brunches of the US armed forces 
led to competing rocket and satellite efforts. Indeed, by the early 1950s, all of the 
three services had developed separate missile programmes, which further delayed the 
pace of progress. More importantly, perhaps, US strategists did not perceive the 
development of missile capabilities as an urgent task because the possession of long-
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range bombers provided the US military with the necessary means to conduct strikes 
deep into the Soviet Union effectively (Sheehan, 2007: 38). Nonetheless, the election 
of President Eisenhower in 1952 was an important event in catalysing the 
reorientation of the US strategy, leading to the acceleration of missile and satellite 
development. A key aspect of this process was Eisenhower’s New Look Policy, which 
emphasised the role of nuclear weapons for national defence and the reduction of 
conventional forces as part of his broader attempt at constraining the growth of 
government expenditures (Callahan and Greenstein, 1997: 20). At the strategic policy 
level, the development of the hydrogen bomb by the Soviet Union in 1953, soon after 
the end of the Korean War, presented the Eisenhower administration with a new 
challenge. In response, the United States recognised the need for more credible 
deterrence based on a wide range of strategic scenarios from massive retaliation to the 
possibility of regional conflict. As a consequence, the development of long-range 
missile capabilities assumed more strategic importance (Moltz, 2008: 86).  
   At the same time as these major changes to the structure of the international system 
were occurring, the two superpowers were enacting different approaches to the 
negotiations on arms control and disarmament. While the United States were 
supporting an arms limitation on the basis of an inspection mechanism, the Soviets 
were vehemently opposed to any agreement that would allow on-site inspections. On 
the one hand, even if an agreement on arms control were possible, the conduct of on-
site inspections would be crucial for monitoring nuclear activities. On the other hand, 
the possibility of nuclear competition, without reaching any arms control agreement, 
would plainly implicate the need for reliable information on Soviet capabilities.  
Either way, given the absence of information concerning the development of Soviet 
long-range ballistic missiles, the United States had to devise effective ways to spy on 
the Soviet Union in order to mitigate the threat of a surprise attack against US soil 
(McDougal, 1997: 115). 
   The most obvious manifestation of the need for information about Soviet nuclear 
activities was Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’ initiative that was presented at the Geneva 
summit in July 1955. Under the initiative, the United States and the Soviet Union 
would allow aerial surveillance of their capabilities for verifying any arms control 
agreements that might be reached. Given that secrecy served to hide the military 
weaknesses of the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that the Soviets rejected the 
proposal (DeGroot, 2007: 50).    
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   What was causing particular concern to President Eisenhower was the possibility of 
a ‘nuclear Pearl Harbor’. This led him to establish the Technological Capabilities 
Panel, a top-level study group of experts known as the Killian Panel, which was 
consisted of distinguished scientists and engineers headed by James Killian of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In February 1955, the group sent a classified 
report to President Eisenhower entitled ‘Meeting the Threat of Surprise’. The report 
advised the government to accelerate the development of the ICBM programme and 
the inter-mediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) programmes as the highest national 
priority. The Killian panel group also recommended the development for an advanced 
airplane for gathering intelligence, which led to the now-infamous U-2 spy plane. 
Finally, the report suggested the idea of launching a reconnaissance satellite in order 
to establish the precedent for the principle of ‘freedom of space’ for future 
reconnaissance satellite overflight. This is an important consideration if we remember 
that the free transit of space was not given at the time (Bille and Lishock, 2004: 74). 
   Consequently, one of the most important developments in this regard was the 
National Security Council policy statement ‘US Scientific Satellite Program’ (NSC 
5520), which was approved by Eisenhower in May 1955. The classified document 
provided a number of important recommendations that defined the key features of the 
inchoate space programme. More specifically, the document suggested that the launch 
of ‘a small scientific satellite will provide a test of the principle of “Freedom of 
Space”’. Moreover, highlighting that the Soviet Union was working on its own 
satellite programme, as we saw previously, the document recognised that 
‘considerable prestige and psychological benefits will accrue to the nation which first 
is successful in launching a satellite’. Accordingly, NSC 5520 suggested that the 
‘demonstration of advanced technology’ through the launch of a satellite and its 
‘unmistakable relationship’ to ICBM technology would have significant political 
implications for ‘the political determination of free world countries to resist 
Communist threats’ (National Security Council, 1955: 3).  
   Nelson Rockefeller, special assistant to the President, circulated the document 
through the government with an appended memo of his own, in which he noted that 
the launch of a satellite ‘will symbolise scientific and technological advancement to 
peoples everywhere. The stake of prestige that is involved makes this a race that we 
cannot afford to lose’ (McDougal, 1997: 120). His view echoed those of von Braun, 
who was working on the development of a new missile for the Army at the Redstone 
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Arsenal at the time. In his 1954 report ‘A Minimum Satellite Vehicle’, von Braun 
warned that ‘it would be a blow to US prestige if we did not do it first’ (McDougal, 
1997: 119). 
   Although NSC 5520 highlighted the scientific and technical benefits that would 
derive from the use of satellites, it also underlined their potential military uses for 
surveillance and intelligence gathering. Furthermore, given the desire of the 
Eisenhower administration to stress the peaceful purposes of the US satellite, the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) was suggested as ‘an excellent opportunity’ for 
the launch of a scientific satellite (National Security Council, 1955: 2-4). However, 
the report recommended the launch of a small scientific satellite with the 
understanding that this should not impede the progress of research directed towards 
the development of satellites for research and intelligence purposes, nor to delay 
‘other major Defense programs’, an allusion to the ballistic missile programme 
(National Security Council, 1955: 6).  
   The approval of developing a scientific satellite raised the questions of how to 
launch a satellite and which satellite to use. The Ad Hoc Committee on Special 
Capabilities, known as the Stewart Committee, was tasked with selecting the best way 
of placing a US satellite in orbit, given that all of the three branches of the US armed 
forces were simultaneously conducting research associated with space and rocket 
technology. In August 1956, the members of the Stewart Committee voted for the 
Navy’s proposal, known as the Vanguard Project, although it is plain that the Army’s 
rocket programme (Redstone) was more technically matured than the Navy’s Viking 
research rocket (Bille and Lishock, 2004: 82). In retrospect, this has been an 
important issue because of the technical difficulties and launching failures of the 
Vanguard Project that followed the decision. Not surprisingly, perhaps, it is usually 
assumed that the United States had the rocket and space capabilities to launch a 
satellite before the Soviet Union, but political considerations delayed the US space 
effort.  
   The controversial decision remains debatable today, although it has become 
commonplace among observers to argue that the selection of the Navy’s proposal 
reflected the desire of the committee to use a research rocket (Vanguard), rather than 
a rocket that would be derived from a military ballistic missile, like the Army’s 
Redstone, which was developed by von Braun and his team (Schefter, 1999: 15-6). In 
this regard, given the less openly military aspects of the Navy’s rocket, it is also 
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plausible to suggest that the choice of the Vanguard rocket indicated Eisenhower’s 
priority to establish the ‘Freedom of Space’ principle, and, thus, to ensure that the 
Soviets would not protest against the future overflight of US military satellites over 
their national territory (McDougall, 1997: 121-3). In addition, the Navy’s satellite 
proposal promised to offer solid scientific benefits (Bille and Lishock, 2004: 81). 
   While there is something in this argument, the potential importance of other factors 
behind the rationale of the Stewart Committee’s decision has also been recognised. 
For example, given that the Navy’s satellite proposal was more detailed and 
scientifically solid, the possibility of a compromise could be achieved based on a 
combination of the Navy’s satellite with the Army’s rocket. Yet, as Clifford Furnas, a 
member of the Stewart Committee, notes ‘we finally decided that breaking the space 
barrier would be an easier task than breaking the interservice barrier’ (Bille and 
Lishock, 2004: 82). There is also evidence to suggest that the decision was taken on 
the grounds that the Navy’s proposal was less expensive and had the potential for 
further development. A less influential factor seems to be an anti-German feeling 
among the Committee’s members, given that the Redstone rocket was designed by 
von Braun and his team and was a descendant of the V-2 rocket (Bille and Lishock, 
2004: 82-4).  
   Be that as it may, on 29 July 1955, James Hagerty, Eisenhower’s press secretary, 
publicly announced that the United States would launch a scientific satellite as part of 
the IGY. The United States would eventually launch their first satellite, Explorer 1, on 
31 January 1958. However, by that time, the Soviets had already launched Sputnik. 
But before considering the implications of Sputnik, it is worth briefly saying 
something about the IGY.  
 
The International Geophysical Year  
    
The idea of organising the IGY was suggested as a Third Polar Year in April 1950 on 
the occasion of an informal gathering of American upper-atmosphere physicists, 
including prominent scientists like James Van Allen. The two previous International 
Polar Years had taken place in 1882-3 and 1932-3 to study the polar regions. But 
because 1957-8 would be a period of intense solar activity, it presented a good 
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opportunity for scientists to organise another international scientific project 
encompassing Earth sciences, hence the International Geophysical Year (IGY).28 
   In discussing the role of the IGY in setting the stage for the Space Age, a few 
aspects are worth emphasising. First, despite the fact that the IGY has been usually 
described as a reflection of the activities of the international scientific community that 
happened to coincide with the US plans to launch a scientific satellite, in reality, it has 
been a telling manifestation of the intersection of politics and science during the Cold 
War. The formation of the IGY was largely the product of key American scientists 
most of whom had links with the US government. In this respect, it is noteworthy that 
the inclusion of artificial satellites in the IGY programme was successfully proposed 
by the American delegation (Bulkeley, 1991: 95-7). Second, the IGY programme was 
also an expression of scientific internationalism and one of the largest cooperative 
scientific endeavours ever pursued (Deudney, 1985: 285). As Bulkeley (2010: 235) 
notes, ‘the founders of the IGY have cited only its scientific merits, perhaps out of an 
ideological commitment to the purity of basic science’. The third point to make is that 
after the inclusion of space research in the IGY activities, the US IGY committee 
approached Eisenhower for his approval, given that the use of military rockets would 
be needed. The announcement of the US plans for the launch of a satellite during the 
IGY soon followed (Bulkeley, 2008: 8).  
   On 3 August 1955, four days after the announcement, Leo Sedov, a senior Soviet 
rocket scientist who was attending the Sixth Congress of the International 
Astronautical Federation in Copenhagen, told reporters at a press conference that the 
Soviet Union had plans to put an artificial satellite into orbit ‘in the comparatively 
near future’ (Bulkeley, 2008: 8; Schefter, 1999: 3-4). Henceforth, American officials 
and participants in the IGY would try to gather any information related to the details 
of the Soviet plans (Bulkeley, 1991: 104-5).  
 
Sputnik and the Beginning of the Space Age  
 
The launch of Sputnik was in large part the consequence of human agency and 
historical contingencies. But if there is one individual that epitomises much that was 
unique about the ad hoc structure of the Soviet space programme during that period, it 
                                                
28 On the origins of the IGY, see, for example, Bulkeley (2010). The most detailed account of the IGY 
and the Sputniks is Bulkeley (1991).  
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is Korolev, as indicated earlier. His proposal of placing a satellite into orbit before the 
Americans was facing objections from key military officials, Party commissioners, 
scientists, and engineers. This was because, among other reasons, of the conservatism 
of the Armed Forces and the scientific community, and concerns that putting a 
satellite into space would interfere with ICBM development. Indeed, Korolev needed 
the approval of the sceptical members of a high-level state committee to use a 
modified ICBM from the available stock of the R-7 ICBMs, the number of which had 
been depleted because of successive test failures (Brzezinski, 2007: 142-50). Yet, in 
light of the public announcement of the US plans to launch a scientific satellite, 
Korolev was eventually effective in lobbying for his cause. His efforts were further 
helped by the subsequent successful trials of R-7s. Under such circumstances, instead 
of being accused of hindering the progress of a potential important achievement, the 
members of the committee approved the launch of a Soviet satellite (Bille and 
Lishock, 2004: 71). 
   On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite to 
orbit the Earth. Despite the fact that Sputnik was undoubtedly an important 
technological accomplishment, it was not a scientifically sophisticated satellite. What 
is noteworthy in this regard is that Korolev carefully designed the first Soviet satellite 
in ways to maximise the propaganda and psychological benefits derived from its 
launch. He intentionally ordered the satellite to be made of a highly reflective 
aluminium alloy in a spherical shape so as to be more visible in the night sky. The 
same logic also informed his preference for the use of audio capability, rather than 
scientific instrumentation. What mattered to Korolev was to safeguard that nobody 
would deny the Soviet achievement in space, hence the steady transmission of its 
well-known ‘beep’ (Brzezinski, 2007: 146-7). As we shall see in chapter 4, similar 
political considerations influenced the design of China’s first satellite, which 
effectively undermined its scientific value. Interestingly, even members of Korolev’s 
team did not anticipate the sensation that Sputnik would make worldwide. Boris 
Chertok, who was closely involved in the launch of the world’s first satellite, recalled, 
‘at that moment we couldn’t fully understand what we had done. We felt ecstatic 
about it only later, when the entire world ran amok. Only four or five days later did 
we realise that it was a turning point in the history of civilisation’ (Associated Press, 
2007).  
 
 
44 
   To suggest that the launch of Sputnik posed a significant political and scientific 
challenge to the United States is hardly controversial. Yet, although there has been 
agreement among observers about the decisive impact of the launch of Sputnik on US 
space policy, there has been less agreement about the nature of the US response to the 
crisis generated by the Soviet triumph in space. Clearly, there were different opinions 
among policy makers within the United States on the best way to react to the Soviet 
challenge, which were partly reflective of their different views about the extent to 
which state power should be used to support space exploration for the public good 
(Launius, 2010: 261-2). Equally, the response that Sputnik elicited from the 
Eisenhower administration in the wider context of his leadership style remains rather 
controversial in much of the space history literature. Therefore, it is important to 
briefly review some of the main policy decisions that have influenced the evolution of 
US space policy, leading to the moon race, and to briefly highlight some of the key 
aspects of the debate that deals with the US response to Sputnik.  
   The first point to make is that two different visions regarding space utilisation had 
already emerged even before the launch of Sputnik. On the one hand, Eisenhower’s 
vision for space placed emphasis on the use of satellite technology for military and 
scientific purposes and, thus, he was opposed to the idea of entering into an 
international race with the Soviet Union determined by the pursuit of engineering 
feats, such as human spaceflight, without tangible practical benefits (McCurdy, 2011: 
68-9). On the other hand, there were a number of influential promoters of space 
travel, including von Braun and Ley, who advocated very effectively that the 
expansion of human presence in space was inevitable. Based on influential ideas 
entrenched in American culture and society, such as the myth of the frontier, this 
vision of space eventually became so powerful and appealing to the public 
imagination that any alternative approach to space exploration seemed unthinkable 
(McCurdy, 2011: 12-3, 155, 308-9).  
   But the early efforts of space promoters alone could not justify the enormous 
amount of money for human spaceflight. For this reason, in addition to stressing the 
adventurous nature of space exploration, space advocates had to exploit public 
anxieties about the Cold War. Hence, the political ramifications of the Sputnik crisis 
presented them with an opportunity, not only to excite, but also to frighten, the US 
public. This becomes an important consideration if we remember that the so-called 
‘Sputnik crisis’ transformed space exploration into a new arena for political 
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competition and congressional partisanship. Consequently, given that the public’s 
knowledge of complex technical issues related to space exploration was rather absent 
during the opening of the Space Age, it hardly needs to be added that certain 
politicians, journalists, and military-industrial hawks inflated the threat of Sputnik by 
alarming the public about the military importance of space. As a result, Soviet 
achievements in space were effectively connected to nuclear missiles and to the 
possibility of a nuclear attack from outer space (McDougall, 1997: 142-9; McCurdy, 
2011: 71-7).  
   It was within this reconfigured domestic political context that Eisenhower’s 
personal style of leadership became so important. A few aspects of the ‘Sputnik crisis’ 
are worth highlighting here. First, it has become commonplace to argue that Sputnik 
was ‘the shock of the century’ that took the Americans by surprise, and produced a 
popular crisis as a consequence (Dickson, 2001). Yet, there is the recognition by 
contemporary analysts that the wider US public did not identify the Soviet satellite as 
a threat in the days that followed. By contrast, if there was any sort of panic following 
the launch of the Soviet satellite, it took place in Washington and among the elite, not 
among the general public (McQuaid, 2007). In addition to the role of space advocates 
in exploiting the launch of Sputnik, it seems that the sense of panic that followed the 
Soviet satellite was also constructed for political purposes via selective reporting and 
news coverage (McQuaid, 2007; Launius, 2010: 258-9).  
   From the perspective of some of ‘Eisenhower revisionists’, who challenge the 
assumption that Eisenhower was a presidential figurehead, the formulation of the US 
space policy under his administration serves to illustrate that he was an astute 
politician and strategist (Callahan and Greenstein, 1997: 15-6). In this respect, there is 
evidence to suggest that the highly classified WS-117L military reconnaissance 
programme was a high priority for the Eisenhower administration (Divine, 1993: 
110). However, although Eisenhower worked hard behind the scenes to devise a 
strategy that emphasised the use of satellite technology for military purposes, what is 
noteworthy is that he certainly underestimated the role of prestige associated with 
spaceflight (Launius, 2010: 259). Plainly, the image of the United States as a 
scientific and technological leader suffered abroad. For example, according to a 
survey, the majority of people from India, Canada, France, Norway, Finland, and 
Denmark shared the view that Sputnik had ‘struck a hard blow at US prestige’ (Von 
Benche, 1997: 20).  
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   That Eisenhower failed to recognise the role of prestige is especially striking given 
that it was discussed by key military and civilian observers and it was identified as a 
key aspect of space exploration in reports regarding the use of space technology, as 
was mentioned earlier. Equally, in discussing how Eisenhower managed the response 
to the Sputnik crisis, it is important to note that he eventually lost the initiative in the 
issue of space exploration to space promoters and political rivals who vigorously 
supported spaceflight as a way to challenge the early Soviet triumphs in space 
(Launius, 2010: 255, 259-60). As Callahan and Greenstein (1997: 29) note, 
Eisenhower’s space policy was characterised by the tension between his belief that 
space should not become an arena of competition and his growing recognition that it 
unavoidably was. Only one month after the launch of Sputnik, the Soviet Union sent a 
dog into space, Laika, the first living creature to orbit the Earth. This achievement 
clearly indicated that the Soviets were considering the possibility of human 
spaceflight. In light of the successive Soviet space feats following Sputnik, 
Eisenhower eventually succumbed to the pressure from spaceflight advocates and 
authorised the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) in 1958, although he tried to safeguard a modest space exploration agenda 
for the newly founded organisation. Notably, his experience with the management of 
the ‘Sputnik challenge’ was partly reflected is his famous farewell address on 17 
January 1961, when he warned the American public about the dangers of a rising 
‘scientific-technological elite’ closely linked to the military-industrial complex 
(Launius, 2010: 254-5).  
   Significantly, in an attempt to highlight the demarcation between the civilian and 
the military space programme, Eisenhower directed key military missile and space 
research programmes to be placed under NASA’s control, including the Vanguard 
programme and von Braun’s rocket team. Ironically enough, however, despite 
Eisenhower’s preoccupation with the military-industrial complex, the 
institutionalisation of the US space policy, with the establishment of NASA under his 
administration, solidified the intersection of military and civilian uses of space. While 
NASA was regarded to be a civilian organisation in nature, the legislation that enacted 
NASA recognised the organisation’s affiliation with the Department of Defence 
(Harding, 2013: 54-5). Therefore, on 31 January 1958, the United States launched its 
first satellite, Explorer 1, using an upgraded Redstone as a launching vehicle (Juno 1), 
which was developed by von Braun and his team (Bille and Lishock, 2004: 128).  
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   A number of observations flow from this discussion. First, as far as the US space 
programme is concerned, it is important to recognise that this period established a 
closed relationship between NASA and the US military, which continues to define US 
activities in space. The use of space launch vehicles, such as the Delta, Atlas, Titan, 
and Saturn, which were originally developed as military rockets, is a telling 
expression of the enduring intersection of military and civilian uses of space. That the 
later space shuttle was designed to support military applications is also indicative of 
the unclear distinction between military and civilian activities in space (Harding, 
2013: 55-6).  
   The second important historical aspect to emphasise at this stage is that this period 
established the foundations for international space order. It is plain that the launch of 
the world’s first artificial satellite signified the emergence of a social structure in 
space that encompasses virtually every aspect of international relations. Despite 
Soviet objections, the ‘Freedom of Space’ was ‘socially established’ as a key 
principle and practice underpinning international space order, which would later be 
enunciated as a key legal principle embodied in the Outer Space Treaty. Accordingly, 
although it is clear that this period was characterised by antagonism between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, it also marked the first steps towards forming 
normative rules for the conduct of activities in space within the UN system, as I shall 
discuss later.  
   Of even greater long-term significance, perhaps, for the purposes of this study, was 
that the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union has had a profound influence on the 
ways in which space technology was ‘socially constructed’ as a key symbol of 
scientific and technological leadership and power in international society. 
Consequently, although there has been an absence of a global history of space 
exploration to date largely because nationalist narratives still prevail among many 
observers (Siddiqi, 2010b), it is useful to remember that the aftermath of Sputnik saw 
the emergence of national space programmes in many countries.  
   As we shall see, this dynamic was also evident in the history of the space 
programmes of China and India. In the case of China, in May 1958, at the Second 
Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist of China, Mao famously 
declared ‘we want to make artificial satellites’. Subsequently, China began working 
on a programme to develop a satellite. Likewise, the Indian National Committee for 
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Space Research (INCOSPAR) was established in 1962, under Vikram Sarabhai, 
which inaugurated the formulation of the Indian space programme.  
   The circumstances in which these Asian countries established their efforts in space 
are considered in detail in subsequent chapters. At this stage, it is important to 
emphasise that the global implications of Sputnik might seem to highlight how ideas 
and meanings associated with space technology as the outcome of a complex mix of 
historical and contingent factors became embedded in the fabric of the nascent 
international space society. But despite the significance of this period in establishing 
outer space as a new realm of international relations, it was the dramatic events of the 
moon race and the emergence of what Moltz (2008) calls the ‘cooperative restraint’ 
between the two superpowers since 1962 that would define technological 
achievements in space as a powerful symbolic tool of foreign policy.  
 
The Moon Race  
 
The story of the moon race has been frequently told, but a few salient points are worth 
briefly re-capping as this period established human spaceflight programmes as a 
principal marker of power, status, and modernity. The key figure in developing a 
more aggressive US space policy stance was John F Kennedy, who took over as US 
president in January 1961. What is striking about Kennedy’s policy is that space 
exploration did not occupy an important place in his personal or policy agenda when 
he took office (Krug, 1991: 30).  
   Although the implications of Kennedy’s space policy remain rather controversial, it 
is possible to identify two especially important factors in making space exploration 
his priority. First, the unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro of Cuba had the 
effect of undercutting both the US and Kennedy administration’s credibility abroad 
(Krug, 1991: 30). Second, Yuri Gagarin’s first human orbital flight in April 1961 and 
the international reaction to it prompted a US response. Kennedy was quick to express 
his interest in a spectacular accomplishment that could improve the US image abroad 
(Logsdon, 2010: 117-8). In this regard, he directed his Vice President, Lyndon 
Johnson, to identify a space programme ‘which promises dramatic results in which we 
could win’ (Kennedy, 1961a).  
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   While a detailed report regarding Kennedy’s request was under completion, in a 
memorandum to the President concerning the progress of the space programme after 
Gagarin’s flight, Johnson noted that ‘the Soviets are ahead of the United States in 
world prestige attained through impressive technological accomplishments in space’ 
(Johnson, 1961). Likewise, von Braun, who was consulted by Johnson during the 
preparation of the report, suggested that sending a man to the Moon and back would 
offer the United States a good chance of being first to accomplish a dramatic 
achievement in space. This would require the development of a new powerful rocket 
that both the Americans and the Soviets did not have at their disposal at that time 
(Logsdon, 2010: 86, 88).  
   A few weeks later, the classified report was submitted, recommending the 
expansion of the US space programme to include a lunar-landing human mission. The 
report noted that ‘Dramatic achievements in space… symbolize the technological 
power and organising capability of a nation’ and ‘contribute to national prestige’. 
Therefore, the report continued, the United States ‘needs to make a positive decision 
to pursue space projects aimed at enhancing national prestige’, like ‘lunar and 
planetary exploration’ projects, because such achievements and the prestige they 
would confer are ‘part of the battle along the fluid front of the cold war’ (Logsdon, 
2010: 105).  
   Consequently, Kennedy accepted the recommendations contained in the report and 
he gave a speech before a joint session of US Congress, announcing the plans for an 
ambitious space exploration programme. He famously told the Congress, ‘I believe 
that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of 
landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to Earth’ (Kennedy, 1961b). The 
announcement marked the beginning of the Apollo space programme, which would 
culminate in the Apollo 11 first lunar landings on 20 July 1969.  
   Meanwhile, in the early 1960s, the Soviets had forged ahead with a series of ‘firsts’ 
in spaceflight that provided huge propaganda benefits as a Soviet foreign policy tool. 
Following Gagarin’s dramatic flight, and that of the second man to orbit Earth, 
German Titov, in 1961, the Soviet Union achieved the first ‘rendezvous’ in space 
between two Soviet spacecrafts in 1962. In 1963, Valentina Tereshkova became the 
first woman in space, which allegedly demonstrated that the social values of the 
Soviet Union were superior to that of the United States (Sheehan, 2007: 31).  
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   What is noteworthy is that period also witnessed some efforts towards cooperation 
in space. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis that made for the first time nuclear 
annihilation a real possibility, the Kennedy administration considered signing an 
agreement on cooperation with the Soviet Union. However, Khrushchev declined 
Kennedy’s proposal and later the US Congress approved an amendment that forbade 
the US government from reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on space 
cooperation (Sheehan, 2007: 63). But despite these initiatives and a preoccupation 
with the unjustified high costs of the programme, Kennedy’s unflinching 
determination to go forward with the Apollo programme persisted. As Jerome 
Wiesner, science advisor to Kennedy, noted, the Moon race would serve as an 
important ‘surrogate for military power’ (Logsdon, 2010: 83).  
   We now know that prestige considerations were at the heart of Kennedy’s decision 
to go to the Moon. For example, a discussion during a meeting between President 
Kennedy, NASA administrator James Webb, and others that was held at the White 
House in November 1962 sheds a revealing light on the manner in which Kennedy 
sought to exploit space exploration. During the meeting, Kennedy tried to make clear 
to Webb that the Apollo project was the highest priority of NASA. Explaining the 
rationale behind his decision to support the Apollo programme, Kennedy said that 
‘this is important for political reasons, international political reasons, and this is, 
whether we like it or not, in a sense a race’…‘otherwise, we shouldn’t be spending 
this kind of money, because I’m not that interested in space’ (Logsdon, 2010: 155-6). 
Equally, a discussion during a meeting with Webb regarding the future of the US 
space programme in September 1963 indicates that Kennedy was concerned about 
how to sell the Apollo programme to the American public since the support for space 
exploration seemed to be waning at the time. Consequently, he told Webb that 
‘putting a man on the moon really is a stunt and it isn’t worth that many billions’, 
thus, ‘the heats going to go on unless we can say this has got some military 
justification and not just prestige’ (Kennedy, 1963). 
   The most direct consequence of the dramatic accomplishment of the lunar landings 
was, of course, that the main objective of beating the Soviets in space and restoring 
the image of the United States as the scientific and technological leader in the eyes of 
the world was achieved. However, Kennedy’s approach to the space programme ‘as a 
means to a political end’ meant that once the political goal was attained, the ‘means’ 
were obsolete (Krug, 1991: 35-6). As a result, after the dramatic expeditions to the 
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Moon, NASA entered a long period of identity crisis from which it seems it has yet to 
recover (Logsdon, 2010: 242).  
   As far as the Soviet space programme is concerned, although the 1957-1962 period 
was characterised by remarkable Soviet firsts in space, in reality these achievements 
served to hide the comparative weakness of the programme in computers, 
miniaturisation, and electronics (Moltz, 2008: 117). In contrast to Korolev, who 
wanted the development of sophisticated technology with scientific priorities, which 
would allow for the consolidation of a next generation of advanced space technology, 
Khrushchev was only interested in the pursuit of political propaganda and prestige 
through high-publicity civilian stunts. Not surprisingly, perhaps, this approach 
eventually proved to be ineffective and self-defeating with respect to the Moon 
landings (Sheehan, 2007: 29). In addition to technical deficiencies and the 
mismanagement of the limited available resources, the death of Korolev in 1966 had 
the effect of hindering the progress of the Soviet space programme (Moltz, 2008: 
155).  
   Despite the existence of an ambitious Soviet lunar human spaceflight programme, in 
the aftermath of the successful Apollo Moon landings, the Soviets denied that they 
had entered into a moon race with the United States. Given that copying an American 
achievement would not confer prestige or propaganda benefits, in the end, Moscow 
decided to abandon its lunar programme. Consequently, in 1969 the Soviet Union 
tried to adjust to the technical realities of its space programme by focusing on the 
development of space stations operating in low-Earth orbit (Sheehan, 2007: 34-5, 58). 
Moreover, it continued to exploit a series of successes of its space programme for 
political purposes. For example, the first robotic probe, Luna 16, landed on the Moon 
in 1970, followed by the remarkable landing of another spacecraft on the Moon’s 
surface. Several probes were also sent deep into the solar system. All of these 
technical feats served to demonstrate the technological prowess of the Soviet Union 
(Sheehan, 2007: 57-8).  
 
The Military Uses of Space  
 
There is a consensus among analysts that the militarisation of space began with the 
launching of the first communications satellites. As we saw earlier, military and 
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national security considerations provided a strong rationale for the development of the 
US and Soviet space programmes. The point to emphasise here is that the space race 
between the two superpowers was also an arms race originating from the need to 
acquire highly accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is also in this context that 
the use of space satellites was utilised to support critical elements of military 
operations such as surveillance, reconnaissance, early warning, and targeting that 
served as the foundation of the US and Soviet deterrence policies during the Cold 
War.29   
   In discussing the military uses of space, the second point to make is that both the US 
and the Soviet Union entertained the idea of space warfare from the early phases of 
the Space Age. Not only did the two superpowers develop and deploy anti-satellite 
(ASAT) weapons, but they also detonated nuclear weapons in high altitudes. 
However, a number of factors led to the re-evaluation of these projects. In addition to 
high financial costs and technology deficiencies, it is clear that the specific qualities 
of the space environment posed unexpected dangers and risks that constrained the 
deployment of certain technologies, such as nuclear weapons in space and the use of 
ASATs. Through tests and experiments, US scientists realised that the space 
environment could not contain the emitted nuclear radiation in the space environment, 
putting human spaceflight, communications satellites, and reconnaissance satellites in 
jeopardy. Space debris generated by the conduct of ASAT’s also highlighted the 
existence of mutual interdependence in the space environment. Given that the United 
States was leading in the area of communications and reconnaissance satellite 
technology, there was no need to risk losing that position. But there were additional 
factors that ultimately brought about the re-evaluation of a number of proposed US 
space weapons. These included: concerns within the defence department that the 
Soviet Union might be compelled to respond to the US nuclear test programme, 
pressure from the international scientific community, and the emerging US 
commercial space interests. The Soviets also recognised that harmful activities in 
space could put in danger human spaceflight and other space activities, and, thus, they 
adjusted their plans to the physical realities of the space environment. This led to the 
emergence of ‘cooperative restraint’ that defined the interaction between the United 
States and the Soviet Union since the early 1960s (Moltz, 2008: 65, 42-66, 121-75). 
                                                
29  For detailed accounts on the militarisation of space, see Wong and Fergusson (2010); Moltz (2008); 
Sheehan (2007: 91-123); and Kalic (2012).  
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   It was in this context that the two superpowers decided to tread carefully to avoid 
destabilising their relations, as they were aware of any move in space that could 
possibly distort the crucial relationship between the use of satellites and nuclear 
weapons. Consequently, the United States and the Soviet Union came gradually to 
mutually recognise the use of space as a collective good (Moltz, 2008: 65). This logic 
was reflected in the bilateral arms control agreements, signed between the two 
superpowers during the Cold War, that acknowledged the use of and non-interference 
of satellites as ‘National Technical Means of Verification’ (NTM) (Sheehan, 2007: 
129). It was also manifested in the formation of the legal regime that still guides the 
multiple activities in space, as we shall see in the next chapter. Beyond strategic 
restraint, it is useful to briefly highlight the ways in which the Soviet Union and the 
United States engineered international cooperation as an effective instrument of 
foreign policy.  
  
International Cooperation  
 
Although it is clear that the space race in tandem with the growing use of space for 
military purposes were an expression of the intense competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, it is also apparent that international cooperation was a 
key feature of space activities during the Cold War. This has been evident in a number 
of bilateral cooperative agreements between countries, multinational space 
programmes, and in the establishment of the international regime of outer space. 
Accordingly, both superpowers realised the importance of space cooperation as a 
symbolic tool in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Thus, while a detailed 
discussion of international cooperation in space during the Cold War is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, it is worth briefly highlighting some of its key features here. 
   After the Soviet Union lost the race to Moon, it continued to invest in its space 
programme as an instrument of political propaganda and foreign policy. In this regard, 
space cooperation was seen as a way to emphasise the integrity of the Communist 
world and to confirm the unity of the Soviet bloc. This was manifested in the 
Intercosmos programme, which began in December 1976, based on the development 
of space stations operating in low-Earth orbit. Improvement in the design and 
operation of the Soviet space stations allowed visiting astronauts outside the Soviet 
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Union to fly on Soyuz/Salyut missions for a short period of time. What is noteworthy 
is that all of the Warsaw Pact states sent their cosmonauts aboard the Soviet space 
station as part of their participation in the Intercosmos programme. The selection of 
cosmonauts from countries like Cuba, Vietnam, France, India, Afghanistan, and 
Mongolia to fly on Soyuz/Salyut missions was illustrative of the politicised nature of 
this programme. For example, the selection of the Indian Air Force pilot Rakesh 
Sharma, the first Indian to fly in space in 1984, indicates the Soviet interest in 
strengthening ties with India as the leader of the non-aligned movement. Accordingly, 
cooperation with Soviet Union in space research promised to enhance India’s space 
capabilities and served to highlight the autonomy of its foreign policy (Sheehan, 
2007: 58-62).30   
   While it is clear that the Soviet Union placed greater emphasis on turning the space 
programme into a tool of political propaganda and foreign policy than the United 
States did, international cooperation was also a key dimension of the US space 
programme. Indeed, one of NASA’s key missions was ‘cooperation by the United 
States with other nations and group of nations’ that marked NASA’s role as ‘an arm 
of American diplomacy’ (Krige, 2013a: 6). This usually involved the launch of 
foreign scientific satellites, sharing of space-derived data, and the provision of 
scientific instruments on foreign spacecrafts. A telling expression of space 
cooperation in this respect was the Ariel I satellite, which was launched by the United 
States in 1962, carrying scientific instruments designed and developed by the British 
National Committee for Space Research. The launch of Ariel I made the United 
Kingdom the third country, after the Soviet Union and the United States, to operate a 
satellite. Likewise, the United States launched Canada’s Alouette I in the same year to 
ensure that a country from the Western alliance was the first, other than the two 
superpowers, to have its own satellite in space (Krige, 2007: 209-10). Similarly, the 
US-Japan cooperation in rocket and satellite technology helped to accelerate the 
development of the Japanese space programme in the 1970s (Watanabe, 2011: 1335-
6). However, cooperation was also expanded to developing countries, including India, 
as I shall discuss in Chapter 5.31  
                                                
30 A more detailed analysis of the flight of the first Indian astronaut is taken in chapter 5. 
31 International cooperation has also been involved in the establishment of tracking and communication 
facilities funded in support of space missions. Yet, little attention has been paid to this area of 
cooperation in the literature. For example, NASA funded the formation of a satellite tracking facility 
near Johannesburg in 1958, and a second facility in Hertebeesthoek in 1961 (Alden, 2007: 39-40).  
 
 
55 
   The most obvious manifestation of cooperation in space as an instrument of foreign 
policy during the Cold War was that between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
In May 1972, the ‘Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of 
Space for Peaceful Purposes’, was signed, which led to a number of joint scientific 
programmes. But the most important event was the design and plan of a joint mission, 
the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), which led to the first rendezvous and docking 
of the two spacecrafts on 17 July 1975. The ‘handshake’ in space between the Soviet 
and US commanders became a symbol of the policy of détente pursued by the United 
States and the Soviet Union at the time (Ross-Nazzal, 2010; Sheehan, 2007: 65). 
   However, it is plain that President Reagan’s ‘Strategic Defence Initiative’ (SDI), 
known as ‘Star Wars’, combined with renowned Soviet ASAT testing, marked a 
significant policy shift from civilian to military programmes that challenged 
international order in space. This policy change had the effect of deteriorating US-
Soviet relations, including cooperation in space (Moltz, 2008: 187-94; Johnson-
Freese, 2009: 39-48).32 Given the profound impact of the Reagan administration’s 
policies, especially on China, some of the implications of the SDI programme are 
examined in more detail in the following chapters. What is important to note here, 
however, is that the Reagan administration also placed emphasis on cooperation with 
US allies through the SDI programme and the creation of the ‘Space Station Freedom’ 
(Sheehan, 2007: 177; Westwick, 2010). The most general point to make is that by that 
time several countries, including China and India, were already engaged with key 
institutions of the nascent international space society.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
    
Even a long chapter such as this can barely analyse the complex amalgam of factors 
that influenced the history of the international politics of space. Nevertheless, a few 
important points that emerge from this discussion are worth emphasising as they help 
to explain the course of a set of ideas, norms, and practices that have shaped the 
existing international space order within which other space actors, like China and 
                                                
32  These developments severely strained strategic constraint in the early 1980s (Moltz: 2008: 176-218; 
Deudney 1983-1984: 105, 98-109). However, a number of factors, including the continuing influence 
of collective approaches to space security, prevented the emergence of a new round of a space arms 
race (Moltz, 2008: 226).  
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India, continue to pursue their space policies and activities, as latecomers to the Space 
Age. First, it is important to recognise the combination of structural and agential 
factors that defined the emergence of the Space Age as a key feature of modernity and 
progress in the twentieth century. What this chapter has tried to demonstrate is that a 
number of key engineers, designers, and space enthusiasts, who had participated in 
the space movement of interwar Europe, played a crucial role in promoting the cause 
of spaceflight during the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
   The second point to make is that, although most IR analyses focus on the emergence 
of space politics as the upshot of national security considerations in the context of the 
Cold War, it is necessary to emphasise the role of technological achievements in 
space as a marker of scientific and technological prowess. True, the specific historical 
and strategic circumstances of the Cold War have had a profound impact on the 
development of space technology as a crucial strategic asset that eventually, through 
the use of surveillance and reconnaissance satellites, helped to stabilise the US-Soviet 
relations. But space technology has also been ‘socially constructed’ as a normative 
symbol of prestige and modernity during the space race. While is it clear that this 
process was the product of the US-Soviet competition, it also reflects an established 
practice among nations to construct technological achievements as a marker of 
modernity and prestige.  
   Plainly, the ways in which the Soviet Union and the United States constructed space 
technology has important comparative significance for much of the space activities of 
China and India. As the following chapters explain, in the longer term, the beginning 
of the Space Age impelled the two Asian countries to participate in the Space Age in 
order to demonstrate their share in modernity as well as to influence international 
space order. Consequently, the second long-term impact of the beginning of the Space 
Age has been manifested in the emergence of a dynamic international society in 
space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
Chapter 2. Space as International Society in Theory and Practice 
	  
	  
This chapter focuses on space as international society. Drawing on key English 
School concepts, it argues that it is possible to conceptualise outer space not merely as 
a system, but also as an international society at the sectoral level with a distinct social 
structure. I attempt to develop this argument by highlighting how the nature of space 
as a distinctive sectoral interstate society is manifested in the ways in which its 
primary institutions are differentiated from such institutions at the global level in a 
historical and comparative context. In doing so, the following discussion helps to 
highlight the constitutive impact of these institutions on space-faring states. 
    The argument of the chapter is developed in the following ways. The first section 
engages with the use of international society as a central analytical idea and how it 
can help to conceptualise order in space. It is here that my analysis introduces my 
most innovative and ambitious contribution: I argue that a possible way to relate 
technology to international society is to focus on sectoral international societies, while 
recognising most of the key insights developed by scholars working on 
subglobal/regional international societies, including the need to identify how distinct 
primary institutions are differentiated at the subglobal/regional or sectoral level. The 
second section of the chapter then sketches out the primary institutions of 
international space society. Although the intention is not to provide a comprehensive 
and definite account of what may be counted as a primary institution, this conceptual 
exercise has the merit of highlighting the nature of space as a distinctive sectoral 
interstate society. This is manifested in the ways in which its primary institutions are 
differentiated from such institutions at the global level. In doing so, this study offers 
an important test of our ability to understand how order is maintained in space and 
helps to illustrate the growth of tensions and contradictions among the pluralist and 
solidarist conceptions of order in the social structure of international space society.  
 
Sectoral International Societies and International Space Order 
 
Before considering the key institutions of international space society in detail, it is 
necessary to make a number of points about the ways in which we can relate the idea 
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of international society to outer space.33 First, although, arguably, the launch of 
Sputnik can be seen as marking the expansion of international society in outer space, 
how to understand outer space presents knotty analytical and conceptual challenges 
when trying to treat it as a subglobal international society. The contention that there is 
an international society in outer space might seem at first sight to be rather 
straightforward and unproblematic, if we intuitively accept that outer space 
constitutes a different geographical region in terms of spatiality existing beyond the 
surface of Earth. This, of course, is reinforced by the fact that the physical attributes 
of the space environment are quite dissimilar from Earth (Deudney, 1982: 52). Hence, 
a focus on outer space as international society in spatial and geographical terms might 
be important enough in itself to be worth further examination, but it would provide a 
very narrow understanding of what an international space society entails. Following 
the ‘logic of geography’, such an analysis would deal merely with topics such as the 
operation of the International Space Station as a microcosm of international society as 
well as on human-made objects placed in orbit as enclaves of each state’s sovereign 
territory.34  
   Second, as Deudney (1982: 52) notes, it makes more sense to see outer space, or at 
least near space, ‘as an extension of the human world’ rather than as a ‘remote 
frontier’. In this vein, I also share McDougal’s view that it is important to understand 
the expansion of space activities from Earth to space as an ‘earth-space community 
process’, which was initially confined to Earth, and then gradually expanded to outer 
space. This ‘earth-space social process’ means that ‘the people conducting activities 
in space are the same people who have been acting on earth’ (McDougal, 1963: 621). 
In this regard, it makes more sense to identify a large number of actors as ‘effective 
participants’ in this community process, including states, international governmental 
                                                
33 In this chapter I use the term ‘outer space’ in a conventional way to highlight what the concept of 
international space society entails in terms of geography and spatiality. However, after putting forward 
the case of international space society, the use of the term ‘space’, which is more in line with a sectoral 
approach, is preferred, unless indicated otherwise.   
34 To the best of my knowledge, only Stuart (2008) has adopted an explicit English School approach to 
analyse how outer space has played a role in influencing world politics. Her thesis focuses on areas of 
cooperation as instances and expressions of international society. However, her focus is on the wider 
context of international society and world politics rather on the existence of a space-faring society of 
states. What merits emphasis here is that, although the International Space Station can be seen as an 
illustration of international society in space, in my analysis it is an epiphenomenon of the complex 
array of social relations between states that constitute social order in space. 
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organisations, non-governmental organisations, pressure groups, private enterprises, 
individual human beings, and so on (McDougal, 1963: 621-2).35  
   Third, while McDougal’s concept provides a more comprehensive framework of the 
expansion of international society in outer space, the question of how to examine 
outer space as a different international society by utilising the analytical tools of the 
English School remains. My intention here is to take a less trodden path. I argue that it 
is necessary to recognise that certain technologies lead not only to the formation of 
technological systems, but also to technological international societies, such as the 
international space society or ‘space-faring society of states’, and what might be 
called the nuclear society of states and the cyber-society of states. This requires us to 
give attention not only to regional, but also to sectoral international societies, while 
acknowledging most of the key insights developed by scholars working on 
subglobal/regional international societies. Significantly, this involves the need to 
identify how distinct primary institutions are differentiated at the subglobal/regional 
or sectoral level within a globalised international society. As we saw earlier, Buzan 
and Gonzalez-Pelaez (2009) have utilised regional differentiation as a conceptual 
framework for capturing the extent to which the Middle East can be seen to constitute 
a regional international society with distinctive primary institutions. In a similar 
fashion, Schouenborg (2013) has suggested that there is a Scandinavian international 
society with different regional institutional developments. More recently, Buzan and 
Zhang (2014) have examined whether a distinct international social structure exists in 
East Asia at the regional level. 
   Despite the fact that the conceptual move towards a sectoral approach might seem to 
be a less travelled road, it has not been wholly uncharted territory within the English 
School literature, albeit largely neglected. For example, employing a sectoral analysis, 
Holden (2008) shows how world cricket can be regarded as a sui generis postcolonial 
sectoral international society in the sector of sports. More recently,	  Palmujoki (2013) 
has explored the extent to which an international society has been formed around 
global climate change governance, hinting at the merits of a sectoral approach to 
international society in general and to issues of global governance in particular. As far 
as nuclear technology is concerned, in his seminal work on nuclear weapons and 
international order, Walker (2012: 10) acknowledges the formation of orders in 
                                                
35 I would like to thank Daniel Deudney for bringing McDougal’s work to my attention. For a detailed 
analysis of the ‘earth-space social process’, also see McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic (1963).  
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particular domains, such as the regional, economic, security or other orders, and how 
the international nuclear order, as ‘an example of an order to an issue area, refers to 
the international order developed to address the distinctive set of problems, issues and 
goals associated with nuclear technology’. In my view, however, Walker misses a 
trick by not linking nuclear order with the existence of an international nuclear society 
underpinned by distinct institutions. The same also applies to Horsburgh’s insightful 
work on China’s engagement with global nuclear order (Horsburgh 2015).36   
   It is also important to note that Buzan and Albert (2010: 318) have drawn attention 
to the ways in which functional differentiation defines ‘distinct and specialized 
subsystems or sectors of activity’, including science, as a consequence of the 
emergence of modernity. Although limited space precludes a discussion of how the 
approach put forward in this thesis could draw upon and contribute to debates about 
functionally specific sectors, it is clear that it can speak to this very promising body of 
scholarship, and so it is a task worth undertaking elsewhere.37 Suffice it to say that the 
international space society as a sectoral international society has also some 
ontological quality as the very debates over the nature of the global space order and 
the notion of a space club indicate. In other words, while the principal focus of this 
thesis is on the analytical purchase of a sectoral approach to space, it is important to 
note that this study also offers a way of examining international space society in 
hermeneutical and ontological terms, if we remember that there is the idea of an 
imagined and constructed community and/or an exclusive club of space-faring 
countries, just like nation-states or regions (Anderson, 1991; Hurrell, 2007: 242). The 
notion of a space community or space club is usually articulated by actors, 
governments, diplomats, lawyers, analysts, and the global media. 
   In light of the above, it becomes less fanciful to suggest that specific technologies 
have the effect of creating new domains of social interaction that have a constitutive 
impact on their members. In this sense, technological international societies are 
characterised by their own social structure and their distinct institutions, which 
construct distinctions between outsiders and insiders by defining certain conceptions 
of rightful membership of what is perceived as legitimate patterns of conduct among 
the members of these technological societies. It is important, therefore, to understand 
                                                
36 Building on Walker and the English School, Horsburgh (2015) offers an innovative framework for 
analysing China’s engagement with global nuclear order, which has influenced my analysis of China’s 
engagement with international space society discussed in Chapter 6. 
37 On this debate, see also, for example, Donnelly (2011); and Albert and Buzan (2013).    
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outer space not merely as a structure of strategic interaction between states, but also 
as an expression of an international society of states underpinned by social order. In 
this vein, this study contends that there is an international space society ‘with its own 
social structure which embodies complex social relations among participating and 
constituent states, and which has a particular set of institutions that help to define 
norms of acceptable and legitimate state behavior’ (Zhang and Buzan, 2012: 8). 
Briefly stated, a sectoral approach helps to transcend the boundary between outer 
space and Earth by focusing on the social structure in the sector of space as a whole.   
   This complex amalgam of social practices, values, and norms reflects the conscious 
effort of the space-faring countries to build social order in space. However, it is also 
suggestive of the embedded institutions that define and reproduce the structure of 
international space society through a process of institutionalisation, emulation, and 
socialisation. Consequently, this opens up the possibility of exploring the ways in 
which its primary institutions are differentiated from such institutions at the global 
level (war, law, diplomacy, balance of power, great power management, nationalism, 
market, environmental stewardship and so on) and how space order is created, 
maintained, negotiated, and transformed. This may involve an attempt to identify 
what should be counted as an institution as well as the ways in which the institutions 
of the space social domain as a sectoral inter-state society differ from those at the 
global level. 
   A few additional points should be made at this stage. First, a sectoral approach helps 
to highlight the tension between three different normative orders underpinning the 
international space society, which is reminiscent of the three traditions espoused by 
Wight (1991): Hobbesianism or Machiavellianism (realism), Grotianism 
(rationalism), and Kantianism (revolutionism), respectively. In discussing distinct 
schools of thought concerning space utilisation and space governance, several authors 
have captured this tension. For example, as far as the space weaponisation debate is 
concerned, Mueller (2003) has identified six schools of thought: idealist, 
internationalist and nationalist sanctuary theories, and preemptive, utilitarian and 
hegemonist pro-weaponisation perspectives. In relation to space governance, 
Gallagher (2013) singles out three strategic logics for space cooperation associated 
with distinct ideas and policies: the ‘strategic stability’, the ‘space governance for 
global security’ and the ‘global commons’ logics. While an analysis of these schools 
of thought and strategic logics is beyond the scope of this study, it is clear that an 
 
 
62 
explicit English School approach, which builds on the three traditions of what might 
be called ‘Space Machiavellian’, ‘Space Grotian’, and ‘Space Kantian’, can enrich 
these debates by highlighting the constant tension and conversation between the two 
extremes of ‘Star Wars’ and ‘Spaceship Earth’.38 In doing so, an English School 
approach also helps to underline the fragility of international space order.  
   The second point to make is that a sectoral approach should not preclude the study 
of regions, regionalism, or distinct regional patters of order within international space 
society. After all, regional space orders within the global space order are far from 
unimaginable. By way of illustration, one can speak of an East Asian space order or a 
European space order.  Furthermore, there is good reason to explore the study of inter-
sectoral and intra-sectoral relations and dynamics. What I have here specifically in 
mind is the relationship between the international space society and the international 
nuclear society or how space is related to the cyber society of states.39 Third, from the 
above, it also follows that a sectoral approach opens up new avenues for exploring the 
ways in which the English School can provide insights about global governance. 
Equally, it can also be seen as a first step, albeit incomplete and underdeveloped, 
towards responding to Buzan’s call for bridging the English School with International 
Security Studies (Buzan, 2014b).  
   Therefore, it is worth briefly sketching out how it is possible to apply structural 
concepts from English School to space. As we saw earlier, this may involve an 
attempt to identify the ways in which the institutions of space as a sectoral inter-state 
society differ from the global level. In what follows, my intention is not to provide a 
comprehensive or definitive list of the primary institutions of international space 
society. Rather my aim is to sketch out the ways in which the employment of 
international institutions as subjects of analysis can offer insights into the study of the 
international politics of space.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
38 The tension between the two images of space as ‘Star Wars’ and ‘Spaceship Earth’ is succinctly 
captured in the title of Deudney’s The High Frontier of Outer Space in the 1990s: Star Wars or 
Spaceship Earth? (Deudney, 1991).  
39 This is significant, given the growing intersection between the space and cyber domains. See, inter 
alia, Baylon (2014); Stuart (2015); and Livingstone and Lewis (2016). 
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Primary International Institutions in Space  
    
Space War  
 
Given that war appears somewhat unthinkable between liberal democratic states 
operating inside the existing liberal international order and great-power war involves 
high costs largely because of economic interdependence and the threat of the use of 
nuclear weapons, there is some scope for questioning whether war should be seen as a 
primary institution of the contemporary international society.40 However, as 
Pejcinovic (2013: 164) notes, the policies associated with efforts to avoid the use of 
nuclear weapons, including nuclear deterrence, ‘so deeply embed a necessity to be 
prepared for war that we are unable to think of war as anything other than a vital 
institution of international society’.41  
   Be that as it may, war as an institution of international space society presents at least 
three key differences with the global level. First, the very idea that space is seen as a 
different domain of warfare because of the particular qualities of the space 
environment helps to illustrate how space warfare differentiates from war at the global 
level. Second, despite the fact that the use of space assets has had an important impact 
on the conduct of terrestrial warfare, it is striking, perhaps, that a conflict in space has 
not occurred yet. This, of course, presents a key difference with the global level. At 
the same time, it is indicative of the existence of order in space. Third, as we shall see, 
the trend towards the militarisation and even weaponisation of space suggests that it 
makes more sense to treat space militarisation as a key institution of international 
space society, at least for now, which is also another main difference with the global 
level.  
   In the context of discussing militarisation as an additional derivative institution of 
international space society, it is worth remembering that both the United States and 
the Soviet Union developed means of conducting space warfare from the early phases 
of the Space Age, but a reassessment of the technical challenges and destabilising 
effects that this involved gave rise to ‘cooperative restraint’, as we saw in the previous 
chapter. But this period also saw the militarisation of space. While there was not a 
                                                
40 On these points, see Buzan (2014a: 150-3). On liberal international order, for example, see Deudney 
and Ikenberry (1999); and Deudney and Ikenberry (2009).  
41 For an insightful analysis of the impact of nuclear weapons on international order, see Deudney 
(2007: 244-64). 
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clear and authoritative definition of the term ‘peaceful uses’ in the UN documents and 
treaties, the widely accepted interpretation of the term ‘peaceful’ in relation to outer 
space is ‘non-aggressive’ instead of ‘non-military’ (Kuskuvelis, 1988: 91-2). Notably, 
the legal regime of space contains important prohibitions concerning military 
activities, but at the same time it leaves open the option for the use of conventional 
weapons or the use of ASAT weapons, the transit of nuclear weapons through space 
or the launch of nuclear weapons from Earth into space to reach an incoming missile 
(Tannenwald, 2004: 370). 
   Although the term ‘peaceful uses’ in relation to space has been accepted to mean 
‘non-aggressive’, problematic here has been the distinction between the militarisation 
and the weaponisation of space. While a definition of space weapons is highly 
contested, generally it refers to ‘any specialized destructive device built to operate or 
take effect’ from Earth-to-space, space-to-space and space-to-Earth (Bulkeley and 
Spinardi, 1986: 3; Jasani, 1987). Yet, other definitions refer only to those weapons in 
orbit that have the capability to attack targets in space or on Earth (Institute of Air and 
Space Law, 2005: 3).  
   But whatever one thinks about the merits of these definitions, the weaponisation of 
space should not be seen as a linear process that follows the militarisation of space. 
There is not a turning point that signifies the transition from the militarisation to the 
weaponisation of space (Mueller, 2003: 5). Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 1, the United 
States and the Soviet Union soon came to realise how destructive and destabilising the 
use of nuclear weapons in space would be in the exoatmospheric environment, as the 
destructive effects of the blast and radiation would not differentiate between friendly 
and enemy satellites. Likewise, the two superpowers decided to restrain the use of 
ASAT systems (Moltz, 2008: 42-66). While these systems were developed and tested, 
they didn’t reach operational status or used against other countries. But despite the 
development and deployment of these weapons, space has not been weaponised 
(Deblois, 2003: 31). In other words, there was nothing inevitable about the course of 
these developments if we consider that ‘space weaponisation is inherently political’ 
(Mueller, 2003: 23).  
   That said, the issue of space militarisation and weaponisation came again on the 
forefront when the George W Bush administration announced plans for the 
deployment of space-based missile defence systems and the development of anti-
satellite weapons (Mueller, 2003; Deblois, 2003; Johnson-Freese, 2009: 56-94). The 
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ASAT test carried out by China in 2007 served to further highlight how pertinent the 
issue of space militarisation and weaponisation is for the maintenance of international 
space order. The Chinese ASAT test is examined in detail in Chapter 6, but it is useful 
to say briefly something about the US plans to deploy space-based weapons under the 
Bush administration.  
 
From the Militarisation to the Weaponisation of Space?  
 
Certainly, the 1990s saw a shift from the use of space assets in support of strategic 
deterrence to space utilisation as a military force multiplier that enhances the 
effectiveness of combat forces on the ground.42 This change began with the first Gulf 
War in 1991, known also as the ‘first space war’, which confirmed the strategic 
significance of space systems in warfare at both the operational and tactical levels. As 
a result, the national space policy under the Clinton administration that followed 
elaborated for the first time on the concepts of space support, force enhancement, 
space control, and force application and recognised ‘access to and use of space’ as ‘a 
vital interest’ of the United States (Sheehan, 2007: 94, 98). Yet, it was apparent that 
the Clinton administration did not make any tangible effort to develop the required 
technologies for the implementation of its space policy (Moltz, 2008: 239-40, 254). 
   This position changed with the George W Bush administration’s plans to pursue and 
develop certain technologies that would signal the move towards the weaponisation of 
space.43 This was accompanied by a series of US doctrines and documents that called 
for the development of space weapons and control in space. This was evident in the 
2000 Report of the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management 
and Organization that infamously warned of an imminent ‘space Pearl Harbor’.44 
Then, in 2002, the Bush administration announced the withdrawal of the United States 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). This meant that there was no 
                                                
42 On key developments related to the military uses of space, for example, see Handberg (2000); 
Sheehan (2007: 91-123); Coletta and Pilch (2009); and Wong and Fergusson (2010).  
43 For detailed accounts of the US space policy under the George W Bush administration, see, inter alia, 
Moltz (2008: 259-301); and Johnson-Freese (2009: 56-94).  
44 Known as the ‘Space Commission’ chaired by Donald Rumsfeld just prior to his nomination as US 
defence secretary, the commission in its final report submitted to Congress on January 2001 concluded 
that ‘If the United States is to avoid a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’, it needs to take seriously the possibility of 
an attack on US space systems. The report also called the United States to take the necessary steps in 
order to ‘develop the needed capabilities and to maintain and ensure continuing superiority’ 
(Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organization 2001: viii, x). 
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international treaty obligation for the United States to refrain from moving forward 
with missile defence and space-based missile defences (Sheehan, 2007: 95). One 
month later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a doctrine document for space activities 
that enunciated the concept of ‘space superiority’.45 Subsequently, in 2004, the United 
States Air Force issued the first doctrinal document that declared space superiority as 
providing ‘freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack’ (U.S. Air Force, 2004: 
1). More importantly, on 31 August 2006, President Bush authorised a new national 
space policy that called on the Secretary of Defence to ‘maintain the capabilities to 
execute the space support, force enhancement, space control and force application 
missions’ and to ‘develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action 
in space, and if, directed, deny such freedom of actions to adversaries’ (the White 
House, 2006: 4).46  
   But although there is general agreement that during the Bush presidency the quest 
for space dominance became a priority, there is less agreement about the precise 
operability of these programmes or their outcomes. What is more clear, however, is 
that the emphasis on space superiority in tandem with an ambiguous position on space 
weaponisation, reflected in the wording of certain US doctrines and statements during 
the Bush administration, had the effect of reinforcing the views of other countries 
about the inevitability of space weaponisation and conflict by exacerbating security 
dilemmas (Peoples, 2008).47 Conversely, as we shall see, the fact that the Obama 
administration placed greater importance on international cooperation has contributed 
to the strengthening of international space order.48  
   Consequently, the issue of space militarisation and weaponisation highlights the 
pluralist/solidarist dilemma under conditions of uneven development and asymmetries 
of power in space. It also points to the significance of socialisation in international 
space society. But although the space weaponisation threshold has not been crossed 
yet, the trend towards space militarisation continues apace. Therefore, for the 
                                                
45 The concept of space superiority called for the use of space by the US military not only for support 
functions, but also for two offensive missions: ‘space control’ and ‘space force application’ (Hitchens, 
Katz-Hyman, and Lewis, 2006: 35).  
46  In addition, the new policy stated that: ‘the United States will oppose the development of new legal 
regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space. Proposed arms 
control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, 
development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for US national interests’ (the White 
House, 2006: 4).  
47 On space security and the growing security dilemma between the United States and China, for 
example, see B. Zhang (2011).  
48 For a trenchant analysis of the US space policy under Obama, see Gallagher (2013).  
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purposes of this study, it is more helpful to treat space militarisation as a key sectoral 
derivative institution of international space society.  
 
 
Space Law 
    
According to Wight (1986: 107), ‘the most essential evidence of the existence of an 
international society is the existence of international law.49 As far as space law is 
concerned, the realm of space is governed by five international treaties. These are: the 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, known as the ‘Outer 
Space Treaty’ (OST)50; The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the ‘Rescue 
Agreement’)51; the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects (the ‘Liability Convention’)52; The Convention on Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space (the ‘Registration Convention’)53; The Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the 
‘Moon Agreement’)54 (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2008).  
   In addition to the five treaties, the space regime comprises a set of five declarations 
and principles,55 and a number of bilateral disarmament and arms control agreements 
                                                
49 For a good overview of the English School’s approach to international law, see Wilson (2009).  
50 The Outer Space Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 2222 (XXI) and 
entered into force on 10 October 1967. 
51 The ‘Rescue Agreement’ was adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 2345 (XXII) and 
entered into force on 3 December 1968. 
52 The ‘Liability Convention’ was adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 2777 (XXVI) 
and entered into force on 1 September 1972.  
53 The ‘Registration Convention’ was adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 3235 
(XXIX) and entered into force on 15 September 1976. 
54 The ‘Moon Treaty’ was adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 34/68 and entered 
into force on 11 July 1984. 
55 The five declarations and legal principles are: the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (UN General Assembly resolution 1962 
(XVIII) of 13 December 1963); The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth 
Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (UN General Assembly resolution 37/92 of 
10 December 1982); The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (UN 
General Assembly resolution 41/65 of 3 December 1986); The Principles Relevant to the Use of 
Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (UN General Assembly resolution 47/68 of 14 December 
1992); The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the 
Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing 
Countries (UN General Assembly resolution 51/122 of 13 December 1996).  See United Nations Office 
for Outer Space Affairs (2008). Also, see http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/ 
treaties.html. 
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between the United States and the former Soviet Union56, in line with international 
law and practices. It also consists of various multilateral and bilateral legal 
instruments, including a series of agreements related to the commercial use of space 
and a number of pronouncements concerning the establishment of intergovernmental 
bodies and organisations and their functions (Tannenwald, 2004: 370).57  
   The ‘Outer Space Treaty’ (OST) remains arguably the cornerstone of international 
space order largely because it introduces a series of principles and concepts that have 
since been regarded as the basic framework of international space law. Specifically, 
the Outer Space Treaty recognises ‘the common interest of all mankind in the 
progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes’ and that ‘the 
exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of 
their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all 
mankind’. It also acknowledges that ‘outer space is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
means’ and prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass 
destruction in orbit or on other celestial bodies. Briefly stated, the fundamental 
principles governing space activities include the concept that space should be reserved 
for ‘the benefit and in the interests of all mankind’ and for ‘peaceful purposes’ and 
that it is ‘nonappropriable’ (Tannenwald, 2004: 370-1).  
                                                
56 There is a series of bilateral disarmament and arms control agreements that explicitly apply to space 
operations or include a space component meriting discussion (Tannenwald, 2004: 370, note 28). The 
‘Partial Test Ban Treaty’ (PTBT), also abbreviated as the ‘Limited Test Ban Treaty’ (LTBT), formally 
the ‘Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water’, 
prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in space. It was signed between the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and the United Kingdom and entered into force on 10 October 1963. The Interim Agreement 
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures 
With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I), signed on 26 May 1972, and the 
Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II) prohibit 
interference with National Technical Means (NTM) of verification (reconnaissance and 
communications satellites). Further, the SALT II agreement contains provisions relating to outer space 
by forbidding the development, testing, or deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space. The 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), which was signed on 26 May 1972, 
recognised the non-interference principle by one party with the national technical means of verification 
of the other and it also banned the deployment of space-based missile defence systems between the two 
parties. However, on 13 December 2001, the Bush administration announced the withdrawal of the 
United States from the ABM Treaty, and thus, it is not in force anymore. For a good summary of these 
developments and the treaties related to arms control, see Graham and LaVera (2003). 
57 For a non-exhaustive list of a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, see 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/nationalspacelaw/bi-multi-lateral-agreements.html. 
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   Notwithstanding the rather progressive language of the normative framework 
envisioned by the legal regime of outer space, given the historically small number of 
states with space capabilities these general principles have not been tested and remain 
largely aspirational (Tannenwald, 2004: 370). To complicate matters, while there 
have been a series of recent diplomatic initiatives, one of the striking aspects of the 
international politics of space is how little has been achieved in terms of new 
agreements or treaties pertaining to the legal regime of space in the post-Cold War 
era. Moreover, although interpretations of the principles asserted in the Outer Space 
Treaty are still hotly debated among scholars, they also serve to highlight the familiar 
order/justice dilemma expressed in pluralist/solidarist debates within the English 
School literature. Nowhere is this more evident than in the endless normative debate 
about how to understand sovereignty in space as I explain below.  
 
Sovereignty  
    
The institution of sovereignty constitutes the heart of international society as it usually 
defines who legitimately controls what territory and who is a member of the society of 
states. It is here perhaps that we can see how realist calculations and universalist 
aspirations are pulling in different directions in international space society. At one 
level, it is clear that the institution of sovereignty in space introduces important 
elements of difference with the global international society. This has been reflected in 
the principles of ‘Mankind’, and ‘non-appropriation’ that mark a departure from 
traditional conceptions of Westphalian sovereignty and, thus, set up a solidarist 
promotion of the exploration and exploitation of space ‘for the benefit and in the 
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development’. Likewise, the ‘common interest’ provision leans towards a solidarist 
conception ‘of the interests of the international community as a whole’ (Wolter, 2006: 
97). The Outer State Treaty, therefore, establishes a shift towards cosmopolitan 
sovereignty (Stuart, 2009: 16).  
   At another level, however, this solidarist conception is staged as complementary to 
a pluralist logic. This is because the Outer Space Treaty confers the responsibility of 
conducting space activities upon states, irrespective of ‘whether such activities are 
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities’ (Fawcett, 
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1984: 10). Besides, for all its aspirational, and rather inspirational overtones, the 
Moon Agreement has yet to be ratified by any key space power. Indeed, the 
Agreement provides that the Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage 
of mankind and that an international regime should be established to govern the 
exploitation of such resources when such exploitation is about to become feasible. But 
the fact that the Moon Agreement is essentially a failed treaty becomes more 
important, given that ideas about colonising the Moon are still favoured by key space 
powers as well as by non-state entities that promote the privatisation of space and the 
exploitation of the Moon’s resources. Thus, the ongoing normative tension between 
order and justice in space will remain as the idea of territorialising space gains more 
support among those who favour the commercialisation of space resources. Yet, the 
general point to make is that the institution of sovereignty in space does present 
significant sectoral specificities that differentiate it from the global level.  
 
Space Diplomacy 
   
The institution of diplomacy, together with its derivatives of bilateralism and 
multilateralism, does not present any recognisable sectoral differences with the global 
level. Nevertheless, it played a crucial role in contributing to the creation and 
management of order in space.58 Historically, the UN system has been used as the 
main forum for space cooperation from the early days of the Space Age. In 1958, after 
the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union, the United Nations General Assembly 
established the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS) in Vienna 
as an ad hoc committee by adopting resolution 1348 (XIII).59 In 1958, the General 
Assembly decided to establish COPUOS as a permanent body and reaffirmed its 
original mandate in its resolution 1472 (XIV). In 1961, the General Assembly adopted 
resolution 1721 (XVI) that requested the Committee: to maintain close 
communications with governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in 
outer space matters; to provide for the exchange of information among governments 
                                                
58 The most detailed account of space diplomacy is Peterson (2005).  
59 The mandate of the Committee was to consider: the activities and resources of the United Nations 
concerning the peaceful uses of outer space; the proper ways in which international cooperation could 
be undertaken under UN auspices; organisational arrangements to facilitate international cooperation 
within the UN framework; and legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space. See, United 
Nations Office for Outer Space Activities, COPUOS History, http://www.unoosa.org/ 
oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/history.html.  
 
 
71 
relating to activities in space on a voluntary basis; and to contribute to the study of 
measures for the promotion of international cooperation in space. The same resolution 
also called states to provide the United Nations with information on their launching 
objects in space through COPUOS and requested the UN Secretary General to 
maintain a public registry of objects launched into space (United Nations Office for 
Outer Space Affairs, 1961). These mandates have guided the activities of COPUOS in 
its efforts to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space 
since then.  
   The Committee consists of two standing subcommittees: the Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee. The Committee and its two 
Subcommittees meet annually in Vienna to consider questions raised by the UN 
General Assembly and issues that concern the Member States. In this regard, the 
Committee and its two Subcommittees make recommendations to the General 
Assembly on the basis of consensus. Significantly, COPUOS has played a 
fundamental role in the evolution of the legal framework that governs space activities 
and has promoted the use of space applications by developing countries. Indeed, 
COPUOS has been the primary forum for the elaboration and development of the five 
international treaties and agreements that thereafter govern the realm of outer space 
(Graham and Huskisson, 2009: 108). At the same time, it was also a forum for US-
Soviet competition to achieve the image as the country most committed to the use of 
space for peaceful purposes, both at the international and the domestic level (Von 
Bencke, 1997: 40; Peterson, 2005: 23).   
   Beyond COPUOS, it should be added that the UN Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) in Geneva has been the single forum for negotiating space arms control. In 1981 
the UN General Assembly adapted the resolution on Prevention of an Arms Race in 
Outer Space (PAROS), which was put on the agenda of the CD in 1982. An ad hoc 
committee was established in 1985 on negotiating PAROS on the basis of consensus. 
From 1985 to 1994, the ad hoc committee held several meetings, but the process 
reached an impasse largely because of the US refusal to enter into such negotiations. 
In fact, as a result largely of the US position that there is no arms race in space and 
that there is no need for new treaties or agreements concerning space arms control, 
negotiations held at the CD have been stalemated since the late 1990s.60  
                                                
60 For a detailed discussion on negotiating PAROS, see Wolter (2006: 60-80).   
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   Nevertheless, given the emergence of new space security challenges from the 
growing military use of space and the orbital debris problem to the issue of frequency 
interference, as space becomes increasingly crowded, there have been a number of 
new multilateral efforts to enhance space governance. It is worth briefly spelling out 
the most important of these recent initiatives, as they help to highlight the growing 
recognition that space diplomacy is a fundamental pillar of managing international 
space order.  
 
Current Multilateral Initiatives 
 
There are currently three important multilateral initiatives concerning space activities 
focusing on voluntary measures, which are related to each other: the EU Code of 
Conduct, the COPUOS Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer 
Space Activities, and the Group of Government Experts (GGE) on Transparency and 
Confidence-building Measures (TCBMs) in Outer Space. Moreover, proposals for a 
legally binding treaty banning space weapons have been submitted at the CD. More 
specifically, in June 2008, the European Union proposed a ‘Code of Conduct in Outer 
Space Activities’ as a way to place the issue of space security back in the agenda of 
space diplomacy amid the continuing deadlock in the CD and the Bush 
administration’s opposition to any new treaty regarding space.61 China’s ASAT test in 
January 2007 caused EU policy makers to further realise the need for cultivating a 
safe space environment for European space activities (Dickow, 2009: 153). The 
initiative partly originates in the efforts of the US based non-governmental 
organisation, the Henry L. Stimson Center, whose founding director, Michael Krepon, 
has been advocating the concept of a code of conduct or ‘rules of the road’ for what 
constitutes responsible behaviour in space (Krepon and Clary, 2003; Krepon, 2012).  
   The proposed EU code is non-legally binding, voluntary, open to all states, and 
complimentary to existing international law as it applies to space. In addition to 
contributing to TCBMs, the draft code is aimed at enhancing the safety, security and 
sustainability of space-related activities by setting consensual norms of behaviour that 
define responsible and irresponsible practices in space based on general principles 
                                                
61 On the background of the EU draft Code of Conduct, see, inter alia, Dickow (2009); and Rathgeber, 
Remuss, and Schrogl (2009). 
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associated with the peaceful and sustainable use of space.62 It also provides a set of 
measures on space operations and space debris mitigation and proposes several 
cooperation mechanisms among the subscribing signatories (Council of the European 
Union, 2008).   
   The EU proposal generated a variety of responses and reactions. In January 2012, 
Ellen Tauscher, US undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, 
announced that the United States would not sign the EU draft at the time on the 
grounds that it was ‘too restrictive’. There were also concerns that signing the draft 
code would limit the freedom of action of the US military in space. Instead, it was 
stated that the EU draft could serve as the foundation for future deliberations on what 
was now referred to as ‘an international code of conduct’ (Weisgerber, 2012).63  
   Aside from the United States, Australia, Canada and Japan endorsed the code of 
conduct. However, the reaction of Russia, China, and India was rather negative for at 
least two reasons. First, there was a general unease that the procedure followed by the 
EU was not inclusive because key space-faring states and developing countries were 
not consulted prior to the code’s drafting. Second, there was discomfort with the idea 
that negotiations over the EU code would take place outside of the UN multilateral 
structure based on informal consultations. China and Russia were especially 
concerned that the proposed code would shift the focus of attention from their draft 
text concerning a legally binding treaty to prevent an arms race in space, which was 
proposed to the CD in 2008 (more on which below) (Moltz, 2014: 161; Su and Lixin, 
2014: 35; Hitchens, 2015: 7). To overcome the concerns and criticisms that the 
drafting of the code was not inclusive, the EU convened a series of multilateral 
consultations open to all interested states. The consultation process led to the 
publication of revised drafts versions of the code in September 2010, June 2012, and 
September 2013. The latest draft of the code was released in March 2014.64  
                                                
62 The proposal’s emphasis on codifying norms of responsible and good behaviour in space is a tacit 
recognition that space is a social environment where a behavioural framework can ‘foster mutual 
constraint, mutual accommodation’, and ‘the pursuit of separate purposes’ in space (Wilson, 2009: 
178). This points to the importance of normative rules in providing a behavioural framework that is 
keeping in line with an English School understanding of law (Wilson, 2009: 171). Krepon (2012) 
provides an insightful analysis of the importance of norms setting in space.  
63 Shortly after, the US Department of State issued a press statement that reaffirmed the US stance on 
the EU draft (US Secretary of State, 2012).  
64 European Union External Action, ‘Code of Conduct of Outer Space Activities’, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/outer-space-activities/index_en.htm. 
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   Given the stalemate at the CD, another important step towards continuing dialogue 
on space security issues has been the formation of the GGE on TCBMs in Outer 
Space.65 In December 2010, Resolution 65/68 by the UNGA’s First Committee, 
which deals with disarmament and security issues, requested the Secretary-General to 
establish a GGE to carry out a study on TCBMs in space (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2010). Consequently, the GGE on TCBMs was established in 2011, 
consisting of fifteen international experts.66 The key upshot of the GGE work was its 
final report, which was received and adopted by the UNGA in 2013 at its 68th 
session. The report puts forward basic TCBMs for space that can contribute to 
fostering mutual trust and understanding among nations and minimising the risk of 
misconceptions, misperceptions, and conflict (United Nations General Assembly, 
2013: 16-8). It remains to be seen how successful the implementation of these 
recommendations will be, but as Hitchens (2015: 5) points out, the report is also 
significant because it is the first UN agreement that has emerged after many years 
focusing on measures related to improving space security. Meanwhile, in 2010, 
COPUOS formed the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space 
Activities, which is tasked with drafting a consensus report regarding best-practice 
guidelines with the aim to safeguard the long-term sustainable use of outer space (C. 
Johnson, 2014b).67  
   Beyond multilateral initiatives based on voluntary measures, in 2008, China and 
Russia offered at the CD a draft for a legally binding ‘Treaty on Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against 
Outer Space Objects’ (PPWT) (Loshchinin and Wang, 2008). It is clear that this 
initiative by China and Russia reflected their shared concern about the US Ballistic 
Missile Defence (BMD) programme, which could possibly negate their nuclear 
deterrent (Arbatov, 2010: 85). But the draft treaty received mixed reactions. On the 
one hand, it was seen as an important step in trying to break the deadlock at the CD. 
On the other hand, there were still concerns regarding the intentions of China’s 2007 
ASAT test that remained unaddressed (Moltz, 2014: 158-9).  
                                                
65 For the role of TCBMs in space, see Robinson (2010).  
66 Five of the fifteen spots were secured by the permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, 
France, Russia, UK, and the United States). The following countries filled the remaining spots: Brazil, 
Chile, Italy, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine (C. 
Johnson, 2014a: 1).  
67 For the background of the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, see Brachet (2012).   
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   As far as the content of the treaty was concerned, in August 2008, Ambassador 
Christina Rocca (2008: 3-8), the US representative to the CD, issued a number of 
comments and criticisms that pointed to the vague language and provisions in the 
draft treaty, especially with regards to the following issues: a) the definition of the 
‘use of force’ in space, b) whether the draft treaty prohibits the testing and 
deployment of terrestrial-based ASATs, c) and the absence of a provision for a 
verification regime. In a formal reply, China and Russia indicated that the draft PPWT 
addresses weapons in space (Loshchinin and Wang, 2009). This means that the 
proposed treaty prohibits the use of space-based ASAT and BMD systems as well as 
space-to-Earth weapons, but not the research, testing or deployment of ground-based 
space weapons like China’s 2007 ASAT test (Arbatov, 2010: 85; Su, 2010: 86; 
Mutschler, 2013: 140-1).  
   In June 2014, China and Russia issued the updated draft PPWT (Borodavkin and 
Wu, 2014). Yet, as Tronchetti and Hao (2015: 44-5) argue, while the amended 
proposed treaty was characterised by a considerable rewording of its provisions, it 
retains the most controversial features of the 2008 version, including an exclusive 
focus on prohibiting weapons placed in space and the lack of verification 
mechanisms. Therefore, the prospect for a positive reception to the proposed treaty 
was seriously undermined.  
 
The Balance of Power 
 
In many ways, the advent of the Space Age was the result of the Cold War rivalry 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, it is important to note that 
the balance of power did not only reflect the sort of a mechanistic understanding 
espoused by realists. It was also an expression of a conscious effort to maintain 
international order in space. In other words, Little’s distinction between adversarial 
and associational balancing is relevant to this discussion (Little, 2007: 66-7, Buzan, 
2014a: 143). Although the first phase of the space race followed the logic of 
adversarial balancing, the emergence of cooperative restraint that defined the 
interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union since the early 1960s was 
in line with associational balancing. As we saw earlier, the United States and the 
Soviet Union decided to tread carefully to avoid destabilising their relations in space 
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(Moltz, 2008: 124-75). This led to the mutual recognition of treating the use of space 
as a collective good (Moltz, 2008: 65). In turn, this paved the way towards the 
bilateral arms control agreements signed during the Cold War that acknowledged the 
use of and non-interference of satellites as ‘National Technical Means of Verification’ 
(NTM) (Sheehan, 2007: 129). It was in this context that a set of norms regulating the 
conduct of behaviour in space was emerged as embedded practices shared by 
latecomers in the Space Age.   
   With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the sole 
superpower, the fundamental question is the extent to which the balance of power has 
weakened as a primary institution of international society (Buzan, 2014a: 144). The 
same question is also relevant to the status of the balance of power as an institution of 
international space society. After 1989, not only did the action-reaction dynamic that 
underpinned much of the US-Soviet space relations end abruptly, but also the very 
issue of space security was given relatively low priority by the United States (Moltz, 
2008: 228-9).  
   However, as we shall see in more detail in subsequent chapters, there is evidence to 
suggest that some form of balancing behaviour is emerging, especially in the context 
of the US-China rivalry, which involves a mix of both types of balancing. But 
whether the balance of power will be strengthened as a key institution of international 
space society, not the least because of the rise of Chinese space power, remains an 
open question. What can be said is that much will depend on how Washington and 
Beijing will decide to manage their broader strategic relations and work together to 
shape international space order. How India will decide to use its growing clout in 
space will also be an important factor. These questions are closely tied to the 
functions of great power management as an institution of international space society. 
 
Great Power Management 
 
The idea of great power management (GPM) is about the ‘existence of a club with a 
rule of membership’, which is largely underpinned by great powers seeking to be 
recognised by others to assume, and have been recognised by others, to assume 
managerial responsibilities and rights in international society (Bull, 2002: 194, 196). 
In this regard, as an institution it is closely linked to an associational balance of power 
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(Little, 2006). Given that at the outset of the Space Age space capabilities were 
confined to the two superpowers, great power management initially fell to the hands 
of the United States and the Soviet Union. As we saw earlier, gradually, the two 
superpowers reasserted space as a common good, which was manifested in the 
emergence of strategic restraint (Moltz, 2008). Therefore, one of the fundamental 
goals of the Outer Space Treaty was to ensure that outer space would not be an arena 
of colonial competition and military conflict (Park, 2006: 877).   
   According to Wolter (2006: 19), there were three main principles that defined the 
responsibilities of the two superpowers in space. These were: the ‘responsibility 
towards the international community not to extend the arms race into outer space; the 
principle of the peaceful use of outer space; and the principle of putting the interest of 
mankind above individual interests’. Another principle, embodied in the Outer Space 
Treaty, is that of state equality, which suggests that great powers have the duty of 
assisting developing countries to participate in space activities (Wolter, 2006: 96). 
Some initiatives were taken by the United States and the Soviet Union towards this 
direction as part of their Cold War competition over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
‘Third Word’, but these were often overshadowed by the primary goal of preserving 
strategic stability between the two superpowers.68  
   With the passing of the Cold War, a key discussion within the English School has 
centred on how to make sense of the operation of great power management given the 
uncontested hegemonic position of the United States and, since 2001, its unilateralist 
tendencies under the Bush administration.69 One useful way of conceptualising the 
management of order under conditions of primacy has been put forward by Clark 
(2009b), who postulates that it is possible to treat hegemony as an institution of 
international society. Be that as it may, as far as great power management in space is 
concerned, the end of the Cold War broke down the cooperative restraint that the 
United States and the Soviet Union had established in the management of 
international space order, which had facilitated the signing of bilateral arms control 
agreements and international treaties pertaining to space activities. But after 2000, 
international space order appeared particularly weakened due to a number of 
challenges, including the US plans for the weaponisation of space, its refusal to 
                                                
68 As we shall see in Chapter 5, cooperation between NASA and ISRO in the 1960s and early 1970s 
was an a key example of providing assistance to a developing country. 
69 Recent works on great power management include: Morris (2005); Little (2006); Bukovansky et al. 
(2012); Aslam (2013); C. Jones (2014); Lasmar (2015); Cui and Buzan (2016); and Loke (2016). 
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negotiate arms control, and China’s ASAT test. As a result, great power management 
was subject to increasing pressure. But, as we shall see, since the late 2000s, some 
progress has been made towards stabilising international space order as a consequence 
of collective efforts by great space powers, including the United States, China, and 
India.  
   In terms of great power responsibilities, as Bukovansky et al. (2012: 47-8) observe, 
since the end of the Cold War, the move from state-based definitions of security 
towards a broadened security agenda with a deepened content, including 
environmental and human security, has had an important impact on what is accepted 
as the special responsibilities of great powers.70 Likewise, one of the most important 
changes in the normative structure of international space society in the post-Cold War 
era has been the shift from a traditional focus on the military security of states to the 
widening and deepening of the concept of space security, which now encompasses 
other dimensions, especially environmental and human security (Sheehan, 2015).  
   Two points are worth making about this. First, as Sheehan (2015: 10) argues, the 
evolution of the meaning of space security can now be seen to embrace three crucial 
dimensions: a) outer space for security, which describes the use of space assets for 
security and defence purposes; b) security in outer space, which refers to the 
protection of space-based assets from natural and/or human threats or hazards in the 
context of sustainable space utilisation71; and c) security from outer space, which 
concerns the contribution of space-based assets to terrestrial human and 
environmental security, including the use of space for disaster and rescue 
management, weather and climate monitoring, improvement of agricultural 
production, and tele-education. In light of the above, Sheehan (2015: 21) suggests that 
a working definition of space security would be ‘secure and sustainable access to, and 
use of, outer space in accordance with international laws and treaties, free from the 
threat of disruption, as well as security of terrestrial human and state security from 
threats emanating from space’. 
   Second, and consequently, the evolution of the meaning of space security has had a 
significant impact on what great power responsibilities involve by generating new 
                                                
70 On this point, also see Cui and Buzan (2016: 195). On the widening of the security agenda, see, inter 
alia, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998); Sheehan (2005); Buzan and Hansen (2009); and Dannreuther 
(2013). For an early influential critique of environmental security, see Deudney (1990).  
71 Natural and human threats or hazards include: space debris, interference with satellite 
communication frequencies, and space weather effects (Sheehan, 2015: 15-7).  
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functions for great power management in international space society. This is evident 
in the growing acceptance of the norm of the long-term sustainability of space. 
Several governments now emphasise the concept of ‘space sustainability’, with a 
particular focus on tackling space debris as an important transnational threat that 
requires collective action. Indeed, as mentioned previously, there have been a series 
of multilateral initiatives with the aim of mitigating space debris and ensuring the 
sustainable use of space. As we shall see, these threats to space security have 
highlighted the vital role of great powers in dealing with global challenges in space. 
Equally, another key function of great power responsibilities is the provision of space-
related goods that address the needs of developing countries with limited or no space 
capabilities. These usually include: sharing satellite data for disaster management, 
weather monitoring, and rescue support, the provision of training and technical 
assistance focused on space utilisation for socio-economic development and so on. 
While this function is related to the duty of great powers to facilitate the participation 
of developing countries in space activities, it has become increasingly conflated with 
the contribution of space-based systems to human security and the use of space by 
developing countries for socio-economic development.   
   The implications of these developments for China and India as aspiring great space 
powers will be taken up in subsequent chapters, but the point to make here is that 
great power management has grown in strength over the last years. What should be 
added is that the possession of space capabilities has been historically associated with 
acquiring the status of a great power. It is in this context that great power management 
is interwoven with another master institution of international space society, that is, 
techno-nationalism. Certainly, becoming a member of the so-called space club is 
almost synonymous with entering the club of great powers at the global level, and this 
remains a significant driver behind the space programmes of aspiring space powers, 
such as China and India.  
 
Techno-nationalism 
 
Mayall (1990) explores the dynamics of the rise of nationalism as a key institution of 
international society. What follows from this is that there is good reason to treat 
techno-nationalism as a master institution of international space society. Yet, as noted 
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in the introduction, my understanding of the term highlights how articulations of a 
techno-nationalist ideology explicitly associate technological achievements with the 
relative position of the state in international society. As far as China and India are 
concerned, my formulation of the concept of postcolonial techno-nationalism is also 
attentive to the ways in which a variant of techno-nationalism that signifies 
technological advancement as an indicator of the state’s status, power, and modernity 
is still influential in a postcolonial context. This largely reflects the origins of techno-
nationalism, which can be traced back to the expansion of the European society of 
states in the nineteenth century, when scientific and technological advancement 
operated as a formal standard of civilisation, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
Suffice to say at this stage that the formative experience of China and India’s 
encounter with the expanding European international society and the civilisation 
dimension that was ascribed to this process has had, and continues to have, a profound 
impact on Chinese and Indian views about the importance of highly visible 
technological projects, such as nuclear and space programmes.  
   As far as space technology is concerned, it is also important to acknowledge the 
close relationship between being space-faring and being modern. Significantly, we 
cannot understand the importance of becoming space-faring without considering that 
the Space Age coincided with the process of decolonisation.72 In this regard, the 
advent of the Space Age, like the Nuclear Age, marked a global condition that defined 
space capabilities as a new form of reproducing insiders and outsiders on the basis of 
space-faring hierarchies. This raises the issue of hierarchy in international space 
society. Indeed, as the space-faring society has expanded to include a large number of 
states, social hierarchies of space participation have been established according to the 
different levels of space capabilities (Hanberg and Li, 2006: 53). Thus, human 
spaceflight remains a ‘marker of modernity and first-class status’ (Mindell et al., 
2009: 15). While robotic space exploration appears to be less prestigious, of course, 
than human spaceflight, it can also be understood in this way. Equally, one key 
insight developed from scholars such as Sagan (1996/1997) is that we need to go 
beyond realist assumptions that focus on national security considerations if we want 
to understand why states seek to develop nuclear weapons. Sagan (1996/1997) argues 
that nuclear weapons are not merely military tools, but also serve as political devices 
                                                
72 On this point with regards to the Nuclear Age and the meaning of being nuclear, see Hecht (2006).  
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in the context of domestic politics and can also be regarded as symbols of status and 
modernity. Likewise, both civilian and military space-based assets can be understood 
as ‘the touchstones upon which any capable state’s modernity is measured’ (Harding, 
2013: 194).  
   Moreover, it is necessary to briefly say something about how techno-nationalism as 
a primary institution interacts with some of the other institutions of international space 
society. First, in many ways, techno-nationalism is complimentary to sovereign 
statehood because sovereignty in space is largely embedded in cosmopolitan and 
solidarist conceptions. This is partly why highly visible space projects define space-
faring hierarchies. Second, and consequently, techno-nationalism is also closely 
linked to great power status and great power management in the sense that different 
space capabilities also confer different levels of status and responsibilities in the 
management of international order in space. Likewise, in relation to diplomacy, 
highly visible techno-nationalist space feats can also offer a seat at the table of 
diplomatic initiatives and negotiations. Seen in this light, ‘high-visibility’ projects, 
such as space programmes are part of ‘recognition games’, which states play in order 
to acquire the status of a great power (Suzuki, 2008). As Cunningham (2009: 74) 
notes, ‘to be a superpower, one must be a “spacefaring” nation’.  
 
The Space Market  
 
Arguably, the economic factor has been one of the most neglected issues in the 
English School literature. Discussing some of the shortcomings of Bull’s work, Miller 
(1990: 74) pointed out in 1990, ‘a basic criticism of Bull’s account of international 
society’ is ‘that it does not include a strong economic component’ dealing with rules 
regarding trade, navigation, and investment and the common interests that permeate 
the sphere of economic activities. Since then, some important work has been done to 
bring together the economic sector and the English School, especially in the context 
of globalisation (Buzan, 2004; Buzan, 2005; Hurrell, 2007: 194-215). However, the 
question of how to consider the economic sector within the English School remains 
rather underdeveloped. According to Buzan, one response is to treat capitalism as a 
master institution, but he prefers the use of the market as a more neutral term, which 
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has the additional merit of encompassing other practices, such as trade (Buzan, 2004: 
193-4, Buzan, 2014a: 136).  
   Consequently, given the growing globalisation and commercialisation of space 
activities (OECD, 2014: 9-10), there are good reasons for considering the space 
market as an emerging primary institution of international space society. 
Significantly, in some ways, since the advent of the Space Age, the space market has 
followed a parallel trajectory to the market as a distinctive institution at the global 
level. In particular, although the market was a key primary institution of the Western-
global international society during much of the Cold War, it has emerged as a sort of a 
global institution in the post-Cold War era (Buzan, 2014a: 138). Likewise, the space 
market was initially confined to American-led space activities, beginning as a US 
government initiative with the Communications Satellite Act in 1962, which led to the 
creation of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat) in 
1964 (Moltz, 2014: 94). However, during the early Cold War, commercial activities 
were largely limited to the field of satellite communications and even commercial 
transatlantic cooperation in space was determined to a large extent by political and 
strategic factors and technology transfer considerations (Krige, 2013b). Equally, the 
idea of the commercialisation of space remained contested not the least because of the 
opposition of the Soviet Union and communist China to the market in general. This 
began to change only in the 1980s, when a number of space players emerged, 
including Europe and Japan, that challenged the US leadership in the fields of satellite 
manufacturing, launching capability, and other commercial space services. It was also 
during this period that the Soviet Union and China became less reluctant to get 
involved with commercial space activities (Krige, 2013a: 16-7).  
   But it was after the end of the Cold War that the globalisation and 
commercialisation of space activities gradually led to the emergence of a global space 
market, which points to its inclusion as a primary institution of the international space 
society. According to a recent report by the Space Foundation (2015: 2), the global 
space economy grew up by 9 percent in 2014, totalling $330 billion, with commercial 
space activities accounting for the 76 percent of the global space economy and direct-
to-home television services accounting for more than three-quarters of the commercial 
space sector. Even in the launch field, which has been traditionally reserved to the 
state largely due to national security and cost considerations, US small private 
companies have emerged like Space Exploration Technologies Corporation, known as 
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SpaceX, and XCOR Aerospace. As Newlove-Eriksson and Eriksson (2013) argue, the 
globalisation of space activities has been underpinned by the growing importance of 
private authority and transnational Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the blurred 
distinction between the military and civilian uses of space. 
   Therefore, it makes sense to think of the space market as an institution of 
international space society. Yet, a number of points are worth noting here as they help 
to highlight the possibilities and limits of this move. First, despite all the attention 
paid to the privatisation of space travel promoted by space entrepreneurs of the likes 
of Elon Musk (SpaceX), Jeff Bezos (Blue Origin), and Richard Branson (Virgin 
Galactic), the privatisation of space should not be overstated. Not only does the 
degree of privatisation vary across space services and products (Moltz, 2014: 102-12), 
but governments also remain central actors in the space industry as key sources of 
initial investment and as customers for several space products and services (Brennan 
and Vecchi, 2011: 18, OECD, 2014: 17).  
   Second, while it is clear that the argument over whether to have the market or not 
ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the tension between economic 
nationalism and economic liberalism is far from over, as there are not many states 
fully open to the forces of the global economy and many states support a form of 
capitalism that is embedded in economic nationalism. This points to the contested 
nature of the market as a primary institution in the sense that for many states the 
challenge of how to relate to the global market and make it more effective remains 
(Buzan, 2014a: 138). As far as international space society is concerned, it is necessary 
to note that the contested nature of the space market as an institution is reflected in the 
continuing dialectics between techno-nationalism and techno-globalism. It is 
commonplace among scholars to argue that Japan and China are two key examples of 
states that privilege a techno-nationalist approach to technology and innovation, 
including space technology. But even the United States has not been immune to 
techno-nationalist impulses. As Weiss (2014) shows, the enduring lead in high 
technology that the United States still enjoys is largely explained by the creation of 
not a liberal, but a hybrid political economy, whereby the national security state is 
interwoven with the commercial sector. NASA, of course, has been a key institution 
of the national security state since the beginning of the Space Age. But this has also 
been manifested in its recent efforts to catalyse the development of a commercial 
space industry through inviting competitive innovation (Weiss, 2014: 119-20, 27-8).   
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   This leads to the third point to make about how to understand the relationship 
between techno-nationalism and the space market. Because of the enduring influence 
of the former, it is tempting to see techno-nationalism as containing the space market 
(at least for the time being). Clearly, at one level, the space market can be understood 
as complementary to techno-nationalism in the ever-globalising international space 
society. Yet, at another level, the space market as a solidarist institution is staged as 
opposed to techno-nationalism. This tension is compounded by the fact that, in many 
ways, techno-nationalism occupies the crucial place of national sovereignty and 
territoriality in the sector of space considering that sovereignty in international space 
society is largely understood in cosmopolitan terms. 
   Fourth, in discussing the market as a primary institution, Beeson and Breslin (2014) 
suggest that it makes more sense to treat the ‘developmental state’ and ‘regional 
production structures’ as primary institutions in East Asia rather than focusing on the 
market. This is an important consideration that serves to highlight how the global 
political economy is underpinned by significant regional derivations. Following from 
this, although it is apparent that the space market is a key feature of the social 
structure of international space society, it is possible to say that there are significant 
regional derivations. Perhaps the best expression of this is the Chinese and Indian 
variants of postcolonial techno-nationalism that still shape how the two rising Asian 
space powers relate to the space market.  
   In light of the above, for now, it seems that there is some sort of hierarchy between 
techno-nationalism and the space market with the former subsuming the latter, 
especially with regards to space programmes in a postcolonial context. Certainly, the 
integration of China and India into the global space economy has accelerated over the 
last decades, but, as we shall see, techno-nationalism is still prominent in the ways in 
which the two Asian space powers approach space technology. Moreover, the space 
market remains contested as an emerging institution due to the ambiguity embedded 
in space law regarding space activities carried on by private actors. This process is 
further complicated by the inherent dual-use nature of space technology and the 
blurring of the distinction between the private and public realms (Newlove-Eriksson 
and Eriksson 2013). 
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Environmental Stewardship 
 
There is now a burgeoning literature that deals with the relationship between 
international society and global environmentalism and assesses the extent to which 
environmental stewardship can be seen as a nascent institution of international 
society.73 Recent efforts to find ways to mitigate space debris as well as to create a 
normative framework for the sustainability of space are illustrative of how 
environmental stewardship is gradually becoming an institution in space. For 
example, in 2007, COPUOS adopted the ‘Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines’, which 
were wrought by the international Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee 
(IADC), consisting of experts from thirteen space agencies (United Nations Office for 
Outer Space Affairs, 2010). Moreover, as discussed earlier, in 2010, COPUOS formed 
the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. 
Notably, the European Union proposal for a Code of Conduct for Outer Space also 
includes provisions on space debris control and mitigation (Council of the European 
Union, 2008: 9; Dickow, 2009: 159).   
   Thus, there are grounds for considering environmental stewardship as an emerging 
institution of international space society. Indeed, the growing number of governments, 
private firms, and non-state actors that emphasise the importance of the sustainable 
utilisation of space suggests that space sustainability has emerged as a key norm. 
However, what should be noted is that these developments reflect a more pragmatic 
approach to maintain the space environment sustainable for the effective use of space 
rather than an expression of cosmopolitan values. Consequently, in the subsequent 
chapters, rather than examining in detail the engagement of China and India with 
environmental stewardship as a nascent institution in space, the focus will be on the 
emerging norm of space sustainability as a key great power responsibility in 
managing international space order and the implications of this development for 
China and India as aspiring great powers.     
 
 
 
 
                                                
73 See, inter alia, Jackson (2000: 170-9); Buzan (2004: 186, 233); Hurrell (2007: 216-36); Falkner 
(2012); Palmujoki (2013); and Buzan (2014a: 161-3).  
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Concluding Remarks  
 
Although it is clear that there are a number of ways of understanding the international 
politics of space, it may be worth going beyond standard theoretical approaches to 
understand how order is maintained in space. Drawing on key English School 
concepts, this chapter suggests that it is possible to conceptualise space not merely as 
a system, but also as an international society with a distinct social structure. This 
exercise of concept development is important both analytically and hermeneutically, 
given the notion of an exclusive club of space-faring countries. The chapter developed 
this argument further by highlighting how the nature of outer space as a distinctive 
sectoral interstate society is manifested in the ways in which its primary institutions 
are differentiated from such institutions at the global level (space war, space law, 
cosmopolitan sovereignty, space diplomacy, balance of power, great power 
management, techno-nationalism, space market, and environmental stewardship) in a 
historical and comparative context. In doing so, the chapter helps to highlight the 
constitutive impact of these institutions on the norms that shape the behaviour of the 
space-faring states. 
   This argument also points to the importance of recognising the socialisation process 
in international space society and the social hierarchies that underpin international 
space order. As a consequence, if the development of space technology  is what the 
members of international space society make out of it, then, it becomes clearer that 
there is nothing inevitable about the weaponisation of space and the emergence of a 
new ‘race mentality’. Equally important is that a sectoral approach that relates 
technology to the idea of international society offers an innovative and 
straightforward way of trying to bring technology into the English School theory. 
Moreover, it is a significant step towards relating the English School to International 
Security Studies. While an analysis of what form this investigation might take is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, as far as space security is concerned, it offers a more 
holistic understanding of space security that transcends the three dimensional 
framework (outer space for security, security in outer space, security from outer 
space). For instance, by bringing together both terrestrial and non-terrestrial 
dimensions of space security from ground stations and communications to space 
weapons and space debris, a sectoral approach to space offers a different way of 
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conceptualising a normative framing for securitisation and helps to highlight the 
outside/inside distinction in the security dynamics of space.  
   All in all, while the conceptual framework provided here remains incomplete in 
many ways, the suggestion that it is possible to conceptualise an international space 
society based on the English School also provides a useful framework for 
understanding the ongoing complex dynamics of the growing exploration and 
utilisation of space. It also offers important insights about China and India as 
members and aspiring great powers in international space society. Before considering 
this, however, it is necessary to take a look at the origins of techno-nationalism and 
technological hierarchies in international society, to which the next chapter turns.  
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Chapter 3. Civilisation, Modernity, and the Origins of Techno-
nationalism in International Society  
 
 
The central contention of this chapter is that it is important to consider how a 
civilisation dimension was ascribed to the role of technology during the expansion of 
the European society of states in the nineteenth century, if we want to understand the 
origins of techno-nationalism in international society and its enduring influence in the 
postcolonial context of China and India. It does this by illustrating the ways in which 
the emergence of scientific and technological advancement as a normative measure of 
the level of civilisation in international society since the mid-nineteenth century have 
had a powerful and enduring impact on Chinese and Indian conceptions about science 
and technology.  
   I develop this argument in the following ways. The first part of the chapter briefly 
revisits the concept of the ‘standard of civilisation’ and then moves on to review the 
ways in which technological achievements have been represented as markers of the 
superiority of Western civilisation since the late nineteenth century and how China 
and India were seen as ‘uncivilised’, based on European perceptions of their 
technological backwardness. The second part of the chapter then suggests that the 
social pressure created by the need to conform to the operation of technological 
advancement as an informal European standard of ‘civilisation’ was one of the key 
drivers behind late Qing China’s technological modernisation. In this regard, the 
origins and the enduring influence of Chinese techno-nationalism have been largely a 
consequence of the international social pressure from European international society 
to introduce technology as a normative marker of the state’s modernity, power, and 
status. The final part briefly highlights some of the principal aspects of the nexus 
between science, technology, and modernity in British India and the Indian responses 
that this process elicited. 
   Given that it is difficult to do justice to what has arguably been a very complex 
reality, the discussion that follows is necessarily a schematic simplification. However, 
it is crucial to have a sense of the formative legacy of China and India’s encounter 
with the expanding European international society and how science and technology 
were key features of this process, as it helps to illustrate one of the overarching 
arguments of this thesis: history does not just matters, but it continues to influence 
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contemporary conceptions about the role of science and technology as a principal 
marker of the state’s power, status, and modernity in international society. This also 
calls attention to how the ‘global transformation’ of the nineteenth century still 
influences key understandings of the relationship between state, modernity, and 
technology in the context of international relations (Buzan and Lawson 2015). 
 
The Standard of Civilisation  
 
One of the most important aspects of the modern structure of international society has 
been the expansion of the European international society into the non-European world 
and the subsequent great transformation of regulating international relations it brought 
about in the nineteenth century as a consequence.74 Although it is clear that a complex 
amalgam of factors played a decisive role in shaping the ways in which non-European 
states came to accept key European institutions, norms, and practices in the conduct 
of their international relations, for the purposes of this discussion, the important 
feature of this process has been the ‘standard of civilisation’, based on civilisational 
and racial hierarchies.75 A detailed discussion of the evolution of the standard of 
civilisation in international society is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a few 
points are worth making. First, as the Europeans were accumulating more economic 
and military power, in large part as a consequence of the industrial revolution, they 
came to regard modern civilisation as synonymous with European standards of 
behaviour and they saw it was their duty and interest to spread European civilisation 
to the rest of the world.76  By the nineteenth century, the shared conviction among the 
key colonising European powers that their institutions and moral values were superior 
to those of the non-European world led them to impose their civilisation and their 
administrative standards in most parts of Asia and Africa (Watson, 1984: 27). 
Permeated with this strong belief in the superiority of European culture, the expansion 
of European international society was also a violent process that involved the 
subjugation and suppression of indigenous peoples (Bowden, 2009: 105; Keal, 2003).  
                                                
74 The classic account of the expansion of the European international society is Bull and Watson 
(1984). Also, see Watson (1992). For a recent discussion of the ‘expansion thesis’ literature, see Buzan 
and Little (2014). 
75 The most comprehensive account of the ‘standard of civilisation’ is Gong (1984). Also, see Keene 
(2002); Hobson (2004); Bowden (2009); the contributions in Stroikos (2014a); and Linklater (2016). 
For an overview of the literature on the standard of civilisation, see Stroikos (2014b). 
76 Scientific racism also contributed to perceptions of European superiority (Hobson, 2012). 
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   Second, the underlying logic of the standard of civilisation was evident in how the 
classification of ‘civilised’, ‘barbarian’, and ‘savages’ was used by international 
lawyers as three categories consistent with different stages of legal recognition 
(Simpson, 2004: 227-53; Anghie, 2005). A key dimension of the operation of the 
‘standard of civilisation’, therefore, was that those political entities aspiring to be 
brought within the confines of the perceived international society of ‘civilised’ states 
had to fulfil a number of requirements set by the European society of states in order to 
be recognised as full members	   states (Gong, 1984: 3).77 Effectively then, as Keene 
(2002: 98-99) notes, two patterns of order emerged: toleration and civilisation. 
Interaction between those states that were recognised as full members of the 
‘civilised’ society of states was based on reciprocal diplomatic engagement and 
international law and it was characterised by ‘the toleration of other political systems, 
cultures and ways of life’. Accordingly, it was reasonable for those polities that were 
deemed as ‘uncivilised’ to be patronised and to be subject to violent and coercive 
behaviour in the name of promoting civilisation (Keene, 2002: 98-9). In this regard, 
the standard of civilisation was also important in constructing the European Self in 
relation to the non-European ‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’ Other (Neumann and Welsh, 
1991). As Ringmar (2014: 447) points out, the social construction of a demarcation 
between insiders and outsiders meant that the formation of international society was 
constituted by practices of mutual recognition among the Europeans themselves and 
practices of non-recognition regarding their interaction with non-Europeans. 
   Third, as a result, the implementation of legal, administrative, and economic 
reforms was presented, with varying degrees, by non-European elites as a path 
towards modernity and progress based on the assumption of a universal and inclusive 
modern civilisation, which promised to lead non-European states to their recognition 
as equal members of international society (Aydin, 2007: 15, 23). But the need for 
adjusting to Western style standards usually involved the introduction of alien values 
and norms to their culture, and, hence, the dilemma of how to balance traditional 
culture with modernity and reforms. It is in this context that the cases of Japan, China, 
Russia, and the Ottoman Empire have generated debates about their encounter with 
                                                
77 According to Gong, these standards were expressed in a number of treaties signed with non-
European political entities in the nineteenth century and came to include an extensive set of political 
and economic criteria such as basic rights of life and property; the existence of an organised political 
bureaucracy; the adherence to international law; the operation of diplomatic interchange and 
communication; and the abstract notion that a ‘civilised’ state follows the norms and practices the 
‘civilised’ international society (Gong 1984: 14-5). 
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European international society and their struggle with the standard of civilisation.78  
Notably, however, accounts of other cases have also been provided.79 On the other 
hand, the cases of colonies, such as India, have been largely neglected in the 
‘expansion thesis’ literature.80   
   Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the fulfilment of this set of criteria remained 
largely a moving target for non-European polities. In particular, Japan is usually 
invoked as the first non-European state that met the standard of civilisation and was 
successfully accepted as a member into international society. Although it is difficult 
to identify the exact landmark of Japan’s entrance into international society, there is 
an agreement among scholars that with the abrogation of extraterritoriality in 1989, 
the Anglo-Japanese military alliance in 1902 based on equal relations between the two 
countries, the Hague conferences in 1899 and 1907, and the victory of the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905, Japan was recognised as ‘civilised’. Yet, despite these 
achievements, the reality was a good deal more complex. The 1895 Triple 
Intervention by Russia, France, and Germany after the first Sino-Japanese War and 
the denial of racial equality clause by key Western powers at the Paris Peace 
conference in 1919 are testimony to the tensions and contradictions that were central 
to the process of the standard of civilisation as a universal process (Okagaki, 2013: 
117; Gong, 1984: 63).   
 
Great Powers, Civilisation, and Modernity 
    
The case of Japan also serves as a touchtone for wider debates about the relationship 
between great powers, civilisation, and modernity. The intention here is simply to 
highlight that, although the recognition of equal membership into European 
international society was premised on the fulfilment of the European standards, it is 
useful to remember that the European society of states was characterised by multiple 
layers of hierarchies and tiers even among its members. A few points are worth noting 
                                                
78 For the case of Japan, see Gong (1984: 164-200); Suzuki (2005); Suzuki (2009: 114-39); Zarakol 
(2011: 160-200); and Okagaki (2013). Neumann has recently explored Russia’s entry into international 
society (2011). On the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, for example, see Neumman and Welsh (1991); 
and Zarakol (2011: 111-59). It is not surprising that the case of China has generated a great deal of 
debate about its membership in international society. See, inter alia, Gong (1984: 130-63); Zhang 
(1998); and Suzuki (2009: 89-113). 
79 These include: Stivachtis (1998); Roberson (2009); Fabry (2010); and Englehart (2010). 
80 However, one exception is Abraham (2014: 46-72). 
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here. First, the logic of the standard also provided the normative basis for regulating 
the conduct of intra-European relations at a time when competition among European 
imperial powers was beginning to be projected in the scramble for colonial territory 
outside Europe, while the number of new independent states in Europe was increasing 
(Clark, 2005: 47-9).	   Moreover, the seemingly inclusive and expanding European 
society was clearly marked by a stratified hierarchy and what Simpson (2004) calls 
the ‘legalised hegemony’ of Great Powers throughout this process in the sense that it 
was a handful of European great powers, especially Britain and France, that served as 
the ‘legitimisers’ of membership in international society. In other words, 
notwithstanding the inclusive principles of the expansion, European powers continued 
to retain their role as distinctive members that constituted a special group of states 
carrying the managerial burden as the gatekeepers of international order. The middle 
and small powers recognised that role for the Great Powers (Simpson, 2004). In other 
words, as Keene (2014) shows, there have been different layers of differentiation 
within the family of ‘civilised’ nations. 
   Second, despite the fact that the material power of Russia and the Ottoman Empire 
have led to their recognition as participants in the European balance of power system, 
this was not enough to offset the perceived cultural superiority of the European elite 
of Great Powers and to allow the entry of non-European powers into this club as 
social equals, that is ‘civilised’. Indeed, as Neumann (2014) suggests, it takes a 
combination of possessing material capabilities and fulfilling civilisational standards 
to achieve full acceptance into the club of great powers. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the 
legacy of this period is that self-narratives of being an outsider still influence the 
social self-identity of those non-European states that were seeking to acquire 
modernity and equal status in international society, only to realise that their entry was 
suspended as outsiders.81  
 
Contemporary Practices and the Standard of Civilisation 
      
Given that much attention has been paid to the consolidation of the contemporary 
structure of international society on the basis of equality among nations, especially 
after the decolonisation process, it may be supposed that the notion of the ‘standard of 
                                                
81 On this point, see Neumann (2011); and Zarakol (2011).  
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civilisation’ has been redundant. Ironically enough, therefore, it was the ‘barbarian’ 
behaviour of the self-perceived ‘civilised’ European powers during the First and 
Second World Wars that delivered a blow on hierarchical ideas about civilisations 
(Bowden, 2009: 126). Yet, there is by now a burgeoning literature on examining the 
relevance of the	  ‘standard of civilisation’ to key practices engrained in the normative 
structure of contemporary international society, which are closely related to liberal 
norms, ideas and principles (Fidler, 2001). These usually include: human rights 
(Donnelly, 1998), economic and financial standards (Gong, 2002: 85-92; Mozaffari, 
2001: 77-96; Bowden and Seabrooke, 2006), democratic government (Hobson, 2008; 
Clark, 2009a; Navari, 2013), the status of women (Towns, 2009; Towns, 2014), the 
European Union’s membership conditionality (Behr, 2007; Stivachtis, 2008), 
development and environmental stewardship (Buzan, 2014c: 590-2), peacebuilding 
and statebuilding (Paris, 2002), and trusteeship (Bain, 2003).82  This has been evident, 
of course, in the generation of new categories of outsiders to the liberal structure of 
international society, such as ‘rogue’, ‘failed’, ‘pariah’, and ‘outlaw’ states (Simpson, 
2004: 278-316; Clark, 2005: 176; Bowden, 2009: 17, 186, 190-1). 
   In this context, non-European countries continue to face the same dilemmas of how 
to respond to the challenges of modernisation, development, and globalisation (Gong, 
1984: 10). As Gong (2002: 80) notes, ‘one cannot speak of “modernization”, or the 
“process of becoming modern”, in a historical perspective without referring to what 
an earlier age called “civilization” and the process of becoming “civilized”’.83 This is 
an important consideration, for the purposes of this chapter, especially given how 
Chinese and Indian elites continue to struggle with the stigma of ‘not being of the 
‘West’, not being ‘modern’ enough, not being developed or industrialized or secular 
or civilized or Christian or democratic enough’ (Zarakol, 2011: 4).  
   Indeed, China has attracted much attention in the scholarly literature that deals with 
international society and the particular dynamics highlighted above. Although there 
are varied differences of opinion about when China gained entry into international 
society as well as on quite what this process might have involved, it is possible to 
identify a classical and a modern round to it (Buzan, 2014c: 583). The first describes 
                                                
82 The discussion of the enduring relevance of the standard of civilisation is part of wider debates about 
the importance of civilisation and culture in international relations. See, inter alia, O’Hagan (2002); 
Salter (2002); Mazlish (2004); Hall and Jackson (2007); Bowden (2009); Katzenstein (2010); and 
Buzan (2010a). 
83 On this point, also see Gong (1984: 10).  
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China’s struggle with the classical standard of civilisation, whereas the latter one 
describes Communist China’s ‘alienation’ (but not isolation) with international 
society under Mao, when China was a ‘revolutionary state in international society’ 
(Armstrong, 1993: 176-84; Zhang, 1998).	  But there is a noteworthy twist in China’s 
struggle to cope with modernity, especially in the post-Cold War era, given how the 
normative structure of international society has moved towards more liberal norms 
and standards of conduct at a time when China’s international behaviour still 
emphasises Westphalian practices and principles. As a consequence, there has been a 
great deal of debate about the whole question of the standard of ‘civilisation’, be it the 
classical/historical or the modern one, and its relevance to our understanding of 
China’s place in international society.84 
   Unlike China, however, India’s encounter story has been largely neglected 
presumably because it appears as a somewhat straightforward case.85 India initially 
succumbs to colonial rule so its struggle with modernity is understood as part of the 
broader issue concerning the relationship of ruler and ruled. It becomes a sovereign 
member of international society after its partition from Britain in 1947. But reality has 
been less linear and more complex than is usually assumed in the literature. In this 
light, some scholars have provided a necessary corrective to this narrative (Anand, 
2010; Abraham, 2014: 46-72). For example, from 1919 to 1947, India’s international 
recognition as an international person was something of an anomaly under 
international law. Notwithstanding that it remained under British rule throughout this 
period, it participated as a sovereign state at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, it was 
admitted to the League of the Nations and was a founding member of the United 
Nations (Anand, 2010). Equally, some work has been done recently on India as a 
rising power in international society (Ogden, 2015; Hall, 2015).  
   Nevertheless, the point to emphasise here, for the purposes of this discussion, is that 
it is simply impossible to consider the emergence of the ‘standard of civilisation’ in 
the nineteenth century without recognising how a civilisation dimension has been 
central to technological achievements in international relations in the context of the 
expansion of the European international society and how this process reinforced not 
only the sense of European superiority, but also the link between the state, 
                                                
84 Recent examples are: Zhang (1998); Foot (2001); Suzuki (2009); Buzan (2010b); X. Zhang (2011a); 
X. Zhang (2011b); Suzuki (2014); and Clark (2014). 
85 On this point, see Buzan (2014c: 581). 
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technology, and modernity. As soon as we begin to unpack the relationship between 
civilisation, modernity, and technology, it becomes clear that the decolonisation 
process led to the creation of new sites of inclusion and exclusion in the form of the 
spread of exclusive clubs based on technological capabilities as sources of social 
recognition and status in international society. It is here that contributions from the	  
history and sociology of technology are potentially helpful in illuminating the wider 
historical context that defined the impact of scientific and technological 
accomplishments as a key feature of the expansion of the European international 
society. 
   Before considering some key aspects of this literature, however, a caveat should be 
noted. One of the most enduring and influential assumptions has been the centrality of 
science and technology in Western civilisation and the ignorance of the sciences of 
other cultures based on the idea of a Great Divide between the scientific West and its 
intuitive East. This has culminated with an analytical property of a Eurocentric and 
hierarchical understanding of the relationship between science and civilisation, which 
often entails ‘the comparison of civilisations along normative teleologies of moral, 
political, scientific, or economic progress’ (Hart, 1999: 90). 
   My intention, therefore, is not to advocate a Eurocentric conception of science and 
technology that seeks to deny Eastern agency from the global story of science and 
technology, but to try to understand and explain how notions of Western superiority 
and hierarchy based on the state of scientific and technological development have had 
profound implications in the context of the whole standard of ‘civilisation’ question, 
notwithstanding how discomforting their telling may be. Hence, it seems clear to me 
that trying to shed a light on a rather neglected aspect of the modern history of 
international society is not thereby endorsing it.  
 
 
Technological Advancement and Civilisational Hierarchies 
     
One of the most important contributions that historically-informed analyses have 
made is in interrogating how science and technology were used by Western countries 
after the Industrial Revolution to establish a Western ideology that justified concepts 
of Western superiority, dominance, and colonialism as part of their ‘civilising 
mission’. In his seminal work on science and technology, Adas (1989) persuasively 
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demonstrates how scientific and technological achievements became an indication of 
what it meant to be civilised. Simply put, underpinning Western ideologies of 
dominance was the notion that scientific and technological accomplishments were 
markers of the level of civilisation a given society had achieved. In addition, Pyenson 
(1993) offers an account of how the spread of pure science abroad was a key element 
of the French civilising mission, while Headrick (1981) shows how technological 
advancements were becoming a crucial factor in colonial expansion.  
   More broadly, the origins of science and technology as representations of cultural 
authority can be traced back to the first phase of overseas expansion during the 
fifteenth century. Indeed, the advancement of weaponry, shipbuilding, and 
manufacturing provided the means for the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama. 
There is also evidence to suggest that travellers and missionaries also paid attention to 
the material achievements of the cultures they encountered and drew comparisons 
with their own during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, in addition to 
the fact that travellers during this period placed more emphasis on Christian faith as a 
key indicator of their distinctiveness, merchants and missionaries shared also a limited 
understanding of key developments in scientific learning and technological 
improvements. This meant that their interest in assessing the material attainments of 
non-European cultures remained rather marginal in this era. As a result, the role of 
scientific and technological accomplishments in influencing broader categorisations 
of non-European peoples as civilised or barbarian was relatively limited before the 
Industrial Revolution (Adas, 1989: 21-68).  
   Nevertheless, although the consequences of the emergence of industrial civilisation 
were rather gradual, from the 1780s and onwards, machines became emblems of the 
level of civilisation a given society had attained. It is important to emphasise here that 
technological innovation and gauges never assumed the formal status of legal, 
political, and diplomatic standards of the sort described in the relevant literature on 
the standard of civilisation. Rather, technological feats served as an informal, but 
significant, marker of ordering polities along the stages of civilisation and progress.86   
   What is of importance is that technological advancement as an informal standard 
provided a framework for expectations about the proper place of science and 
technology within the context of state and modernity that indicated the differing levels 
                                                
86 Towns (2009: 694) makes a similar point with regards to the status of women as an informal 
standard of civilisation.  
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of material and social development. One reason for thinking that technological 
achievements emerged as meaningful measures of human development, progress, and 
civilisation by the nineteenth century is because they could be empirically 
demonstrated (Adas, 1989: 7). Equally importantly, in addition to their function as 
physical and symbolic indicators of the superiority of European colonial powers, 
scientific and technological attainments were also seen to embody a set of more subtle 
superior attributes, such as rationality, the mastery of time and space, precision and 
discipline (Adas, 1989: 224). Ironically, perhaps, the construction of the ‘Other’ as 
‘barbarous’ in terms of technology occurred even though ‘barbarous’ countries such 
as China and India had developed sophisticated technologies in the past (Adas, 1989; 
Hobson, 2004).   
   Given this background, of particular significance here is the need to understand the 
representation of material achievements as a key element of the political ideology that 
imbued the political thought and public life in key colonising powers, such as Britain 
and France. In this sense, the representation of scientific and technological 
achievements was embodied in ‘clusters of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values and 
attitudes usually held by identifiable groups, that provide directives, even plans, of 
action for public policy-making in an endeavour to uphold, justify, change or criticize 
the social and political arrangements of a state or other political community’ 
(Freeden, 2004: 6). Put differently, the representation of material achievements as a 
standard of civilisation was not articulated in the form of a comprehensive strategy 
towards non-European polities, but it was a key feature of the political ideology of the 
civilising mission that emerged in key European imperial powers in the nineteenth 
century. While a detailed discussion of the quite different understandings of the 
relationship between technology and civilisation of that period is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, it is worth briefly considering some of the most influential works, 
especially those with a focus on China and India.  
   A wide range of European observers, authors, politicians, and travellers offered 
explicit accounts of the close synergy between technological accomplishments and 
civilisation, and their more subtle attributes. For example, in his comparative account 
of civilised and barbarian societies, William Cooke Taylor (1840: 1-2) distinguishes 
the ‘civilised race’ as the one that emphasises material improvements and progress 
based on new discoveries, such as the railroads, while the ‘uncivilised race’, 
exemplified by China, seems to ‘have set bounds to itself’ and there are ‘no traces of a 
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tendency to further and future improvement can be discovered’. For Taylor (1840: 5) 
‘the idea of progress, development, amelioration, or extension, appears to be the 
predominant notion…in the definition of civilization’. This compels him to identify 
civilisation with knowledge and barbarism with ignorance, and, thus, to examine the 
‘progress of science’ and its impact on the ‘advance of civilization and the moral 
improvement of individuals’ (Taylor, 1840: 188).  
   Other observers came to draw conclusions about the level of Chinese and Indian 
civilisation by providing an extensive account of their technological achievements in 
the nineteenth century. Clearly, not everyone supported the idea that China and India 
should be evaluated and ranked as ‘uncivilised’ on scientific and technological 
criteria, while some authors acknowledged the contributions of the Chinese and 
Indian civilisations to scientific knowledge and technological progress, at least in 
ancient times. Nevertheless, the views of authors, such as those of James Mill and 
John Barrow, are illustrative of the ways in which technological achievements were 
articulated as a measure to evaluate China and India as ‘uncivilised’. In his influential 
History of British India, Mill suggests that India has no mark of high civilisation 
because of the low state of scientific knowledge. After a rather detailed analysis of the 
use of key tools and machines by Indians, Mill (1840: 99) notes that:  
 
Whoever, in the present improved state of our knowledge, shall take the trouble to 
contemplate the proofs which we possess of the state of knowledge and civilization 
among the Hindus, can form no other conclusion, but that every thing (unless 
astronomy be an exception) bears clear, concurring, and deniable testimony to the 
ignorance of the Hindus, and the low state of civilization in which they remain.  
 
Referring to ‘Surya Sidhanta’ as a proof of the contribution of Hindu civilisation to 
astronomical knowledge, Mill (1840: 100-1, 106) contends that ‘it is on the authority 
of our own countryman I am enabled to declare, that this book [Surya Sidharta] is 
itself the most satisfactory of all proofs of the low state of the science among the 
Hindus, and the rudeness of the people from whom it proceeds’ and he concludes that 
‘the ignorance [of Hindus] of the present age is the same with the ignorance of all 
former ages. Elsewhere in his History of British India, Mill (1840: 220) offers a brief 
analysis of the use of machines and tools by Indians and Chinese to find that ‘in the 
contrivance and use of machinery both are equally simple and rude’.  
   The publication of History helped Mill to take a position with the East India 
Company, where he eventually took over the post of Examiner of India 
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Correspondence. Although other works appeared soon after its publication that 
provided a more balanced account of Indian society and history, it is important to note 
that his views appear to have profoundly influenced the policies of reformist British 
administrators in India, as his History came to be regarded as the definite source on 
India for future British rulers, traders, and missionaries. That candidates for the Indian 
Civil Service had to read History as part of their training is also illustrative of its 
authoritative status at that time (Adas, 1989: 171).  
   In a rather similar fashion, Barrow’s Travels in China has been an authoritative 
source on Chinese society and history since its publication in 1804. The book was the 
culmination of Barrow’s participation in a British Embassy mission that travelled 
from Beijing to Guangzou in 1792 with the aim of improving trade with China. While 
Barrow (1804) acknowledged that China had once achieved a high level of 
civilisation in terms of social development and material culture, it steadily stagnated 
and, thus, its position in relation to European industrial powers eventually diminished 
after the fifteenth century. Barrow compares in detail the level of scientific knowledge 
and technological innovation in China with the magnificent achievements of the 
European powers and criticises China for its general backwardness in terms of 
technology and science.87  
   In discussing the use of Chinese tools and machines, Barrow (1804: 311) notes that 
‘the great advantages attainable from the use of mechanical powers are either not 
understood or, purposely, not employed’. Left unimpressed, Barrow (1804: 355) 
concludes that, although ‘the Chinese have been among the first nations…to arrive at 
a certain pitch of perfection’…‘more than thousand years ago, at a period when all 
Europe might be considered, comparatively, as barbarous’, ‘they have since made 
little progress in any thing, and been retrograde in many things’. While Travels in 
China did not receive the attention that Mill’s History of British India did, Barrow’s 
views and opinions about the level of Chinese scientific knowledge and technological 
innovation had an enduring impact on nineteenth century accounts of the Qing Empire 
and helped him to build a reputation as an authority on Chinese affairs (Adas, 1989: 
182-3).  
   Not surprisingly, perhaps, non-European countries responded to their encounter 
with European international society during the nineteenth century in intrinsically 
                                                
87 On Barrow’s background and the influence of his Travels in China, see Adas (1989: 178-84). 
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different ways. Japan provides again the model of a country that successfully placed 
emphasis on technological and industrial development during the Meiji period in 
order to be seen as equal with and independent from the West. However, one of the 
consequences of Japan’s rapid technological and industrial transformation in its bid to 
be recognised as a ‘civilised’ great power was that it gradually posed a challenge to 
notions of Western superiority and hierarchy based on the state of scientific and 
technological development. Arguably, Japan’s entry into international society was a 
thorny and ongoing process, but it seemed to confirm the earlier interest among Asian 
reformists in the universal nature of modernity. This possibility was nowhere clearer 
than in Japan’s stunning victory over Russia in 1904-5, which marked the first time 
that a non-European country had proved to be more mighty and modern than a 
European empire, albeit a weak one. The Russo-Japanese War became a global 
moment of revaluating wide-held views about Western civilisation, colonial rule, and 
technological prowess, and reinforced the support among nationalists and intellectuals 
of China and India for equality with the West (Aydin, 2007: 71-82). Consequently, 
not only did the remarkable industrialisation of Japan over just a few decades 
demonstrate that it was a valuable model of modernisation for other Asian societies to 
follow, but it also put in question that the scientific and technological 
accomplishments of the Europeans were indicators of their racial superiority (Adas, 
1989: 357-65).  
   Although Japan may be something of an extreme example with its emphasis on 
technological and industrial development, by the early twentieth century the tendency 
among states to cast technological achievements as markers of modernity was already 
consolidated. Indeed, as Harrison and Johnson (2009: 3) observe, ‘the first states to 
take advantage of the power the nexus [between science and the nation-state] 
produced became globally dominant and were widely imitated’. For example, despite 
the significant differences between British and German understandings of the national 
importance of technology, the Anglo-German political and economic competition of 
that period helped to cultivate a culture of modernity that was conductive to 
technological innovation engrained in a sense of national purpose. This led observers 
in Britain and Germany to see passenger ships, civilian vessels, and airships as 
indicators of their countries’ international status and national prestige that exhibited a 
country’s creative potential, international leadership, and national aspirations (Rieger, 
2005: 224-7). Given that the operation of these technologies consistently involved 
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financial losses, it is clear that the symbolic meaning of technology as a marker of 
modernity and status helps to explain public support and enthusiasm in Britain and 
Germany for civilian and military technological achievements during that period 
(Rieger, 2005; Fritzsche, 1994).  
   Clearly, the first and the second World Wars have had a profound impact on the 
discourse of civilisation and notions of European superiority over non-European 
societies. Yet, the same cannot be said about the role of technology as an informal 
standard of modernity and hierarchy in international society. At a time when the 
erstwhile European powers were trying to recover from the devastating consequences 
of the two wars, technological development was increasingly becoming a key aspect 
of the growing influence of the United States and the Soviet Union as an indicator of 
national purpose, international status, and global aspirations amid the Cold War. 
Concomitant with this process was the reworking of the relationship between 
technology and the state in the context of modernisation. In many ways, 
modernisation, as a term associated with different levels of human worth, came to 
supplant previous ideas about civilisation and technological accomplishments (Adas, 
1989: 402-3; Adas, 2006; Bowden, 2009: 69-72). In this respect, as Bowden (2009: 
186) notes, the ‘efficacy of science and technology’ can be understood as one of a 
number of criteria that states need to meet in order to be recognised as full members 
of international society in the twenty-first century. What is more, as Buzan and 
Lawson (2015: 185) point out, contemporary attempts at restricting the spread of 
advanced weapons, including nuclear weapons and missile technology, to the 
periphery of international society is reflective of the nineteenth century colonial 
pattern of demarcating the ‘civilised’ at home and the ‘barbaric’ abroad.88 
   In light of the above, the postcolonial as outsider should not be understood in 
chronological terms, that is, the natural state of being automatically postcolonial after 
becoming independent. Rather, as Abraham (1998: 18-9) argues, it should be seen as 
a ‘specific moment of a global condition of modernity’ that represents ‘modernity-as-
a-Western-thing’ as the “true’ definition of the historical moment’ rendering the 
condition of modernity as something ‘desirable and impossible to escape’. At the 
same time, however, the quest for modernity is the reaffirmation of its absence that 
compels the reinvention of time as incomplete defined by an endless effort to catch up 
                                                
88 On the relevance of the standard of civilisation to the restriction and control of certain weapons, see, 
for example, Price (1997: 26, 35-8, 43); and Krause and Latham (1998: 41-4).  
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with the ‘modern’ in the future. This helps to explain the obsession of the postcolonial 
with world rankings and international status (Abraham, 1998: 18-9). As we shall see 
in the following chapters, it was in this context that an influential postcolonial techno-
nationalism emerged that signified the space programmes of China and India as a 
possible response to the challenge of coping with the identity, sovereignty, and status 
of the postcolonial state and its struggle with modernity. 
 
China’s Response: A Technological Nation in the Making  
      
Although the case of China has attracted much scholarly attention in the context of 
discussing the whole question of modernity and the standard of ‘civilisation’, less 
attention has been paid to the role of science and technology in China’s encounter 
with international society. And yet, as Elman (2007: 523), a leading historian of 
science and technology in China, observes:  
If there has been one constant in China since the middle of the nineteenth century, it 
is that imperial reformers, early Republicans, and Chinese Communists have all 
prioritized modern science and technology. We can no longer afford to undervalue 
the place of science in modern contemporary China. China plans to send space 
expeditions to the moon and Mars in the twenty-first century are in part a response 
to the shock of heavy-handed Western and Japanese imperialism since 1850. 
Therefore, it is worth briefly considering how China’s encounter with international 
society has shaped its subsequent approach to scientific and technological 
development. It is not my purpose to go into a full discussion of the course of science 
and technology in China since 1850. My modest aim is primarily to briefly sketch the 
outlines in order to highlight the point that the origins of Chinese techno-nationalism 
can be found in the emergence of scientific and technological advancement as a key 
normative measuring rod in international society during the nineteenth century and 
how this compelled Chinese elites to respond to the ‘social pressure’ of introducing 
‘Western’ technology and industry.  
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The Pursuit of Technology and the Standard of Civilisation 
Certainly, one of the most dramatic consequences of China’s violent encounter with 
the expanding European International Society since the mid-nineteenth century was to 
bring about the realisation among Chinese statesmen that institutional reforms were 
needed in order to adapt to the new international environment. The most important 
attempt to modernise was what is usually known as the Self-Strengthening Movement 
with the aim to enhance China’s ‘wealth and strength’ (Kuo and Liu, 1978: 492). 
‘Self-strengthening’ was part of a new Qing foreign policy and diplomatic outlook, 
designed to manage relations with major Western powers based on ‘conciliation’ and 
‘the acceptance of the treaty system’ (Kuo and Liu, 1978: 492). In addition to the 
establishment of the Zongli Yamen in 1861, an important institutional innovation 
aimed at carrying out this new foreign policy, there was also a growing appreciation 
of international law and diplomatic practices (Zhang, 1991).  
   It was this backdrop of internal tension and external pressure that provided the 
impetus for a shift towards the introduction of these reforms, including the adoption 
of Western technology, as part of the Qing restoration. Despite the fact that there were 
a great many skilful officials, who tried to contribute to the restoration of the empire 
by imbuing the empire with a sense of purpose, bolstering the faltering economy, and 
establishing innovative institutions, Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo Zongtang 
are usually considered as the most influential of these (Spence, 1999: 192).89 What 
these influential reformers also shared in common was the view of the urgent need to 
pursue Western technology in the search for ‘wealth and strength’ (Kuo and Liu, 
1978).  
   This is not to say that there were not different views among late Qing reformists 
about the role of science and technology. But there was also an articulation of shared 
ideas and approaches that transcended political and philosophical divisions, which 
were indicative of the emergence of a nascent ideology of techno-nationalism. More 
specifically, Zeng, Li, and their advisors saw the construction of machines not only in 
narrow military terms, but also as the fundamental basis for industry. They were 
sharing the common conviction that there were three basic elements for building new 
industries: a) the manufacture of machines; b) the promotion of a new institutional 
                                                
89 Clearly, it is impossible to do justice to the multifaceted activities of these reformists, their personal 
backgrounds, and their complex motivations and political thought. A classic account of imperial 
reformists in late Qing Dynasty is Teng and Fairbank (1979). 
 
 
104 
category of ‘engineers’, and c) translating scientific and technical textbooks (Elman 
2005: 360). Significantly, key reformists, like Feng Guifen and Li, saw the 
construction of Chinese machines as an indicator of China’s leading role in 
international society, as a way to right the wrongs of past humiliations, and as a 
source of prestige (Teng and Fairbank, 1979: 54, 73). 
   In this regard, a recurring theme among influential ‘self-strengtheners’ was the need 
for the construction of ‘machines that make machines’. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in the establishment of arsenals and shipyards, the most important of 
which were the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fuzhou Navy Yard.90	  Besides the Jiangnan 
Arsenal and the Fuzhou Navy Yard, it has been estimated that 22 other key arsenals, 
shipyards, and factories were operating during the Self-Strengthening Movement 
(1861-1892) (Elman, 2006: 193). Many officially sponsored projects continued 
throughout the late nineteenth century as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement. 
But, among other factors, the prevailing conservatism and prejudice among Confucian 
literati and court officials hampered China’s path towards modernisation and 
industrialisation (Teng and Fairbank, 1979: 87). 
   
Modernisation vs. Westernisation: A false dichotomy? 
     
But the question remains about how to make sense of the impact of the pursuit of 
science and technology in late Qing Dynasty in the context of the operation of the 
standard of ‘civilisation’. In his important study on China and Japan’s encounter with 
the expanding European International Society, Suzuki (2009) explores how military, 
technology, and industrial development were key aspects of what the process of 
learning the competence and skill to be a ‘civilised’ state involved. Crucially, 
however, as Suzuki (2009: 101) observes, in contrast to Japanese elites who saw the 
introduction of Western technology as a key feature of demonstrating their ‘civilised’ 
identity, for Chinese elites industry and technology ‘served no value as a marker of 
‘civilized’ identity, as it did for the members of the Society’. 
   One of Suzuki’s major contributions in this regard has been to recognise that 
Chinese elites did not go beyond the introduction of Western technology and weapons 
to adopt European-style institutions on a wide scale, which would indicate their 
                                                
90 On the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Fuzhou Navy Yard see, for example, Elman (2005: 355-77).  
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intention to conform to the ‘standard of civilisation’ (Suzuki, 2009: 90, 106). Instead, 
they only linked industrialisation and Western technology to strengthening China 
militarily as a result of their socialisation into a competitive international environment 
(Suzuki 2009: 89-113). 
   While Suzuki’s argument is interesting and important, it downplays the fact that a 
firm analytical separation between becoming militarily powerful and confirming to 
the social standards as part of what accorded ‘civilised’ status within international 
society has two substantial consequences. First, a focus on technology as a sole 
attribute of military power provides a rather superficial separation between the 
material and ideational or social dimensions of technology. Yet, the author himself 
shows that Chinese reformers conceived technological modernisation in both military 
and non-military terms, as part of the competence and skill to be ‘civilised’. Second, 
this tension seems to arise partly because the author accepts, albeit reluctantly, the 
ti/yong dichotomy, according to which late Qing reformers opted for military 
modernisation, but not Westernisation (Suzuki, 2009: 93-4). Yet, an uncritical 
acceptance of the ti/yong schema does not help to account for some of the attitudes 
towards science and technology that emerged in China as a consequence of its 
encounter with international society. 
   To be sure, many Chinese reformists who advocated the introduction of Western 
weapons and technology operated within what is known as the ti/yong dichotomy, 
which is an abbreviated form of the longer prescription to understand ‘Chinese studies 
as the essence, Western studies as function’ (zhong xue wei ti, xi xue wei yong). In 
this regard, they called for the use of Western technology as functional means for 
Chinese ends, that is, the protection and preservation of Chinese civilisation.91 Hence, 
underlying the thought of Self-Strengthening supporters was the belief that ‘the 
“substance” (ti) of Confucian culture was essentially invulnerable to the “utility” 
(yong) of Western technology’ (Kuhn, 2002: 52). 
   How then can we make sense of the fact that the views of Chinese reformist elites 
were seemingly more open-minded and multidimensional than the ti/yong dichotomy 
suggests? It is worth remembering that the Chinese intellectual Liang Qichao would 
introduce the term of nationalism to the public discourse via Japan somewhere 
between 1899 and 1901. In the absence of the vocabulary of nationalism, the 
                                                
91 On the enduring importance of the ti/yong dichotomy and its relevance to Chinese nationalism, see 
Hughes (2011a).  
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advocates of the Self-Strengthening movement had to engage intellectually with the 
impact of transnational processes, unleashed by China’s encounter with global 
modernity, drawing on neo-Confucian concepts (Hughes, 2011a: 125). Thus, as 
Hughes (2011a: 119) argues, instead of focusing on the logical inconsistency of the 
ti/yong dichotomy as a philosophical proposition that separates ontologically 
scientific knowledge from culture, it makes more sense to treat it as a political act that 
can be traced back to the efforts by late Qing Dynasty officials ‘to mobilize the 
population by making tradition capable of harnessing the forces of nationalism’ 
during late nineteenth century China. 
   Consequently, the use of the ti/yong formula by the Chinese reformists can also be 
seen as a political move to reconcile new conceptions of ‘Western science’ with 
traditional forms of knowledge and learning (Elshakry, 2010: 100). In particular, since 
the mid-nineteenth century, the consolidation of the idea of a universal and 
teleological ‘Western science’ led Chinese reformists to resort to a further process of 
legitimisation and conceptual appropriation. This involved an attempt to encourage 
and reinterpret traditions and disciplines of knowledge that regarded China as the 
source of ‘Western learning’ (Elshakry, 2010: 102). This, in turn, had the effect of 
rendering the pursuit of ‘Western’ learning and technology more compatible with 
Confucian tradition and identity, and, thus, more acceptable to conservatives. The 
very fact that this position was held among imperial examiners until the early 
twentieth century is illustrative of how it was used by many conservatives as what 
Elman (2005: 397) calls ‘a strategic myth’.  
   Therefore, even if it is conceded that the ti/yong formula has some merit in the 
context of discussing the ways in which influential advocates of the Self-
Strengthening movement tried to appropriate the pursuit of Western technology as a 
necessary and pragmatic step towards military modernisation, but not westernisation, 
it is important to recognise the complex nature of this process generally and the 
multidimensional nature of the views of Chinese reformists on the role of science and 
technology in particular. True, conservatism and ideology, among other factors, led to 
the limited and cautious introduction of Western technology during the second half of 
the nineteenth century. But the social pressure created by the need to conform to the 
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operation of technological advancement as an informal standard of ‘civilisation’ was 
one of the key drivers behind China’s technological modernisation nonetheless.92       
 
From the Sino-Japanese War to Republican China and the Rise of Mr Science: 
‘Saving the Nation Through Science’ 
     
The Sino-Japanese War and its aftermath proved to be a turning point for China’s 
engagement with international society generally and science and technology in China 
in particular.93 One of the most important consequences of the War was that it gave 
rise to references to Japan as a great power and as a member of the family of 
‘civilised nations’, whereas perceptions of China as weak and decadent became 
prevalent (Paine, 2003: 18-9). But what is also noteworthy is that the Sino-Japanese 
War had the effect of fostering a greater interest in Western learning and science 
(Elman, 2005: 399).  
   More generally, in the years following the War, a series of events conspired to 
further destabilise what was already a volatile domestic political environment, which 
created in turn the preconditions for the birth of the ‘modern’ Chinese state in 1911, 
ushering in the Republican era. Crucially, however, the broader question of the 
relationship between science and technology and China’s struggle with global 
modernity remained at the heart of subsequent events. Perhaps, nowhere was this 
more apparent than in the May Fourth Movement. As Chow (1960: 358-9) points out, 
the May Fourth Movement was essentially an intellectual, political, and social 
movement aimed at achieving ‘national independence, the emancipation of the 
individual, and a just society by the modernization of China’. What was unique about 
it was the degree to which many intellectuals espoused a complete break with 
Confucianism and Chinese tradition in favour for an embrace of modernisation or 
Westernisation in all key facets of Chinese culture, from literature and ethics to 
philosophy and politics (Chow, 1960: 359). 
   Importantly, as Mitter (2004: 101) points out, ‘a faith in science and technology, 
linked with ideas of national salvation and reform’, appeared for many to be the 
                                                
92 After all, as far as Japan is concerned, it is worth remembering that the notion of combining foreign 
technology with Japanese values, which was encapsulated in the slogan ‘Japanese spirit and Western 
technology’ (wakon yōsai), helped Meiji intellectuals to legitimise policies designed to attain national 
wealth and power through industrial and technological development during the Meiji Restoration 
(Samuels, 1994: 36-7). 
93 On the importance and implications of the Sino-Japanese War, see Paine (2003).  
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solution to China’s manifold problems. Equally, according to Chow (1960: 359), the 
key underlying assumption behind advocating the creation of a new, modern 
civilisation to ‘save China’ was the idea that science and democracy constituted the 
essence of modern Western civilisation. This was evident in the famous slogans of 
‘Mr Science’ and ‘Mr Democracy’ associated with the May Fourth Movement 
(Mitter, 2004: 65).   
   Clearly, the emergence of ‘scientificism’ as a principal feature of the ideology of the 
May Fourth Movement was significant in itself, but there are a number of additional 
points that can be made about the state of science and technology in Republican China 
as they help to illustrate the relationship between the state, modernity, and 
technological development. First, in his important study on the Science Society of 
China (SSC), Wang (2002) shows how a new generation of scientists and engineers, 
many of whom were educated abroad, aspired to save China through science and 
technology. Notably, whereas the members of the Society were driven by both 
professionalism and nationalism, in reality scientific nationalism had the effect of 
moderating the interaction of scientists and engineers with the state. 
   Second, although the failure of the governments to bolster central bureaucratic 
authority in early Republican China did not provide a permissive material context for 
the formation of a strong national industrial base of the sort that is indicative of a 
techno-nationalist ideology, this changed with the government of Chiang Kai-shek. 
His government stressed the importance of industrial development over other sectors 
of the economy in order to turn China into a modern, industrial, and technologically 
advanced country. However, it was only after the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 
1931 that an effort to create a national-defence economy culminated in the 
formulation of an industrial policy with the organisation of the National Defense 
Planning Commission in 1932, which became known after 1935 as the National 
Resources Commission (NRC). One of the most important features of the NRC was 
its emergence as a self-consciously technocratic organisation through which China’s 
scientific and technological elite could harness technology and expertise for the 
service of the nation, relatively unencumbered by undue political interference (Kirby, 
1989: 29). Remarkably, a tangible manifestation of the NRC’s techno-nationalist 
ideology was its 1942 ‘Preliminary Enforcement Plan for Postwar Industrial 
Reconstruction’ that set out policies aimed at ensuring China’s status as an ‘equal’ 
and ‘modernized’ country (Kirby 1989: 32). Despite the fact that these policies 
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proved to be ambitious in light of the impact of the Sino-Japanese War and the 
ensuing civil war, it is striking, perhaps, that most of the NRC industrial facilities 
were transferred to Communist control in 1948-49 and most of its leaders decided to 
be in the service of a new Chinese government (Kirby, 1989: 37). 
   Consequently, the most general point to make is that the overall approach to 
industrialisation and development policy during the Nanjing decade (1927-1937) 
would provide the institutional and ideological foundations for the support of a 
postcolonial techno-nationalist vision of science and technology in Communist China. 
In short, the fundamental interaction between the state, power, and technological 
hierarchies in international society that has been at the heart of late Qing reformists 
and Republican China would continue to shape conceptions about the role of science 
and technology in the PRC. As we shall see in the next Chapter, the Cold War and the 
concomitant space race would only serve to intensify this process. 
 
India, Modernity, and the Making of the Postcolonial Technological State 
    
The importance of the close links between science, technology, and colonial rule in 
British India has attracted much attention in the scholarly literature that deals with the 
social history of science and technology in India. As many have noted, British saw 
science and technology as important features of their ‘civilising mission’ as well as a 
manifestation of their superior civilisation (Prakash, 1999: 3, Arnold, 2000: 15, 22, 
Kumar, 2006: 15). A detailed account of science, technology, colonialism and 
modernity in the context of British Empire and its impact on India is beyond the scope 
of this chapter, but some of the key aspects of this process are worth highlighting 
here. First, the period of British rule in India witnessed the effort by the colonisers to 
enlighten the natives through science as a source of reason, which had the effect of 
configuring the function of science both as culture and power. In this regard, the very 
idea of Western modernity was embedded in the scientific outlook of the colonial and 
imperial project in the sense that the authority and legitimacy of universal reason 
signified science and technology as tools of the British rule in India (Prakash, 1999: 
4).  
   Second, an important aspect of the projection of India as a modern colony was the 
development of infrastructures, practices, and institutions associated with the 
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representation of science and technology as configurations of Western authority and 
universal reason. This was manifested in the ways in which the colonial state used 
modern techniques of governmentality from irrigation and mining to the railways and 
the telegraph system (Prakash, 1999: 11, 159-70). Indeed, for Marquis of Dalhousie, 
who was Governor-General of India in the early 1850s, the telegraph and the postal 
system represented the two of the three ‘great engines of social improvement’ of 
colonial India. In his view, the third engine was the establishment of a network of 
railways, which epitomised the moral and material superiority of the coloniser over 
the colonised (Adas, 1989: 225). However, it should be noted that this process was 
further consolidated after the 1857 Mutiny that placed India under direct Crown rule. 
Against the backdrop of further centralisation and tightening colonial control, the 
development of science and technology became one of the largest state-sponsored 
undertakings under the Public Works Department (Baber, 1996: 185-6, 212; Prakash, 
1999: 4). 
   Third, the hierarchy of civilisations according to material accomplishments was also 
reflected in the reproduction of social hierarchies between the coloniser and the 
colonised. Not only was the Indian civilisation defined as stagnant and backward, but 
also the Indian worker had to be subordinated to the British engineer ‘as civiliser’ 
(Adas, 1989: 235-6). Equally, as Headrick (1988: 268) observes, the British were 
willing to educate the Indians only to a certain point. ‘Beyond that point, they 
withheld the culture of technology’. Yet, although the consolidation of colonial rule in 
India led to the development of colonial structures that facilitated the 
institutionalisation of Western scientific research and technological projects, which 
had a decisive impact on the indigenous system of science, Indian scientists were key 
agents in promoting the introduction of Western science and technology. In other 
words, it is important to acknowledge that the introduction of Western science and 
technology in India cannot be understood as a simple process of imposing Western 
traditions of knowledge on indigenous ones (Arnold, 2000: 12-4; Baber, 1996: 251).    
   Indeed, during the second half of the nineteenth century an Indian scientific elite 
gradually emerged that could identify with the project of Western modernity. A key 
part of this effort was the creation of institutions like the Indian Association for the 
Cultivation of Science, which was formally established in 1876 with the aim of 
educating Indian scientists on basic research under native control and management. 
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Notably, one of its students, C V Raman, would become the first Indian to be awarded 
the Nobel Prize for theoretical physics in 1930 (Baber, 229-30).  
   But what merit emphasis, however, is that the embracement of modernity by the 
Indian scientific community became gradually interwoven with the rise of nationalism 
that marked the growing intersection of science and politics. As Prakash (1999: 7) 
argues, it became increasingly accepted among anti-colonial nationalists that ‘to be a 
nation was to be endowed with science’. This involved the ‘rediscovery’ of a body of 
indigenous scientific traditions that was appropriated as congruous with Western 
science. Concomitant with this was a process of conceptual appropriation based on 
the idea that these traditions of science, technology, and knowledge were the past of 
the Indian nation imbued with universal thought and rationality. It was in this context 
that Hindu science soon emerged as ‘symbol of the modern nation’ and as a way to 
indigenise modernity. In turn, the claim by nationalists that Hindu science was an 
expression of universality and rationality reconfigured the colonial state defined by 
modern techniques, practices, and infrastructures as a national site that had to become 
independent (Prakash, 1999: 7-11).  
   Consequently, not only was science at the heart of the imagination and institution of 
India as a colonial project, but also became essential in the reconstruction of India as 
an independent nation. This was evident in the widely held assumption among 
nationalists that India succumbed to colonial rule because it did not manage to 
become modern. In this view of the past, as Chacko (2011: 186) notes, it was India’s 
failure to develop a scientific outlook, and thus, to meet the standard of civilisation set 
by the European international society that brought India under British control. Indeed, 
in the postcolonial world the development of a scientific outlook emerged as an 
indicator of national character predicated on the idea that the nexus between modern 
science and the nation-state was a key factor in the making of the dominant European 
powers. In response, postcolonial states had to adapt and imitate these practices 
(Harrison and Johnson, 2009: 3).  
   The colonial experience, therefore, led to the conviction that India was backward, 
which in turn gave rise to the desire of mimicking Western practices, including 
science and technology. But whereas the increasing acceptance of modernity among 
Indian elites was seen as an inescapable process of the emerging international order, 
given the country’s colonial past, India’s response to modernity could not be 
underpinned by simple mimicry. India had to foster a different modernity ‘on its own 
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terms’ (Prakash, 1999: 200). Put differently, the mimicry of Western modernity had to 
be counterbalanced with ambivalence towards Western modernity in order to 
highlight India’s difference as a postcolonial civilisational entity (Chacko, 2011: 186).  
As we shall see in Chapter 5, these themes underlined the emergence of a powerful 
postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology under the leadership of Nehru that signified 
the pursuit of space projects as normative indicators of the postcolonial state’s power, 
status, and modernity.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
Drawing on the concept of the ‘standard of civilisation’ and building on ideas from 
the history of science and technology, this chapter has argued that the origins of 
techno-nationalism and its enduring relevance to conceptions of technology as a 
normative indicator of power, status, and modernity can be found in the expansion of 
the European international society during the nineteenth century. I developed this 
argument by examining the ways in which scientific and technological attainments 
were seen to function as material and symbolic indicators of the cultural superiority of 
European colonial powers since the nineteenth century and how China and India were 
constructed as ‘uncivilised’, premised on European assumptions and perceptions 
about civilisational hierarchies and technological advancement. Crucially, although 
the first and the second World Wars have had a profound impact on the discourse of 
civilisation and notions of European superiority over non-European societies, sites of 
inclusion and exclusion on the basis of technological capabilities continued, and still 
continue, to define distinctions between outsiders and insiders and, thus, political 
forms of hierarchy, power, and status in international society.  
   This conceptual rethinking helps to highlight how China and India’s formative 
experience with the European international society still informs a powerful variant of 
techno-nationalism in a postcolonial context. As we shall see in the following 
chapters, this becomes an important consideration, especially given how China and 
India remain enmeshed in a process of negotiating their role as non-European 
emerging technological powers in the context of modernisation, development, and 
globalisation. But before we consider how these dynamics of identity and history play 
out in international space society, we need to take a closer look at the ways in which 
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the consolidation of a postcolonial techno-nationalism has had an enduring influence 
on the pursuit of the Chinese and Indian space programmes from their inception.   
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Chapter 4.  The Long March Into Space: China’s Space Programme 
(1956-1989)   
 
 
This chapter provides an overview and analysis of the origins and development of 
China’s space programme from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s. It does this by 
placing the relationship between science and technology and China’s quest for high-
visible technological projects in its specific historical context. In some ways, China’s 
early interest in pursuing a space programme was influenced by the same military, 
political, and prestige considerations that shaped the space programmes of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Like the first two participants in the Space Age, China’s 
initial space endeavour can be seen as a reflection of the realisation that building 
space capabilities would enhance military effectiveness and improve China’s 
international political prestige during the Cold War. Like the United States and the 
Soviet Union, China’s space programme also benefited largely from ballistic missile 
development, which was driven by its nuclear programme. 
   Yet, despite the fact that the case of China may not appear to be quite distinctive in 
this respect, this chapter suggests that the context and evolution of the Chinese space 
programme was rather unique not the least because China, when compared with the 
United States and the Soviet Union, was not only a relatively backward state in terms 
of its economy and technology, but also went through periods of sustained political 
and social turmoil during the Maoist era. Under such circumstances, as Hymans 
(2012: 125) points out in his analysis of China’s nuclear weapons programme, the key 
question is ‘how did China’s nuclear weapons project succeed?’. Clearly, this is a 
question that is also pertinent to the space programme, albeit one that is yet to be 
elaborated in the relevant literature.  
   In addressing the question of how China’s space programme succeeded, this chapter 
argues that its space effort, from its inception, has been especially marked by the 
influence of postcolonial techno-nationalism. Indeed, the history and evolution of 
space development in China might have been different were it not for postcolonial 
techno-nationalism as a composite and complex, but influential, ideology that 
rendered the pursuit of space projects appealing to China’s political and scientific elite 
as a normative indicator of the state’s scientific prowess, great power status, and 
modernity. This is not the same as simply arguing that the space programme received 
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considerable support and protection from the high echelons of the Chinese leadership. 
After all, this was not always the case, as we shall see. Equally importantly, and 
echoing again Hyman’s question, postcolonial techno-nationalism does not only help 
to account for the reasons why China decided to build specific space technologies in 
the first place and how it used them once they were acquired, but also helps to 
highlight how building these technologies was justified and implemented efficiently 
(Hymans, 2012: 127).  
   Certainly, any attempt to provide an historical account of China’s early quest for 
becoming a space-faring nation is inevitably confronted with the brevity of available 
and/or reliable information as a consequence of the general opaqueness that underpins 
much of China’s space-related activities. Unfortunately, to a great extent, Johnson-
Freese’s description of the space programme as ‘a mystery within a maze’ back in 
1998 is still valid (Johnson-Freese, 1998). Moreover, a definite political history of the 
Chinese space programme is yet to be written. However, recent works have offered 
helpful insights into how key decisions and space projects have come about, the most 
important of which is A Place for One’s Mat by Kulacki and Lewis.94 Building on 
these works helps to illustrate some of the main issues and themes discussed in this 
chapter. Another invaluable source on which this chapter draws upon is the lengthy 
official history of the space programme China Today: Space Industry by the Ministry 
of Space Industry, as it enriches our understanding of what can be called the 
‘consensus narrative’ of principal decisions and events from a Chinese perspective.95 
In putting forward the above argument, the chapter also relies on the scholarly 
literature that deals with techno-nationalism and the history of China’s nuclear and 
missile programmes, especially on the evidence and insights provided by Lewis and 
Xue, and Feigenbaum.96  
                                                
94 Other useful works include: Chen (1991); Chen (1999); Johnson-Freese (1998); Harvey (2004); 
Handberg and Li (2006); Zheng (2007); Besha (2010); Zhang (2010); Moltz (2012: 70-89); Harvey 
(2013); Li (2013); Solomone (2013); and Erickson (2014).  
95 The Chinese version was published in 1986 entitled ‘Dangdai Zhongguo de Hangtian Shiye’ edited 
by Jun Zhang and was translated in English in 1992. A copy of the English edition is somewhat rare to 
find, but this is compounded by some confusion regarding who is attributed as the main editor of the 
volume. In the English edition, Jun Zhang is indicated as the chief editor of the volume in general, 
whereas Liu Jiyuan is credited with editing the English edition. Some works in the western literature 
refer to Liu as the editor, but here I have chosen to cite Zhang as the chief editor not the least because 
this is how the source is mainly known among experts of China’s strategic weapons programme. Zhang 
Yun was director of the Ministry of Space Industry.   
96  See Lewis and Xue (1988); Lewis and Xue (1994); Feigenbaum (2003), Feigenbaum (1999a), and 
Feigenbaum (1999b). See also Lewis and Hua (1992); and Hymans (2012: 124-56).  
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   The discussion of this chapter is organised in the following way. The first section 
spells out briefly the principal factors that led to the Chinese decision to build the 
bomb, which had far-reaching implications for the country’s overall scientific and 
technical direction, before offering a brief sketch of the main individuals that shaped 
the strategic weapons programme. While there is no doubt that the role of Mao 
Zedong and Zhou Enlai was instrumental, most attention is given to Marshal Nie 
Rongzhen largely because it was the articulation of his postcolonial techno-nationalist 
vision that had a profound impact on the trajectory of the strategic weapons 
programme, and, consequently, on the space programme.97 However, I do this by 
briefly assessing the impact of one other key figure, Qian Xuesen, who is usually 
known as ‘the father of China’s missile and space programmes’. The second section 
then delves into the first phase of the space programme (1956-1966), during which 
work on China’s first satellite was put forth, only to be suspended due to the excesses 
of the Great Leap Forward. Nonetheless, the satellite project was soon revitalised 
along postcolonial techno-nationalist lines. The second phase of the space programme 
coincides with the decade of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which is the focus 
of the third section. Despite the fact that the Cultural Revolution engulfed the entire 
Chinese society, this period also saw China joining the space club with the successful 
launch of its first satellite in 1970, which was followed by other space feats. The 
fourth section moves on to consider the third phase of China’s space activities in the 
post-Mao era (1976-1989). Although this period was marked by Deng’s emphasis on 
few space projects that could contribute to economic modernisation, such as 
communication and meteorological satellites, the reconsolidation of a postcolonial 
techno-nationalist vision in the mid-1980s enshrined in the ‘863 High-Tech Plan’ 
provided a new impetus for the space programme, including human spaceflight. Of 
equal significance, this period also heralded China’s engagement with the evolving 
international space society.  
 
                                                
97 The terms ‘strategic weapons’, ‘high technology’, and ‘strategic technology’ are used here 
interchangeably, unless explicitly stated otherwise, to describe what the Chinese call the ‘Two Bombs, 
One Satellite’ or Liangdan Yixing project.  This is usually a reference to the atomic and the hydrogen 
bombs and the first satellite, but it has become synonymous with the successful building of nuclear and 
space capabilities in the 1960s and 1970s. Other related highly complex technological projects of that 
period, such as the missile programme and the nuclear submarine projects, have been part of the 
strategic weapons programme. See Cheung (2009: 238).   
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The Decision to Build the Bomb and Techno-nationalism 
 
The Impact of the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet Cooperation 
     
Almost from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the 
political and military elites were well aware of China’s technological gap with the 
advanced countries of the West and the need to respond to the new competitive 
international environment of the Cold War. While the Second World War served to 
illuminate the growing importance of technology in modern warfare, it was China’s 
experience of the Korean War of 1950-53 that revealed the extent of its technological 
backwardness and galvanised industrial military modernisation (Feigenbaum, 2003: 
16-21; Chen, 1994: 223). 
   Therefore, despite the People Liberation Army’s early emphasis on ‘fighting a 
people’s war with a people’s army’, the trauma of the Korean War highlighted the 
urgency for depending more on advanced technology and professionalism (Lewis and 
Xue, 1988: 9).98 This compelled Chinese leaders to rely on the Soviet Union for 
technical assistance as part of China’s declared ‘leaning to one side’ policy.99 
Consequently, China and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on 14 February 1950. Soviet aid took the 
form of what has been described as ‘the most comprehensive technology transfer in 
modern history’ (Dittmer, 1992: 18-20). But while, in principle, the Sino-Soviet 
alliance meant that the Soviets would provide China with a nuclear umbrella, Mao 
was suspicious of the Soviet eagerness to resort to the use of nuclear force in support 
of China. This led to a shift from China’s ‘leaning to one side’ policy to an emphasis 
on ‘self-reliance’ (Chen, 1994: 222). Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration 
alluded to the use of atomic weapons during the Korean armistice talks. Atomic 
threats were also issued during other crises that involved the United States and China, 
including the Indochina crisis in 1953 and the first Taiwan Straits crisis in 1954-55. 
The subsequent forward deployment of US nuclear-capable forces in areas 
surrounding China had the effect of intensifying concerns among Chinese leaders 
about the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons against their country and underlined 
the need for achieving nuclear deterrence (Foot, 1995: 169-70). The structural 
                                                
98 On the doctrine of People’s War, see, inter alia, Burles and Shulsky (2000: 22-5); and Scobell (2003: 
46-9).   
99 For an account of the diplomatic and political background of the ‘lean-to-one-side’ decision, see, for 
example, Chen (2001: 44-6, 50-3).  
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pressure on Chinese leaders to acquire nuclear weapons only increased with the 
unfolding of the Sino-Soviet split since the late 1950s  
     
The Decision to Build the Bomb 
 
Clearly, these events acted as a catalyst for the decision to build a national strategic 
force and urged the Chinese leadership to consider the establishment of an indigenous 
strategic weapons programme (Lewis and Xue, 1988: 35). However, even though the 
overarching geostrategic circumstances of the Cold War help to explain why the 
Chinese leaders decided to develop the strategic weapons programme, as many 
scholars note, ideational influences were also important. Indeed, as Lewis and Xue 
(1988: 35) point out, given ‘the nationalistic ideology and concepts of force and 
diplomacy’ of Mao and other Chinese leaders, the decision to manufacture a bomb 
might have been taken even without these external pressures. According to Foot 
(1995: 170), the possession of nuclear weapons as a marker of great power status, the 
desire to overcome its putative century of humiliation, and the use of nuclear power 
for economic purposes were also key drivers behind China’s quest for building the 
bomb. 
   In this regard, while Mao’s thinking has been complex and often contradictory, 
there is a plethora of evidence to suggest that his desire for the bomb was also driven 
by national identity impulses entrenched in China’s colonial experience (Hymans, 
2012: 134-5).100 As Mao famously stated in 1958, ‘as for the atomic bomb, this big 
thing, without it people say you don’t count for much. Fine, then we should build 
some’ (cited in Johnston, 1995/96: 8). On a different occasion, Mao encouraged the 
scientists involved with the nuclear programme to accelerate their work by instructing 
them, ‘We are stronger than before and will be stronger in the future. We will have 
not only more planes and artillery but atomic bombs as well. If we are not to be 
bullied in this present-day world, we cannot do without the bomb’ (cited in Lewis and 
Xue, 1988: 142).101 Thus, for all his public references to the atomic bomb as a ‘paper 
tiger’ and his proclamation of ‘fighting a people’s war’, in reality Mao conveyed a 
                                                
100 There is a conspicuous absence of a work that focuses explicitly on Mao’s nationalism in the 
existing literature. However, in his important analysis of Mao’s political thought, Schram (1989: 8, 15) 
identifies nationalism as a key theme of his thinking. For an overview of Mao’s views about nuclear 
weapons, see Zhang (1999).  
101 This nationalist impulsion was also evident in Mao’s discussion with Soviet Ambassador Yudin. 
See Christensen (1996: 209).  
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quite different message to his inner circle and to those involved with the development 
of the nation’s nuclear weapons programme: ‘whatever they have, we must have’ 
(Lewis and Xue, 1994: 209).   
   What should be added is that other Chinese leaders also shared this deep-rooted 
symbolic and psychological importance attached to the bomb. For example, as one 
representative of a Chinese scientific association put it in 1951: ‘only when we 
ourselves have the atomic weapon, and are fully prepared, is it possible for the 
frenzied warmongers to listen to our just and reasonable proposals…’ (cited in Harris, 
1965: 94). More tellingly, perhaps, expressing the operation of technological 
attainments as an informal standard of modernity, Premier Zhou Enlai remarked after 
the detonation of China first nuclear device, ‘Have we not exploded an atom bomb? 
Has not the label, ‘sick man of the east’, fastened on us by Westerners, been flung 
off?’ (quoted in Foot, 1995: 172).102 Equally tellingly, addressing a group of Japanese 
reporters, Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated in the early 1960s, ‘atomic bombs, missiles 
and supersonic aircraft are reflections of the technical level of a nation’s industry. 
China will have to solve this issue within the next several years; otherwise, it will 
degenerate into a second-class nation’ (cited in Lewis and Xue, 1988: 194). 
   It was against this backdrop that the decision to build the bomb was taken in 
January 1955 (Lewis and Xue, 1988: 37-9).  But although we might reasonably expect 
that there was a consensus about building the bomb, reality was more complex. It was 
only after Marshall Nie Rongzhen and his aides articulated successfully a postcolonial 
techno-nationalist argument that China’s nuclear programme made progress.  
   
The Rise of Techno-nationalism and Marshall Nie Rongzhen  
 
In the context of discussing how China succeeded in carrying out its first nuclear test 
by 1964, a central explanation usually offered is that China received crucial technical 
assistance from the Soviet Union. Certainly, Soviet help was fairly generous in many 
fields, but it also ‘imposed demands and restrictions’ on the Chinese side (Lewis and 
                                                
102 Racial and civilisational qualities ascribed to the bomb have been quite prominent in the Western 
discourse of nuclear non-proliferation. As Powell (1965: 616) noted, after the successful testing of 
China’s first bomb, ‘It is as portent of the future that the mushroom cloud over West China has crucial 
importance for the peace and security of the world. All previous atomic testing has been carried out by 
industrial powers of the Occident; Communist China is non-Western, non-white and only semi-
industrialized’. On this racial dimension with regards to the Chinese bomb, see, inter alia, Jones (2010: 
401-49). 
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Xue, 1988: 221, 228). As Hymans (2012: 130) points out, Soviet technology transfer 
‘was far from determinative’ when it came to the nuclear weapons project. In fact, it 
was to a great extent the abrupt Soviet withdrawal that accelerated the progress of the 
strategic weapons programme (Lewis and Xue, 1988: 224). As we shall see, the 
Soviet withdrawal had a similar effect on the space programme. Another standard 
explanation provided is that China benefited enormously from Western-educated 
Chinese scientists who returned to China. True, by the early 1950s, a number of 
remarkable Western-educated scientists began returning to China from abroad to 
devote their energy to the conduct of cutting-edge scientific research usually related to 
the strategic weapons programme, including the US educated Qian Xuesen (more on 
whom below). But while it can be quite tempting to attribute the development of 
nuclear weapons or missiles to a few outstanding individuals, large-scale scientific 
research (big science), encompasses a large number of scientists working in numerous 
specialised research institutions defined by a clear division of labour between them. 
These were definitely qualities of the strategic weapons projects, save for the periods 
during which political and social turbulence hindered the progress of these projects 
(Hymans, 2012: 132).  
   How then can we make sense of the success of the strategic weapons programme? 
To be sure, Mao initially accorded to specific projects the necessary strong political 
support. But as he became more preoccupied with his revolutionary cause, he was less 
interested in getting directly involved even with the nuclear weapons project (Lewis 
and Xue, 1988: 221). What is more, his political campaigns created many obstacles to 
the advancement of these projects. It was the ‘organizational genius’ Marshall Nie 
Rongzhen (1899-1992) who gets much credit for the successful course of the strategic 
weapons programmes (Lewis and Xue, 1988: 235, 223; Lewis and Xue, 1994: 239; 
Feigenbaum, 2003: 15; Hymans, 2012: 133). Two of Marshal Nie’s important 
breakthroughs merit emphasis. First, Nie and his aides articulated a techno-nationalist 
vision since the mid-1950s that justified the flow of enormous resources into strategic 
weapons projects. In response to those who opposed the prospect of building such 
technologies on both economic and military grounds, Nie put forward the argument 
that strategic weapons could play a decisive role both in national security and 
economic development terms, and thus, they could enhance the international political 
standing of China in international society (Feigenbaum, 2003: 15, 27-31). 
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   Second, Nie’s role was crucial in forging a nationwide organisational structure 
based on the coalition between high-politics and big science backed by Zhou Enlai 
(Lewis and Xue, 1988: 224, 229; Lewis and Xue, 1994: 239). What made this 
managerial system quite effective and innovative was the establishment of strongly 
professional and flexible organisations of horizontal controls and flattened hierarchy, 
premised on the autonomy of scientists and limited political and bureaucratic 
interference (Feigenbaum, 2003: 39-60). As a consequence, the personal and 
professional motivation of those working for the strategic technology projects was 
blended together with a sense of national mission and pride (Lewis and Xue, 1988: 
232-6; Hymans, 2012: 139).  
   Two additional points are worth making here. First, it is difficult to make sense of 
how Nie’s techno-nationalism became so influential without recognising the 
postcolonial context of his vision. For even a cursory glance at his memoirs and 
statements serves to highlight that his understanding about the place of science and 
technology in China was much informed by China’s colonial legacy and the need to 
right the wrongs of its humiliating past by ‘saving China through science’.  
   In his memoirs, Nie (1988: 663-4) explains what motivated him to get involved with 
leading the strategic technology programme: ‘The Chinese people who created a new 
China through decades of struggle will certainly be able to turn their motherland into 
a modern, powerful country in the next decades…I saw in my youth how the old 
China, being poor and backward was humiliated by the imperialists. This left an 
indelible mark on my mind…I was guided by the ideal of “saving the country through 
the development of industry”’. The marshal also notes, ‘The imperialists dared to 
bully us precisely because we were backward. To extricate ourselves from this 
passive position, we had to advance as rapidly as possible and, therefore, must 
develop science and technology energetically’ (Nie, 1988: 661). Equally remarkably, 
in addressing the opponents of the strategic weapons programme, Nie (1988: 702) 
postulates a postcolonial techno-nationalist rationale that it is worth quoting at length: 
 
For more than a century, imperialists had frequently bullied, humiliated and 
oppressed China. To put an end to this situation, we had to develop sophisticated 
weapons such as the guided missile and atomic bombs, so that we would have the 
minimum means of reprisal if attacked by imperialists with nuclear weapons…[W]e 
had become keenly aware that the pursuit of guided missiles and atomic bombs 
would advance us in many other branches of modern science and technology. 
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Hence, acknowledging the postcolonial dimension of the vision expounded by Nie 
and his associates helps to illustrate why China’s techno-nationalism has been 
somewhat different from that of Western countries. It also helps to explain how the 
plasticity of this postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology and the necessary political 
myths that animated it facilitated the creation of a broader synergy among the political 
leadership, scientists, and the military establishment.   
   Second, although Nie’s influence on the strategic weapons programme is widely 
recognised in the literature that deals with the nuclear and missile programmes, 
scholarly works on China’s space programme have usually overlooked his vital 
role.103 Yet, this is not often the case with Qian Xuesen, who is usually seen as the 
key individual behind China’s space effort and to whom we now turn.  
 
Qian Xuesen  
 
Qian Xuesen (1911-2009) is regarded as one of the most important aeronautical 
engineers and scientists of the past century.104 After graduating from the Shanghai 
Jiatong University in mechanical engineering, he received a Boxer Rebellion 
Scholarship and left China in 1935 to study aeronautical engineering in the United 
States. Although he began his studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), one year later he moved to the California Institute of Technology, known as 
Caltech, where he completed his PhD in 1939 under the mentorship of Theodore von 
Karman, the world-renowned aeronautical scientist. He would work for four years as 
a research assistant at Caltech. In 1945, he became a co-founder of the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL), which was initially funded by the US military and later came under 
NASA. Notably, as the Second World War was nearing the end in 1945, Qian joined a 
team of top scientists led by Karman that visited defeated Germany to assess the 
progress of Nazi German missiles, where he interrogated Wernher von Braun. 
Subsequently, in 1949, he was appointed the Robert Goddard Professor of jet 
propulsion at Caltech (Chang, 1995: 40-113, 140-49). However, his life took a 
dramatic turn when barely one year after his appointment as the Robert Goddard 
Professor of jet propulsion at Caltech, he was labelled a communist at the height of 
                                                
103 For example, it appears that in Chinese Space Policy by Handberg and Li (2006) there is no single 
mention to Marshal Nie. 
104 The best biography of Qian remains Chang (1995), on which this section draws. 
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the witch-hunts of the McCarthy period. Qian tried to return to China, but he was 
arrested on accusation of attempting to ‘send technical material overseas’. After his 
release he spent five years under virtual house arrest. Eventually, Qian and his family 
were deported to China in exchange for the return of American Korean War prisoners 
of war (Chang, 1995: 149-98).  
   Qian’s immediate involvement with the strategic weapons programme upon his 
arrival to China was pivotal, but it is necessary to make a number of points about his 
role in the missile and space programmes at this juncture. First, while there is a 
widely held belief that he ‘single-handedly led China’s space and military rocketry 
efforts’, this is somewhat overstated.105 Indeed, there is a standard narrative in the 
United States according to which China’s space and missile programmes might not 
have been progressed, were it for his forced return to China. Yet, Qian was not the 
main contributor to the design of any Chinese missile or satellite (Kulacki and Lewis, 
2009: 30). According to Kulacki and Lewis (2009: 30), these views about Qian in the 
United States are enmeshed in ‘American myths’ about the role of ‘great men’ in 
history and McCarthyism. While there is clearly something into this, I would argue 
that these American views about Qian are also reflective of a subtle Eurocentrism in 
the sense that only somebody who was educated in the United States could help China 
to develop its missile and space programmes. This sort of subtle Eurocentrism is also 
linked to another ‘myth’ indicated above regarding the impact of Soviet technology 
transfer to China’s missile and space projects. Following this logic, China’s strategic 
weapons programme would not have advanced, were it not for Soviet technical aid.  
   Second, Chinese narratives about Qian also overstate his contribution to China’s 
missile and space projects largely for political reasons. Remarkably, Qian began to 
heap praise and honours only after he expressed his support to the Chinese leadership 
for the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. Since then, a glorification campaign 
has occurred that has elevated Qian to one of the most eulogised and honoured 
Chinese scientists not only for his contribution to the ‘Two Bombs, One Satellite’ 
project, but also for his allegiance to the Party. Consequently, a ‘Qian literature’ has 
emerged that reproduces this official Party narrative of ‘hero construction’, which has 
been facilitated by Qian’s self-representation as a patriot and a loyal to the Party 
(Wang, 2011).  
                                                
105 This description is taken from the New York Times Qian’s obituary (Wines, 2009).  
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   What was then Qian’s main role in the missile and space programmes? For Kulacki 
and Lewis (2009: 30), ‘Qian, is first and foremost, a cheerleader, pressing China’s 
leaders to consider the possibilities of interplanetary spaceflight…In other cases, he 
was essential to move the bureaucracy’. These observations are not quite dissimilar to 
what Chang identifies as Qian’s principal contributions. According to Chang (1995: 
209), one of the most important aspects of Qian’s participation in the missile and 
space projects was that he instilled a sense of confidence in the Chinese leadership. 
As a standout scientist with an international reputation, Qian had the attention of the 
Chinese leaders. As Lin Jin, a missile expert confirms, Qian ‘did not make any 
specific contribution or specific missiles, but it was his overall vision and 
organization that mattered. He was the one who made the proposals and gave advice 
to Mao and Zhou Enlai. They listened to him. He got us the funding’ (quoted in 
Chang, 1995: 209). In this regard, Qian’s ‘role was symbolic’ (Chang, 1995: 209). 
Qian also contributed significantly to the organisational direction of the missile effort 
and he initiated and guided several key missile and space projects (Chang, 1995: 210-
1). Crucially, all of the above contributions dovetailed nicely with Nie’s techno-
nationalist vision.  
        
The Twelve-Year Science and Technology Plan  
 
 In January 1955, the Soviet chief advisor to the president of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences (CAS), V. A. Kovda, submitted a report to the academy on ‘Some Measures 
for the Planning and Organisation of Chinese National Scientific Research Work’. 
Then a series of events unfolded that culminated in the ‘Outline of a Long-Term Plan 
for the Development of Science and Technology, 1956-1967’, known as the Twelve-
Year Science and Technology Plan. The big-scale and ambitious 1956 plan set the 
stage for further Sino-Soviet cooperation, but it was also an important step towards 
making science and technology an essential part of ‘nation-building and state 
formation’ (Wang, 2015: 180). Wang (2015) details how the plan was the product of 
political tensions and compromises between a radical approach to science and 
technology based on revolutionary mobilisation favoured by Mao and a more 
technocratic vision supported by Zhou Enlai and Marshal Nie.   
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   Nevertheless, a consensus reached at the 1956 conference that Western-influenced 
scientists and engineers should be trusted to contribute to the formation of communist 
China and, so, the technocratic vision won the day, something that helped to put 
forward the science plan. Significantly, this compromise partly reflected Chinese 
leadership considerations concerning building nuclear and missile technology (Wang, 
2015: 184; Zhang, 1992: 5). Focusing on the quest for modernising China’s national 
economic and scientific capability, the programme intended to follow the global 
trends in key world science and technology areas of research. Fifty-seven projects 
were identified for their significance in this regard, with five of them – atomic energy, 
electronics, jet propulsion, automation, and rare mineral exploration – designated as 
the most urgent ones (Cao, 2004: 29). Despite the fact that the 1956 plan did not 
explicitly identify the building of atomic bombs and missiles, the top five 
aforementioned areas of research were directly applicable to the nuclear and missile 
development. The connection between civilian scientific research and the nuclear and 
missile programmes, which was reflected in the 1956 plan, was further strengthened 
by the appointment of Marshal Nie as head of the high-level Science Planning 
Commission of the State Council in late 1956, given that Nie was already in charge of 
the strategic weapons programme (Wang, 2015: 192).  
   What is noteworthy is that Qian Quesen, as head of the General Group tasked with 
the overall drafting of the plan, was instrumental in shaping its direction and its focus 
on missile development. Qian’s recommendations were also critical in convincing the 
Chinese government that missile development should be prioritised over building 
aircraft technology (Wang, 2015: 193; Chang, 1995: 211-12; Erickson, 2014: 145). 
Consequently, in April 1956, the Aeronautical Industry Commission (AIC) was 
formed, with marshal Nie as chairman and Qian as one of its members. One month 
later, it was decided that AIC would be responsible for setting up the administration 
for missile research (the Fifth Bureau) and the Missile Research Academy (the Fifth 
Research Academy) (Zhang, 1992: 5). This decision marked the beginning of the first 
phase of the space programme.   
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The First Phase (1956-1966): Maoist China and the Advent of the Space Age  
 
The beginning of China’s space effort has its origins in the establishment of the Fifth 
Academy of the Department of Defence on 8 October 1956 (Chen, 1991: 117; Zhang, 
1992: 6; Harvey, 2004: 22). With Qian Xuesen as its first director, the academy was a 
missile research and development organisation aimed at building long-range missiles 
to counter the US threat to China (Lewis and Hua, 1992: 7). However, given their 
limited knowledge about missile technology, the Chinese had little choice other than 
looking for Soviet technical and material help. In August 1956, Nie asked Vice 
Minister Li Fuchun, who was in Moscow negotiating Soviet economic aid, to request 
technical assistance in building guided missiles (Nie, 1988: 694). From the outset, the 
Soviets were reluctant to assist the Chinese with developing missile technology and 
other sophisticated weapons, but they eventually agreed to supply to China two R-1 
missiles in September 1956. These were essentially Soviet replicas of the Nazi 
German V-2 rockets. The primitive nature of these rockets meant that they were not 
of much help to the Chinese (Lewis and Hua, 1992: 7).  
   Nevertheless, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev soon expressed his willingness to 
provide more advanced missiles to China because he urgently needed Mao’s political 
support in his effort to consolidate his political position, which had weakened both at 
home and abroad after his denunciation of Stalin (de-Stalinization) and the protests in 
Poland and Hungary (Lewis and Xue, 1988: 62; Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 5). In 
September 1957, Nie, together with PLA generals, led the Chinese delegation in the 
Soviet Union for talks. After marathon negotiations that lasted 35 days, the Sino-
Soviet New Defence Technical Accord was signed on 15 October 1957 (Nie, 1988: 
696). Under the 1957 October agreement, the Soviet Union delivered two R-2 
missiles, followed by the supply of blueprints and technical documents (comprising of 
10,151 volumes) related to manufacturing, testing, and launching the two missiles. 
Subsequently, Soviet missile engineers visited Beijing and the Fifth Academy 
obtained twelve additional R-2 missiles. With the delivery of the R-2 missiles, the 
Fifth Academy soon embarked upon an effort to copy them, named project ‘1059’. 
The 1059 project essentially marked the birth of the Chinese ballistic missile 
programme (Lewis and Hua, 1992: 8). But it was an international event, the launch of 
Sputnik, which paved the way for plans to launch China’s first satellite.  
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Mao and Sputnik 
    
Chairman Mao Zedong gets much of the credit for China’s decision to develop its first 
satellite soon after the launch of Sputnik in October 1957. Indeed, the Chinese leader 
was genuinely impressed by the Soviet feat in space (Lewis and Xue, 1988: 68; 
Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 4-5; Zhang, 2010: 4-6). In November 1957, shortly after the 
1957 October agreement and the launch of Sputnik, the Chinese leader visited 
Moscow to take part in the conference of World Communist and Workers’ Parties, 
which was scheduled to coincide with the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the 
Bolshevik revolution. There is agreement among scholars that the 1957 Moscow 
conference signalled the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split.106 But despite serious 
points of conflict in the Sino-Soviet partnership, during his stay in the Soviet Union 
Mao adopted a somewhat conciliatory tone. Both sides had agreed that it was 
necessary to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp. Besides, participating at the 
conference presented for Mao a good opportunity to offer his political support to 
Khrushchev in exchange for the future provision of Soviet assistance to China’s 
nuclear and missile programmes as part of the 1957 October agreement (Luthi, 2008: 
74-9).    
   What is especially noteworthy for our purposes is that Mao made several 
remarkable references to Sputnik during his stay in the Soviet Union. When he arrived 
at the Moscow airport on 2 November 1957, the Chinese leader stated that since the 
Bolshevik revolution the Soviet Union had attained many successes that indicated its 
standing ‘in the foremost rank among the countries of the world’ and that sending the 
first satellite in orbit ‘was no simple matter’ as it heralded the beginning of a new era 
‘in mankind’s [efforts] to conquer nature further’ (Mao, 1957a: 758). In his speech at 
the conference on 14 November 1957, Mao acknowledged that the Soviet Union was 
the leader of the socialist camp by making an explicit link to China’s lack of satellite 
technology. In his words: ‘We, China, cannot be the head. We are not qualified; we 
have [too] little experience...In terms of population we are a big country; in economic 
terms we are a small country. We have not sent up even half a satellite’ (Mao, 1957b: 
768). In another speech addressed to Chinese students and trainees in Moscow, which 
became known for his assertion that the East wind was destined to prevail over the 
                                                
106 For an early insightful account of the Moscow conference, see Zagoria (1961). For a recent analysis 
of the importance of the conference in the Sino-Soviet partnership, see Shen and Xia (2009).   
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West wind, Mao described the launch of the two Soviet satellites, along with the 
Bolshevik Revolution and the 1957 Moscow conference, as major turning points in 
the history of humankind (Mao, 1957c: 775).107 
   What Mao’s reaction to Sputnik suggests, therefore, is that the prestige value and 
the tangible military implications of the first Soviet satellite had quite impressed him. 
For Mao, the balance of power between the East and West had changed because of the 
supposed superior capacity of the Soviet Union to deliver nuclear weapons (Lewis 
and Xue, 1988: 217). But while the Soviet accomplishment in space was a mark of the 
power of the Soviet Union, it had also persuaded Mao of the superiority of the 
socialist camp in general (Pantsov and Levine, 2012: 442-3). Yet, notwithstanding his 
expressed optimism and confidence, Mao was concerned that the growing 
technological capabilities of the Soviet Union would also decrease China’s strategic 
role within the alliance. Mao also feared that China could suffer the same fate as the 
Soviet Union’s Eastern European allies (Christensen, 1997: 206). It was in this 
political and strategic context that the Chinese leader called for building China’s first 
satellite.  
 
Plans for China’s First Satellite: Project 581 
 
One of the immediate consequences of Sputnik was Mao’s declaration that ‘We too 
should produce satellites’ during the Second Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Party 
Congress on 17 May 1958. The Chinese leader added that ‘if we’re going to throw 
one up there then throw a big one, one that weights two tons. Of course we start 
throwing small, but with one that is at least two tons. Something like that chicken egg 
of the Americans, I won’t do it!’ (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 5; Chang, 1995: 226). 
This phrasing was so characteristic of Mao’s benchmarking approach to technological 
achievements by which he gauged China’s international standing against that of its 
adversaries (Feigenbaum, 2003: 29).   
   Yet, although it is clear that Mao was a prime mover of China’s space effort, it is 
unlikely that such a scientific and technological endeavour would have come to 
conceptualisation were it not for the support of China’s scientific community. Indeed, 
by January 1958, even before Mao’s proclamation, Qian Xuesen and his colleagues 
                                                
107 On 3 November 1957, the Soviet Union launched its second satellite, Sputnik 2, which was the first 
to carry a living animal.   
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had initiated the draft of a satellite development programme and appointed a working 
group under the code name ‘Project 581’ (Chang, 1995: 225). Apart from Qian, there 
were other key Chinese scientists, who had promulgated their ideas about the 
potential benefits stemming from the use of satellites (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 5). 
   That said, it is plain that Mao’s call for a Chinese satellite in May 1958 acted as a 
catalyst for plans to develop satellite technology. Thus, in August 1958, the State 
Council Scientific Planning Commission submitted the ‘Report on Implementation of 
the 12-Year Plan’, which listed the merits of a satellite. According to the report:   
 
The launch of an artificial satellite will accelerate the progress of top science and 
technology, open new research areas, and build up the missile technological 
reserve. In addition, the launching of a large satellite will be an open signal of 
success in the intercontinental ballistic missile, an expression of the nation’s 
scientific and technological level, and an indispensable means for scientific 
research to reach the outer space (cited in Zhang, 1992: 20).  
 
Considering the crucial importance of building a satellite, Nie then assigned leading 
CAS scientists and the Fifth Academy with the responsibility to draft a satellite 
programme plan. Accordingly, CAS designated project 581 its first priority for 1958 
under Qian and prominent scientist Zhao Jiuzhang (Zhang, 1992: 20).  
   Despite this promising beginning, two distinct but rather inter-connected aspects of 
this period were crucial in hindering the progress of China’s satellite programme. 
First, the anti-intellectualism of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the political and 
ideological climate of the Great Leap Forward had the effect of generating obstacles 
and delays that led to a reconsideration of the plans to place a satellite into orbit. 
Second, tensions between China and the Soviet Union resulted in Moscow’s decision 
to withdraw Soviet technical assistance for China’s rocket programme.  
 
 The Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap Forward  
 
The convention of the special conference on the issue of intellectuals by the CCP 
Central Committee in January 1956 marked a period of tolerance to the idea of 
intellectual freedom. Hence, in February 1957 Mao introduced the infamous slogan of 
‘let the hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools of thought contend’. Many 
intellectuals and professionally trained elites responded by articulating publicly their 
discontent with the Party’s approach to science. But their ideas and views soon 
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backfired, when the Party launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign (Wang, 1993: 50).   
   Then, in the summer of 1958, Mao introduced a set of ambitious and ill-conceived 
policies aimed at turning China into a socialist country based on the collectivisation of 
agricultural production and rapid industrialisation, known as the Great Leap Forward. 
The ostensible idea was that China could leap over the stages of economic 
development through the mobilisation of the productive power of the entire society in 
order to transform labour to capital (Lieberthal 2004: 103-9). But as Lieberthal (2004: 
103) points out, the Great Leap Forward ‘is most accurately viewed not as an 
integrated strategy but as a broad spirit and basic set of priorities’. The campaign was 
encapsulated in the organisation of the People’s Communes and the construction of 
‘backyard steel furnaces’ in every commune with the stated target of overtaking Great 
Britain in steel production within a period of fifteen years. In this regard, one of the 
main goals was also the belief of China’s need to speed up its modernisation and to 
transform the country, over a period of several years, into a great power with a strong 
industrial base and nuclear capabilities (Christensen, 1997: 204-5). Interestingly 
enough, on a few occasions, Mao made the case that the Great Leap Forward was a 
continuation of the process of modernisation and industrialisation that began in the 
late nineteenth century by Qin reformist Zhang Zhidong (Schram, 1989: 131). But 
whatever one thinks about the motivations behind the Great Leap Forward, however, 
ultimately it proved to be a political, social, and economic failure that resulted in the 
Great China famine of 1958 and spun the Chinese economy into deep recession 
(Lieberthal, 2004: 108-9). It also contributed to the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet 
partnership and the ensuing Sino-Soviet split.108  
   What should be noted here is that an unscientific approach prevailed in every field 
during this period. Many scientists and engineers felt compelled to demonstrate their 
loyal support for what appeared to become the party line by proposing unrealistic 
projects.109 It was during this period that Qian Xuesen turned into a hard-line 
politician by touting the party line (Chang, 1995: 237-45). At the same time, the 
slogan ‘launch a satellite’ (fang weixing) became a popular metaphor for pushing 
forward the implementation of ambitious projects from grain production to factory 
                                                
108 For an analysis of the connection between the Great Leap Forward and the Sino-Soviet Split, see 
Shen and Xia (2011).  
109 This seeming enthusiastic response to Mao’s controversial campaign was somewhat typical of what 
Goldstein (1991) has described as ‘bandwagon politics’, which predominated political behaviour in 
China up until 1966. 
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production, while children were given the name ‘Weixing’ (Kulacki and Lewis, 2008: 
6; Chang, 1995: 226). CAS even announced the unattainable target of sending a 
satellite into orbit in October 1959 to coincide with the tenth anniversary of the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Kulacki and Lewis, 2008: 6).  
   However, throughout the tumultuous years of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), 
key scientists and engineers involved in the missile and space programmes were 
protected from the excesses of this highly politically charged period. This is not to say 
that they totally escaped from the destructive forces that were unleashed by the 
political campaign. In fact, members of the Fifth Academy, including Qian himself, 
were forced to spend considerable time in counterproductive activities aimed at 
mobilising the masses and ideological remoulding (Chang, 1995: 237-8). But when 
compared to other research institutions, the Fifth Academy remained rather insulated 
and its members received support from the political leadership (Zhang, 1992: 463). 
For instance, during the famine, Nie intervened by requesting the Navy and other 
military units to deliver special supplies of food to the scientific and technical 
personnel of the Fifth Academy (Zhang, 1992: 468).  
   The upshot of Nie’s efforts to secure the uninterrupted progress of the nuclear and 
missile programmes was the establishment of two new powerful institutions 
pertaining to science and technology. In 1958, the State Science and Technology 
Commission (SSTC) was set up, which was followed by the creation of the National 
Defence Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) (Guofang Kewei) under the 
Ministry of Defence in 1959. Appointed chairman of the two newly founded 
commissions, Nie could now exert an important influence on the course of the 
strategic technology programme amid the social and political upheaval (Feigenbaum, 
2003: 54-6). As the marshal notes, this restructure helped to create a ‘fairly complete 
system of leadership’ based on the SSTC, the NDSTC and CAS, which essentially 
established complete control over scientific research (Nie, 1988: 678-9). 
      
The Development of Sounding Rockets 
 
In light of this rearrangement of priorities, however, Chinese leaders soon recognised 
that launching a heavy satellite by 1959 was an unrealistic goal that could potentially 
divert the limited resources available from the development of China’s missile 
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programme. Instead, the focus should be shifted towards sounding rockets. Therefore, 
the CAS Party Group decided to suspend the satellite project, and directed the focus 
on sounding rockets for training (Zhang, 1992: 21, 71).  
   As a result, significant progress was made in sounding rockets between 1959 and 
1960. Sounding rockets were used in a series of experimental missions, including the 
meteorological rockets, the biological experiment rockets (carrying albino rats and 
dogs), and rockets for technical experiments (Zhang, 1992: 21-2, 74-88). But despite 
these small steps in sounding rockets, not surprisingly, the nuclear and missile 
programmes remained the prime concern of the Chinese leadership.  
 
 
From the Withdrawal of Soviet Experts to the Chinese Bomb: Techno-nationalism 
Consolidates  
 
By August 1960, the Soviet Union had withdrawn all of its technical experts from 
China. Although there has been a great deal of debate about the extent to which Soviet 
technology transfer contributed to the Chinese nuclear and missile programmes, it is 
clear that the sudden Soviet withdrawal had an important impact on the management 
of numerous projects that were designed and executed under Soviet tutelage (Wang, 
1993: 59).110 However, as Nie (1988: 700-1) point outs, in assessing the implications 
of the termination of the Soviet assistance at the Fifth Academy ‘we concluded that 
the withdrawal of Soviet specialists would have little effect on our research and 
development, because they had never helped us in this work when they were here’.111 
Nie (1988: 701) also recalls Mao saying that Khrushchev should be awarded ‘a 
massive, one-tone medal’ for compelling China to advance its strategic weapons 
programme on its own earlier than expected. Indeed, not only did the Soviet 
withdrawal precipitate the focus from licensed-copying 1059 missiles to ‘self-design 
and independent development’ of missiles, but it also strengthened the determination 
of those involved with the effort ‘to win honor for the motherland and bring credits to 
the Chinese people’ (Zhang, 1992: 92, 475; Nie, 1988: 699, 701).  
                                                
110 For an account of the impact of Soviet technology transfer on China’s nuclear programme, see Liu 
and Liu (2009).  
111 In a report sent to Mao, Nie (1960) noted that the Soviet Union had tried to ‘delay’, ‘put off’, and 
‘withhold’ the transfer of sensitive technology to China.  
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   Therefore, one of the most immediate consequences of the abrupt cancellation of the 
Soviet assistance was that it compelled China to accelerate the progress of its own 
indigenous technologies. By the early 1960, the Central Military Commission (CMC) 
had made missile development an even greater priority than building the atomic bomb 
(Erickson, 2014: 147). Consequently, China soon launched a Soviet-made R-2 missile 
in September 1960 and a Chinese version of the R-2, designated Dongfeng 1 (DF-1), 
on 5 November of the same year. A product of the 1059 project, DF-1 was the first of 
the DF or East Wind series of ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 km capable of 
hitting Japan from East China (Lewis and Hua, 1992: 8, 13; Erickson, 2014: 147).  
   But even in this seemingly more permissive environment for strategic technology of 
the early 1960s, there was nothing inevitable about it. As indicated previously, Nie 
and his aides had to put a lot of effort in ensuring that the conditions were conductive 
to carrying out the high technology projects. More specifically, a number of factors, 
including the Soviet withdrawal and the limited financial and technical resources in 
the immediate aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, gave rise to two broad 
constituencies within the Chinese government that opposed the significance attached 
to the strategic weapons programme. The first of these was civilian consisting mainly 
by central economic planners, like Bo Yibo, who believed that a preference for R&D 
on sophisticated technology would threaten to derail the creation of a basic 
technological infrastructure. The second constituency was within the military 
establishment and supported the view that, except for a basic nuclear deterrent, 
priority should be given on the urgent need to modernise conventional weapons, such 
as armour, artillery, and aircraft (Feigenbaum, 2003: 26-7). Some even suggested the 
termination of all the high technology projects (Nie, 1988: 702).  
   It was against this backdrop of challenges stemming from this broad civilian-
military coalition that Nie successfully articulated a postcolonial techno-nationalist 
approach to strategic technology. In addition to the importance of industrial ‘spin-off’, 
Nie’s argument also highlighted that investments in strategic weapons had broader 
implications than the civilian-military coalition suggested. According to Nie, whereas 
the civilian constituency mistakenly saw the strategic weapons programmes simply in 
terms of ‘greater firepower’, the proponents of conventional weapons were equally 
wrong in downplaying the ways in which building strategic weapons could allow 
China to evade ‘the trap of future obsolescence’. In doing so, Nie and his colleagues 
formulated a comprehensive approach to strategic technology that offered a path 
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towards stimulating much needed innovation and cementing an advanced 
technological base, while also being attentive to great power status (Feigenbaum, 
2003: 28). 
   A high-level conference that took place at the resort town of Beidaihe from 18 July 
to 14 August 1961 proved to be a turning point for the issue of whether the high 
technology projects should be continued. Before the opening of the conference, in the 
spring and early summer of 1961, a highly classified report on Japanese science and 
technology policy was distributed to senior members of China’s party and military 
leadership. By highlighting the relationship between defence technology and 
industrial competitiveness, the report suggested that Japan was about to invest heavily 
on state-of-the art technology as an indicator of its national standing. The report 
provided Nie with an opportunity to advance the merits of his techno-nationalist 
thinking, so he prepared a document based on the Japanese report and sent it to Mao 
(Feigenbaum, 2003: 30). After readying Nie’s report, Mao intervened in the debate in 
support of Nie by instructing that ‘China being far behind Japan in industrial 
technology, what policy we should take was worth careful consideration’. Therefore, 
thanks to Nie’s vigilance, Mao’s pronouncement settled the debate of the conference 
in favour of the continuation of the strategic weapons programme (Nie, 1988: 702; 
Lewis and Xue, 1988: 129; Feigenbaum, 2003: 30-1). Subsequently, in the summer of 
1961, at a special meeting, Mao declared ‘We should make up our minds to develop 
sophisticated technologies. We can’t relax our efforts or discontinue [the sophisticated 
defense projects]’ (cited in Lewis and Xue, 1988: 130). Apparently, this marked an 
important victory for Nie and the strategic weapons programme (Lewis and Xue, 
1988: 130).    
   However, concerned with the impact of the Great Leap Forward on scientific 
progress, Nie also made great strides towards ensuring that key scientific institutions 
were conductive to research. In this regard, Nie introduced the ‘Fourteen Articles on 
Scientific Work’. Approved by the Central Committee in July 1961, the ‘Fourteen 
Articles’ were essentially guidelines with the aim to foster a stable environment for 
scientists by highlighting the ‘primacy of the experts’ in the conduct of scientific 
research (Nie, 1988: 713-21; Feigenbaum, 2003: 46-7).  
   In such circumstances, therefore, the stage was set for the nuclear and missile 
programmes to yield results. On 16 October 1964, China detonated its first atomic 
bomb, becoming the fifth member to join the nuclear club. When Mao was informed 
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about the news, he wanted to confirm ‘whether it really was a nuclear explosion so as 
to convince the foreigners’ (Lewis and Xue, 1988: 188). As far as the missile 
programme was concerned, the first DF-2 was successfully launched on 29 June 1964 
(Erickson, 2014: 147). By that time, missile development was based on an 
incremental logic: DF-2 was capable of reaching Japan; the DF-3 the Philippines; the 
DF-4 Guam; and the DF-5 the continental United States (Lewis and Hua, 1992: 14, 
20). In November 1965, the Chinese proceeded with the successful launch of a more 
advanced missile, the DF-2A. Eventually, on 27 October 1966, a DF-2A carried a 12-
kiloton nuclear device over populated areas, and henceforth, China’s first strategic 
missile system had entered its operational phase (Lewis and Hua, 1992: 15). 
 
Revitalising the Satellite Programme: Project 651 
 
While the pursuit of the nuclear and missile programmes was clearly the highest 
priority of the Chinese leadership throughout the early 1960s, progress was made not 
only in the R& D of sounding rockets, but also in space sciences and test equipment. 
At the same time, inspired by Yuri Gagarin’s orbital space flight in April 1961, CAS 
created a spaceflight committee to outline a plan for spaceflight and other advanced 
research areas of space technology (Zhang, 1992: 23).112  
   But the significant advancement of missile technology in the early 1960s also meant 
that the conditions for reconsidering the issue of launching a satellite had been 
established. Aware of this possibility, on 21 December 1964, Zhao Jiuzhang 
submitted a proposal to Zhou Enlai, arguing for launching a satellite. In his report, 
Zhao suggested that using a ballistic missile to put a satellite into space would ‘get the 
benefit of hitting two birds with one stone’. Zhou requested from Zhao to prepare a 
more extensive proposal. Consequently, Zhao, together with one of his colleagues, 
prepared a detailed proposal, which was submitted to the Party Central Committee 
(Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 9). In January 1965, Qian followed suit with handing in his 
own report to NDSTC. This move was crucial, given that NDSTC headed by Nie was 
charged with the missile programme. In his proposal, Qian noted that building ‘the 
planned intercontinental ballistic missile can also launch a satellite’ (Kulacki and 
                                                
112 The committee was named ‘Interplanetary Flight Committee’ after Qian’s book called 
‘Interplanetary Flight’ (Kulacki and Lewis 2009: 9).  
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Lewis, 2009: 10). Nie, who was also aware of the military significance of a satellite, 
told Qian: ‘Last year, before we detonated our atomic bomb, the Americans had 
already seen it with one of their satellites. Now that’s something’ (cited in Kulacki 
and Lewis, 2009: 10).113  
   Eventually, in April 1965, NDSTC sent a report to the Party Central Committee that 
suggested placing a 100-kilogram satellite into orbit between 1970 and 1971. In July 
1965, CAS drafted the ‘Proposal on Development Programme for China’s Artificial 
Satellite’, which was later approved by the Party Central Committee and was included 
in the national plan. It was designated ‘Project 651’ (Zhang, 1992: 29; Kulacki and 
Lewis, 2009: 11). As Kulacki and Lewis (2009: 11) point out, the CAS proposal was 
not merely about launching a single satellite, but a long-term plan for an extensive 
national satellite programme. What should be noted is that emphasis was placed on 
the political benefits that could accrue from the first Chinese satellite. In this regard, 
given that China was a latecomer in the Space Age, a consensus emerged that the first 
satellite should be more sophisticated than the first satellites of the Soviet Union and 
the United States and all the technical measures should be taken into account in order 
to ensure that ‘the world would be able to “see it and hear it”’ (Zhang, 1992: 235). 
   Consequently, between October and November 1965, a lengthy conference was 
convened, known as the ‘651 conference’, which set the parameters of the satellite 
project (Zhang, 1992: 235; Harvey, 2013: 39). This resulted in the establishment of 
the CAS 651 Design Institute, under the leadership of Zhao Jiuzhang, and the 701 
Project Bureau, which was in charge of the management of the ground stations. CAS 
allocated numerous research projects associated with the R&D on the satellite 
programme (Zhang, 1992: 31; Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 12). Then, in May 1966, 
Qian and other key members of the institutions involved with the 651 project decided 
to name the first satellite Dongfanghong (DFH)-1 (The East is Red -1) and its space 
launch vehicle Changzheng (CZ)-1 (Long-March-1), while the launch of China’s first 
satellite was set for 1970 (Zhang, 1992: 30).  
   Rather than focusing solely on the satellite project, Chinese leaders and scientists 
had more ambitious goals. In August 1965, the Central Special Committee presided 
by Zhou Enlai approved a plan for a first human flight space mission in 1979 (Zheng, 
2007: 167). As we shall see, discussions and plans regarding human spaceflight 
                                                
113 It is worth noting that in his report Qian also recommended the development of navigation satellites 
(C. Li 2013: 9).  
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remained a constant throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s. Yet, again, another 
political campaign initiated by Mao, the Cultural Revolution, threatened to halt 
China’s forays into space.  
 
The Second Phase: The Cultural Revolution Years (1966-1976)  
 
The Cultural Revolution: ‘Reds’ and Revolution Over ‘Experts’ and Modernisation     
 
Before considering the development of the space programme during this period, it is 
important to say briefly something about the Cultural Revolution, as this was a major 
event with long-lasting implications for scientists and science and technology in 
China. The Cultural Revolution was essentially a mass movement that unleashed 
destructive forces that had the effect of turning the whole society against itself. As 
violence soon went out of control, Mao announced its termination in 1969, but 
radicalism, factionalism, and upheaval did not end until his death in 1976. Although 
the principal features of the Cultural Revolution are by now well known, a few points 
are worth making about this period. First, historians agree that the Cultural Revolution 
was largely the product of Mao’s fixation with his personal power and what he saw as 
the growing ideological impurity of Chinese leaders and bureaucrats.114 
   Second, as Mitter (2004: 234-5, 200-43) shows, in some ways the Cultural 
Revolution was part of China’s enduring struggle with modernity, which can be 
traced back to key ideas associated with the May Fourth Movement, including an 
obsession with ‘catching up with foreigners’ and technological modernity, especially 
space technology. Yet, according to Mitter (2004: 235), unlike Republican China, this 
technological fixation during the Cultural Revolution shared similarities with the 
Qing, in the sense that, even though technology was desired, ‘the means of creating 
the knowledge base that went with it’, and which were usually associated with 
western (or Soviet) modernity, were not accepted. This clearly points to the enduring 
relevance of the ti/yong dichotomy (Schram, 1989: 191; Wang, 1993: 69). But the 
Cultural Revolution was also reflective of a radical shift in Mao’s thinking over the 
proper balance between revolution and modernisation (Wang, 2010: 269). However, 
what suffice at this stage to say is that while Mao’s worldview about the role of 
                                                
114 On the Cultural Revolution, see, among others, MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006); and Mitter 
(2004: 200-43).  
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military power in attaining national goals by linking politics and strategic weapons 
had created a powerful synergy with the worldview of the postcolonial techno-
nationalists, the Cultural Revolution had the effect of gradually disrupting the 
congruence of these two views (Lewis and Xue, 1994: 151).  
   Third, therefore, one of the most important aspects of the Cultural Revolution was 
the resurfaced issue of the ‘red and expert’, as once again being ideologically ‘red’ 
was considered far more important than being an ‘expert’.115 Consequently, given that 
scientists and intellectuals were regarded as ‘white experts’, they were usually 
subjected to purges and suffering. Apart from personal suffering, not only did the 
prevailing anti-intellectualism of this period lead to the closure of schools and 
universities for several years, but also put in jeopardy the institutional scientific 
infrastructure of the country (Cao, 2013: 123-9).  
      
The Strategic Technology Programme during the Cultural Revolution 
 
It was in this political atmosphere of generalised radicalisation and anti-
intellectualism that the strategic technology programme achieved some remarkable 
feats, including the successful explosion of China’s first hydrogen bomb in June 1967, 
the flight of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-5, in September 
1971, and the launch of the first satellite carried on a CZ- 1 space launch vehicle in 
April 1970. Intuitively we might expect that these successes can be explained by the 
fact that strategic technology projects were regarded as top priority during the 
Cultural Revolution due to national security and prestige considerations. True, coping 
with possible Cold War predations, especially after the Sino-Soviet split, forced China 
to continue advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities. As a consequence, the 
strategic weapons programme was not hit as hard as its conventional counterpart, not 
to mention non-defence related research (Wang, 1993: 72; Cheung, 2009: 29).116   
   Nevertheless, reality was rather different and more complex. For even the nuclear 
programme was convulsed by the violence and disturbance that had engulfed the 
entire society during the most intensely radical phase of the Cultural Revolution 
                                                
115 For an overview of key aspects related to science and technology during the Cultural Revolution, 
see the contributions in Brock and Wei (2013).  
116 For a comparative analysis of the conventional and strategic weapons programmes during the 
Maoist era, see Cheung (2009: 22-51).  
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(1966-1969). As anarchy was spreading throughout the country, Nie and Zhou were 
facing much difficulty in protecting the strategic weapons programme from growing 
factionalism and radicalism (Lewis and Xue, 1988: 202-6).  In fact, between 1967 and 
1969, even the politically dexterous Nie became the target of Maoist ‘rebels’ (Cao, 
2013: 126; Wang, 2010: 271). As to the missile programme, by September 1966, two 
contenting factions had emerged in the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building.117 On 
23 January 1967, Qian Xuesen and other leaders of the Seventh Ministry were 
removed from power by what was a ‘top-down coup’ backed by the central 
government (Chang, 1995: 248-9; Lewis and Xue, 1994: 146-7). The situation was 
improved in 1967, when the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building was placed under 
military control, but factional violence continued (Zhang, 1992: 43). Then, one of the 
most noted casualties of the Cultural Revolution occurred: the Birmingham University 
educated Yao Tongbin, who was a missile expert and the first director of the 
Aerospace Research Institute of Materials and Processing Technology, was beaten to 
death by Red Guards in June 1968 (Solomone, 2013: 243).  
   The death of Yao prompted Zhou to instruct a thorough investigation into what 
caused this tragic event along with a directive that forbade attacks on scientists. 
Shortly after, Zhou ordered the Military Control Committee of the Seventh Ministry 
to draft a list of those scientists that were deemed indispensable for the missile 
programme in order to be put under special protection (Lewis and Xue, 1994: 147). 
Qian Xuesen was one of those scientists placed under state custody (Chang, 1995: 
250). Zhou also participated in several meetings of the Seventh Ministry as a mediator 
trying to convince the contending factions that unity was necessary for the 
advancement of the missile programme (Zhang, 1992: 45; Erickson, 2014: 150). As a 
result of these efforts, relative stability was brought to the Seventh Ministry and, so, 
progress was made in missile development, albeit rather slowly. The space 
programme suffered from similar problems, but it also received vital support for the 
most part of the Cultural Revolution. 
 
 
                                                
117 In January 1965, the Fifth Academy was transferred from the military to the state. It was 
restructured and renamed the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building.  
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The Space Programme During the Cultural Revolution 
 
Certainly, the space programme did not remain completely immune to the political 
and social turmoil. As was the case with the nuclear and the missile programmes, in 
early 1967, many scientists working on space projects were subjected to purges and 
mistreatment (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 12). But again Nie, Zhou, and others played 
a key role in trying to minimise the effects of the Cultural Revolution. In early 1967, 
Nie proposed to the Central Party Committee the formation of the Chinese Academy 
of Space Technology (CAST) with the aim of uniting all the space research units from 
different departments into one body, which would be part of the military, and, so 
exempted from Cultural Revolution excesses. The Central Party Committee and the 
State Council accepted the proposal. Then, on 17 March of the same year, Zhou 
brought the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building and other defence ministries under 
PLA control. On 20 February 1968, CAST was formally established and Qian Xuesen 
was appointed its director. The newly founded academy was placed under the aegis of 
NDSTC (Zhang, 1992: 33).  
       
The First Satellite DFH-1: China Joins the Space Club 
 
Consequently, the plan for launching the DFH-1 satellite in 1970 was resumed, under 
the leadership of Qian and Sun Jiadong, a young ex-force officer. Sun proposed 
straight away to move on with a basic satellite design in order to accommodate the 
installation of a music device to broadcast the melody ‘The East is Red’. This was one 
of the most emblematic revolutionary songs associated with the Cultural Revolution 
that praised Chairman Mao.118 The proposal was approved by NDSTC in October 
1967 (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 13). To ensure the observation of the satellite from 
Earth, an ‘observation skirt’ was installed on the final stage of the rocket (Zhang, 
1992: 246).119 Significantly, Zhou showed a particular interest in ensuring the 
successful implementation of the DFH-1 satellite project (Zhang, 1992: 45, 142, 252).  
                                                
118 The idea of transmitting the song is attributed to He Zhenhua, who was the chief designer of the 
DFH-1 project. See, Wang, Yu and Yang (2016).  
119 As was noted in Chapter 1, these considerations were not unsimilar to what the Soviets did with 
Sputnik (Harvey, 2013: 39).  
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   Eventually, on 24 April 1970, China successfully launched its first satellite from the 
Jiuquan Satellite Launch Site, becoming the fifth country to join the space club.120 
Upon Zhou’s insistence, the press communiqué that was released after the launch 
noted: ‘We did it through our own unaided efforts’ (Harvey, 2013: 43).121 
Undoubtedly, putting the satellite into orbit was no small feat, especially if we take 
into consideration the political circumstances under which it was achieved. But given 
that the purpose of the satellite was simply to broadcast the ‘East is Red’ song, as 
Hanberg and Li (2006: 71) point out, it was ‘propaganda pure and simple’. One week 
later, Qian was acclaimed as a national hero as he stood together with other scientists 
in Tiananmen Square, while Mao and other leaders praised Qian for his contribution 
to China’s historic achievement in space (Chang, 1995: 227). 
   An article published in Peking Review in June 1970 highlighted some key themes 
related to China’s formative space effort. It noted that the Chinese space feat was a 
source of encouragement for the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples and a 
‘heavy blow to the U.S. imperialists and the socialist imperialists’ that smashes ‘their 
fond dream of monopolizing space technology’. More tellingly, perhaps, links were 
made between China’s colonial experience and space technology: ‘we can see what a 
tremendous change has taken place in the transformation of semi-colonial and semi-
feudal old China into a socialist country which has mastered atom and space 
technology and stands like a giant in the East of the world!’ (Yu, 1970: 30). 
        
Satellite Development: 1971-1976 
   
After the launch of DF -1, satellite development gained momentum. On 3 March 
1971, China successfully put in orbit its second satellite named Shijian (SJ) -1 
(Practice -1), which was essentially an experimental satellite (Johnson-Freese, 1998: 
49; Solomone, 2013: 236). But domestic politics entered into a new phase of turmoil 
and factional strife marked by the mysterious death of Lin Biao in 1971, the then 
Minister of Defence and Mao’s putative successor, and the ascendancy of the Gang of 
                                                
120 In 2016, the State Council set this date as China’s Space Day to celebrate space flight (China 
Central Television, 2016a).    
121 The Xinhua News Agency noted, among other things, that the Chinese first satellite was the 
successful result of the Chinese people under the leadership of Mao and the Party Central Committee 
under Mao and Lin, ‘adhering to the principle of maintaining independence and keeping the initiative 
in our own hands and relying on our efforts’ (Xinhua, 1970: 5, emphasis in the original).  
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Four. This was significant because Lin Biao and the Gang of Four tried to use the 
space programme as a way to enhance their political power and legitimacy (Chen, 
1991: 120).  
    Thus, key space projects became an important area where different factions 
competed to take over control (Hanberg and Li, 2006: 66, 74-77). Indeed, Shanghai, 
which was politically associated with Mao and the Gang of Four, was turning into a 
new centre of space operations, focusing on building both launchers and satellites 
under Project 701. This led to duplication among space projects undertaken in Beijing 
and Shanghai (Chen, 1991: 122). Regardless, the ‘Shanghai team’ managed to build 
the Fengbao (FB) -1 (Storm -1) launcher, which put into orbit the Ji Shu Shiyan 
Weixing (JSSW) -1 (Technical Research Satellite -1) in July 1975. This was followed 
by the successful launch of two other JSSW satellites. However, it appears that the 
JSSW satellites performed poorly and the project was called off one month after 
Mao’s death (Solomone, 2013: 235-6; Harvey, 2013: 47-8; Hanberg and Li 2006: 79-
80).122 Another series of satellites, Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW) (Recoverable Model 
Satellite), under Project 911, was more successful. In 1975, China put in orbit its first 
FSW satellite, FSW -01. More advanced versions of the FSW series were introduced 
in the next decades (Harvey, 2013: 105-33).    
 
Human Spaceflight: Project 714 
 
As indicated above, during the Cultural Revolution years there was a continuing 
interest in human spaceflight. But while some preliminary studies were taken on 
scientific and technical aspects of human spaceflight, there was a constant debate 
about whether China should pursue such a project considering the urgent needs of the 
country. In September 1967, a report was submitted that proposed flying one 
astronaut, but Qian Xuesen argued that this would promote ‘individual heroism’. 
Instead, Qian suggested that orbiting five astronauts would symbolise ‘collective 
heroism’. By 1967, there were complete blueprints of flying astronauts (Zheng, 2007: 
168). Shortly after, the programme was named Shuguang (Dawn’s Early Light) 
(Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 20).    
                                                
122 The exact purpose of the JSSW satellites remains a mystery, as there is little information available. 
According to Harvey (2013: 48), there is agreement among Western analysts that their purpose was 
electronic intelligence (ELINT).  
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   The launch of China’s first satellite in 1970 spurred further research on a human 
spaceflight mission, the first of which was planned to take place by 1973. On 14 July 
1970, Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao approved a joint report on the 
Shuguang project, which was designated ‘Project 714’. We do know now that the Air 
Force then started recruiting China’s first astronauts to form an astronaut corps. In 
turn, in May 1971, a group of twenty astronauts was selected for a two-year training 
programme as part of the scheduled first flight of Shuguang (Kulacki and Lewis, 
2009: 20; Harvey 2013: 259-60). Yet, given Lin’s association with the human 
spaceflight project and his close ties with the Air Force, shortly after his death, Mao 
decided to cancel the training of astronauts by saying ‘We should take care of affairs 
here on earth first, and deal with extraterrestrial matters a little later’. Another 
obstacle to China’s lofty ambitions, of course, was the lack of funding due to the 
economic hardship and different priorities (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 20-1). As a 
result, by 1974, the programme was essentially suspended (Zheng, 2007: 168).  
     
The Third Phase 1976-1989: China Engages with the Nascent International 
Space Society 
 
Mao died in 1976, and after a short succession struggle, Deng Xiaoping consolidated 
his power and took China in a startlingly different direction by initiating his policy of 
‘reform and opening up’. Plainly, this has had a profound impact on the pursuit of 
space related activities, not the least of which was China’s engagement with the ever 
evolving international space society of states. Before considering this, however, it is 
worth making a number of points about the wider context in which the space 
programme was pursued during this era. First, it is clear that Deng’s modernisation 
programme of opening up China’s economy to market forces led to an unprecedented 
integration with international society (Zhang, 1998: 98, 99-125). Yet, Deng’s policy 
of integrating China within the existing international order coexisted rather uneasily 
with fostering his appeal to patriotism and nationalism (Hughes, 2006: 11-54).     
   Second, a focus on science and technology became a notable theme of China’s 
multifaceted and often contradictory modernisation push under Deng.123 Perhaps, 
nowhere was this more evident than in the revival of the ‘Four Modernisations’ by 
                                                
123 For useful early accounts on science and technology in the post-Mao era, see the contributions in 
Goldman and Simon (1989).  
 
 
144 
Deng at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee in 1978. 
Originally introduced by Zhou Enlai, the ‘Four Modernisations’ of agriculture, 
industry, defence, and science and technology would pave the way for China’s 
genuine modernisation and economic development. In March 1978, a major 
conference of 6,000 scientists and engineers, the National Science Conference, 
reconfirmed the high priority attached to science and technology policy by the 
Chinese leadership (Suttmeier, 1980: 2). In his address to the conference, Deng 
(1978) noted:  
 
The key to the four modernizations is the modernization of science and technology. 
Without modern science and technology, it is impossible to build modern 
agriculture, modern industry or modern national defence. Without the rapid 
development of science and technology, there can be no rapid development of the 
economy. The Central Committee of the Party decided to call this national science 
conference in order to bring home to the Party and country the importance of 
science, to map out a programme, to commend advanced units and individuals and 
to discuss measures for speeding up the development of science and technology in 
China. 
 
In what was an important departure from Mao’s views about ‘reds’ over ‘experts’, 
Deng (1978) also recognised science and technology as productive forces and defined 
scientists and technicians as ‘both red and expert’ that formed a contingent of the 
working class.124  
   Third, Deng’s confidence that the overall strategic environment was conductive to 
peace and economic development rather than war had profound implications for the 
defence economy. Soon after he took office, Deng introduced a major transformation 
of the defence industry based on spinning off a large part of the defence economy 
from military to civilian activities (Cheung, 2009: 52-100). This defence conversion 
and demilitarisation process had the effect of empowering the civilian technology 
elites, while the prominence of strategic weapons began to erode for the first time 
since the mid-1950s. The precarious position of the erstwhile influential weapons 
scientists was further compounded by Deng’s decision to prioritise conventional 
weapons and equipment (Feigenbaum, 1999b: 98). As a result, by September 1977, 
the strategic technology programme was confined to the completion of the three 
principal tasks of the 1960s and 1970s, dubbed the Three Grasps (san zhua): a fully 
                                                
124 For incisive analysis of the place of science and technology under Deng, see Wang (1993: 78-80). 
Also see Hughes (2006: 30-49).  
 
 
145 
operational intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBM), and a communications satellite (Feigenbaum, 2003: 79; Zhang, 
1992: 47).  
   It was in this reconfigured geostrategic and political context that China’s space 
programme moved towards a focus on economic development. In 1978, Deng made 
explicitly known his view about where the priorities of the space programme should 
lie when he remarked that ‘China, as a developing country, was not to take part in the 
space race’. According to China’s paramount leader, there was no need for China to 
land on the Moon, but it was vital to focus on application satellites instead (Zhang, 
1992: 50). Yet, the space programme can be analytically divided into two distinct 
periods. The first period (1976-1984) was shaped by a focus on a few projects that 
could contribute to the economic construction of China, such as satellites (and their 
launchers), based on Deng’s aforementioned direction. Meanwhile, China started to 
seek international cooperation in the space field as part of its broader opening up to 
the world. What is noteworthy, however, is that the space programme was left for the 
first time without strong support from the Chinese leadership (Chen 1991: 123). This 
was also the case for the overall strategic technology programme.  
   The succeeding period was defined by a continuing interest in application satellites 
and the steady adjustment of the Chinese space community to civilian operations and 
commercialisation as part of major reforms in the defence sector. Hence, China’s 
further integration with the international space society sustained momentum. Equally, 
this period marked the reconsolidation of a postcolonial techno-nationalist vision that 
was encapsulated in the ‘863 Plan’. Launched in March 1986, this was an ambitious 
long-term plan to narrow the gap between China and advanced countries in a number 
of cutting-edge R&D areas, including space.  
   All in all, three main themes underpinned the third phase of the space programme: 
the development of application satellites and launch vehicles, international 
cooperation, and the reconsolidation of postcolonial techno-nationalism. The rest of 
this chapter will deal in some detail with these three themes.  
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The Communications Satellite: Project 331 
 
As Handberg and Li point (2006: 85) out, the immediate post-Mao era signalled what 
can be called ‘a period of relative normalcy’ in the sense that the Chinese space 
programme entered into the phase of space applications development. True, prestige 
considerations were still relevant, but now the programme had to be justified in terms 
of its contribution to economic construction. Thus, two series of satellites became the 
focus, reflecting the utilisation of space assets for socio-economic development: the 
Dongfanghong (DFH) (East is Red) communication satellites and the Fengyun (FY)  
(Wind and Cloud) meteorological satellites.   
   The launch of a communications satellite was clearly the most advanced and 
ambitious space project of the early 1980s, so it is worth spelling out in some detail 
just how it came about (Zhang, 1992: 48).125 In general, for a country with diverse 
topographical features and vast territory like China the utilisation of communications 
satellites makes a valuable contribution to the improvement of communications and 
data transmission from a central location to remote areas. This, in turn, benefits 
education, government, transport, and the economic and financial sector development 
(Wu, 1988; Zhu, 1993: 171-2; Gilks, 1997: 217-9). Therefore, in February 1975, the 
development of a communications satellite was endorsed by the Central Military 
Commission, and later by Mao and Zhou. The communications satellite programme 
was codenamed ‘Project 331’ (Zhang, 1992: 48). 
   Nonetheless, by 1978, unhappy with the inert pace of the project, Deng began 
entertaining the idea of purchasing a communications satellite from the United States. 
This prospect seemed even more attractive as China was negotiating the normalisation 
of its diplomatic relations with the United States. As part of this process, an unusually 
large US science and technology delegation was about to visit Beijing in July 1978, 
led by Frank Press, President Carter’s scientific advisor, and consisted of, among 
others, Robert Frosch, a NASA administrator (Suttmeier, 1980: 84-6; Ross, 1994: 
159-60). The visit presented an opportunity to raise the issue of purchasing a satellite. 
But after lengthy negotiations, no deal was reached (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 16-7). 
                                                
125 On the meteorological satellites, see Harvey (2013: 173-4). It should also be added that this period 
also saw the development of the CZ-2, CZ-3, and CZ-4 space launch vehicles (Chen et al., 2000: 560-
1; Johnson-Freese, 1998: 50; Handberg and Li, 2006: 87). 
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   Then Deng intervened to reinvigorate Project 331. Reflecting a techno-nationalist 
rationale, a consensus soon emerged that it would be difficult for China to obtain 
sophisticated space technology from abroad in the future (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 
17). Consequently, on 29 January 1984, China attempted the first launch of its 
communications satellite, DFH -2, from the Xichang Satellite Launch Centre in 
southwest China.126 However, there were technical problems, which resulted in 
putting the satellite in an elliptical orbit. The Chinese described the launch of what 
was now referred to as an ‘experimental satellite’ successful (Zhang 1992: 58; 
Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 18). As Kulacki and Lewis (2009: 18) observe, 
notwithstanding that the satellite was not placed into the intended orbit, it was still 
remarkable that the Chinese managed to track the satellite and manoeuvre it into 
another position. On 8 April 1984, the second launch of a geostationary 
communications satellite took place. The DFH -2 was initially placed into an elliptical 
orbit, and after eight days, it was successfully sent into the ‘quasi-geostationary’ orbit 
(Zhang, 1992: 58, 332-5). Subsequently, China’s first operational communications 
satellite was put in orbit in February 1986 (Handberg and Li, 2006: 86).     
     
International Cooperation 
  
Certainly, one of the most important features of this period was China’s growing 
appreciation and sharing in the working of key common institutions of the expanding 
and evolving international space society, including space diplomacy, space law, and 
space commercialisation. The official history of the Ministry of Space Industry 
captures this nicely when it notes that since 1978 China ‘made friends broadly within 
the world space circle’, ‘introduced [its] achievements in space technology’, and 
spread its ‘influence internationally’ (Zhang, 1992: 490). A detailed analysis of 
China’s engagement with the institutions of the international space society is taken up 
in Chapter 6, but a number of points are worth noting here. First, although it is clear 
that the level of sophistication of China’s space capabilities had enabled China’s 
integration in the international space society, international cooperation was now 
imperative for China in order to sustain the further advancement of its space 
                                                
126 By 1983, the Xichang Satellite Launch Centre had been completed as part of the 331 Project 
(Zhang, 1992: 50, 58). This new launch site would be mainly used to launch geostationary satellites on 
powerful rockets.   
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endeavour (Handberg and Li, 2006: 88).127 At the same time, given the remarkable 
progress of their space programme, the Chinese were feeling self-confident enough to 
see space cooperation as an exchange between equal partners rather than as an 
unequal partnership that was so characteristic of China’s encounter with the colonial 
expansion of international society (Handberg and Li, 2006: 88-9). In other words, 
what was emerging was a process of mutual engagement (Zhang, 1998: 73).  
   Second, and consequently, China’s engagement with the international space society 
was evident in its expanding international relations in the space sector. In particular, 
to facilitate international cooperation and exchanges with foreign agencies and 
organisations in space technology, the Chinese Society of Astronautics (CSA) was 
formed as an academic organisation. In this vein, the Seventh Ministry of Machine 
Building was renamed the Ministry of Space Industry (MASI) in 1982. With an 
expanded mandate as a governmental department, the newly founded Ministry played 
a key role in increasing contacts and ties with foreign countries and regional 
organisations. Overall, throughout this period, China established relations with more 
than 40 countries, including bilateral agreements with key space players, such as 
France, Japan, Germany, the United States, Brazil, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the 
European Space Agency (ESA) (Zhang, 1992: 494-502). 
   Third, in addition to bilateral space diplomacy, China also entered a number of key 
international governmental and non-governmental organisations related to space 
activities. China rejoined the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 1972 
and the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) in 1978. More importantly, 
perhaps, China was accepted as a full member of the UN Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1980 and ratified the 1967 Outer Space Treaty 
(OST) in 1983, which is regarded as the cornerstone of space law. In terms of 
international non-governmental organisations, China received an invitation to join the 
International Astronautical Federation (IAF) in 1979, and the membership of CSA, 
representing China, was eventually admitted one year later at the IAF congress in 
Tokyo (Zhang, 1992: 502-5).  
   Fourth, a noteworthy expression of China’s integration with the international space 
society was the commercialisation of China’s launch industry. This involved the 
                                                
127 As the official history of the Ministry of Space Industry acknowledges, the international nature of 
space activities rendered international cooperation ‘an inevitable trend for the development of space 
technology’ (Zhang, 1992: 491).   
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establishment of the China Great Wall Industry Company (CGWIC), which was 
officially tasked with marketing Chinese made-satellites and commercial launches of 
the CZ-3 space launch vehicle in 1985 (Chen, 1991: 125; Freese-Johnson, 1998: 55). 
The first time China provided space related services was in August 1987, when it 
successfully launched an experimental payload for the firm MATRA of France 
(Zhang, 1992: 509). Crucially, as part of its effort to further enhance international 
cooperation in space and to establish a legal framework that safeguards the provision 
of launching services, China was also prompted to ratify the 1968 Rescue Agreement, 
the 1972 Liability Convention, and the 1975 Registration Convention in December 
1988. This allowed China to sign three memoranda with the US government 
regarding: satellite technical security, satellite launches, and commercial launch 
services (Zhang, 1992: 508-9). Given the US strict control over technology transfer, 
the conclusion of these agreements with the US government opened the way for 
contracting US satellite manufacturers. Contracts with other countries followed suit 
(Zhang, 1992: 509; Johnson-Freese, 1998: 56-7).  
   As was true of the entire defence sector, this engagement was partly a deliberate 
response of the space community to the government’s call for prioritising civilian-
sector needs. Put simply, the space community had to adjust to a more entrepreneurial 
model if it wanted to avoid fading into obscurity (Chen, 1991: 124-5). However, this 
change was also partly reflective of China’s expanding international relations in 
science and technology, including space technology, which exposed Chinese 
scientists to a wide range of new ideas and influences through various academic, 
governmental, and industrial channels.128 In this sense, this change was also the result 
of a gradual process of socialisation into the emerging institutions of the international 
space society.  
 
Techno-nationalism Redux and the ‘863 High Technology Plan’: The Space 
Programme Strikes Back 
 
Despite the fact that the strategic weaponeers found themselves in a tenuous position 
in the immediate post-Mao era as a consequence of Deng’s reforms, they gradually 
managed to re-consolidate their power base by spreading successfully their influence 
from the military research and development system to the civilian sphere of science 
                                                
128 For an overview of China’s international scientific relations of this era, see Suttmeier (1980: 67-81).  
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and technology and other key related bureaucratic systems. The creation of the 
Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National defence (COSTIND) 
in 1982, which brought Nie’s erstwhile NDSTC and the National Defence Industries 
Office (NDIO) under the oversight of an integrated military industry commission 
directed by Zhang Aiping, was the first step towards this direction.129 By 1987, 
COSTIND was known within the defence industry as the ‘Nie family army’, as Ding 
Henggao, Marshall Nie’s son-in-law, became director of the commission and Nie’s 
daughter and Ding’s wife, Nie Li, the head of the commission’s electronic bureau 
(Feigenbaum, 2003: 107-10).  
   The influence of the strategic weaponeers increased further, when Song Jian, who 
had been chief designer of China’s SLBM and a specialist in astronautics, was 
appointed director of the SSTC in 1985, and Zhou Guangzhao, a prominent physicist 
of China’s nuclear programme, became president of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences in 1987. Both Song and Zhou were two of the most distinguished and 
younger scientists of Marshal Nie’s strategic technology programme. Therefore, by 
1987, the three principal agencies concerned with China’s science and technology 
policy agenda, COSTIND, SSTC and CAS, were headed by former strategic 
weaponeers. Not only did these members of the strategic weapons elite share a 
common professional heritage and organisational practices, but also a techno-
nationalist vision about the place of science and technology in China. Consequently, 
coalition building and cross-agency coordination regarding science and technology 
were facilitated (Feigenbaum, 2003: 147, 143-53).  
   At the same time as the successful ideological, bureaucratic, and institutional 
consolidation of techno-nationalists was occurring, the Strategic Defence Initiative 
(SDI), which was announced by Ronald Reagan in March 1983, assumed an 
important place in debates about whether China should follow a similar path to 
technology that is based on state-directed S&T planning (Feigenbaum, 2003: 134). To 
be sure, many Chinese analysts viewed the SDI as a US attempt to attain strategic 
superiority over the Soviet Union in space, which essentially meant first strike 
capability.130 However, apart from this grand geopolitical view, others suggested that 
the SDI was a political programme intended to maintain the powerful position of the 
                                                
129 Zhang Aiping was a key member of Nie’s patronage network since the late 1950s (Feigenbaum, 
2003: 54, 83). 
130 For contemporary analyses of Chinese views about the SDI, see Glaser and Garret (1986); and 
Garver (1986).  
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United States by targeting the advancement of high technology and economic 
development (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 22). By the mid-1980s, many strategic 
weaponeers, who shared the view that the SDI would have far-reaching implications, 
saw the US programme as evidence that China needed a techno-nationalist response 
(Feigenbaum, 2003: 134).   
   It was against this backdrop of techno-nationalist consolidation and external 
influences that the ‘863 High Technology Plan’ emerged. On 3 March 1986, four 
leading strategic weapons elders and senior scientists, Wang Daheng, Chen Fangyun, 
Wang Ganchang, and Yang Jiachi, took the initiative to draft a formal proposal, 
‘Recommendations Concerning Research to Keep Pace with Foreign Strategic High 
Technology Development’, which they sent directly to Deng Xiaoping (Kulacki and 
Lewis 2009: 22).131 The scientific and political status deriving from their association 
with the strategic technology programme, gave the four senior scientists the necessary 
confidence and credence to circumvent standard channels of bureaucratic 
communication by appealing directly to Deng (Feigenbaum, 2003: 141-2). When the 
Chinese leader read the letter he reportedly responded, ‘this suggestion is very 
important…Find experts and discuss it. Do it immediately’ (cited in Zheng, 2007: 
169). Consequently, four months’ deliberations with two hundred experts culminated 
in the document ‘An Outline for National High Technology Planning’. Significantly, 
although experts were soon divided over whether the focus should be on building 
military capabilities or a more comprehensive plan that could contribute to the 
economy, Deng stepped in the dispute suggesting the development of dual-use 
technology with an emphasis on civilian applications (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 23). 
   By that time, Deng’s thinking had evolved into a far more broad understanding of 
the role technology in China’s economic construction. As Feigenbaum (2003: 159, 
162) notes, while Deng did not go as far as to agree with Nie’s view about the role of 
‘spin-offs’ from the military to the civilian system, he did share marshal’s main 
argument about the important impact of strategic technology on China’s position 
within the global order. Indeed, expounding on the significance of China’s high 
technology development to an audience of physicists in Beijing in 1988, Deng 
                                                
131 For the profile of the four senior scientists, see Feigenbaum (2003: 154-6). 
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provided a postcolonial techno-nationalist rationale, after referring to the SDI and 
Europe’s Eureka programme,132 which is worth quoting at length:  
 
China must develop its own science and high technology. [We] must take our place 
in the world in these areas. From the 1960s, if China hadn’t had the atomic bomb, 
the hydrogen bomb, if we hadn’t launched satellites, it couldn’t be said that China 
is an influential great power. We wouldn’t occupy our present international 
position. The issue reflects a people’s abilities. It symbolizes [whether] a people’s 
and a country’s development is flourishing. As the world is now developing, 
science and high technology are moving at an extremely rapid pace. China cannot 
afford to fall behind. [We] must take our proper place…China cannot afford not to 
engage in spite of the fact that we are poor. Because if you aren’t engaged, if you 
don’t develop in these areas, the gap will only become greater and it will become 
extremely difficult to catch up. We are at present backward in some areas. But we 
are not backward in all areas (cited in Feigenbaum, 2003: 160). 
 
Crucially, the 863 programme received vital and enthusiastic support by Deng. In 
fact, a formal 863 system was created within merely nine months after the four 
scientists sent their letter to Deng. This system mirrored, in many ways, the techno-
nationalist ideological and organisational principles of Nie’s strategic technology 
programme (Feigenbaum, 2003: 141-3). The 863 programme focused on seven 
technological fields, where China should attempt to ‘follow international 
developments, decrease the gap between China and more advanced nations, and look 
for advantages where China could make a breakthrough’ (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 
24). These were: automation, biotechnology, energy, information technology, lasers, 
new materials, and space technology.133  
   Consequently, in February 1987, a special committee was formed to elaborate on a 
plan for space technology (Plan 863-2). What is noteworthy is that the committee 
identified the building of a space station as one of the long-term goals of China’s 
space programme due to the fact that such a space feat could confer the status of a 
twenty-first century great power (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 24; Chen, 1991: 126). 
The general point to make is that the space programme was once again a priority for 
the Chinese leadership. As we shall see in chapter 6, the remarkable progress of 
China’s human spaceflight programme over the last years owes much to the 
postcolonial techno-nationalist vision enshrined in the 863 Plan.  
                                                
132 As a response to SDI, European countries established their alternative high tech industrial R&D 
programme, named Eureka. See Westwick (2010).  
133 For a detailed account of the history, organisation, and specific projects of the 863 programme, see 
Feigenbaum (2003: 153-88).  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
While a complex amalgam of external and internal factors shaped China’s decision to 
develop a space programme, a key question is how this was achieved given the wider 
geopolitical, political, and economic context in which it was embedded. As this 
chapter has suggested, the success of China’s space effort can be largely explained by 
the enduring and powerful influence of a composite ideology of postcolonial techno-
nationalism that rendered the pursuit of space projects appealing to China’s political 
and scientific elite as a normative marker of the state’s scientific prowess, great power 
status, and modernity. In other words, there was nothing preordained about the pursuit 
of a space programme. It was the influence and the composite nature of a postcolonial 
techno-nationalist ideology that helped to secure the development of key space 
programmes amid political turmoil and limited financial resources in the Maoist era. 
    An important aspect of this process was the crucial role of Marshal Nie Rongzhen, 
who managed to articulate successfully a postcolonial techno-nationalist vision that 
has had a profound impact on the development of the strategic weapons programme, 
and, consequently, on the space programme. Yet, this postcolonial techno-nationalist 
approach was shared by key leaders and numerous scientists and engineers, including 
Zhou Enlai, Qian Xuesen and others. In terms of organisation, forging strongly 
professional and flexible institutions premised on the autonomy of experts created an 
environment conductive to large-scale and ambitious space projects. Crucially, 
however, this process was accompanied by the construction of a strong professional 
identity related with those working for the space programme, which was woven into a 
sense of nationalist commitment and mission. 
   Notwithstanding that the advent of the Deng leadership initially marked a focus on a 
few space projects that could contribute to economic construction, the reconsolidation 
of a postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology by the mid-1980s embodied in the 863 
Plan spurred a new interest in space-related research and capabilities and brought 
human spaceflight back in the agenda. Equally importantly, this period saw China’s 
entry into the international space society.  
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Chapter 5.  Leapfrogging Into Modernity: India’s Space Programme 
(1955-1989) 
 
 
One of the most distinctive qualities of India’s space programme has been its 
emphasis on the civilian uses of space science and technology for the promotion of 
socio-economic development. As we shall see in this chapter, therefore, the focus of 
the Indian space programme, from its inception, was the development of space 
applications such as communications and remote sensing to deliver practical benefits 
that could meet the specific social and economic needs of a developing and large 
country like India (Sankar, 2007: 2; Raj, 2000: 22). In explaining the rationale behind 
the development of India’s space programme, Vikram Sarabhai (1968: 39, emphasis 
added), who is generally considered by many observers to be the father as well the 
scientific visionary of India’s space programme, famously noted: 	  
There are some who question the relevance of space activities in a developing 
nation. To us, there is no ambiguity of purpose. We do not have the fantasy of 
competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon 
or the planets or manned space flight. But we are convinced that if we are to play a 
meaningful role nationally and in the community of nations, we must be second to 
none in the application of advanced technologies to the real problems of man and 
society, which we find in our country. The application of sophisticated technologies 
and methods of analysis to our problems is not to be confused with embarking on 
grandiose schemes whose primary impact is for show rather than for progress 
measured in hard economic and social terms.  	  
In the absence of any comprehensive policy framework articulated by the Indian 
government within which to make sense of the key motivations behind the early 
development of India’s space programme, it is plausible to say that Sarabhai’s words 
represented what was as close to a policy framework that one was likely to come 
(Sachdeva, 2013: 303-4). That Sarabhai’s vision served as one of the earliest 
expressions of India’s policy goals in space has been manifested in the ways in which 
India has been successful in utilising space systems for key developmental and human 
security applications, such as tele-education and telemedicine, disaster monitoring, 
meteorological observation and forecasting, and the management of natural and earth 
resources (water, fishery, agriculture, forestry) (Reddy, 2008: 237-8; Das 2007; Rao 
2007). 	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  This is, of course, not to say that national security and prestige considerations were 
absent from the development and deployment of space technologies. In fact, India’s 
missile programme benefited from its space launch vehicle technology - albeit for 
most of the established space powers it has been the other way around (Pant and 
Gopalaswamy, 2008a; Mistry, 1998: 156-7). Rather, the point to emphasise here is 
that in contrast to the overt military applications of other national space programmes, 
the Indian space programme gave priority to a number of civilian space-based 
applications and projects for societal and developmental benefits.	  	  	  	  Although earlier works have focused on the security and military aspects of India’s 
space programme,134 International Relations scholars have recently paid much 
attention to the strategic, political, and economic drivers of India’s growing profile in 
space, especially with regards to the purported Asian space race.135 Yet, while this 
body of literature is a welcome contribution to our understanding of the factors that 
have shaped India’s space goals and ambitions, there is generally little consideration 
of the wider historical context in which India’s space programme has emerged.136 
Even when there is consideration of the earlier stages of India’s space programme, 
this usually tends to be rather descriptive and technical in its empirical focus and 
rather uncritical or hagiographic in its normative expectations.137 Having said that, 
these studies should not be treated as unworthy of our attention, as they offer very 
helpful insights about key developments in the history of India’s space programme 
and policy. It should also be noted that, even though the political history of the Indian 
space programme has not been the focus of extensive analysis in the scholarly 
literature, specific projects and programmes have recently attracted the attention of 
space historians.138 The following analysis builds on these recent works as they help 
to highlight some of the key issues considered in this chapter. 	  	  	  	  What merits emphasis for the purposes of this discussion is that most of 
International Relations accounts seem to be interested only in making sense of why 
the Indians decided to pursue a space programme and how they decided to utilise their 
                                                
134 Examples include: Elkin and Fredericks (1984); Bhatia (1985); and Thomas (1986).  
135 See, inter alia, Clegg and Sheehan (1994); Mistry (1998); Pant and Gopalaswamy (2008b); Sheehan 
(2007: 142-57); Siddiqi (2010); Pant and Lele (2010); Moltz (2012: 110-35); and Lele (2013). 
136 One exception is Reddy (2008). 
137 See, Raj (2000); Suresh (2008); Rao and Radhakrishnan (2012); Harvey, Smid and Pirard (2010: 
141-253); Rao (2014); and Rao, Suresh, and Balagangadharan (2015).  
138 See, inter alia, Srinivasan (1997); Maharaj (2013a); Maharaj (2013b); Siddiqi (2015a); and Siddiqi 
(2015b).  
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space assets once they were developed. And yet, one of the most important and 
relevant questions about India’s space programme is how India’s space project 
succeeded in joining the space club as a developing country. This involves saying 
something not only about the strategic, political, and economic factors that shaped 
India’s space programme, but also about the ways in which it was justified and 
implemented efficiently. 	  
   The key point that emerges from this discussion is that the effectiveness and 
efficiency of India’s space programme can be explained – to a great extent – by the 
influence of a postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology with Indian characteristics. As 
we shall see, it was the prevalence among India’s political and scientific elites of a 
postcolonial techno-nationalist approach to space utilisation that led them to instil the 
notion of the need for a extensive space programme, from its inception, as a powerful 
symbol of the state’s scientific prowess, great power status, and modernity. 
Consequently, this postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology played an important role 
in turning the widely held perception, especially in the West, that India as an 
underdeveloped and poor country should not have a space programme to a perception 
that justified space capabilities precisely on the grounds that it was a poor and 
underdeveloped country (Siddiqi, 2010b: 436). Therefore, it is striking, perhaps, that 
it is still difficult to quantify the costs and benefits of India’s space programme, as a 
recent study contends (Sankar, 2007: 291-2).  
   Before moving on, however, for the sake of convenience, it is helpful to 
conceptualise India’s space programme as falling into four time periods. The first era 
began in 1955 with the establishment of the Indian national committee for the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) and ended with the formation of the 
Department of Space (DoS) in 1972. The second period from 1972 until the mid-
1980s saw the development of principally experimental, low-capability projects, 
including the construction and operation of satellites, and the development of 
indigenous launchers. The third period commenced in the second half of the 1980s 
and marked the beginning of the operational stage of the space programme with a 
focus on larger and mission-specific systems (Mistry, 2001: 1025-6).139 The last 
                                                
139 Baskaran (2005) also identifies four phases, each of which lasted roughly a decade long: a) the 
scientific phase (1960s); b) the learning phase (1970s); b) the threshold phase (1980s); c) and the 
commercial phase (1990s). While the phases put forward here largely overlap with the ones suggested 
by Baskaran, it is important to note that the author traces the origins of the space programme in 1961 
(Baskaran 2005: 159).  
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period, from the 1990s to the present, finds India with a coherent and growing 
programme, including space exploration. The first two periods are considered in some 
detail in this chapter because they saw the establishment of an institutional framework 
that defined the course of India’s space programme underpinned by Sarabhai’s 
postcolonial techno-nationalist vision. Given that, in large part, the third era in effect 
signified the implementation of this vision, it is briefly described and analysed in this 
chapter.  Chapter 7 covers the last period.  
   This chapter proceeds in the following way. The first section provides a brief sketch 
of the principal scientist who has been associated with India’s space endeavour, 
Sarabhai, because I argue that his postcolonial techno-nationalist vision exercised a 
profound influence on the direction of the programme even after his sudden death in 
1971. I do this by considering two other key figures that have had an important impact 
on the place of science and technology in post-independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Homi J. Bhabha. Following this, the second section provides a detailed analysis 
of the first period of the space programme by highlighting the key external and 
internal factors that created a permissive environment for its establishment. The third 
section considers the second period of India’s space activities and then moves on to 
briefly describe the operational stage of the programme. By way of conclusion, the 
chapter argues, that although the relative weight of the key drivers behind India’s 
space activities may have varied over time, with national security considerations 
becoming more salient – or at least more overt – in the 1980s and beyond, it was an 
Indian version of postcolonial techno-nationalism, as a complex and composite 
ideology centred on the belief of technology as an indicator of the state’s power, 
status, and modernity, which largely explains the effectiveness of India’s space 
endeavour.  
 
Techno-nationalism, Modernity, and Modern India 
 
To understand the overall context in which the space programme emerged, it is 
important to say something about the small, albeit influential, scientific elite, or what 
Abraham (1992) calls the ‘strategic enclave’, which played a vital role in India’s early 
space effort. In doing so, the principal focus of attention in this section is the two key 
architects of India’s space programme, Homi Bhabha and Vikram Sarabhai, who 
shared in common a postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology couched in the language 
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of social progress, economic development, and modernity. However, the starting point 
of this analysis is that the underlying logic of this postcolonial techno-nationalist 
ideology was nurtured and facilitated by the dominant political figure of post-
independent India: Jawaharlal Nehru.  
    
Nehru and Foreign Policy 
 
There is already a growing literature that seeks to highlight the key tenets of Nehru’s 
foreign policy. Nevertheless, my goal here is simply to consider what these tell us 
about his understanding of the place of science and technology in post-independence 
India. To begin with, Nehru’s attitude towards foreign policy has been complex and 
frequently contradictory and ambiguous. The potential relevance of this claim has 
been evident in the continuing debates about whether Nehru’s policy of nonalignment 
was an expression of idealism or realism. Yet, as Cohen (2001: 39-40) notes, it makes 
more sense to consider Nehru’s foreign policy and strategic outlook as reflective of a 
constant tension between idealism and realism. Besides, to treat his foreign policy 
outlook along these Manichean lines merely has the effect of attributing to Nehru’s 
thinking a static quality, which does not do justice to his complex view about world 
affairs. The fact that he stayed in office for nearly twenty years also means that his 
worldview was susceptible to change (Nayar and Paul, 2003: 116).  
   Having said that, it is possible to identify some of the principal influences that have 
underpinned the foreign policy orientations and views of Nehru, as this can help to 
illustrate the role of science and technology in the immediate post-independence 
period. One of these is the long-standing aspiration of India to become a great power 
that ‘is fully autonomous, influential and respected by the world’ (Ogden, 2014: 3). 
As Nayar and Paul (2003) persuasively demonstrate, India’s desire to attain the role of 
a major power has been a key determinant of its international behaviour since 
independence.  
   But while it is clear that India’s quest for great power status has been a material 
expression of its national attributes, including its sub-continental size, large 
population, and its hegemonic presence in South Asia, it is also apparent that it had a 
vital ideational and normative dimension (Nayar and Paul, 2003: 3). On the one hand, 
Nehru’s efforts to carve out a greater role for India as the leader of the non-alignment 
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movement were partly a response to the structural and geopolitical pressures of the 
Cold War. On the other hand, his orientations and calculations were entrenched in 
India’s ‘civilisational exceptionalism’ (Chacko, 2012). This was reflected in the 
widely held belief among Indian elites, that, as an enduring and distinct civilisational 
entity, India is entitled to play a global role in international society (Cohen, 2001: 52; 
Nayar and Paul, 2003: 3). 
   This leads to another key feature of Nehru’s worldview, which is often interwoven 
with India’s quest for great power status and ‘civilisational exceptionalism’, that is, 
the profound and enduring impact of the legacy of colonialism on India’s interaction 
with international society. Like Mao and other nationalists, Nehru’s writings display 
the pride taken in the past achievements of his motherland embodying an ancient 
civilisation as well as the blame of the colonial powers for the loss of this past 
greatness and the suffering and humiliation henceforth caused (Miller, 2013: 32). 
Thus, not only was the support of the anti-colonial movements a principal theme of 
India’s diplomacy under Nehru’s leadership (Cohen, 2001: 38), but Nehru also 
believed that India was entitled to a leadership role in international society because of 
its colonial past and its anti-colonial struggle (Miller, 2013: 93).  
   Nonetheless, focusing merely on Nehru’s foreign policy outlook provides a very 
narrow understanding of his thinking for he was, perhaps, more than anything else, an 
intellectual (Nayar and Paul, 2003: 116). To be sure, non-alignment was a key feature 
of what has come to be called the ‘Nehruvian consensus’ in the scholarly literature, 
which is indicative – to some extent, at least – of his perceived centrality in the 
making of the modern Indian nation state since 1947. Yet, the ‘Nehruvian consensus’ 
was consisted of two other main themes: the construction of a modern Indian society 
centred on the ideals of freedom, equality, and democracy within a secular state and 
the creation of a self-sufficient economy through import-substitution and rapid 
industrialisation in order to do away with poverty and dependence on advanced 
industrial countries (Stein, 2010: 399-400). 
    
 
Nehru, Science, and Technology 
 
It was against this backdrop of ideas and influences that Nehru succeeded in fostering 
an environment conductive to science and technology, which bears the characteristics 
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of a postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology. Certainly, even before independence 
Nehru had identified science with the future of modern India. But it was in the early 
postcolonial period that the full impact of his personal involvement with the formation 
of India’s science and technology policy and his interaction with scientists and their 
ideas became more apparent (Anderson, 2010: 249). While many writers have drawn 
attention to the salience of science in modern India, Arnold (2013) has provided an 
especially useful analysis of what he calls ‘Nehruvian science’, a concept that has 
particular relevance for this discussion. Even though Nehruvian science embraced 
many different things, according to Arnold (2013: 361), four aspects are especially 
noteworthy. Firstly, Nehruvian science placed science at the centre of the 
autobiography of the Indian nation by forming ‘a space for postcolonial ownership 
and subjectivity’. Secondly, it was intended to defy the Eurocentric belief about a 
monopoly of science by placing modern science in India’s history and traditions 
through a process of cultural appropriation. Thirdly, although Nehru emphasised the 
transnational nature of modern science, he primarily saw science as a means to meet 
India’s national needs and fulfil its Cold War ambitions. Fourthly, his was a 
programme of socio-cultural change with the aim to transform Indian society through 
the cultivation of a scientific outlook or what Nehru usually referred to as the 
‘scientific temper’. 
   What is distinctive about Arnold’s concept of Nehruvian science is that it makes the 
link between Nehru’s commitment to the cultivation of a ‘scientific outlook’ and ideas 
about postcolonial science. Building on Arnold’s concept, it is not too fanciful to 
suggest that Nehruvian science was also a postcolonial techno-nationalist vision with 
Nehruvian characteristics. More specifically, Nehru’s techno-nationalist ideology 
favoured an approach to science that was state-driven and controlled by the state. This 
was because he saw the development of science and technology as too important and 
strategic to be left to either the states of the Indian Union or local universities. 
Therefore, as prime minister, Nehru sought to build a scientific establishment that was 
favourably inclined to his vision about the role of science by using the central 
government, its scientific institutions, and controlling science expenditures. Crucially, 
this involved not only institution building, but also the establishment of a nexus of 
relationships with like-minded scientists and advisors around Nehru, including 
amongst others, S.S. Bhatnagar, Patrick Blacket, and Homi K. Bhabha (Arnold, 2013: 
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366-8).140 Equally, for Nehru, not only did science and technology offer a way to get 
rid of India’s former scientific dependence on Britain and to form relations with other 
scientific powers, but it also ‘gave India a new authority, a new moral stature, in the 
world’ amid the Cold War (Arnold, 2013: 368). 
  
 
Nehru, Techno-nationalism, and the Nuclear Programme 
 
The epitome of India’s early postcolonial techno-nationalism was, of course, India’s 
nuclear programme and the discourse around it. Despite the fact that there is still a 
good deal of debate about the drivers behind India’s nuclear programme, there is 
agreement among observers that nuclear technology and nuclear weapons served as 
powerful markers of India’s independence, its technological advancement and 
modernisation (Ogden, 2011: 290). Yet, even though techno-nationalism has not been 
explicitly used as an analytical framework in the relevant literature that deals with the 
Indian nuclear programme, a postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology, as has been 
defined in this study, was pivotal in creating the sort of thinking and institutions, 
which in turn, encouraged the successful undertaking of a techno-political project of 
such a large scale and investment.  
   Certainly, Nehru played a crucial role in articulating an influential discourse around 
science and the nation, and atomic energy, as part of the postcolonial state’s project of 
modernity (Abraham, 1998: 28-30). This discourse was also enmeshed in narratives 
about India’s civilisational backwardness and civilisational exceptionalism (Chacko, 
2012: 21-45). In this regard, Nehru’s decision to establish an Indian nuclear 
programme reflected his belief that the mastery of modern science would allow 
postcolonial India to reach the Western standards of modernity (Chacko, 2011: 192-7) 
and take part in the ‘universal ideal of scientific competence’ (Harrison and Johnston, 
2009: 1). As Nehru noted in 1955:  
    	  
Often our people fail to recognize what the modern world is all about. How did 
Europe and the US advance? Why were they able to conquer us? It is because they 
had science through which their wealth and economic and military strength grew. 
Now they have even produced the atom bomb. All these things stem from science 
                                                
140 Anderson (2010) provides a detailed study of the influence of this network of scientists and advisors 
associated with Nehru on India’s science and technology policies and practices since independence. 
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and if India is to progress and become a strong nation, second to none, we must 
build up our science’ (cited in Chacko, 2012: 32). 	  
 
Therefore, Nehru was keen to emphasise that India’s response to science as an 
expression of modernity had to be an alternative modernity, that is, an ethical 
modernity. This was based on the perception that India is armed with unique 
civilisational qualities to furnish an ethical modernity, which is in contrast to the 
violent and materially-oriented modernity of the West. As Chacko (2012: 34) argues, 
this move allowed Nehru to use science as a tool to ‘reconcile India to a modernity in 
which the West was seen as the standard of material development’, without being 
accused of Western mimicry. Such perceptions of India’s ‘civilisational 
exceptionalism’ help to explain why India decided to become a nuclear power, while 
at the same time was a key supporter of nuclear disarmament during the Cold War 
(Chacko, 2012: 21-45). Remarkably, perhaps, this principal paradox between 
weaponisation and disarmament has remained a constant in India’s nuclear 
programme ever since (Ogden, 2011: 297).   
   Indeed, one of the most important aspects of this ambivalent response to modernity 
was an equivocal stance towards the possibility of the use of the Indian atomic energy 
programme for military purposes (Abraham, 1998: 46-8; Chacko, 2012: 21-45). This 
stance can be traced at least back to the 1948 Constituent Assembly debates about the 
Atomic Energy Act to establish an Atomic Energy Commission (Abraham, 1998: 50-
1). In discussing the merits of developing an atomic energy programme, the Indian 
prime minister recognised the Indian nuclear project as a potential source of both 
economic and military power:  
 
Consider the past few hundred years of history, the world developed a new source 
of power, that is steam – the steam engine and the like – and the industrial age came 
in. India with all her many virtues did not develop that source of power. It became a 
backward country in that sense; it became a slave country because of that…Now 
we are facing the atomic age; we are on the verge of it. And this is obviously 
something infinitely more powerful than either the steam or electricity…The point I 
should like the House to consider is this, that if we are to remain abreast in the 
world as a nation which keeps ahead of things, we must develop this atomic energy 
quite apart from war – indeed I think we must develop it for the purpose of using it 
for peaceful purposes…Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other 
purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using 
it that way (cited in Perkovich, 1999: 20).  
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Therefore, Nehru was careful not to rule out the military use of atomic energy due to 
its inherent dual-use nature. As Perkovich (1999: 20) points out, the founders of the 
Indian atomic establishment welcomed this possibility in 1948, even before Mao’s 
communists took over China and without any serious external threat to India’s 
national security. In this context, this phrasing by Nehru can be seen as a typical 
articulation of a techno-nationalist discourse in the sense that it acknowledges the 
importance of science and technology as a source of national power both in military 
and economic terms. But, at the same time, as Abraham (1998: 29) notes, what is 
interesting in Nehru’s phrasing is the exegesis he puts forwards for the reason why 
India was rendered a colony: ‘because of its lack of technological sophistication’. 
Equally, references to India as a ‘backward’ and ‘slave country’ on the grounds of its 
scientific and technological advancement vis-à-vis the colonial powers serve to 
illustrate the enduring impact of India’s colonial experience on Nehru’s understanding 
of science and technology as a modern ‘standard of civilisation’. 
   The Atomic Energy Act was eventually passed in 1948 and led to the creation of the 
Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on 10 August 1948. Not surprisingly, 
Nehru was personally engaged with overseeing the trajectory of the atomic 
programme. In practice, however, it was Bhabha who guided its early 
conceptualisation and implementation (Perkovich, 1999: 20-1). 
 
 
Homi J. Bhabha and Postcolonial Techno-nationalism 
 
Homi Jehangir Bhabha (1909-1966), like Nehru and Sarabhai, articulated a vision 
about the role of science and technology that was keeping in line with postcolonial 
techno-nationalist thinking.141 A key feature of this thinking was Bhabha’s 
determination to build strong research institutions in India characterised by strong 
professionalism blended with nationalist motivation. Using his family connections 
with the Tata family, he wrote a letter to the Sir Dorab Tata Trust in 1944 with a 
proposal to set up a world-class scientific institute of fundamental research. In the 
often quoted letter, Bhabha (1944: 2-3) somewhat presciently noted that ‘when 
nuclear energy has been successfully applied for power production in say a couple of 
                                                
141 Accounts of Bhabha’s life and legacy include: Venkataraman (1997); Dasannacharya (2009); 
Chowdhury and Dasgupta (2010); and Menon (2010).  
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decades from now, India will not have to look abroad for its experts but will find them 
ready at hand’. In turn, the Tata Trust accepted Bhabha’s proposal and the Tata 
Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) began functioning in 1945 with Bhabha as 
its founder director. What is worth noting is that the TIFR enjoyed a remarkable 
freedom of interference from the central government and generous financial resources 
available from the very beginning of its formation (Perkovich, 1999: 17).  
   Bhabha, of course, has been synonymous with the early direction of India’s nuclear 
programme. He was chair of the Atomic Energy Research Committee, which was 
formed in 1946 and one of the three members of the AEC. In 1954, the new 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was created as a separate ministry. Bhabha was 
appointed as the secretary and he reported directly about the progress of India’s 
nuclear programme to Nehru. This eventually elevated Bhabha to ‘a science 
policymaker without equal in the country (Anderson, 2010: 254). Bhabha’s close 
relationship with Nehru was a key factor in this development. Besides, the two men 
shared the view that Indian science could transcend India’s colonial legacy and 
achieve the principal marker of modernity at the time, that is, atomic energy 
(Perkovich, 1999: 17). According to Anderson (2010: 260), Bhabha exerted a subtle 
influence on Nehru, something that was evident in Nehru’s belief that atomic 
scientists should be treated as a special category. Thus, in contrast to other research 
centres in India, Bhabha’s institutes or projects were not subject to the same review 
and assessment processes (Anderson, 2010: 270). In this light, the Nehru-Bhabha 
relationship was effectively the only form of checks and balances in the early stages 
of India’s nuclear endeavour (Perkovich, 1999: 21).  
   By the mid-1950s, Bhabha was not only the indisputable leader behind India’s 
nuclear programme, but he had also become ‘the sole power in Indian science’. 
Therefore, Nehru’s considerable reliance on him further increased (Anderson, 2010: 
252). Indeed, it was Bhabha who drafted the influential 1958 ‘Scientific Policy 
Resolution’ embodying the spirit of self-reliance, which was passed within less than a 
year after the launch of Sputnik. An illustrative example of the advent of India’s 
postcolonial techno-nationalist thinking under Nehru’s leadership, the resolution also 
provides insights into Bhabha’s views about the role of science and technology. While 
this brief resolution policy was primarily designed to ‘foster, promote, and sustain, by 
all appropriate means, the cultivation of science and scientific research’ by ‘offering 
good conditions of service to scientists’, it was also framed around a postcolonial 
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techno-nationalist ideology. According to the document (Government of India, 1958), 
‘the dominating feature of the contemporary world is the intense cultivation of science 
on a large scale, and its application to meet a country’s requirements’ and ‘the wealth 
and prosperity of a nation depend on the effective utilisation of its human and material 
resources through industrialisation’. It also states that ‘an early and large scale 
development of science and technology’ is necessary in order to ‘reduce the drain of 
capital’, which otherwise has to be spent on importing science and technology and 
‘highly paid personnel and technical consultants’. More tellingly, perhaps, the policy 
resolution (Government of India, 1958) notes that:  
 
Science had developed at an ever-increasing pace since the beginning of the 
century, so that the gap between the advanced and backward countries has widened 
more and more. It is only by adopting the most vigorous measures and by putting 
forward our outmost effort into the development of science that we can bridge the 
gap. It is an inherent obligation of a great country like India, with its traditions of 
scholarship and original thinking and its great cultural heritage, to participate fully 
in the march of science, which is probably mankind’s greatest enterprise today. 
 
   In this regard, the policy resolution codified and institutionalised, perhaps, for the 
first time in public, a postcolonial techno-nationalist framework based on two rather 
subtle moves. In the first place, it articulated the familiar narrative about how science 
had generated the gap between advanced and backward countries and how this 
compelled India to bridge this gap. In the second place, the necessity to participate in 
‘the march of science’ and modernity was also rendered inescapable due to India’s 
sense of ‘civilisational exceptionalism’. 
   Another important and revealing example of Bhabha’s postcolonial techno-
nationalist thinking was his last speech in 1966.142 In his speech, Bhabha articulated 
his views about the role of science and technology in a developing country like India. 
Echoing the Scientific Policy Resolution, Bhabha (1966: 541, emphasis added) noted:  
 
Western Europe is in fact a small area of the globe which outstripped the rest, 
essentially from the time of the Industrial Revolution, because of its development 
of modern science and the enhanced ability this gave it to utilize the forces of 
nature and to thus achieve a much higher material standard of life for its people…A 
major part of the world, however, still remains underdeveloped by these standards. 
                                                
142 The speech was delivered on the occasion of the latest of the biennial assemblies of the International 
Council of Scientific Unions hosted by TIFR in January. However, Bhabha’s speech was published 
posthumously in the prestigious Science magazine.    
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What the developed countries have and the underdeveloped lack is modern science 
and an economy based on modern technology.   
 
    Nevertheless, the point to make is that Bhabha, as the most powerful scientist of the 
period under consideration, played a crucial role in identifying and promoting other 
important areas of research, including electronics and space technology. Despite the 
fact that he did not live long enough to see India’s first steps in space, he provided 
important support to Sarabhai’s plans for the creation of a space programme. 
Inaugurating a seminar on Space Science in January 1963, Bhabha provided a 
rationale for the development of space research in India along postcolonial techno-
nationalist lines that it is worth quoting at length:  
 
If we do not do so now, we will have to depend later on buying know-how from 
other countries at a much greater cost…[s]ome people may well ask whether it is 
appropriate that we should spend some of [our limited resources], even if in a 
modest way, on space research. I am convinced that the answer to this is ‘Yes’. 
Science and technology provide the very basis upon which the future of the country 
rests; and it is not possible for us to develop the best that our scientists are capable 
of, and to attract our best and most able people to scientific work, unless one can 
also provide them the opportunities of making discoveries in the fields of scientific 
endeavour, which are the most active and exciting today. The second reason for 
going into space research is that there are many areas in which it is likely to yield 
results of great practical interest and importance in the near future, and we would 
again be falling behind the advanced countries in practical technology if we were 
not to look ahead and prepare ourselves to take advantage of these new 
developments also (cited in Rao and Radhakrishnan 2012: 5-6).  
 
It was in this reconfigured context conductive to ‘highly visible technology’ that 
Sarabhai managed to promote his ambitious plans for an Indian space programme. In 
many ways, he shared with Bhabha similar assumptions about the role of science and 
technology premised on a postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology.  
 
Vikram Sarabhai 
    
Vikram Ambalal Sarabhai (1919-1971) was born to an established, political, and 
wealthy family of industrialists in Ahmedabad.143 He completed an undergraduate 
degree in natural sciences at Cambridge in 1939, but although he was about to embark 
upon graduate studies in physics, he had to return to India because of the break of the 
                                                
143 On Sarabhai’s life and legacy, see the contributions in Joshi (1992); and Shah (2007).  
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Second World War. This didn’t prevent him from joining the Indian Institute of 
Science (IISc) at Bangalore in 1940 to study cosmic rays, where he also met Bhabha. 
When the war ended in 1945, Sarabhai returned to Cambridge and completed his PhD 
in 1947, but the next year he went back to India. Utilising his family resources and 
ties, he established the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL) in 1952, which would be 
an important vehicle for his scientific work on cosmic ray physics and space research.    
   A detailed analysis of Sarabhai’s involvement with the early stages of India’s space 
programme will be taken in the next section. For now, given that Sarabhai combined 
the roles of ‘an innovative scientist, forward-looking industrial organiser’ and 
institution builder (Ramanathan, 1992: 111), his thinking about science and 
technology merits consideration in its own right. This is no easy task, not least 
because soon after Bhabha’s death Sarabhai was appointed as chairman of the AEC, 
secretary of the DAE, and chairman of the Electronics Committee, key positions that 
he held until his sudden death in 1971. In short, Sarabhai was not only the scientific 
visionary and leader of India’s space effort, but for the span of five years (1966-1971) 
he was also responsible for the country’s nuclear programme. But although it is not 
possible to do justice even to Sarabhai’s contribution to India’s space effort in the 
course of one chapter, it is necessary to have a sense of his approach to science and 
technology and his influence over what, over time, resulted in a full-fledged space 
programme.  
 
Sarabhai’s Vision: A Subtle and Ambivalent Postcolonial Techno-nationalism?  
 
As Siddiqi (2015a: 38-9) points out, apart from similar backgrounds and being 
institution-builders, Bhabha and Sarabhai shared a rather ahistorical technological 
enthusiasm embedded in deep-rooted beliefs about science and technology as a 
powerful catalyst for progress, socio-economic development, and modernity in a 
postcolonial context, which was reinforced by theories of modernisation that were so 
influential in the West during the 1950s and 1960s. This made the two men the ideal 
agents of Nehru’s vision of promoting the creation of a ‘scientific temper’ and a 
‘scientific outlook’ in the newly independent country. In doing so, Bhabha and 
Sarabhai also believed that the state should play a key role in India’s modernisation 
(Siddiqi 2015a: 38-9). 
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   For all the attention given to Sarabhai’s distinctive approach to science and 
technology, it is important to recognise that it is difficult to disentangle the enduring 
influence of Sarabhai’s vision and ideas without a reference to a postcolonial techno-
nationalist thinking. However, as we shall see below, his sort of postcolonial techno-
nationalist thinking is best conceived as more complex, subtle, and ambivalent than 
Bhabha’s. In this regard, a number of key features of Sarabhai’s ideas are particularly 
germane here, to which I now turn.  
 
Security or Development?  
 
One of the most important aspects of Sarabhai’s approach to science and technology 
is the relationship between the civilian and military uses of nuclear and space 
technology. This is an important consideration, especially given that there has been a 
great deal of debate about what is usually seen as Sarabhai’s aversion to nuclear 
weapons and the military uses of space. As Perkovich (1999: 123) notes, Bhabha was 
not much interested in nuclear weapons as military tools, but rather in their political 
and psychological value. But Sarabhai saw the possibility of developing nuclear 
weapons quite differently from Bhabha. In particular, whereas Bhabha believed that 
acquiring the capability to explode a nuclear device would allow India to enter him 
and India into ‘the league of atomic scientists who symbolized the apogee of 
modernity’, Sarabhai was quite sceptical about the material and practical benefits that 
would accrue from India’s entrance into the nuclear club (Perkovich 1999: 124).  
   While there is clearly something in this argument, Sarabhai held a more ambivalent 
position towards the possibility of making a bomb throughout his AEC chairmanship 
than is usually acknowledged (Anderson, 2010: 434).144 As Abraham (1998: 143) 
                                                
144 Not surprisingly, Sarabhai’s seemingly position against nuclear weapons created tension and friction 
with the constituency within the Indian scientific community that favoured building nuclear weapons. 
Indeed, one of the first decisions that Sarabhai took as AEC chairman was to halt the plans for India’s 
nascent bomb programme (Chengappa, 2000: 104). Notwithstanding Sarabhai’s opposition, in 1968 
key scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defence Research and 
Development Organisation (DRDO) revived the project for developing a nuclear explosive. 
Significantly, it appears that Sarabhai was aware of the revived project, but he did not try to stop it 
(Perkovich, 1999: 141). It is likely that Sarabhai’s view on nuclear weapons changed from opposition 
to acquiescence after his diplomatic mission with LK Jha to Washington and Moscow in order to 
secure a guarantee against nuclear attack on non-nuclear countries did not yield any results (Perkovich, 
1999: 136-7, 148-9; Shah 2007: 194). In May 1970, under growing pressure from the ‘bomb-for-
security’ lobby, Sarabhai declared that India retained the option for conducting peaceful nuclear 
explosions (Perkovich, 1999: 152). 
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points out, Sarabhai was not against the development of atomic weapons per se, but 
he was opposed to an aggressive military stance in the absence of the required 
infrastructure and the means to support it. Anderson (2010: 437-8) concurs with 
Abraham, adding that Sarabhai was also aware that going nuclear would bring about 
the wrath of the United States with important economic consequences. 
   Likewise, there is a widely held perception that Sarabhai was averse to the military 
uses of space. And yet, it seems that his vision did not preclude the utilisation of space 
for both economic and security purposes. Where his vision differed was in the means 
by which to link economic development with national security. For he thought that 
India’s national security during that period could be safeguarded better through the 
use of space technology for socio-economic development without the overt use of 
military applications. We do know now that, in spite of the fact that the space 
programme was not directly related to the military, Sarabhai kept the lines of 
communication between the two open. As Pramod Kale, who joined the space 
programme in 1963, notes, ‘We were very clear that space was for peaceful purposes 
but we had the capability that could help and if the government wanted it, it was there. 
Defence people would come to see us and vice versa’ (Shah 2007: 132).   
   In November 1962, for instance, soon after the Sino-Indian war had made 
painstakingly obvious India’s lack of adequate early warning systems or interceptors 
like missiles, a meeting of the Electronics Committee headed by Bhabha took place. 
During the meeting, Group Captain VS Narayanan, a radar expert, was asked by 
Sarabhai why India could not build a radar system to pick up both ballistic missiles 
and aircraft. Narayanan responded that India lacked the technology and the resources 
to build basic radars and noted that it needed its own ballistic missile in order to build 
a deterrent. Narayanan then asked: ‘Are we ready for it?’ During a break, Sarabhai 
approached Narayanan by clapping him on the shoulder and invited him for a 
breakfast to further discuss the subject (Chengappa, 2000: 89-90). K Subrahmanyan, 
who was the head of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses around that time, 
also recalls vividly an interesting conversation he had with Sarabhai about the 
possibility of developing a phased radar to detect missiles. He asked Sarabhai: ‘If you 
are not keen on this sort of militarization then why is BARC vying for this contract?’ 
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Sarabhai responded: ‘Who am I to shut off all these options for future generations? I 
am only saying at present I am not for the bomb’ (Shah, 2007: 194).145  
   There are, however, a number of additional points that can be made about 
Sarabhai’s postcolonial techno-nationalist thinking. First, Sarabhai exhibited an 
understanding of the societal dimension of space activities and international 
cooperation. As we saw earlier, he believed that the development of India’s space 
programme would allow India ‘to play a meaningful role nationally, and in the 
community of nations’. Elsewhere, Sarabhai (1974: 23) noted that India’s engagement 
with space activities would provide India with the opportunity to establish 
‘collaborative relationships with organisations as well as with scientists and 
technologists’, which, in turn, would lead India to look outwards ‘from its 
encapsulated existence born out of an emergent nationalism’ to a process of learning 
to deal with peers by establishing mutuality. For Sarabhai, therefore, scientific 
cooperation was an essential vehicle for development in the postcolonial era. 
   Second, his was a typical techno-nationalist approach in the sense that he advocated 
‘a total systems approach’ through the indigenisation of space technology and its 
diffusion throughout the economy, hence, his emphasis on self-reliance as part of his 
vision for India’s modernisation and national independence (Sarabhai, 1974: 91). In 
other words, instead of following ‘the black box approach’ based on an ‘imported 
turnkey solution’, for Sarabhai India should promote the cultivation of an ongoing 
development of technology based on indigenous research and development in order to 
achieve self-reliance (Sarabhai, 1974: 92). Equally, under Sarabhai’s leadership, the 
DAE embraced the combination of a new spirit of private corporate enterprise and the 
older spirit of public service associated in large part with Bhabha. Sarabhai himself 
epitomised the ‘convergence between state science and technology, state industry, and 
private capitalist industry’ (Anderson, 2010: 399).  
   Third, while modernisation theories have had some impact on Bhabha’s approach to 
science and technology, Sarabhai articulated a vision about the role of science and 
technology in his utterances, which was typically expressed in terms of India’s need 
to ‘leap-frog’ the stages of modernisation set by developed countries (Rao, 1992: 146-
7). Sarabhai (1974: 92) also spoke of the need for a comprehensive approach to the 
                                                
145 Another useful illustration of Sarabhai’s techno-nationalist approach to India’s space endeavour, 
through a careful effort to integrate civil and military resources, was the development of indigenous 
rocket engines through reverse engineering (Anderson, 2010: 420, Chengappa, 2000: 148, Kalam with 
Tiwari, 2003: 31-2).  
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process of modernisation and development, according to which any effort to catch up 
with developed countries must encompass the build-up of a strong national 
technological infrastructure, the establishment of a scientific and managerial culture, 
and the cultivation of self-confidence. In his statement as vice-president and scientific 
chairman of the 53rd meeting of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS) in 1968, Sarabhai (1968: 36) elaborated on the ways in which 
developing countries could benefit from the peaceful uses of outer space in order to 
close the economic, social, and cultural gap with developed countries:  
 
A positive approach out of this predicament seems to lie in finding solutions where 
the particular disadvantages of developing nations, that they have little to build on, 
is made an asset rather than a liability. I suggest that it is necessary for them to 
develop competence in advanced technologies and to deploy them for the solution 
of their own particular problems, not for prestige, but based on sound technical and 
economic evolution involving commitment of real resources…Indeed, they would 
discover that there is a totality about the process of development which involves not 
only advanced technology and hardware but imaginative planning of supply and 
consumption centres, of social organisation and management, to leap-frog from a 
state of backwardness and poverty. 
 
For Sarabhai, therefore, there was ‘a totality about modernisation’ that required 
developing countries to go beyond an ‘in-built culture’. In this view, developing 
countries ‘cannot have twentieth century atomic energy with nineteenth century 
industry’ grounded on outdated modes of management and organisation (Sarabhai, 
1974: 98). However, it is important to remember that for some observers the process 
of modernisation in general and theories of modernisation in particular can be seen as 
a euphemism for contemporary standards of civilisations (Bowden, 2009: 69-72, 
Adas, 1989: 402-3; Adas, 2006).  
   Fourth, and related to the previous point, while Sarabhai’s somewhat technological 
apotheosis seems to be technocratic and apolitical couched in the language of 
modernisation and progress, it was also enmeshed in India’s postcolonial identity and 
‘civilisational exceptionalism’. True, Sarabhai’s postcolonial techno-nationalist 
thinking was usually expressed in a more subtle way vis-à-vis the first generation of 
technological enthusiasts of the likes of Nehru and Bhabha, but it was postcolonial 
nonetheless. As such, it embodied the tension of appropriating and participating in the 
march of (Western) modernity without inviting the accusation mimicry. Therefore, 
Sarabhai (1974: 23) would warn against the enticement to use space technology for its 
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‘glamour’, which stems from the desire to device ‘a sham image nationally and 
internationally. Instead, India should utilise space for its specific national socio-
economic needs. That said, Sarabhai also drew more direct links between India’s 
colonial experience and the space programme. As he noted in 1971: ‘Either we decide 
to remain a servile and repetitive state which does not take initiative and plays safe all 
along the line…or we must try to exert on our own and be innovative and do things 
which have never been done by us before’ (cited in Bhatt, 1976: 23).   
   The point to emphasise is that Sarabhai’s postcolonial techno-nationalist vision was 
also shared by many of his aides and his contemporaries who were involved with the 
development of India’s space programme. Crucially, it was in this ideological context 
that the space programme emerged based on the creation of strongly professional and 
flexible organisations of horizontal controls and flattened hierarchy, which operated 
with unusual autonomy from political and bureaucratic interference. At the same time, 
Sarabhai, as the indisputable visionary and leader of the space programme, was 
successful in fusing the strong professional motivation of the young scientific and 
technical workers involved in the space endeavour together with a sense of a national 
mission and commitment. As Raj (2000: 27) notes, ‘Sarabhai was able to give those 
he recruited and led the feeling that they were partners in a great venture which would 
benefit the country’. In short, Sarabhai engineered the construction of a strong 
professional identity associated with those working for the space programme, which 
was blended together with their national identity. As we shall see below, however, the 
high politics of the Cold War would also prove conducive to India’s forays into space.  
    
India’s Space Programme: The Formative Years (1955-1972) 
 
Most accounts identify either the formation of the Indian National Committee for 
Space Research (INCOPSAR) in 1962 or the launching of India’s fist sounding rocket 
in the next year as the beginning of India’s space programme. True, these were clearly 
key developments in the early phases of the programme. Yet, as we shall see in this 
section, one of the most distinctive features of India’s space programme has been the 
crucial role played by the Indian scientific community in contributing to the 
establishment of space research even before the launch of Sputnik in 1957. A key 
aspect of this process was the participation of leading Indian scientists in the 
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International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-1958, which led to the establishment 
of the Indian space programme.  
     
India and the IGY 
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, the launch of the first artificial satellites occurred as part of 
the IGY. What is noteworthy is that India was an active participant both in the 
planning and the execution of the IGY. By the early 1950s, there were already a 
number of established research institutions and facilities for ionospheric, 
geomagnetic, and meteorological studies that could support India’s participation in 
the IGY.  The country’s special geophysical characteristics, such as its vast size and 
its close location to the magnetic equator were also of considerable scientific interest 
and so they could contribute to IGY activities. IGY was, after all, a ‘poor man’s 
programme’ because participation requirements were not related to the level of a 
country’s scientific or economic development (Reddy, 2008: 221).  
   It was in this context that Indian scientists working on upper atmospheric studies 
sought to engage with IGY and the international scientific community early on. 
Sarabhai was one of the first to see the opportunities that were becoming available in 
the field of space research and exploration through India’s involvement with IGY 
(Rao and Radhakrishnan, 2012: 4). It was his proposal that led to the inclusion of a 
worldwide study of cosmic ray variations with standardised equipment in the IGY 
agenda (Ramanathan, 1992: 113; Rao, 2001: 15). As a result, in 1955 a national 
committee for IGY was set up consisted of prominent Indian scientists. K S Krishnan, 
an internationally renowned physicist, was appointed as president, with Sarabhai as a 
member of the committee (Kochhar, 2008: 814).   
   India’s participation in the planning and execution of the programme has had the 
effect of deepening the links between the Indian and the international scientific 
community as well as enhancing the image of Indian science and scientists within 
India and abroad. It also made policy makers more cognisant not only of the 
significance of science and technology, but also of the growing gap between the 
developed and developing countries (Reddy, 2008: 226). Equally, it led Indian 
scientists, like Sarabhai, to further appreciate the significance of satellites and 
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missiles. As Kochhar (2008: 815) points out, it is no exaggeration to say that ‘the IGY 
experience paved the way for the Indian space programme under Sarabhai’.  
 
 
Establishing India’s Space Programme 
 
Despite the fact that Nehru had passed the scientific resolution in 1958, there was still 
a good deal of scepticism even about whether a modest rocket programme should be 
developed (Shah, 2007: 121). However, Indian decision makers soon became more 
responsive to the opportunities offered for international cooperation in space. Central 
in this context were the efforts by Bhabha and Sarabhai (Reddy, 2008: 229-30). More 
specifically, in August 1961, the Indian government, urged by Bhabha, recognised 
space research and the peaceful uses of space as an important issue and put it under 
the jurisdiction of the Department of the Atomic Energy (DAE).  As a result, Sarabhai 
was appointed a member in the board of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and 
the PRL was identified as the ‘appropriate centre’ for research and development in 
space (Shah, 2007: 122).  
   In the meantime, utilising his extensive network of personal connections, Sarabhai 
was exploring the possibility of India’s participation in NASA’s international 
cooperative programmes in areas that could be beneficial for both parties, such as 
sounding rockets. In his meetings with NASA, Sarabhai mentioned his plans of a 
space research programme through the formation of a government-sponsored Indian 
space research committee. Bhabha, who visited the NASA headquarters in November 
1961, confirmed that such a committee was being established and he suggested that 
this should be the main point of contact with NASA (Maharaj, 2013a: 217-8). 
   Eventually, in February 1962, the DAE set up the Indian National Committee for 
Space Research (INCOSPAR), under the chairmanship of Sarabhai, to enable the 
promotion of international cooperation in space research and the peaceful uses of 
space (Rao and Radhakrishnan, 2012: 5). A key consequence of this institutional 
development was that it improved the organisation and coordination of the many 
space activities, which were conducted across the country, and it provided an 
institutional framework for facilitating collaboration with foreign agencies, especially 
NASA (Maharaj, 2013a: 218). 
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The Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS) 
 
One of the immediate consequences of INCOSPAR was the effort to establish a 
rocket launching facility, which would culminate in the Thumba Equatorial Rocket 
Launching Station (TERLS). In 1962, a resolution by the Committee on Space 
Research (COSPAR) acknowledged the major gaps in the coverage of sounding 
rocket sites by stating that ‘the equatorial region has a special interest for meteorology 
and aeronomy’.146 It also suggested the importance of setting up a sounding rocket 
launching facility on the magnetic equator under UN sponsorship (Rao, 2014: 6). In 
response, COPUOS passed a resolution that recommended the formation of sounding 
rocket stations, especially in the equatorial region and the southern hemisphere with 
the aim to further international cooperation, advance human knowledge, and offer 
possibilities for training. Clearly, Sarabhai and Bhabha were keen to exploit a 
possibly unique opportunity to achieve the establishment of a sounding rocket station 
in India, given the country’s location in the equator. Thus, after considering possible 
sites, the fishing village of Thumba near Thriruvanathapuram on the south west coast 
of India was selected mainly due to its half-degree latitude south of the magnetic 
equator (Rao and Radhakrishnan, 2012: 24).  
   However, it is worth noting that, although most accounts emphasise the pivotal role 
of Bhabha and Sarabhai in the selection of Thumba, there is little acknowledgement 
of the active involvement of US scientists and officials in the selection of the site and 
of their connections with Sarabhai (Maharaj, 2013a: 219). And yet, the creation of an 
international station in India was appealing to the United States for a number of 
reasons. First, American scientists were interested in the possible contribution of a 
sounding rocket facility in India to the forthcoming International Indian Ocean 
Expedition (IIOE) and the International Quiet Sun Year (IQSY) activities organised 
under ICSU. Second, such a facility had the potential to give the United States an 
opportunity to establish an indirect venue of relations with the Soviet Union in space 
science amid the Cold War (Reddy, 2008: 231). Indeed, Arnold Frutkin, who was the 
Deputy Director of the NASA international programmes office between 1957 and 
1978, believed that the involvement of the Soviet Union ‘might lift some of the veil of 
                                                
146 COSPAR is an international non-governmental organisation (INGO). It was established by the 
International Council for Science (ICSU) in 1958 to ‘promote at an international scientific level 
scientific research in space’. For more information, see  https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/.  
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secrecy from Soviet space activities’ (Maharaj, 2013a: 220). Third, given India’s 
policy of non-alignment during that time, collaborative research on space with NASA 
was part of the US effort to increase the number of Indian scientists that were 
positively oriented towards the United States  (Maharaj, 2013a: 218).  
   Accordingly, NASA and DAE signed a memorandum of understanding in October 
1962 for collaboration on research of the upper atmosphere through the use of 
sounding rockets. As part of the agreement, NASA’s assistance included the offer of 
nine Nike-Apache launchers, crucial tracking and telemetry equipment, and the 
possibility of recruiting a small group of Indian scientists and engineers to visit 
NASA for training at the Goddard Space Flight Centre and the Wallops Island facility 
used for the launch of sounding rockets (Maharaj, 2013a: 218, 220). Under the 
agreement, therefore, Sarabhai initially selected a small group of young engineers for 
training in assembling and launching imported sounding rockets and their payloads, 
the safe launch of these rockets, tracking their flight, receiving data and gathering 
other information required. These young engineers were R Aravamudan, Pramod 
Kale, A S Prakasa Rao, B Ramakrishna Rao, H G S Murthy, A P J Abdul Kalam, and 
D Easwaradas. Upon their return, they would operate TERLS and play a key role in 
India’s space endeavour (Raj, 2000: 14). Remarkably, Kalam would come to be 
known as the ‘missile man of India’ due to his crucial contribution to the development 
of ballistic missile and launch vehicle technology, before becoming the eleventh 
president of India.  
   The government announced its decision to build a sounding launching facility in 
Thumba in the parliament on 21 January 1963 and, then, India expressed its interest in 
offering the facility under UN-sponsorship. The first Nike-Apache rocket provided by 
NASA was launched on 21 November 1963, marking, thus, the operational phase of 
TERLS. Soon after, international cooperation with other countries was established in 
the form of joint scientific experiments, including collaboration with the Soviet Union 
in 1963 and France in 1964 (Baskaran, 2002: 213).  
   In December 1965, the 20th session of the UN General Assembly provided 
sponsorship for the ‘continuing operation of the TERLS facility’ and an International 
Advisory Panel for TERLS was established consisted of scientists from four countries 
(India, France, USA, USSR) chaired by Sarabhai. It is worth noting that in his 
memoirs the French scientist Jacques Blemont, who was a member of the advisory 
panel for TERLS, offers a rather orientalist account of his visit at Thumba fused with 
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an admiration for Sarabhai. He recalls that upon arriving at the airport of Trivandrum, 
‘there were four coolies who weren’t able to put our boxes and luggage in the trunk in 
the car’, something which was indicative of ‘the wound plaguing the subcontinent, the 
inability of the poor men to really perform effective actions’ (Siddiqi, 2015b: 441). 
Notwithstanding Blemont’s views about ‘poor’ Indians, the United Nations adopted 
TERLS as an international UN-sponsored facility in 1967. On 2 February 1968, a 
large number of scientists and officials, including Indira Gandhi, prime minister of 
India, gathered at Thumba to attend the historic ceremony of dedicating TERLS to the 
United Nations (Rao and Radhakrishnan, 2012: 23-8). Meanwhile, Sarabhai was 
contemplating India's indigenous path towards the utilisation of space centred on the 
principle of self-reliance. This was perhaps nowhere more evident than in the 
indigenisation of sounding rockets.  
 
First Steps in Rocketry: Sounding Rockets  
  
The launch of the Nike-Apache rocket in 1963 was a defining event in the early 
history of India’s space programme. However, for the purposes of this discussion 
what is significant about the sounding rocket programme is not the role of 
international cooperation itself, but how it was part of Sarabhai’s broader step-by-step 
approach to the development of indigenous technology. Indeed, given the benefit of 
hindsight, it is easy to see that Sarabhai employed a three-pronged approach to space 
utilisation: gaining experience by regularly launching foreign sounding rockets at 
TERLS, embarking on the indigenisation of sounding rockets, and promoting the 
indigenisation of all the branches of rocketry (Gowarikar and Suresh, 2009: 1516). In 
this regard, a number of points are worth highlighting. First, there is evidence to 
suggest that Sarabhai envisioned a full-fledged national space programme right from 
the beginning (Raj, 2000: 18). Kalam (with Tiwari 2003: 26) recounts that ‘after the 
successful launch of Nike-Apache, he [Sarabhai] chose to share with us his dream of 
an Indian Satellite Launch Vehicle’.  
   Second, in consequence, international cooperation was bound to have far more than 
symbolic significance throughout the 1960s. This was because in the early phase of 
the programme India had little choice other than cooperation with other countries to 
develop the necessary technological and engineering skills. Yet, the potential problem 
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of dependence on other countries had to be mitigated through a conscious effort to 
collaborate with different countries at the same time (Sheehan, 2007: 146). After all, 
such an approach was reflective of India’s broader non-alignment policy based on 
autonomy and choice (Ogden, 2014: 6-7). In the long-term, therefore, international 
cooperation was largely seen as a means to achieve greater self-reliance in space 
technology. 
   One of the most obvious manifestations of this thinking and practice was the 
Centaure indigenisation programme through technology transfer from France. It is 
estimated that a total of 81 Centaures were launched from TERLS between 1965 and 
1988, of which the large majority were manufactured in India (Rao and 
Radhakrishnan, 2012: 42, 48). The net effect of this period was the development of 
India’s indigenous Rohini sounding rockets. On 20 November 1967 the first of these 
rockets was launched from TERLS named RH-75, a reference to Rohini and the 
rocket’s diameter in millimetres.147 These sounding rockets would contribute to the 
more difficult task of building a launch vehicle (Raj, 2000: 41-4).  
  
Building Space Capabilities in the 1960s: Towards Self-Reliance 
  
National Launch Vehicle 
 
Although technology transfer was a key feature of India’s early efforts in rocketry, it 
is important to recognise that the course of India’s space programme remained 
vulnerable to wider political and geopolitical pressures throughout the 1960s and 
beyond. Plainly, the 1962 border war with China brought India and the United States 
together and created a momentum for cooperation in setting up TERLS.  Yet, since 
the mid-1960s, the limits of cooperation were becoming increasingly apparent in 
India’s quest for building a launching capability due to the fact, of course, that such a 
capability also suggested the development of long-range missiles and related 
expertise.  
   Soon after the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, Bhabha and Sarabhai explored the 
possibility of collaborating with NASA in developing the more powerful all-solid 
four-stage Scout rocket, which could launch satellites weighting roughly 100 pounds 
                                                
147 The Rohini rockets were named after the Hindu Goddess.  
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into low-earth orbit. This possibility was seen as a response to China’s remarkable 
technological feat, which had provided a major boost to India’s rival communist 
neighbour. Maharaj (2013a: 226-7) details how the Indian request triggered an 
argument between Frutkin and the US State Department about whether the United 
States should contribute to India’s plans through technology transfer. To be sure, the 
United States saw space cooperation as a way to help India increase its lost prestige 
after the Chinese test, without resorting to the option of building nuclear weapons. 
However, it was believed that assisting India with the procurement of the Scout rocket 
would be highly visible enough both in political and technological terms, so it could 
not contribute to restoring India’s prestige. Thus, no progress was made in these 
initial discussions (Maharaj 2013a: 226-7).    
   Nevertheless, by that time, the commitment to the development of indigenous space 
technology was already consolidated. Besides, the humiliating defeat in the war with 
China and the strategic implications of China’s nuclear capability acted as a catalyst 
for challenging the main tenets of non-alignment. The death of Nehru in 1964, then, 
precipitated a more pragmatic foreign policy outlook.148 More importantly, perhaps, 
concerns related to the emerging non-proliferation regime served to highlight the need 
for the establishment of a strong technological base in rocketry. In other words, the 
possession of an indigenous launch vehicle was seen as a way to keep the nuclear 
option open without having to alter India’s traditional emphasis on the peaceful uses 
of nuclear technology (Reddy, 2008: 234).  
   What is of the most significance for this discussion is that these dramatic 
developments were aligned with Sarabhai’s techno-nationalist thinking. As early as 
1968, Sarabhai was contemplating the development of the Satellite Launch Vehicle 
(SLV), which could be able to launch a modest 40 kg satellite into 400 km circular 
orbit within five years. Although the configuration and design of the first of these 
launch vehicles, SLV-3, was modelled after Scout, as (Raj 2000: 57) notes, it was ‘not 
a mere copy of the Scout’. At the same time, as these steps towards developing an 
indigenous launcher were being taken, other major developments were occurring as 
part of Sarabhai’s techno-nationalist strategy, including the establishment of the 
Space Science and Technology Centre (SSTC) in 1966 on Veli Hill near Thumba and 
                                                
148 On the impact of these developments on India’s foreign policy, see, inter alia, Cohen (2001); and 
Ogden (2014).  
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India’s first earth station, the Experimental Satellite Communication Earth Station 
(ECNES).149 
 
Satellite Capabilities and Applications  
 
One of the most important aspects of India’s step-to-step approach to the acquisition 
of complex space capabilities was the concomitant desire to build satellites. As early 
as 1965, Sarabhai was interested in the use of communication satellites for 
establishing a nationwide communication and TV networking system to educate the 
rural population in India (Rao, 2014: 18). To this end, there were already plans for an 
Indian national satellite, to be called INSAT, by 1968 (Srinivasan, 1997: 223).    
   Meanwhile, NASA was looking for an opportunity to field-test the direct broadcast 
of television to receivers from an Application Technology Satellite (ATS). India 
presented the logical site for the ATS experiment due to its geography and 
demographics (Srinivasan, 1997: 219). As we saw earlier, Bhabha and Sarabhai 
explored the possibility of entering into a cooperative agreement with NASA in 
procuring the technology of the Scout rocket, but US officials were not interested. 
However, the idea of a broadcast satellite for India became more attractive to US 
officials soon after the 1964 Chinese nuclear test as part of their efforts to display the 
US commitment to the ‘third-world’ and to promote democratic India as an Asian 
counterweight to communist China (Maharaj, 2013b: 236-7). While the specific 
origins of the idea remain unclear, the eventual US proposal for satellite broadcasting 
dovetailed with Sarabhai’s vision of space utilisation for development and 
modernisation (Siddiqi, 2015a: 41). As a consequence, an agreement was signed 
between NASA and India’s DAE in 1969 for the Satellite Instructional Television 
Experiment (SITE). Designed to broadcast educational television programmes to rural 
areas, the project would be conducted in 1975-1976, as we shall see later. 
   Arrangements for the SITE project occurred in parallel with Sarabhai’s plans for 
building indigenous satellite technology for conducting scientific experiments. In 
1968, Sarabhai requested from U R Rao to draw up such a plan. However, in April 
1971, an offer was made by the Soviet Academy of Science to help India in space 
                                                
149 On the SSTC, see Atomic Energy Commission (1970: 27-8); and Raj (2000: 24). For Sarabhai’s role 
in establishing the ECNES, see Rao (2014: 12); and Shah (2007: 178, 180).  
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exploration. Sarabhai was quick to arrange a meeting with N M Pegov, the Soviet 
Ambassador in India, to discuss the details of the offer. What is noteworthy is that the 
Soviet Ambassador informed the Indian side that the Soviet Union was willing to 
launch India’s first satellite regardless of its weight, but he suggested that it must be 
heavier than the first Chinese satellite. Subsequently, in August 1971, Rao, along with 
a group of Indian scientists, was delegated to visit the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 
Moscow to discuss this possibility. The Soviet team tried hard to persuade the Indian 
delegation that a scientific payload should be flied in one of the Soviet satellites. But 
the Soviets eventually agreed to offer a free launch for an Indian-built satellite upon 
Rao’s insistence that India needed to develop its own expertise in satellite technology 
as soon as possible (Rao, 2014: 28). 
 
The Establishment of ISRO and the ‘Sarabhai Profile’  
 
As research and development related to space activities continued to expand, Sarabhai 
engineered the creation of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) at 
Ahmedabad in 1969, under DAE. This was followed by the announcement of a ten-
year plan for atomic energy and space research by the Atomic Energy Commission in 
1970, entitled a Profile for the Decade. The profile, which is also known as the 
‘Sarabhai Profile’ because it was largely the product of Sarabhai and his acolytes, 
summarised in many ways Sarabhai’s postcolonial techno-nationalist approach to the 
development of India’s nuclear and space programme. In the preface, it noted that 
‘The progress of science and technology is transforming society in peace and in war. 
The release of the energy of the atom and the conquest of outer space are two most 
significant landmarks in this progress…	   India is amongst the nations of the world 
advanced in atomic energy, and is striving for a similar position in space technology 
and research’ (Atomic Energy Commission, 1970: iv). It also recognised that several 
uses of space can make an important contribution to the economic and social 
advancement of India, without which ‘it is difficult to see how we can hold our own 
in a shrinking world’ (Atomic Energy Commission, 1970: v).  
   Published one month after the launch of the first Chinese satellite, the profile laid 
out a concrete decade-long plan for the next phase of a ‘full-fledged’ space 
programme by stating that:  
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The principal objectives of the space programme of the Atomic Energy 
Commission are to develop indigenous competence for designing and building 
sophisticated hardware involved in space technology including rockets and 
satellites for scientific research and practical applications, the use of these systems 
for providing point-to-point communications and a national TV hook-up through a 
direct broadcast synchronous satellite; and the applications of satellites for 
meteorology and for remote sensing of earth resources (Atomic Energy 
Commission 1970: 35).  
 
It also confirmed the establishment of the Sriharikota Range (SHAR), a new satellite 
launching site located at the east coast of India at Sriharikota Island, with the aim to 
offer a suitable range for launching satellites using multi-stage rockets (Atomic 
Energy Commission, 1970: 35). 
   The Profile was not without its critics in the scientific community, the Parliament, 
and the press. Much of the criticism targeted the viability of the development of 
bigger reactors and the lack of communication between the DAE and BARC in 
drafting the Profile (Anderson, 2010: 434). But India’s space programme was also 
subject to criticism in light of China’s remarkable technological achievement in space. 
For instance, Thapar (1970: 726), an influential journalist, noted that China’s space 
feat showed ‘a massive co-ordination of skills and resources’ of a developing 
economy. But given that India’s scientific effort remained entangled in secrecy, 
corruption, and incompetence, the author warned that it would ‘be left far behind 
junior neighbours, let alone China’ (Thapar 1970: 727).150 
   Whatever the merits of these criticisms were, the country was shocked on hearing 
the untimely demise of Sarabhai in December 1971. But while Sarabhai’s sudden 
death marked the end of the scientific phase of India’s space programme, his 
postcolonial techno-nationalist vision and legacy would continue to exert a powerful 
influence throughout the operational phase of the programme during the 1970s and 
1980s.  
 
India Joins the Space Club: From the Experimental to the Operational Phase of 
the Space Programme (1970s-1980s) 
 
By the early 1972, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s faction of the Congress Party had 
already won an important Parliamentary election and had led India to a decisive 
                                                
150 It should be noted that some Indian elites tried to exploit the launch of the Chinese satellite to argue 
that India should develop nuclear weapons (Perkovich, 1999: 151-2). 
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victory in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict over Bangladesh. It was in this 
reconfigured political context that Sarabhai’s sudden death did not come only as a 
shock for the scientific and political elite, but it also offered an unanticipated 
opportunity for the government to alter, or at least ameliorate, the tensions between 
the nuclear and space programmes. A key aspect of this process was a new 
organisational structure with the creation of a Space Commission and the Department 
of Space (DoS) in 1972, which effectively separated the space programme from DAE 
by bringing it directly under the prime minister. This marked the further 
institutionalisation of the space programme with an allocated budget as well as a clear 
mission that needed to be justified in parliament (Reddy, 2008: 234-5).  
   Satish Dhawan (1920-2002) was appointed chairman of ISRO and secretary of DoS 
in 1972. He would remain chairman of ISRO and secretary of DoS until 1984. One of 
his first decisions was to set up organisational structures that would allow the various 
space projects to operate without dependence on the individuals involved (Raj, 2000: 
63). In many ways, Dhawan built on Sarabhai’s postcolonial techno-nationalist vision, 
something that was reflected in his efforts to move on with the development of a ‘full-
fledged’ indigenous space programme. Where Dhawan’s approach differed was in the 
introduction of project-oriented management and coordination mechanisms that 
facilitated the achievement of the stated goals based on rigorous assessments of each 
project (Baskaran, 2005: 163-4; Raj, 2000: 62). In doing so, he managed to establish a 
sort of a new organisational and managerial culture that combined Sarabhai’s 
horizontal management style with a vertical management approach, which allowed for 
better coordination and flexibility (Rao, 2014: 109).   
   As far as the broader strategy of this period is concerned, Dhawan continued to 
follow a step-by-step approach beginning with the implementation of several 
experimental projects related to the development and operation of indigenous 
technological capabilities, such as launch vehicles	  and satellites, through international 
cooperation (Reddy, 2008: 235). Yet, by the mid-1980s, more emphasis was placed 
on the construction of more powerful and mission-oriented technological capabilities 
(Mistry, 2001: 1026). 
   One notable exception of this period occurred in 1980, when Prime Minister Gandhi 
accepted an offer by the Soviet Union for a joint human mission. This political 
decision resulted in the visible and symbolic flight of the first Indian astronaut. On 3 
April 1984, Rakesh Sharma, an Indian Air Force pilot, was blasted off aboard the 
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Salyut 7 space station. One day later, amid much publicity, when Prime Minister 
Gandhi asked Sharma how India looks from space, he famously replied ‘the most 
beautiful land in the whole world is our Hindustan’ (Rao, 2014: 83).151 For all the 
media attention and the national pride that the flight stirred up, other missions of 
astronauts did not follow. This exception notwithstanding, what merits mention is that 
both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, as prime ministers, continued to provide 
unlimited political support to India’s space effort throughout this period (Rao, 2014: 
111).152    
 
Satellites and Experimental Applications  
 
As we saw earlier, a Soviet offer was made to assist India with the launch of its first 
satellite. This led to an agreement between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and ISRO 
in May 1972. Under the agreement, India’s first satellite, Aryabhata, was launched on 
19 April 1975. Despite the fact that Aryabhata was launched on a Soviet rocket from 
the Soviet Union, the experimental spacecraft was indigenously developed under the 
direction of U R Rao.153 Interestingly, as far as naming the satellite is concerned, the 
board of the satellite project decided to recommend three names to Indira Gandhi, 
who selected the name Aryabhata after India’s famous ancient astronomer and 
mathematician. The Indian government also decided to release stamps to coincide 
with the day of the launch (Rao, 2014: 41).  
   As Rao (2014: 42-3) notes, with India’s first satellite, India entered into ‘the select 
group of six nations capable of designing, manufacturing and launching sophisticated 
space satellites’. The main contribution of Aryabhata was that it established a solid 
base in satellite technology, which served as a test bed for building future operational 
satellites. Subsequently, the Soviet Union launched India’s first experimental earth 
observation satellite, Bhaskara-1, in 1979, which was followed by the launch of   
Bhaskara-2 in 1981.  
                                                
151 These are the first lines of a popular patriotic song, known as the ‘patriotic song of the people of 
Hindustan’, which has been associated with the opposition against the British rule and it has been 
adopted by the Indian Armed Forces.  
152 Indira Gandhi was prime minister between 1966 and 1977 and between 1980 and 1984. For an 
account of her approach to science and technology, see Parthasarathi (2007). After Gandhi’s 
assassination in 1984, her son, Rajiv, served as prime minister between 1984 and 1989.  
153 On the details of India’s first satellite, see Rao (2014: 32-43).  
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   Over the next decade, India also moved ahead with the conduct of a series of 
experimental projects in satellite applications through international cooperation. As 
was noted earlier, an agreement was signed between NASA and DAE in 1969 for the 
Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE), which was eventually conducted 
in 1975-1976. SITE was an enormous experiment in social engineering (Srinivasan, 
1997: 220). By the end of the project, the broadcast of educational programmes for 
the improvement in health, nutrition, family planning, and agriculture had reached 
over 2,300 villages and demonstrated that space technology could be successfully 
utilised by India for socio-economic development. One of the most important 
consequences of the SITE project was that it paved the way for the development of 
the Indian National Satellite System (INSAT).154  
   Another key experimental project was the Satellite Telecommunication 
Experimental Project (STEP), which was taken up during 1977-1979 by using the 
Franco-German Symphonie satellite. As Reddy (2008: 238) observes, the project was 
to ‘the telecommunications sector, what the SITE was to television broadcasting’ as it 
helped India to enhance its capabilities in operating communications satellites. The 
experimental phase of India’s satellite programme also included the launch of the 
small Rohini series of satellites in the early 1980s as well as the launch of the Ariane 
Passenger Payload Experiment (Apple) communications satellite in collaboration 
with France, which was placed in geostationary orbit in June 1981 (Moltz, 2012: 117).  
   As the space programme moved forward in the 1980s, the development of satellite 
capabilities gradually entered into its operational phase in the fields of 
communications and remote sensing. Built by Ford Aerospace, INSAT-1A was 
launched on a US rocket from US soil in April 1982.155 It was the first satellite of the 
INSAT series that would form part of the INSAT system. Significantly, one year later, 
U R Rao, who was then director of the ISRO Satellite Centre (ISAC), succeeded 
Dhawan as the chairman of ISRO. This marked the transition to the operational phase 
of India’s space programme (Rao, 2014: 109; Baskaran, 2005: 167).  
   In the field of remote sensing, India reached an agreement with the United States to 
receive data from its LANDAT satellite when an earth station was opened at 
Hyderabad in 1979. However, following the successful demonstration flights of 
Bhaskara-1 and Bhaskara-2, India began developing the indigenous Indian Remote 
                                                
154 For a detailed account of the SITE project, see Maharaj (2013b); Also, see Siddiqi (2015a). 
155 On India’s first communications satellite, see Srinivasan (1997: 222-6). 
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Sensing (IRS) satellite programme, which became operational in 1988, with the 
launch of IRS -1A on a Soviet rocket (Burleson, 2005: 139, 144-5).  
 
Launch Vehicles 
 
One of Dhawan’s priorities when he took over as chairman of ISRO was the 
acceleration of the development of the SLV-3 launch vehicle. As part of this effort, 
Kalam was assigned project director of SLV-3 in 1972. Eventually, SLV-3 was 
successfully launched in July 1980. Significantly, the successful completion of the 
SLV -3 project contributed to the establishment of the more advanced Augmented 
Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) project in the second half of the 1980s. In turn, the 
ASLV project would contribute to the design and development of more powerful 
operational launch vehicles like the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the 
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) (Rao and Radhakrishnan, 2012: 
84-97; Raj, 2000: 73). 
   But the SLV-3 did have another noteworthy effect: India’s intermediate range Agni 
missile ‘technology demonstrator’ employed the SLV-3 booster as its first stage (Pant 
and Gopalaswamy, 2008a: 378). More specifically, although India had been carrying 
out R&D programmes on missiles since the early 1970s, under DRDO, these had not 
yielded the expected results. In contrast to the relatively flat, non-hierarchical 
organisational culture of ISRO, the prevalent culture in the DRDO was more 
hierarchical, so it was not particularly conductive to creativity and innovation 
(Perkovich, 1999: 246).156 Under such circumstances, there was pressure by the 
government and the DRDO to bring the space and missile programmes closer, but 
Dhawan was reluctant to jeopardise ISRO’s participation in cooperative projects with 
other countries and risk sanctions and export controls by building missiles. He 
believed that the world should continue to see India’s space programme as an entirely 
peaceful endeavour focused on space applications (Parthasarathi, 2007: 173).  
   However, in 1982 Kalam was eventually transferred to DRDO and was put in 
charge of India’s effort to become self-sufficient in missile technology. Many projects 
                                                
156 For incisive insights on the ways in which the organisational structure of the space and nuclear 
programmes has been different from other establishments of India’s security complex, see Abraham 
(1992).  
 
 
 
 
187 
benefited from Kalam’s involvement with the missile programme, including the 
design of the Agni-1 missile, which was launched in May 1989. In addition to ISRO’s 
expertise, the missile programme was also assisted by the available infrastructure of 
the space programme during that period, as several ISRO facilities and assets were 
used by the DRDO for the test flight of missiles. This was a manifestation of the 
growing relationship between the civilian and missile programmes since the mid-
1980s (Reddy, 2008: 241).  
   Nevertheless, the most general point to make is that, by the end of 1980s, India had 
emerged as a key member of the evolving international space society. While a 
detailed analysis of its engagement with international space society will be taken in 
Chapter 7, it should be noted that India played a constructive role in formulating key 
principles related to space law and strongly supported the peaceful uses of space 
(Jayaraj 2004: 105-6; Wolter 2006: 13, 15, 28-9, 61, 67). Equally, as was highlighted 
above, it was actively involved in many collaborative projects and international 
forums, including the IGY, TERLS, and COPUOS. These were clearly indications of 
India’s acceptance as a key space participant.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
    
Most IR analyses deal with the strategic, political, and economic drivers of India’s 
space programme, which are clearly significant determinants of a country’s decision 
to pursue a scientific and technological project of such a scale. But given India’s 
growing presence in space, it is easy to dismiss that there was nothing preordained 
about India’s effort to become a space-faring country. In this regard, one of the most 
important and relevant questions about India’s space programme is how India’s space 
project succeeded in joining the space club as a developing country.  Thus, although a 
complex array of external and internal factors shaped India’s decision to develop a 
space programme, a key challenge for Indian elites was to justify and implement it 
efficiently in the context of a postcolonial and underdeveloped country.  
   As this chapter has demonstrated, the success of India’s space endeavour can be 
largely explained by the enduring and powerful influence of a composite ideology of 
postcolonial techno-nationalism. In doing so, the proceeded discussion considered the 
role of key figures like Nehru, Bhabha and Sarabhai, who shared in common a 
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postcolonial techno-nationalist understanding of technology as an indispensable 
marker of the state’s scientific prowess, great power status, and modernity. 
Consequently, this helped to turn the widely held perception that India as a 
developing country should not develop a ‘full-fledged’ space programme to a 
perception that India should acquire space capabilities precisely because it was a 
developing country.  
   In addition to an emphasis on indigenisation through international cooperation, one 
of the most important consequences of this postcolonial techno-nationalist thinking 
was the ‘primacy of the experts’, which allowed for the creation of strongly 
professional and flexible institutions of horizontal controls and flattened hierarchy, 
with unlimited political support and generous funding. As far as the space programme 
is concerned, this was reflected in the initial placement of space activities under the 
powerful Department of Atomic Energy and the subsequent creation of a separate 
Department of Space. However, as this chapter has suggested, the mere formation of 
this sort of institutions was a necessary but not sufficient cause of India’s successful 
programme. A principal variable underpinning the earlier phases of India’s space 
programme was the construction of a strong professional identity associated with 
those working for the space programme, which was fused together with a sense of 
nationalist commitment and mission. As part of his postcolonial techno-nationalist 
vision, Sarabhai was instrumental in bringing about this combination of 
professionalism, organisational culture, and motivation in the space programme. 
Under Dhawan, this process was further consolidated as India’s space programme 
continued to achieve remarkable space feats in the 1970s and 1980s.     
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Chapter 6. China and International Space Society (1990-2016) 
 
 
The rise of China as a major space power has been one of the most widely noted 
features of the current international space order. But while China’s growing influence 
in space has attracted much attention in recent years, most analyses have tended to 
examine specific military and/or civilian aspects of China’s space programme. Less 
attention has been given to the constitutive impact of the normative and social 
structure of international space society on its members, including China. Equally 
important, less attention has been given to the ways in which China has tried to play a 
role in shaping international space order. Thus, it is one of the central claims of the 
following discussion that in order to make sense of China’s growing profile in space, 
we need to consider its engagement with the normative and social structure of 
international space society.  
   This chapter approaches this task by examining China’s engagement with the 
primary institutions of international space society from 1990 to 2016. It begins with 
an analysis of the enduring influence of postcolonial techno-nationalism on key 
Chinese space projects with a particular emphasis on human spaceflight and space 
exploration programmes. As we shall see, these remarkable achievements in space 
have gradually granted China the status of a great power and a hand in shaping 
international space order. A key insight that emerges from this discussion is the nexus 
between scientists and political power that reflects the legacy of the strategic weapons 
programme under Mao and Deng.  
   The chapter then moves on to offer an analysis of China’s increasing interest in the 
military uses of space and the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. China’s 
ASAT capabilities have rightly attracted much attention in the literature, especially 
since the international condemnation of the 2007 ASAT test that created potentially 
dangerous pieces of space debris. But while China continues to develop ASAT 
capabilities, it has demonstrated restraint from conducting debris-generating ASAT 
tests. This illustrates the importance of social pressure and socialisation in 
international space society. Then, the chapter provides a brief account of China’s 
engagement with space diplomacy, before exploring the possibilities and limits of its 
attempts to balance US space power as well as the balancing behaviour against China 
by other states. The rest of the chapter considers China’s growing engagement with 
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the primary institution of great power management and the nascent institution of 
space market.  
   The overall picture that emerges suggests that, so far, the rise of China in space has 
contained both negative and positive elements as the emerging post-Cold War 
international space order has presented both opportunities and challenges. On the one 
hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought to end the arms race in space and 
halted plans for the deployment of space weapons. As a result, from the early to the 
mid-1990s, international space order was characterised by relative stability that 
helped a confident China to cement its position as a member of international space 
society by developing a full-fledged space programme, while remaining committed to 
the peaceful uses of space.  
   Yet, in the 2000s, a number of developments, including the institutional deadlock on 
space arms control and shifts in the US space posture, posed profound challenges to 
international order in space. As a result, China’s intentions became more perplexing 
and ambiguous. China’s 2007 ASAT test only served to further undermine the key 
normative and institutional aspects of a dynamic, fragmented, and contested 
international space society. More recently, however, there is evidence to suggest that 
China is willing, albeit tentatively, to play a more active role in contributing to the 
maintenance of international space order that is in accordance with the responsibilities 
of a great space power.157 
    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
157 China’s contribution to the process of creating and consolidating global nuclear order is one of the 
main themes in Horsburgh’s study of Beijing’s engagement with global nuclear politics. As her study 
explains, there are two distinct periods in China’s attitudes towards global nuclear politics since the 
1990s: China’s involvement in the process of contributing to the consolidation of global nuclear order 
as a full-fledged member (1990-9); and China’s proactive and constructive, albeit at sometimes 
cautious, participation in maintaining global nuclear order amid several growing challenges from the 
2000s onwards. Horsburgh (2015: 38, 153-62) also argues that China’s nuclear behaviour has been 
largely a reflection of its international behaviour embedded within the wider global order. What should 
be noted is that there are clearly similarities between China’s main patterns of interaction with nuclear 
order and those of its engagement with space order, not the least because of the links between nuclear 
and space activities. Equally, like China’s nuclear behaviour, its space behaviour has been largely 
determined by the pursuit of its wider interests and its place in international society. 
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Technonationalism  
 
The Enduring Influence of Postcolonial Techno-nationalism in the Era of 
Globalisation  	  
China’s growing integration into the global economy in the post-Cold War era has 
generated some debate about the extent to which the forces of globalisation and 
techno-globalism have led to an important evolution of Chinese techno-nationalist 
views and associated practices about technological development. Few, however, 
would dispute that a postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology still exerts a profound 
influence on the country’s science and technology policy and associated practices.158 
This enduring influence of postcolonial techno-nationalism was captured nicely by the 
words of the then President of China, Jiang Zemin (2000: 2317), in 2000: 
 
The outgoing century has witnessed a blossoming of science and technology in the 
world…These scientific breakthroughs form the foundation on which modern 
civilization builds, and they promise a future replete with material prosperity and 
intellectual enrichment worldwide. For these reasons, I believe that science and 
technology should be the driving force for China’s rejuvenation and sustainable 
development… China has a long history of science and civilization. It was the 
decadent feudal system and the aggression of the imperial powers that plunged 
China deep into backwardness and humiliation in modern times. Since the founding 
of the PRC, however, Chinese scientists and engineers have begun to solve the 
numerous problems that once stunted the development of our society. 
 
In fact, Jiang was one of the key architects of an effort to reinvigorate the spirit of 
the Liangdan Yixing ideology in the late 1990s. In 1999, for instance, he promoted 
a redefinition of this ideology based on the key principles of nationalism, 
indigenisation, diffusion, and catching up (Cheung 2009: 239).   
   But perhaps nowhere has the enduring influence of postcolonial techno-
nationalist ideology been more apparent than in the initiation of China’s 15-year 
science and technology plan. Deliberations on the plan formally began in 2003 and 
involved the input of more than 2,000 scientists, engineers, economists, corporate 
executives, and foreign scholars. One of the most important issues that emerged 
during the contentious process of drafting the plan was the relationship between 
indigenous innovation and technology imports. A number of economists argued 
                                                
158 For example, Suttmeier and Yao (2004: 17-8) argue that there has been some effort by Chinese 
leaders to promote a mix of policies that reconcile the forces of techno-nationalism and techno-
globalism, resulting in what is called ‘neo-techno-nationalism’. 
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that China should continue promoting its current model of development based on 
technology transfers from multinational corporations. On the other hand, some 
scientists suggested that China should avoid becoming dependent on foreign 
corporations for the transfer of technologies, especially with regards to 
sophisticated technologies. The scientific community’s advocacy for a science and 
technology policy focused on indigenous R&D prevailed in the end. A second 
controversial issue was the selection of national mega-projects and whether their 
implementation should be planned by the state or a bottom-up approach associated 
with a market economy was more suitable. Eventually, those who were advocating 
the pursuit of large-scale projects selected and implemented by the state won out 
(Cao, Suttmeier, and Simon, 2006: 41-2; Cheung, 2009: 239-40).   
   The drafting process lasted roughly 3 years and culminated in the 15-year 
‘Medium- to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology’ 
(MLP) in January 2006. Underpinned by techno-nationalist themes, the MLP 
promulgates a set of science and technology development policies that should be 
met by 2020, including the goal of increasing the contribution of science and 
technology to China’s economic development to more than 60 percent, while 
reducing the country’s reliance on foreign technology to less than 30 percent 
(Xinhua, 2006). Reflecting the Liangdan Yixing legacy, the MLP also identifies a 
number of engineering megaprojects in strategic technologies (Cao, Suttmeier, and 
Simon, 2006: 40). Significantly, space has been given a high priority with the 
inclusion of five project areas: human spaceflight, lunar exploration, high-
resolution earth remote sensing, satellite navigation and positioning, and next 
generation launch vehicles (Pollpeter et al., 2015: 42). Therefore, space related 
R&D has gained additional momentum with the introduction of the MLP in the 
mid-2000s. However, as we shall see, this has been given impetus by a postcolonial 
techno-nationalist ideology that has remained one of the driving forces shaping the 
trajectory of key space projects from the early 1990s onwards.  
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China’s Space Programme: Key Projects and Developments (1990-2016) 
 
Satellites and Launch Vehicles   
 
Clearly, China has pursued its space programme with a noteworthy consistency in 
recent years. It has also sustained a comprehensive approach towards the exploitation 
and exploration of space that encompasses the full spectrum of space activities. While 
activities related to human spaceflight and space exploration have attracted much 
attention over the last decades, satellite development has also progressed steadily. 
More specifically, although China continues to deploy and operate several 
communication satellites of the Chinasat and Apstar series, the principal focus has 
been on building different types of remote sensing satellites with various applications. 
This has been evident in the introduction of five new series of remote sensing 
satellites since 2000. In May 2002, China launched the first of the Haiyang series of 
ocean monitoring satellites. Beginning in 2006, China has also deployed more than 
twenty-five satellites of the Yaogan series. Notably, given the limited information 
available about this programme, there has been speculation that the Yaogan satellites 
are mainly designed for military applications. Since 2008, China has also begun 
deploying the Huanjing series used for environmental and disaster monitoring, which 
was followed in 2010 by the introduction of the Tianhui series that provide three-
dimensional images. More recently, China has begun deploying the Gaofen series of 
remote sensing satellites as part of the mega-projects of the MLP. As a result of this 
vast network of satellites, China has considerably decreased its dependence on remote 
sensing data provided by foreign satellites (Pollpeter et al., 2015: 62, 62-8). 
   Meanwhile, China continues to build and launch other types of satellites including 
the Ziyuan remote sensing satellites based on the China-Brazil Earth Resources 
Satellite programme (CBERS), the Fengyun meteorological satellites, and the Shijian 
technology demonstrator satellites. China also carries on with the improvement of its 
indigenous satellite navigation and positioning system, the Beidou Navigation 
Satellite System (BDS), which is expected to provide global coverage by 2020  
(Pollpeter et al., 2015: 68-73).159  
   Moreover, important progress has been made in the development of launch vehicles. 
Throughout the 1990s, China encountered several launch difficulties and failures that 
                                                
159 For a detailed account of China’s decision to develop its own satellite navigation and positioning 
system, see C. Li (2013).   
 
 
194 
severely hindered its ambitions in the commercial launch field (Johnson-Freese, 1998: 
77-88). However, China now operates four variants of the Changzheng (CZ) (Long 
March) family of rockets that can carry a range of payloads into low earth, medium 
earth, and high earth orbits (Pollpeter et al., 2015: 78). More recently, China has 
begun launching its next generation of more reliable rockets, the CZ-6 and CZ-7. It is 
also developing its more powerful launch vehicle, the CZ-5, which is designed to 
support its human spaceflight and deep space exploration missions (A. Jones, 2015b, 
Xinhua, 2016c).  
 
Human Spaceflight: Project 921 
 
As we saw in Chapter 4, even though China’s earlier plan for a human spaceflight 
programme (Project 714) was essentially cancelled by Deng Xiaoping, the 
reconsolidation of postcolonial techno-nationalism in the mid-1980s, enshrined in the 
863 Plan, put human spaceflight on the agenda anew. Consequently, the members of 
the special committee (Plan 863-2), which was tasked with drafting a detailed plan for 
the space sector, suggested that the space programme should revolve around the 
development of a space station operating in low earth orbit as a symbol of a twenty-
first-century great power. However, the idea of a human spaceflight programme was 
once again marked by fundamental differences of opinion about whether China 
should embark upon such an ambitious project in the first place. Opponents of the 
programme argued that human spaceflight is a costly endeavour that would divert 
limited resources from more pressing needs. Besides, for the opponents it was not 
clear from a political point of view why China should try to repeat a feat that the 
United States and the Soviet Union achieved some time ago without bringing them 
major military or scientific benefits. Advocates of the programme, however, argued 
that human spaceflight would be an important source of China’s technological 
advancement, national power, prestige, and national pride (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 
24).  
   Another matter of major debate was the type of spacecraft that China should build. 
The aerospace community was split over whether it should develop a reusable 
spacecraft like the US space shuttle or a Soviet type space capsule (Kulacki and 
Lewis, 2009: 24; Zheng, 2007: 169). After three years of deliberation, in its report to 
the State Council entitled ‘Summary Report of the Exploratory Work of the National 
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High Technology Plan for Aerospace’, the special committee opted for the 
development of a capsule. Subsequently, in January 1991, the State Council held a 
meeting to discuss the report, which was attended by Li Qianming, Deng’s brother-in-
law and deputy commander of the PLA’s Second Artillery (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 
25). During the meeting, Liu Jiyuan, the deputy director of the Ministry of Space 
Industry, secretly gave Li a draft of his own plan for a piloted space programme, in 
which he noted:  
    
Whether or not we go ahead with a human spaceflight program is a political policy, 
not purely a technical question, not something scientific and technical people can 
decide by themselves. Our space program is facing the danger of losing the 
international standing the old generation of proletarian revolutionaries achieved 
with considerable difficulty. I urge Party Central to decide this issue quickly (cited 
in Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 25). 
 
Soon after, contemplating the heated debate about the future of China’s space 
programme, Premier Li Peng reportedly remarked: ‘It can’t be said that going ahead 
with a human space flight program is a wise decision, but it is a decision that must be 
made’ (cited in Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 25). Notably, by that time, while Deng had 
begun stepping down from his political positions, it seems that he tried to persuade his 
successors to move on with the human spaceflight plan through his protégé, Admiral 
Liu Huaqing, who was then advisor to the Central Party Committee and vice chair of 
the Central Military Commission (CMC). Liu delivered a letter to Premier Li, Party 
Secretary Jiang Zemin, and President Yang Shangkun suggesting that the programme 
should be approved. In the letter it was also suggested that funding should not be the 
main concern because the programme could evolve incrementally over several 
decades, which would drastically reduce the costs (Kulacki and Lewis 2009: 25).160   
   Consequently, the Standing Committee of the Politburo chaired by Jiang approved 
the plan for a human spaceflight on 21 September 1992, dubbed Project 921, which 
later became known as the Shenzhou project. Certainly, it was the largest and most 
complex space project that China had ever decided to accomplish (Zheng, 2007: 170). 
The plan initially called for the flight of an unmanned spacecraft by 1998, a human 
spaceflight mission by 2002, a small space station placed in orbit by 2007, and a 
                                                
160 In addition to his support for a human spaceflight programme, Admiral Liu is known in China as 
‘the father of the modern Chinese Navy’. He strongly believed that the PLA Navy should become a 
‘blue water’ force. Part of his ‘blue navy’ dream was an aircraft carrier programme. On this point, see 
Kulacki and Lewis (2009: 25-6). Also see Wong (2011).  
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larger station by 2010 (Harvey, 2013: 264). To this end, the Party Central Committee 
established the ‘Human Spaceflight Project Office’ under the Central Special 
Committee (CSC) tasked with the coordination and implementation of the 921 Project 
(Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 26). The CSC is an ad-hoc high-level decision-making 
committee consisted of senior civilian and military leaders, including the premier, 
defence minister, and leading scientists, which is responsible for the supervision of 
the most significant strategic technology projects. The fact that the 921 Project was 
overseen by the CMC meant that the much-needed political authority existed to help 
transcend bureaucratic hierarchies and inertia, something that highlights the 
institutional and organisational legacy of the Liangdan Yixing programme (Cheung, 
2009: 254). After all, it was no coincidence that the chief designer of the Shenzhou 
programme was Qi Faren, who had previously worked on the Dongfanghong satellite 
project under Marshal Nie’s National Defence Science and Technology Commission 
(NDSTC). According to Feigenbaum (2003: 184), ‘Qi came of age in Nie Rongzhen’s 
organizational model’ and ‘designed Project 921’s R&D structures’ in ways that 
mirrored the management style and organisational modes associated with the strategic 
weapons experience. 
   As the Chinese were contemplating the best way to move forward with the human 
spaceflight programme, they turned to Russia for technical assistance. More 
concretely, with the establishment of a ‘constructive partnership’ between China and 
Russia in the early 1990s, which would evolve into a ‘strategic partnership’ by the 
mid-1990s, bilateral relations between Beijing and Moscow had significantly 
improved. This resulted in the gradual increase of diplomatic and military exchanges, 
including technology transfers (Yu, 2005: 232-3). In this light, the normalisation of 
Sino-Russian relations provided the Chinese with the opportunity to seek cooperation 
in the field of space, especially with regards to China’s eventual Shenzhou 
programme. In March 1994, a formal space cooperation agreement was signed in 
Moscow between the Russian Space Agency (RKA) and the Chinese National Space 
Administration (CNSA),161 which was followed by a visit by President Jiang to the 
Russian flight control centre in September of the same year. A second space 
                                                
161 In 1993, the CNSA was formed, when the Ministry of Space Industry was split into CNSA and the 
China Aerospace Corporation (CASC). CNA is the principal Chinese space agency responsible for 
space cooperation with foreign countries. CASC is the leading organisation of the space industry and 
plays a prominent role in efforts to foster technological innovation and civil-military integration. On 
CASC, see Pollpeter (2011).  
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cooperation agreement was signed in 1996. As part of the burgeoning partnership 
with Russia, the Chinese bought critical equipment related to the human spaceflight 
programme, including an entire support life system, a spacesuit, rocket engines, a 
docking module, and a rendezvous system. They also purchased a complete Soyuz 
capsule, but without its electronics or any of its equipment. Another important aspect 
of space cooperation with Moscow was astronaut training, medicine, and supervision 
(Harvey, 2004: 248-51). Yet, the Chinese side felt discontent with what was seen as 
‘patronizing and opportunistic Russian behavior’ (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 26).  
   Be that as it may, although the Chinese would later downplay the impact of Russian 
equipment and technology transfer on the success of China’s human spaceflight 
endeavour, bilateral cooperation with Russia proved to be crucial in the development 
of China’s spacecraft (Cheung, 2009: 253; Moltz, 2012: 88). Indeed, there has been 
some debate about the extent to which the Chinese have copied the Russian Soyuz 
space capsule. In response to comments and comparisons with the Russian spacecraft, 
Xie Mingbao, the director of the Human Spaceflight Project Office, recognised that 
Chinese experts ‘learned much from their Russian counterparts in spaceship 
designing’, but added that the Chinese spacecraft ‘is not a replica’ of Soyuz ‘and it is 
more comfortable’ with ‘more functions’ (People’s Daily, 2003). According to 
Harvey (2004: 264), while it is clear that the Shenzhou spacecraft reflects the 
influence of the Soyuz design, it is also apparent that it is not a mere copy of it.162 
 
Launching the First Human Spaceflight Mission Shenzhou 5 
 
Delays in meeting the deadline of launching Shenzhou 1 by 1997 reopened the 
question of whether China should cancel the project, but it was decided that a 
modified test capsule should be used for the first launch, which was rescheduled for 
October 1999. As a consequence, in addition to the fiftieth anniversary of the PRC 
and the Macao handover, the flight of Shenzhou 1 became one of the most important 
priorities of the Party Central Committee in 1999 (Kulacki and Lewis, 2009: 26-7). 
Eventually, on 20 November 1999, a CZ-2F rocket carried in orbit the first unpiloted 
precursor flight of China’s spaceship, Shenzhou 1, which returned to Earth after 14 
orbits. President Jiang Zemin is reportedly credited with giving the name Shenzhou 
                                                
162 For a detailed comparison of the two spacecrafts, see Harvey (2004: 261-6). 
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(usually translated in English as ‘magic vessel’ or ‘divine craft’) to the Chinese 
spacecraft and he personally inscribed the calligraphy of the two Chinese characters 
painted on its cabin (Gittings, 1999). On board Shenzhou 1 there were also the flags of 
China, Hong Kong, and Macao. After Shenzhou 1 returned to Earth, President Jiang 
personally opened its cabin in the presence of Vice-President Hu Jintao and other 
senior members of the Chinese leadership (Harvey, 2004: 261). Three other unpiloted 
test flights of the Shenzhou spacecraft followed the launch of Shenzhou 1, reflective of 
the degree of risk aversion of the Chinese leadership regarding human spaceflight. 
These were: Shenzhou 2 in January 2001, Shenzhou 3 in March 2002, and Shenzhou 4 
in December 2002.163  
   Therefore, the stage was set for China’s first human spaceflight mission. On 15 
October 2003, Shenzhou 5 blasted successfully into orbit carrying Yang Liwei, 
China’s first astronaut. This made China only the third country in the world, after the 
Soviet Union and the United States, to put a human in space. Before the flight, Yang 
was quoted as saying ‘I will not disappoint the motherland…And I will gain honor for 
the People’s Liberation Army and for the Chinese nation’. President Hu, who was 
present at the launch remarked that the mission ‘is a glory for our great motherland’ 
and signals ‘another historically significant step forward…toward conquering the 
summit of world science and technology (Yardley, 2003).   
   After spending 21 hours in space, Yang returned to Earth to a hero’s welcome, 
sparking celebrations. ‘I feel proud of my motherland’ China’s first astronaut said 
when he exited the capsule (Agence France-Presse, 2003b).164 In the aftermath of the 
historic spaceflight mission, Yang became instantly a national icon and a symbol of 
national unity and patriotism. In November of the same year, at a high-profile 
ceremony organised by the Central Committee of the CCP, the State Council, and the 
Central Military Commission, Yang was conferred the title of ‘space hero’ (Xinhua, 
2003b). Furthermore, soon after his flight, ‘Great Hero Yang’ visited Hong Kong, 
Macao and other Chinese cities in an apparent bid to bolster Chinese nationalism.165 
The practice of turning Chinese astronauts into ambassadors for the Chinese 
                                                
163 For an overview of these missions, see Harvey (2004: 259-82).  
164 However, it later transpired that when Yang emerged from the capsule his face was covered in blood 
as a result of extreme G-force pressure during re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere. Workers were quick 
to wipe the blood from his face, fastened him back in the cabin, and closed the door. It was only after 
that the cameras arrived (Jacobs, 2010).  
165 For a trenchant analysis of these visits in particular and the role of Yang as an icon in general, see 
Hansen (2007).  
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government and the nation continued to be a feature of the next Shenzhou missions. 
As Sheehan (2013: 110) points out, whereas the Soviet Union used to send its 
cosmonauts abroad as symbols of international prestige, China prefers to send them to 
the mainland and its autonomous administrative regions as a way to promote 
‘patriotism, scientific awareness and national unity’.  
   What is noteworthy is that Xie Mingbao was rather straightforward about the 
political value and techno-nationalist rationale of the mission, stating, ‘We believe 
this outstanding and remarkable achievement would certainly…give rise to more 
patriotic fervor and national cohesion among the Chinese people’. The Chinese 
official added, ‘we believe China must possess independently the technology to 
realize space travel…It’s also a way for us to boost national esteem and hope for 
China’s future development’ (Pomfret, 2003).  
     
Shenzhou Missions 6 – 10 and the Space Station Tiangong 1  
 
Since Shenzhou 5, China has successfully launched four other human spaceflight 
missions. In October 2005, Shenzhou 6 orbited space for five days carrying two 
astronauts, which was followed by a three-man crew mission, Shenzhou 7 in 
September 2008. During the mission, Chinese astronaut Zhai Zhigang performed 
China’s first spacewalk, waving a small Chinese flag (Barboza, 2008). In another 
milestone for the space programme, in September 2011 China launched its first space 
laboratory module, Tiangong 1 (Heavenly Palace), as a test bed for the ultimate goal 
of placing a larger 60-tonne space station in orbit around 2020. In December of the 
same year, the unpiloted Shenzhou 8 successfully docked with Tiangong 1, which was 
the country’s first space docking mission (Xinhua, 2011). This was accompanied by 
the launch of Shenzhou 9, a three-person crew, including China’s first female 
astronaut, Liu Yang. Shenzhou 9 docked with the Chinese space station marking the 
first crewed space docking mission (Amos, 2012). Like Shenzhou 9, China’s fifth 
spaceflight mission, Shenzhou 10, which orbited space in June 2013, also carried a 
crew of three and docked with the space station. This was the most recent human 
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spaceflight mission. It signalled the end of a ‘trial-and-error period’ and the beginning 
of the operational phase of the human spaceflight programme (Chen, 2013).166  
   What should be added is that the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping continues 
to attach great importance to the Chinese space programme through visits to space 
facilities and public utterances (A. Jones, 2014). Indeed, President Xi has linked 
China’s space effort to his slogan of the ‘China Dream’ of rejuvenating the Chinese 
nation, which he put forth when he took over the top post of the CCP in November 
2012.167 During his talk to the crew members of Shenzhou 10 onboard the orbiting 
Tiangong 1, the Chinese leader noted that ‘the space dream is part of the dream to 
make China stronger. With the development of space programs, the Chinese people 
will take bigger strides to explore further into space’ (Xinhua, 2013c).168 Briefly 
stated, political support has been a crucial variable affecting the success of China’s 
human spaceflight programme and this continues to be the case under the leadership 
of Xi.  
 
Space Exploration  
 
China’s Lunar Exploration Programme 
 
China’s Lunar Exploration Programme (CLEP) has carried out four lunar missions 
thus far, as part of a three-step Moon probe project.169 The programme will be 
completed with an eventual lunar sample return mission. The first phase of the 
programme focused on orbiting and taking images of the Moon. It began in October 
2007 with the launch of Chang’e 1 lunar probe, named after the Moon goddess in 
Chinese mythology. Chang’e 1 orbited the Moon providing a full map of the lunar 
surface along with other performances. This was followed by the launch of China’s 
second lunar probe, Chang’e 2, in October 2010, which also orbited the Moon, testing 
critical technologies and gathering data for future landings. Then, in December 2013, 
                                                
166 Tiangong 2, China’s second space station, is scheduled for launch in September 2016 and Shenzhou 
11 in the following month in order to dock with the space station (China Central Television, 2016b).  
Recently, the Human Spaceflight Office publicly proposed landing astronauts on the Moon by 2031-36 
as a follow-up mission to the space station, however such as a mission has not been formally approved 
yet (Perret, 2016). 
167 For an insightful analysis of the ‘China dream’ and its multiple meanings, see Callahan (2013).  
168 However, under the leadership of Xi, it seems that there has been a turn towards restricting the 
amount of information available about China’s space programme (M. Jones, 2014).  
169 For an overview of China’s lunar programme, see, inter alia, Pollpeter et al. (2015: 53-60); and 
Harvey (2013: 311-40). 
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the Chang’e 3 mission was launched with the aim of studying the lunar surface. This 
mission marked the second phase of the CLEP programme and involved landing a 
robotic rover named Yutu (Jade Rabbit).170 It was the first soft landing on the Moon 
after 37 years and made China the third country ever to perform such a mission, after 
the Soviet Union and the United States. The latest lunar exploration mission to date 
was the launch of an experimental spacecraft nicknamed ‘Xiaofei’ (little flyer), which 
conducted a lunar flyby before returning to Earth in November 2014.  It was designed 
to pave the way for the Chang’e 5, which will signal the third phase of the CLEP 
programme (Xinhua, 2014b).  
   Like other key Chinese space projects, the CLEM programme traces its origins in 
the proposals and initiatives of a small group of influential scientists. It was Ouyang 
Ziyuan, a leading geologist and director of the Institute for Geochemistry of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, who started advocating strongly for a first lunar 
mission on political grounds in the early 1990s. By and by, Ouyang managed to get 
the support of other high-profile scientists like Min Guirong. But although Ouyang 
convinced the central government to consider his proposal, it was eventually turned 
down because it was driven by political motivations without much scientific value. 
However, Min, as director of an aerospace group funded by the 863 Plan, suggested 
the creation of a task force for a lunar mission, which resulted in the continuation of 
work on Ouyang’s proposal. In 1993, the newly founded CNSA, under the leadership 
of its Administrator Liu Jiyuan and Deputy Administrator Luan Enjie, carried out its 
own proposal for a lunar mission, which was also rejected by the central government. 
Undeterred, however, advocates continued to tout their idea for a lunar project 
(Besha, 2010: 215-7).  
   Indeed, in 1997, CAS academicians Yang Jiachi, Wang Daheng and Chen Fangyun, 
the three of the four scientists who had proposed the 863 Plan to Deng, drafted the 
‘Proposal for Development of Our Nation’s Lunar Exploration Technology’ under the 
863 programme. Consequently, in 1998, a plan for the development of robotic 
technology for a future lunar mission was approved (He, 2003: 2354). In the same 
year, as part of major organisational reforms, COSTIND was civilianised and placed 
under the State Council, while all its previous military functions were transferred to 
                                                
170  The name Yutu was selected in an online poll of 3.4 million voters and it is a reference to the pet 
rabbit of goddess Chang’e in Chinese mythology (Rincon, 2013).  
 
 
 
202 
the newly established General Armament Department (GAD) under the Central 
Military Commission. This major restructure reduced COSTIND’s influence and ties 
to the military, but COSTIND took control of the CNSA.171 As a result, Luan Enjie, a 
strong advocate of a lunar programme, was promoted to administrator of CNSA and 
deputy director of COSTIND. Luan was keen to exert his new bureaucratic influence 
in order to establish the development of a long-term lunar programme by advocating 
the idea to top policy makers. Meanwhile, in 2000, the CAS lunar team with the 
support of several CAS centres submitted a final report that elaborated on the 
scientific significance of a lunar programme. Among other things, the report 
suggested that such a programme could contribute to the recovery of lunar-based 
Helium-3 fusion fuel. It also suggested a three-phase exploration road map similar to 
its current form. The net effect of these efforts was that a plan for undertaking a three-
pronged lunar exploration programme was formally approved by the Chinese 
leadership in January 2004 (Besha, 2010: 217-8). In 2011, China also announced its 
tentative plans for a human lunar landing by 2025 (State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, 2011).	   
   A number of points are worth making here in order to explain the broader 
significance of the project. First, several of its drivers are usually identified in the 
relevant literature, including: international prestige, national pride, scientific research, 
military spin-offs, access to mineral resources, and geopolitical considerations 
(Pollpeter et al., 2015: 54; He, 2003: 2353-4; Lele, 2010).172 Yet, one of the 
motivating factors behind China’s lunar exploration programme that has attracted 
much attention is access to lunar mineral and energy resources. Indeed, Ouyang, who 
was appointed chief designer of the CLEM, frequently talks about the significance of 
exploring the Moon for Helium-3 and other resources.173 Yet, while the prospect of 
Moon mining might become a reality, albeit in the quite distant future, as Johnson-
Freese (2013a: 63) observes, this justification of lunar exploration can also be seen as 
an attempt by scientists to address political concerns about the economic value of 
such missions.174  
                                                
171 For the significance of these reforms, see Cheung (2009: 112-8).  
172 It is worth noting here that space is mentioned in popular Chinese political texts that reflect what 
Hughes (2011b: 605, 606)  calls ‘geopolitik nationalism’, that is, the growing merging of nationalism 
and geopolitical thinking.   
173 See, for example, China Daily (2006); People’s Daily (2007); and Ouyang (2009).  
174 Interestingly, Ouzang has also publicly suggested that China, India, and Japan should cooperate in 
lunar exploration to ‘deepen mankind’s understanding of the moon’ (Xinhua, 2008a).  
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   Second, it should be noted that the implementation of the lunar programme has also 
been mirroring the management style and organisational structure associated with the 
Liangdan Yixing legacy. Significantly, in February 2004 the Central Committee of the 
CCP and the State Council formed a Leading Small Group (LSG) for the Lunar 
Orbiter Project, as a top-level coordination mechanism. It is also likely that the 
Central Party Committee created a Lunar Probe Project Office under its auspices, 
similar to the Human Spaceflight Project Office. This means that the highest echelons 
of the Chinese leadership undertake the management of the lunar programme in ways 
that support cross-agency coordination and civilian-military cooperation. Thus, 
leaders from key ministries and institutions are involved in the implementation of the 
CLEP. The LSG appointed Luan Enjie as General Manager, Sun Jiadong as Chief 
Designer, and Ouyang Ziyuan as Chief Scientist of the project (Besha, 2010: 218-9). 
   Third, and more importantly for the purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to 
highlight that the political status and function of the CLEP reflects the enduring 
influence of a postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology. In fact, Chinese officials have 
emphasised that the CLEP contributes to the country’s comprehensive national power 
(CNP) (Pollpeter et al., 2015: 53).175 Tellingly enough, in October 2000, expounding 
on the goals of China’s human spaceflight and exploration programmes, Luan Enjie, 
who was then the director of CNSA, outlined a postcolonial techno-nationalist 
rationale behind the space programme, which is worth quoting at length:  
 
Presently the development of space technologies and the level of their applications 
becomes [sic] an indicator of a nation's united power and development of its 
civilization... The Chinese aerospace program has actively contributed to the global 
space development and is an integral part of the world space [community]…Under 
the future integrated national planning and unified leadership, and following the 
strategic guidance of ‘strengthening the nation through science and education’ and 
‘sustainable development’, and through domestic research and development and 
international cooperation, ... the Chinese space program will select limited goals to 
achieve breakthroughs, sustain development, and promote technological innovation. 
This will enhance research and setting up the infrastructure, achieve breakthroughs 
in key space technologies, advance technical levels and basic capabilities, and 
maintain China’s position as a space leader internationally (Wei 2000, emphasis 
added). 
 
 
                                                
175 ‘Comprehensive power’ refers to the idea, shared among Chinese strategists, that power is 
multidimensional, comprehensive and integrative, and thus its pursuit requires the cultivation of power 
across different domains of social activity, including science and technology (Shambaugh, 2013: 5-6).  
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Moreover, Ouyang has emphasised that the US Apollo Moon landing programme of 
the 1960s and 1970s resulted in the advancement of US science and technology and 
its economic take-off.  For this reason, China’s Moon probing project is ‘the job that 
has to be done’. Equally remarkably, elaborating on the question of why China should 
try to ‘reach the moon’ considering the many economic, social, and environmental 
issues that the country is still facing, Ouyang said: ‘This is precisely because the 
moon probing suggests a nation’s comprehensive national strength and it is of 
significance to increasing China's international prestige and the cohesive power of the 
Chinese nation…Furthermore, mineral deposits, energy resources and environment on 
the moon constitute a crucial sphere for the humankind and, if China fails to make any 
inquires into this sphere, the country accordingly will not have any right to speak 
about in this regard’ (People’s Daily, 2007).176  
 
Mars Exploration  
 
Similar political considerations have also underpinned China’s Mars exploration 
ambitions. In 2003, it was reported that China had conducted a planetary exploration 
study as part of the 863 programme, including Mars. Subsequently, in March 2007, 
China entered into an agreement with Russia, which would allow a small Chinese 
Mars satellite, called Yinghuo 1, to be launched in tandem with the Russian Phobos-
Grunt sample return spacecraft.177 In November 2011, Yinghuo 1 was launched piggy-
back on the Russian spacecraft, but it failed to leave Earth orbit, putting a premature 
end to China’s first planetary mission (Harvey, 2013: 330-4). However, in 2014, 
Chinese scientists announced that there are plans for sending a Mars rover around 
2020. These plans reflect mounting pressure on China to conduct a high-profile Mars 
mission after India successfully launched its Mars Orbiter Mission (MOM) in 2013, 
becoming the first Asian country to reach the Red Planet. This has been evident in 
recent statements made by Chinese scientists who advocate a Mars exploration 
mission. For example, Ye Peijian, a leading design adviser for China’s lunar probes 
and a strong supporter for such a mission has been quoted as saying, ‘India has gone 
                                                
176 A very similar argument has been put forward by Ouzhang in a co-authored article with his CAS 
colleagues: ‘Lunar exploration is a hotspot for spaceflight nowadays in the world, and also an 
important reflection of a country’s comprehensive national strength and science and technology level. 
It may strengthen China’s international influence and national cohesion’ (Zheng et al., 2008: 882) 
177 Yinhuo means ‘firefly’ in Chinese and it is an ancient reference to Mars.  
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ahead of us…We already lag behind (India) in time, so we should do it better’ (Yu, 
2014). It appears that these efforts to place a Mars programme on the agenda have 
recently paid off. According to Xu Dazhe, the current director of the CNSA, the 
Chinese government approved a Mars probe mission in January 2016 (Xinhua, 
2016a).   
   In sum, postcolonial techno-nationalism continues to exert a powerful influence on 
the pursuit of key Chinese space projects, such as human spaceflight and space 
exploration programmes, as markers of national strength, great power status, and 
modernity. Chinese elites believe that the development of such high visibility space 
projects can enhance China’s position and status as a full-fledged member in 
international space society and give China a seat at the table and possibly a significant 
role in shaping and maintaining international space order. Crucially, a key aspect of 
this process remains the intersection between high politics and big science as well as 
between the political leadership and the scientific community in China.  
 
Space Militarisation  
 
The lack of transparency in China’s military policies and the inherent dual-use of 
space technology make any accurate observation about China’s military space 
capabilities a daunting task. It is clear, however, that the utilisation of space assets is 
becoming increasingly important to China’s current military modernisation efforts. 
The Gulf War of 1991, which some analysts refer to as the ‘first space war’, led to a 
profound reassessment of China’s key military concepts of operations and doctrines in 
tandem with a growing appreciation of the impact of space capabilities on modern 
warfare (Cheng, 2012: 57-8; Liao, 2005: 206, 208). As part of this reassessment, the 
new doctrine of ‘local wars under modern high-tech conditions’ was introduced with 
priority placed on the R&D of a wide range of more advanced technological 
capabilities. These included: upgrading ballistic missiles development and precision-
guided munitions, acquiring the ability to conduct electronic warfare and electronic 
countermeasures, developing satellites, early warning and command systems, as well 
as communication relay stations (Shambaugh, 2004: 70).  
   The so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), the transition to information 
warfare (IW), the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, the NATO intervention against Serbia 
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in 1999, and the more recent US-led campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq further 
precipitated this process.178 Therefore, in 2002, the phrase ‘limited war under high-
technology conditions’ was changed to ‘local wars under modern informationalized 
conditions’ (Finkelstein, 2007: 104). Two years later, Hu Jintao, the then president of 
China, announced the PLA’s ‘new historic missions’. One of the most important of 
these missions called for safeguarding China’s national interests that have now 
expanded to also include access to space and the electromagnetic sphere (Cheng, 
2012: 61). This emphasis on the military uses of space has continued under the 
leadership of Xi. In 2014, the Chinese President urged the air force ‘to speed up air 
and space integration and sharpen their offensive and defensive capabilities’ 
(Blanchard, 2014). Likewise, China’s most recent Defence White Paper has identified 
outer space as a ‘commanding height in international strategic competition’ (State 
Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015).  
 
Satellites  
    
In light of the above, there has been a growing interest in the development of dual-use 
satellites for communications, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorology, electronic 
intelligence (ELINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection as a force 
multiplier. The rapid growth of China’s satellites constitutes a crucial component of 
the PLA’s expanding operations, like power-projection, precision-strike and anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) operations, by enhancing command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
capabilities. Of particular significance in this regard has been the effort to build a 
variety of high-resolution remote sensing satellites that provide critical military 
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities (Hagt and Durnin, 2011). China is in the 
process of deploying a network of reconnaissance-capable and data relay satellites 
providing real-time images that could support targeting and tactical operations in the 
future. For example, the Yaogan series of remote sensing satellites are equipped with 
electro-optic sensors and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) that provide high-resolution 
                                                
178 For a good overview of the impact of these external pressures on Chinese doctrines and training in 
the post-Cold War era, see Shambaugh (2004: 74-89). For an account of China’s national military 
strategy, see, for example, Finkelstein (2007).    
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imaging.179 It is also believed that some Yaogan satellites serve as electronic 
intelligence (ELINT) platforms (Hagt and Durnin, 2011: 751, 740). As we saw earlier, 
China has also built the Haiyang series of ocean monitoring satellites and the 
Huanjing series of satellites designed for environmental and disaster monitoring. 
These three types of satellites are suited for the task of maritime surveillance and 
contribute to the country’s targeting capabilities (Erickson, 2011: 15). 
   More recently, the last of the Gaofen satellites, Gaofen -4, was put in geostationary 
orbit in December 2015 and it is reportedly designed for both civilian and military 
applications, including locating and targeting US carriers (Minnick, 2015; A. Jones, 
2015d; Lin and Singer, 2016). China simultaneously is developing the new Zhongxing 
series of military communications satellites (A. Jones, 2015c). In September 2015, 
China also launched a classified satellite, which could possibly be a test for a missile 
early warning system (A. Jones, 2015a). As mentioned previously, important progress 
has also been made in completing the Beidou system. When completed, it will 
provide global coverage allowing China to reduce its dependency on the US GPS, 
access to which could be denied to any US adversary during conflict (Pollpeter et al., 
2015: 73; Hu 2015; Xinhua 2016b). According to a retired senior Chinese military 
official, this is what actually happened during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, when 
a sudden disruption of GPS signals led the Chinese military to lose track of its 
targets.180 As the official notes, ‘It was a great shame for the PLA ...an unforgettable 
humiliation. That’s how we made up our mind to develop our own global [satellite] 
navigation and positioning system, no matter how huge the cost’, adding that ‘Beidou 
is a must for us. We learned it the hard way’ (Chan, 2009). 
 
Counterspace Capabilities 
 
China’s focus on acquiring a variety of counterspace capabilities has attracted much 
attention in recent years, especially after its direct-ascent ASAT test in 2007 (Tellis 
2007; U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission 2015: 272-337; 
Heginbotham et. al. 2015: 245-58). In addition to ASAT capabilities (more on which 
                                                
179 The development of satellite-based Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) technology was one of the 
main projects under the 863 Plan. See Feigenbaum (2003: 169, 179-80). 
180 On the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, among others, see Ross (2000); Whiting (2001); Scobell (2003: 
171-91). For an insightful account of the politics of China-Taiwan relations of this period, see Hughes 
(1997).  
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below), it is believed that China is developing a multidimensional counterspace 
programme, including ‘jamming, laser, microwave, and cyber weapons’ (US 
Department of Defense, 2012: 9). For instance, a ground-based laser operating from 
China allegedly ‘blinded’ one US satellite in 2006. However, shortly after, Donald 
Kerr, the director of the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), confirmed that a 
Chinese laser might have ‘illuminated’ one or more US satellites, but ‘it did not 
materially damage the U.S. satellite’s ability to collect information’, something that  
‘blinded’ usually implies (Space News Editor, 2006; Kessler 2011). Assessing 
whether China intentionally tried to illuminate US satellites is very difficult due to the 
lack of available information, but it is important to note that using laser-ranging 
techniques can also be part of regular non-military space activities like tracking the 
orbit of a satellite. Besides, many analysts have pointed out that ground-based lasers 
are not an effective ASAT weapon (Reuters, 2006; Kessler, 2011; Kulacki, 2014: 10).  
   Moreover, China reportedly conducted unusual rendezvous and proximity 
operations (RPO) of two Chinese satellites in 2010 (Weeden, 2010). Similar orbital 
manoeuvres were also carried out in 2013 (Smith, 2013; David 2013), which most 
likely involved space robotic arm technology (Pollpeter, 2013: 1). Yet, while these 
operations could possibly indicate the development of co-orbital ASAT technology, it 
is more likely that they were a demonstration of a non-military capability related to 
orbital satellite inspection (Weeden, 2010; Kulacki, 2014: 10).181 But again, not only 
do such activities serve to highlight how the boundary between civilian and military 
applications in space is rather blurred, but also point to the difficulty of determining 
intentions in the absence of trust and transparency. Having said that, what is clear is 
that China is pursuing a direct-ascent ASAT programme. It is worth considering this 
in some detail.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
181 Robotic arms also have several non-military applications, such as satellite maintenance and space 
debris removal (Pollpeter, 2013: 2).  
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ASAT Capabilities  
 
The 2007 Chinese ASAT Test 
 
On 11 January 2007, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) successfully used a direct-
ascent kinetic kill vehicle to destroy a defunct FengYun-1C (FY-1C) Chinese weather 
satellite.182 The vehicle crashed into the FY-1C satellite utterly destroying it and 
breaking it up into an estimated 35,000 orbital debris objects, making the test the 
‘worst single debris event ever’ (Milowicki and Johnson-Freese, 2008: 2; Morring 
2007). The test has been subject to much analysis and needs little repetition here.183 
But a few observations are worth making about its intentions and motivations. First, 
in the absence of any official explanation offered by the Chinese government, several 
motives have been identified in the relevant literature. For example, from a realist 
perspective, it has been argued that the test was indicative of China’s broader strategy 
to counterbalance US military space superiority, reflecting Chinese beliefs about the 
inevitability of conflict in space (Tellis, 2007). Others have suggested that the test was 
part of China’s effort to cajole the United States into negotiating a treaty banning 
space weapons and space-based missile defence.184 It has also been postulated that the 
test was intended to send a ‘deterrence message’ that the United States cannot fully 
depend on the use of space-based assets in the event of a conflict with China over 
Taiwan (Krepon, 2008: 162).185  
   Second, it was after twelve days that a confirmation of the test was provided by the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a period during which the Ministry appeared to 
be unaware of its conduct. This prompted analysts to question whether the PLA 
proceeded with the test without advising key constituencies of the foreign policy and 
security apparatus, suggesting signs of emerging factionalism between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the PLA (Gill and Kleiber, 2007). But it is most likely that the 
                                                
182 It has been reported that China attempted two other times to test the system. On 7 July, 2005, the 
system was tested without striking a known target. On 6 February, the second test of the system 
occurred with the missile passing near a satellite target without hitting it. It is not clear whether the 
intention was to approximate the target or strike it. In both cases Washington remained silent, without 
issuing a demarche (Gordon and Cloud, 2007).   
183 On China’s ASAT test, see, inter alia, Tellis (2007); Saunders and Lutes (2007); Lieggi and Quam 
(2007); Krepon (2008); and Milowicki and Johnson-Freese (2008). 
184 For a brief overview of these possible explanations, see Hitchens (2007: 15).  
185 On the role of space-based assets during a Taiwan Strait conflict, see, for example, O’ Hanlon 
(2004: 91-104).  
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highest levels in the government hierarchy had approved the test and were informed 
about its conduct (Mulvenon, 2007: 5, Gill and Kleiber, 2007: 3, Cheung 2009: 254).  
   However, while most Western analysts have placed emphasis on the United States 
as the key driver behind the Chinese ASAT test, based on interviews with Chinese 
experts, Kulacki and Lewis (2008) have put forward a more plausible explanation. 
According to Kulacki and Lewis (2008: 337) it seems that all of the key parts of the 
Chinese bureaucracy were aware of the test, but they did not coordinate well, and the 
key determinant for the decision to conduct the ASAT test was ‘the maturity of the 
technology’. More specifically, it is likely that the project managers pushed for the 
test because they were under pressure to demonstrate to the leadership that they had 
developed a technological capability ready to be used. It is also likely that the 
decision to conduct an ASAT test, instead of a missile intercept, was taken on the 
basis that targeting a satellite was easier than intercepting a missile (Kulacki and 
Lewis, 2008: 337). In some ways, therefore, this would be in line with the influence 
of techno-nationalists in the history of the Chinese missile and space programme. 
Equally importantly, Kulacki and Lewis (2008: 336) suggest that the ASAT test was 
part of an R&D programme, which began in the mid-1980s, without a specific 
military mission or objective. It is possible that it was the product of the broader 
reconfiguration of defence planning that occurred during that period, under Deng’ 
leadership, with a focus on building dual-use science and technology research like the 
863 Plan (Feigenbaum, 2003: 153-88; Kulacki and Lewis, 2008: 336, 343).  
 
Other Suspected or Known ASAT Tests 
 
On 11 January 2010, in a three-sentence statement, China announced that it had 
conducted a test of what was described as a ‘ground-based midcourse missile 
interception technology’ (Xinhua, 2010a). This came at a time when Beijing had 
expressed its fierce criticism over the prospect of arms sales by the United States to 
Taiwan, including advanced Patriot Pac-3 air defence missiles (Branigan, 2010). The 
next day, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu confirmed the test of missile 
interception technology by stating that it was in line with China’s defensive military 
strategy and that it ‘was defensive in nature and targeted at no country’. Significantly, 
it was also stressed that ‘the test would neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose 
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a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft’ (Xinhua, 2010b).186   
   What is noteworthy is that China managed the 2010 test quite differently from the 
way it had handled the January 2007 ASAT test (Mulvenon, 2010). First, in contrast 
to the January 2007 test, China immediately issued an announcement and the Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson was prepared to confirm the conduct of the interception. 
Second, despite the fact that the test was ostensibly part of China’s ASAT 
programme, this time it was careful to carry out the test in low orbit without creating 
long-lived orbital debris and calling it a missile defence test. Indeed, as indicated 
above, China was keen to stress that the test did not generate space debris. In doing 
so, Beijing was able to avoid the sort of political condemnation that accompanied the 
January 2007 test (Lewis, 2010; Mulvenon 2010: 1-2).187 Then, on 27 January 2013, 
China conducted a second ‘land-based mid-course missile interception test’ similar to 
the one carried out in January 2010 (Xinhua, 2013a).  
   However, one of the most important developments in China’s ASAT programme 
was the launch of a rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch Centre on 13 May 2013 
(Weeden, 2014: 1). China announced that the launch was a scientific ‘experiment in 
the high-altitude atmosphere and near-Earth space’ aimed at studying the space 
environment (Xinhua, 2013b). Yet, several US officials believe that this was the first 
test of a new direct ascent ASAT system (Shalal-Esa, 2013; Gertz, 2013; Gruss 2015). 
A Pentagon spokesperson stated that the launch ‘appeared to be on a ballistic 
trajectory nearly to geosynchronous Earth orbit’, that is roughly 30,000 km (Schanz, 
2013). According to Weeden (2014: 1-19), there is evidence to suggest that the launch 
could have reached an apogee of around 30,000 km using a new missile, which could 
attack targets in medium or high earth orbits, including satellites in geostationary 
earth orbit (GEO).  
   Subsequently, on 25 July 2014, the US State Department issued a statement 
claiming that China had carried out ‘a non-destructive’ test of an ASAT system on 23 
July (Gruss, 2014a; Weeden, 2015: 1). The Chinese Ministry of National Defence 
called the launch an ‘anti-missile experiment’ (Xinhua, 2014a), but Frank Rose, U.S. 
deputy assistant secretary of state for space and defence policy, said that ‘Despite 
                                                
186 According to a 2011 February cable of the US Department of State, the US intelligence community 
believed that China had launched a SC-19 missile for the interception, which was used previously for 
the 11 January 2007 ASAT test. The United States assessed that the 2010 January test had contributed 
to the improvement of both Chinese ASAT and ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems (United States 
Department of State, 2010).  
187 For an insightful analysis of the January 2010 test and its implications, see Mulvenon (2010).  
 
 
212 
China’s claims that this was not an ASAT test; let me assure you the United States has 
high confidence in its assessment, that the event was indeed an ASAT test’ (Gruss, 
2014b). On 30 October 2015, China conducted what was again claimed to be a missile 
defence interceptor flight test, but there have been reports suggesting that this was 
possibly a test of a new direct-ascent missile capable of destroying satellites (Axe, 
2015, Gertz, 2015).  
   Be that as it may, it not clear that developing such a capability would provide China 
with a significant strategic advantage in the context of a conflict with the United 
States. For instance, the distribution and redundancy of the more than 30 US GPS 
satellites in medium earth orbit (MEO) means that any attempt to degrade GPS 
satellites would require the preparation and execution of numerous back-to-back 
launches of Chinese missiles hitting successfully their targets over several hours 
without suffering a counterattack (Weeden, 2014: 18; Sankaran, 2014: 25). As 
Sankaran (2014: 23-30) argues, this would be a merely impossible task, given the 
resilience of the US GPS constellation and the current missile and launching 
capabilities of China. Moreover, in the event that some US satellites are lost after an 
attack, terrestrial and airborne systems can perform the functions of key US military 
space assets, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and 
communication satellites. Besides, any ASAT test would almost certainly risk 
escalating the conflict (Sankaran, 2014: 33, 30-4).  
     
Learning How to Shoot Satellites 
 
Notwithstanding the strategic rationale for deploying ASAT weapons, it is not 
surprising that these developments have raised legitimate concerns about China’s 
intentions in space. But what merits emphasis is that the change in how China has 
handled and framed the tests since 2007 can be seen as evidence of a process of social 
learning (Mulvenon, 2010; Johnson-Freese, 2013b). It appears that China has come to 
recognise that any ASAT weapon risks jeopardising even its own space assets. 
Equally importantly, this change also points to the importance of collective pressure 
exerted by other key members of the international space society and China’s 
socialisation into the emergence of a new sort of normative convergence premised on 
the norm of ‘space sustainability’.  
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   It is interesting and revealing that the US China Economic and Security Review 
Commission and US diplomats have acknowledged this social dynamic. For example, 
in its 2015 Report to Congress, the US China Economic and Security Review 
Commission notes that ‘The non-debris-generating nature of the tests suggests China 
may have gained a better appreciation of the diplomatic costs of debris-generating 
antisatellite tests as well as the long-term consequences of such tests for China’s own 
space assets’ (US China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015: 293). 
More recently, Mallory Stewart, the US State Department’s deputy assistant secretary 
for emerging security challenges and defence policy, remarked that ‘there have been 
subsequent tests by China, but none of them have been debris generating’, which the 
State Department likes to credit to ‘the huge international outcry’ that followed the 
January 2007 test (Gruss, 2016). At the same time, however, the continuation of the 
ASAT programme also reflects the dark side of this socialisation process, given the 
general trend towards the militarisation of space in international space society. 
Finally, the quest for possessing ASAT capabilities as an indicator of great power 
status and modernity should not be underestimated, especially considering their 
limited strategic rationale.  
 
Space Diplomacy 
 
One of the most important aspects of China’s space diplomacy has been a focus on 
multilateral approaches to space arms control within the UN.188 In February 2000, the 
Chinese delegation issued a working paper to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), 
entitled ‘China’s Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue of 
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament’. In 
the paper, China tacitly acknowledged that space has been militarised, albeit ‘to some 
extent’, through the use of military satellites, but it suggested that ‘their role should be 
all together negated’ (Hu, 2000: 5). It also called for the prevention of the 
weaponisation of an arms race in space based on the ‘basic obligations’ of ‘not to test, 
deploy or use weapons, weapon systems or components’ (Hu, 2000: 5).   
                                                
188 On why the UN is generally favoured by China, see Foot (2014). For excellent overviews of China’s 
opposition against the weaponisation of space at the CD, albeit somewhat outdated, see Lewis (2007: 
171-92); and Zhang (2008).  
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   In June 2001, the Chinese delegation issued another working paper that elaborated 
on its 2000 paper and put forward a possible ‘Treaty on the Prevention of the 
Weaponization of Outer Space’. Then, in 2002, China submitted a joint proposal with 
Russia to the CD on ‘Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Instrument 
on the Prevention of Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of 
Force Against Outer Space Objects’. Combining elements from the Chinese treaty 
proposal and a previous Russian treaty proposal from 1983, this was essentially a new 
space arms control initiative after several years. It urged states ‘not to place in orbit or 
around the Earth any object carrying any kinds of weapons’ and ‘not to resort to the 
threat or use of force against outer space object’ (Hu and Skotnikov, 2002: 3). Yet, in 
addition to the lack of specific verification measures, the treaty did not include a 
definition of ‘weapons’. Also, unlike China’s 2001 proposal, it did not suggest the 
prohibition of testing space-to-space, ground-to-space, or sea-to-space weapons 
(Moltz, 2012: 92-3).  
   As we saw in chapter 2, in 2008 China and Russia also submitted at the CD a draft 
for a legally binding ‘Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer 
Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects’ (PPWT), but 
the proposal received mix reactions, especially given that it followed China’s 2007 
ASAT test. The 2014 updated draft PPWT by China and Russia remains controversial 
because it addresses weapons in space, but it allows for the use of kinetic energy 
ASATs of the type that China used in 2007.  
   Nevertheless, it is important to note that China has played a constructive role in the 
formation of the 2007 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines as one of the thirteen 
members of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) (United 
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2010). It is also a member of the 
UNCOPUOS Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space 
Activities (C. Johnson, 2014b). Furthermore, China has participated in the UN Group 
of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures 
in Outer Space Activities (TCBMs), a key space sustainability and space security 
initiative within the UN framework (C. Johnson, 2014a).  
   In terms of bilateral space cooperation, China has increased space contacts with a 
number of countries and organisations, including Russia, Brazil, ESA, France, UK, 
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Germany, Nigeria, Venezuela, Argentina, Ukraine and Belarus.189 What is more, 
China has been active in the promotion of regionalism with the establishment of the 
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) that started officially 
operating in 2008. With its headquarters in Beijing, APSCO consists of eight member 
states: China, Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand and Turkey. 
APSCO’s aims include the promotion of ‘multilateral cooperation in space science 
and technology’ with an emphasis on ‘development and research, space technology 
application and training of space experts’ (Xinhua, 2008b).190 The creation of APSCO 
clearly indicates China’s desire to establish itself as a space leader in the Asia-Pacific 
(Pollpeter, 2008: 32; Moltz, 2012: 94).  
    
Balance of Power   
 
There is evidence to suggest that a sort of adversarial balancing has been taking place 
in recent years in the context of the US-China rivalry and the ASAT tests. A detailed 
analysis of China’s balancing behaviour or balancing Chinese space power is beyond 
the scope of this study, but it is worth highlighting some aspects of what form this has 
taken thus far and what this can tell us about balance of power as a primary institution 
of international space society. First, while much attention has been paid, and rightly 
so, to the relations between the United States and China as a possible expression of 
adversarial balancing behaviour, there is also some evidence that balancing may have 
a regional dimension. As we shall see in the next chapter, the 2007 Chinese ASAT 
test has had the effect of prompting India to accelerate the development of its military 
space capabilities, which has been exacerbated by the increasing space cooperation 
between China and Pakistan. The notion of an Asian space race, especially between 
China and India, is also suggestive of some ‘soft’ balancing. Another key example 
here is Japan’s increasing interest in the military uses of space, which is partly a 
response to China.191 In 2008, Japan entered into force the Basic Space Law that 
allows for the first time the military uses of space, shifting its decades old normative 
                                                
189 For a more detailed overview of most of these cooperative activities, see Pollpeter et al. (2015: 25-
35). For a good overview of Sino-Russian space relations, see Perfilyev (2010). On Sino-Latin 
American space cooperation, see Delgado-López (2012).  
190 More information on APSCO’s activities and programmes can be found at the organisation’s site: 
http://www.apsco.int/.  
191 For a detailed account of Japan’s space programme, see Pekkanen and Kallernder-Umezu (2010). 
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emphasis on ‘peaceful purposes’ under its pacifist restraints.192  Based on the Basic 
Space Law, Japan formulated the Basic Space Plan in 2009, which includes explicit 
references to the utilisation of space for national security purposes (Secretariat of 
Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, 2009). 
   Second, this regional dimension is compounded by the series of bilateral security 
relationships that the United States has formed with its close allies in the Asia-Pacific, 
known as the ‘hub-and-spokes’ system. Crucially, a space component has become 
more prominent in the US alliance relationships as part of the US ‘pivot’ or 
‘rebalancing’ to Asia under the Obama administration.193 For example, in recent 
years, the United States and Japan have taken key steps towards expanding their 
military cooperation in the domain of space as part of their ‘comprehensive dialogue 
on space’ and the 2015 revised US-Japan Defence Guidelines. Several areas of 
military space cooperation have been identified, including space situational awareness 
(SSA) and maritime surveillance from space (Pekkanen, 2015, Kyodo News, 2015). 
At the same time, the United States has also extended its space cooperation with 
Australia and South Korea with an initiative on tackling space debris (McGuirk, 2012; 
Kim, 2015).  
   However, one of the most widely noted attempts at balancing in space has been 
China’s initial participation in the EU’s Galileo navigation satellite system. Indeed, 
several authors have argued that Sino-European space cooperation represented a form 
of balancing in response to the US quest for space hegemony and growing 
unilateralism under the Bush administration. For example, Johnson-Freese and 
Erickson (2006) have called the space partnership between the EU and China ‘a 
geotechnical balancer’, while Casarini (2009: 108; 89) has described it as ‘a soft 
balancing initiative’ aimed at establishing EU independence from the United States. 
In a rather similar vein, according to Wang (2009: 456), the Galileo case constituted a 
‘pragmatic and flexible balance of geopolitical interests’. Bolton (2009) has even 
suggested that Galileo has been an attempt to balance against the power of the United 
States, as neorealists would typically expect. 
   Therefore, with the benefit of hindsight, it is worth saying something more about 
this interesting case as it helps to illuminate the possibilities and limits of adversarial 
balancing in space. In October 2003, China signed an agreement with the EU 
                                                
192 On the Basic Space Law, see, inter alia, Suzuki (2008); Aoki (2009); and Maeda (2009). 
193 For an insightful account of the US ‘pivot’ to Asia, see Silove (2016).  
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concerning the joint development of the Galileo global navigation satellite system, 
which was envisaged as an alternative to the US GPS. Under the agreement, China 
pledged to contribute approximately €200 million to the programme. Clearly, this has 
been one of the most important and high profile agreements ever reached between 
China and the EU and marked the beginning of what was described then as a 
‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. Despite the fact that Europeans had free access 
to the GPS system, the decision to build Galileo was largely driven by a growing 
concern about the possibility that the United States could deny the use of the GPS 
system to others. In the early 2000s, this concern was reinforced by the unilateralist 
impulses of the Bush administration and the growing emphasis on ‘space control’ and 
‘space power’ in Pentagon documents. As a result, the Galileo system was seen to be 
necessary in order to reduce the EU’s reliance on the GPS and to secure its strategic 
and technological independence from the United States. Further, the Galileo system 
was intended to enhance European competiveness by ensuring that Europe could take 
a share of the lucrative global market for navigation satellite services (European 
Commission, 1999; Johnson-Freese, 2007: 13-5; Casarini, 2009: 106-11). 
   Consequently, these strategic and commercial considerations have had a significant 
impact on the EU’s decision to invite China to collaborate in the Galileo system. In 
particular, Europe saw Chinese participation in the Galileo programme as a way to 
access the potentially lucrative Chinese space market. For China, participating in the 
programme offered an opportunity to access strategic technology and know-how 
(Casarini, 2009: 105).  
   Not surprisingly, however, at a time when a zero-sum approach in space had 
become prevalent in Washington, the development of Galileo was perceived as a 
possible challenge to US dominance in satellite navigation. The United States was 
also concerned about the potential of the Galileo’s commercial signals to overlap with 
the GPS signals used by the US military. Eventually, in 2004, an agreement signed 
between the two sides ended this dispute. However, one of the main US objections to 
the European plans for Galileo was centred on the potential of technology transfer 
raised by Chinese participation (Johnson-Freese, 2007: 190-4, 14-5).  
   Nonetheless, Sino-European cooperation on the Galileo system was short-lived due 
to a confluence of several factors that led the Europeans to exclude China from the 
second phase of the programme in July 2008. Given that the programme had changed 
from a public-private partnership to one funded by European governments, the 
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Europeans decided to introduce national security restrictions. Security considerations 
were compounded by China’s decision to build its own Beidou system that could 
compete with the Galileo and the related dispute over the overlap of signals of the two 
satellite navigation systems. Other important considerations that influenced the EU 
decision included: growing European concerns about technology transfer and the 
enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), strong US objections to Chinese 
participation, especially after China conducted its 2007 ASAT test, and the gradual 
improvement of US-European relations (Casarini, 2009: 177-88; Moltz, 2012: 100; 
Aliberti, 2015: 267-9).  
   To be sure, it is difficult to draw too many conclusions from the aforementioned 
examples, not the least because the inherent dual use nature of space technology 
further complicates matters. Yet, a few observations flow from this discussion. First, 
it appears that there is some form of balancing behaviour against the rise of China in 
space, but this is rather tentative and incomplete. To the extent that it involves the 
traditional allies of the US plus India, it points to aspects of US hegemony that are 
widely regarded as legitimate. At best, these dynamics suggest a US led strategy of 
hedging against China, which is also premised on liberal values held in common 
between the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific. The eventual exclusion of 
China from the Galileo project also helps to illustrate the role of common shared 
values in the context of what is usually called the ‘transatlantic security community’. 
But this also highlights the limits of Chinese efforts to balance against the United 
States in space, at least for now. Third, although, as many have noted, US-China 
relations are characterised by a form of adversarial balancing of the sort that realists 
and power transition theorists would expect, this is accompanied by elements of 
associational balancing, which is more closely linked to great power management. 
 
Great Power Management  
 
Certainly, one of the key drivers of China’s space programme is the quest for great 
power status.194 But the key demand here is for social recognition by other great 
powers. Given that certain space capabilities signify different levels of space 
                                                
194 On China’s quest for great power status in general, see, inter alia, Deng (2008); Suzuki (2008); Ross 
(2009); Larson and Shevchenko (2010); and Suzuki (2014). 
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participation and possibly entrance to the club of great space powers, it is helpful to 
briefly say something about how human spaceflight capabilities have conferred on 
China the status of great power.195 An important indication of this process of social 
recognition in space was a series of messages from foreign leaders congratulating 
China on its first successful human spaceflight mission in 2003.196 More importantly, 
shortly after China’s historical achievement in space, the first deputy of the Russian 
Space Agency, Nikolai Moiseyev stated: ‘We welcome this development and 
congratulate China for joining the club of space powers that have their own manned 
space programs’ (Agence France-Presse, 2003a). Equally, as NASA administrator, 
Michael Griffin (2006: 2), said during a 2006 visit to China, ‘one of the points I tried 
to annunciate…was to welcome China to the rank of space faring nations by virtue of 
their ability to put people into orbit entirely on their own resources’. While visiting 
China, Griffin also noted, ‘we welcome China to the fraternity of space-faring 
nations’ (NASA Office of Public Affairs, 2006: 14). What is remarkable about these 
statements is not only that they illustrate the social recognition of China’s entry into 
the club of great powers by the established space powers based on the acquisition of 
human spaceflight capabilities, but also that this recognition is grounded on a notion 
of an international space society as a point of reference.197 
   Nevertheless, China’s exclusion from the International Space Station (ISS) serves as 
a reminder of how attaining the status of a great power is a complex and non-linear 
process. In this regard, it is necessary to highlight that ESA officials have openly 
supported China’s participation in the ISS. As far as the United States is concerned, in 
2010, it was announced that Charles Bolden, then NASA’s administrator, would 
discuss the possibility of Sino-American cooperation on human spaceflight during his 
visit to China, but this was not well perceived by certain members of the US Congress 
(Moltz, 2012: 95). Perhaps, therefore, China’s exclusion from the ISS says something 
more about the role of the US Congress in shaping US space policy and the 
                                                
195 This is also significant because, unlike, for example, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) distinction 
between recognised nuclear haves and have-nots, the Outer Space Treaty embodies  ‘a material 
understanding of the principle of state equality’ (Wolter 2006: 96).    
196 For instance, see Xinhua (2003a). A full list of the foreign leaders that sent congratulatory messages 
can be found on the Xinhua website following this link: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/space/ 
04.htm.  
197 Although far from insignificant, this is different from recognising China simply as a great power at 
the global level due to the attainment of human spaceflight capabilities. For instance, Australian 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was quoted as saying that ‘China’s manned entry into space…is 
one more sign of that country’s historic emergence as a leading Asia-Pacific nation and a force in 
world affairs’ (Xinhua, 2003a).  
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perception of China as a threat among its members. In fact, under legislation initiated 
by Republican Congressman Frank Wolf, the US Congress passed a law in 2011 that 
effectively bans NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OSTP) from bilaterally working with China on national security grounds 
(Rosenberg, 2013; Johnson-Freese, 2015). Yet, as we shall see below, the Obama 
administration has looked for establishing avenues of cooperation on key areas with 
China.  
   As for special responsibilities and rights, it is clear that China’s 2007 ASAT test 
lessened its credentials as a responsible great power by undermining two key norms 
of international space order, that is, the peaceful uses of space and space 
sustainability. However, it would be wrong to assume that Beijing has not sought 
legitimacy in international space society or that it has not engaged with the process of 
maintaining international space order. As noted previously, it has tried to take a 
leading role in advocating a legally binding treaty on the prevention of a space arms 
race and the placement of weapons in space. It has also participated in all the major 
space sustainability initiatives, including the UNCOPUOS Working Group on the 
Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities and the UN GGE on TCBMs. 
   As a developing country, China has also emphasised the promotion of a more 
representative space order, including support for the needs of developing countries. 
For example, under a recent agreement, China and the United Nations Office for 
Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) will cooperate on enabling developing countries to 
use China’s space station for space experiments and offering flight opportunities (UN 
Information Service, 2016). Indeed, Chinese officials recognise that the provision of 
public goods in this regard is a key responsibility of great powers in space. At a recent 
joint ad hoc meeting on space security at the UN General Assembly, Chinese 
Ambassador Fu Cong (2015) highlighted this important dimension:  
 
Spacefaring nations should take up the responsibility of providing public goods, 
and help nations with limited or no space capabilities to enjoy the benefits of space 
exploration. China has done a lot of work in this regard. China has entered into 97 
bilateral space cooperation agreements with 30 countries, provided satellite 
launching service to more than 10 countries and made great efforts for the 
international application of the Beidou Navigation Satellite system. China has also 
played an active role in regional space cooperation under the framework of 
APSCO, effectively enhancing satellite remote sensing applications by APSCO and 
its members, and contributing to natural disasters reduction and relief in the Asia 
pacific region. China is willing to expand and deepen cooperation and exchanges in 
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peaceful uses of outer space with interested countries, and continue to work with 
the international society for a more equal and equitable environment for utilization, 
based on win win cooperation. 
 
Another significant development in the context of the institution of great power 
management is cooperation between the United States and China. Despite the US 
Congress law banning NASA from collaborating with China, the current US 
administration under Obama and the US State Department have taken important, 
albeit tentative, steps towards cooperation with China on the management of common 
challenges to international space order, such as space debris and space sustainability. 
Washington and Beijing held their first ‘Meeting of the U.S.-China Space Dialogue’ 
in September 2015 aimed at enhancing cooperation between the two countries on a 
range of space related issues with a particular emphasis on space debris and space 
sustainability (US Department of State, 2015). Washington and Beijing have also set 
up an emergency ‘space hotline’ to avoid misunderstandings and manage a future 
crisis in space (S. Jones, 2015).  
   This focus on managing international space order was given further impetus in 
September 2016 during the meeting between Obama and Xi at the margins of the G20 
Leaders Summit in China. The two leaders identified space debris as one of the key 
areas of global challenges on which Washington and Beijing should manage their 
differences and work together. According to a statement issued by the White House, 
the United States and China, as permanent members of the UN Security Council ‘with 
major space programs’, committed themselves to strengthening cooperation on 
addressing the creation of space debris and ‘to promote cooperation on this issue in 
the international community’ (the White House, 2016).  What form this cooperation 
will take remains to be seen, but it serves to illustrate the growing importance of great 
power management as a primary institution of international space society as well as 
China’s growing acceptance as a great power that it should have a hand in the 
management and enhancement of international space order.  
 
The Space Market  
 
Since the mid-1980s, one of the most important aspects of China’s commercial space 
activities has been its effort to establish itself as key player in the commercial launch 
field. In 1990, a CZ-3B rocket successfully launched AsiaSat-1, which made China 
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one of the few countries and organisations offering commercial launches for foreign 
customers. However, during the 1990s, China encountered a series of launch failures 
and accidents that damaged its reputation as a provider of reliable commercial launch 
services. One of these launch failures occurred in February 1996, when a Chinese 
rocket carrying an Intelsat satellite built by Space System/Loral exploded seconds 
after its flight. Then, in August 1996, a CZ-3 rocket failed to put a US Hughes 
satellite in high orbit. These two failures prompted investigations by the US firms 
Loral and Hughes, which involved sharing information with Chinese space officials 
(Johnson-Freese, 1998: 77-88; Moltz, 2012: 89-91).   
   This sharing of information soon emerged a major issue, when it became the subject 
of investigation on suspected Chinese nuclear espionage and satellite technology 
transfer by a US Congress bipartisan committee, known as the Cox Committee. In its 
report, ‘the Cox report’, the committee argued that the exchange of information 
regarding the launch failures between Loral and Hughes involved the transfer of 
technology to China that did not comply with US export control regulations. While 
the extent to which the investigation process resulted in the exchange of sensitive 
information remains controversial, the Cox report had the effect of hindering Sino-US 
space cooperation as well as China’s commercial launch business (Johnson-Freese, 
2007: 153-8; Moltz, 2012: 90-1; Erickson, 2014: 155-6). This case also served to 
highlight how commercial space activities remain largely enmeshed in techno-
nationalist ideas and perceptions. To be sure, this is compounded by the inherent dual-
use of space technology.   
   Nevertheless, China has managed to gain a foothold in commercial launch services. 
Since the mid-2000s, it has launched satellites for a number of countries, including 
Nigeria, Venezuela, Pakistan, Turkey, Argentina, and Ecuador. The stated goal is to 
seize 15 percent share of the satellite-launching market by 2020, which is illustrative 
of its ambition to expand its commercial activities in the global market of space 
products and services (X. Li, 2013). At the same time, China continues to focus on 
satellite exports. China has manufactured communication satellites for Nigeria, 
Venezuela, Pakistan, and Bolivia. It has also built a remote sensing satellite for 
Venezuela. Moreover, China has signed agreements to build satellites for Belarus, 
Laos, Sri Lanka and Venezuela (Pollpeter et al., 2015: 22-3). 
   What this list of countries suggests is that China’s commercial space interests 
cannot be easily separated from its broader foreign policy and diplomatic goals, 
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including developing its role as a leading member of the ‘Global South’ and securing 
access to energy resources (Pollpeter et al., 2015: 22). In sum, it is still difficult to 
disentangle China’s commercial space activities, like those of other countries, from 
broader techno-nationalist approaches and practices. It is clear, however, that China’s 
integration into the global space economy provides it with significant resources for 
claiming a leading role in shaping the emerging space order, which spills over into 
more traditional forms of international politics.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
A number of observations can be made regarding China’s engagement with the 
primary institutions of international space society. First, of all, an analysis of China’s 
engagement with the key institutional elements of international space society provides 
a more comprehensive and insightful account of China’s complex, multifaceted, and 
often contradictory, interaction with international space order. Although most 
analyses about China tend to focus on its specific civilian and/or military space 
programmes, especially in the context of a possible Sino-US conflict in space and the 
Asian space race, relating space to international society sheds a revealing light on the 
constitutive impact of the institutions of international space society on the identity of 
China as a space-faring participant. In doing so, it also helps to illuminate the impact 
of history and nationalism on the formation of China’s space policies and projects.  
   Second, framing space as international society helps to illustrate the ways in which 
China has tried, albeit with different degrees of success, to contribute to the process of 
consolidating and shaping order in space over the last decades. This is an important 
consideration, given that little work has been done on Chinese contributions to the 
normative and social structure of international space society. And yet, to understand 
the ongoing complex dynamics of the international politics of space it is necessary to 
acknowledge that international space society is a two-way street that not only shapes 
its members, but is also shaped by them.  
   Third, a key insight that emerges from this discussion is that China’s rise as a great 
space power has had both negative and positive effects on international space order to 
date. On the one hand, for example, China’s 2007 ASAT test undermined key 
normative features of international space order, such as the peaceful uses of space and 
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space sustainability. On the other hand, throughout the period covered in this chapter, 
China remained committed to engaging with the principal institutional facets of 
international space society, including an emphasis on multilateral approaches to space 
arms control. In part, these contradictions in Chinese space behaviour can be seen as a 
response to what Beijing saw as a shift towards an international space society based 
on US space hegemony aimed at containing China. But they are also indicative of the 
tensions and contradictions embedded in the politics of China’s national identity, as 
Chinese elites remain indecisive about what kind of great power they want China to 
be, including what kind of a space power.198  
   However, the tendency in recent years appears to be that China is willing to play a 
more constructive role in shaping order in space by accepting key responsibilities that 
are more commensurate with its increasing power and influence in international space 
society. It remains to be seen how successful China will be in assuming this role. It is 
relatively safe to say, however, that its willingness to become more involved with the 
process of shaping international space order and its desire for recognition by other 
space-faring members that it should have a stake in the maintenance of that order, 
already mark China as a major power and a full-fledged member in international 
space society. 
 
 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
198 On the importance of China’s multiple and often contradictory identities and their impact on its 
engagement with international order, see, inter alia, Breslin (2013); and Shambaugh (2013: 13-44).   
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Chapter 7. India and International Space Society (1990-2016) 
 
 
One of the most distinctive developments in the current state of India’s space 
programme is a new emphasis on highly visible space projects, such as space 
exploration missions, which seems to be at odds with its traditional conceptualisation 
of space utilisation as a way of promoting socio-economic development. At the same 
time, despite the fact that India’s official policy continues to place importance on the 
peaceful uses of space, a growing number of Indian officials and policy-makers 
advocate the militarisation and even weaponisation of India’s space programme and it 
is clear that India has become more interested in enhancing its military space 
capabilities. It is not surprising, therefore, that these recent developments have 
attracted much scholarly attention, especially in the context of discussing India’s 
rising power in space and the purported Asian space race. However, less attention has 
been paid to the constitutive impact of the social and normative structure of 
international space society on India’s space behaviour. Less attention has also been 
given to the ways in which India has contributed to the maintenance of international 
space order. 
   Consequently, this chapter focuses on India’s engagement with the primary 
institutions of international space society from 1990 to 2016. It begins with an 
examination of the enduring influence of postcolonial techno-nationalism on key 
Indian space projects. Although some observers have suggested that India’s shifting 
outlook in space indicates a significant departure from its longstanding position of 
denouncing high visibility space projects, I shall argue that there is more continuity 
than change in Indian space policies, which is illustrative of the plasticity and 
resilience of postcolonial techno-nationalism. The chapter then moves on to consider 
the growing militarisation of India’s space programme, which is partly a response to 
the external security environment and the broader trend towards space militarisation 
in international space society. Despite external and internal pressures, what is striking, 
perhaps, in this regard is how reluctant New Delhi has been in increasing its military 
space capabilities. The chapter then moves on to offer an analysis of India’s space 
diplomacy, before considering its engagement with the institutions of the balance of 
power, great power management and the space market. It will be suggested that	  
China’s growing influence in space has prompted Indian policy-makers to formulate a 
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response that encompasses elements of balancing behaviour. Deepening space 
cooperation with Washington can partly be seen in this light. Yet, given its continuing 
emphasis on strategic autonomy, New Delhi has resisted being too closely associated 
with the United States. Generally, so far, India’s response has been somewhat 
cautious and incomplete.  
   The chapter will argue that, although India is a rising space power, it is not an 
established great space power yet. While it can be seen as a responsible member of 
international space society that has participated in the process of contributing to key 
aspects of international space order, India has been less willing to assume great power 
responsibilities that are commensurate with its growing influence in space, at least for 
now.  
 
Techno-nationalism 
 
India and Postcolonial Techno-nationalism  
 
India has made great strides in integrating into the global economy over the last 
decades as a result of the liberalisation of its economy in the early 1990s. This has had 
an important impact on India’s science and technology policy as it marked a shift 
from technological self-reliance to an emphasis on cutting-edge R&D that is market-
oriented and suitable for the needs of its industry. Unlike China, India has not 
promoted ambitious R&D plans and the progress of reforming its R&D system 
remains somewhat slow. But like China, the Indian government remains the major 
source of R&D funding, the largest portion of which is dedicated to strategic 
technologies, such as space, atomic energy and defence (Kennedy, 2016: 75-6).   
   Therefore, the point to emphasise at the outset is that the pursuit of the space 
programme is still underpinned by the influence of postcolonial techno-nationalism. 
For even the most cursory glance at how India’s science and technology policies and 
programmes have been justified suggests the enduring relevance of postcolonial 
techno-nationalism to the understanding of the relationship between the state, 
technology, and modernity in contemporary India. For example, APJ Abdul Kalam, 
the eminent and influential scientist whom we encountered in Chapter 5 as project 
director of India’s first indigenous Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV-III) before moving 
to DRDO to become the ‘father’ of the missile programme, and who later served as 
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the eleventh President of India (2002-2007), has cast a revealing light on his 
postcolonial techno-nationalist thinking in his bestselling autobiography. Kalam (with 
Tiwari 2003: 103) ends the epilogue of his book by referring to two key plans for 
India’s science and technology policy – the ‘Self Reliance Mission in Defence System 
1995-2005’ and the ‘Technology Vision 2000’ –with the following words: ‘A nation 
needs both economic prosperity and strong security for growth and development…I 
earnestly hope and pray that development resulting from these two plans…will 
eventually make our country strong and prosperous and take our rightful place among 
the ranks of the “developed” nations’. More recently, delivering the Prem Bhatia 
Memorial lecture, the then National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon noted that 
‘talk of strategic autonomy has little meaning unless our defence production or 
innovation capabilities undergo a quantum improvement…a country that doesn’t 
develop and produce its own major weapon platforms…cannot claim true strategic 
autonomy’ (Press Trust of India 2011).  
   Similar postcolonial techno-nationalist rationales have also been provided with 
regards to the space programme. For example, after witnessing the Polar Satellite 
Launch Vehicle’s (PSLV) 100th space mission in 2012 that launched two foreign 
satellites (France’s Spot 6 satellite and the Japanese micro-satellite), the former Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh (2012, emphasis added) stated:  
 
Questions are sometimes asked about whether a poor country like India can afford a 
space programme and whether the funds spent on space exploration, albeit modest, 
could be better utilized elsewhere. This misses the point that a nation’s state of 
development is finally a product of its technological prowess. The founding fathers 
of our space programme faced a similar dilemma, but they persevered in pursuing 
their vision. When we look at the enormous societal and national benefits that have 
been generated in diverse fields, there can be no doubt that they were right. 
Equally, I have no doubt that ISRO will build on these glorious traditions and scale 
still greater heights.  
 
As we shall see, this postcolonial techno-nationalism premised on space technology as 
a marker of the state’s power, status, and modernity in international society has 
shaped, and continues to shape, the pursuit of most of India’s key space projects and 
activities in the post-Cold War era, to which I now turn.  
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India’s Space Programme: Key Developments and Projects (1990-2016) 
 
Satellites and Launch Vehicles    
 
As we saw in chapter 5, Sarabhai’s postcolonial techno-nationalist vision for the 
indigenous development of satellites and launch vehicles continued to guide the 
course of India’s space programme during the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the fact that 
India’s growing interest in space exploration missions has added a new highly visible 
component in its space programme (more on which below), since the early 1990s, the 
principal focus has remained on space-based applications, such as communications 
and remote sensing, and satellite launch vehicles.   
   In the field of communications satellites, the 1990s saw India building fully 
operational multipurpose communications satellites as part of the Indian National 
Satellite (INSAT) system, which provides services in the areas of 
telecommunications, television broadcasting, weather forecasting, and search and 
rescue missions. While the INSAT-1 series was built by Ford Aerospace, the launch 
of INSAT-2A in 1992 marked the operation of the second generation of INSAT 
satellites (INSAT-2 series), which was indigenously designed and developed by 
ISRO. Since then, India has launched several state-of-the-art satellites of the INSAT-3 
and INSAT-4 series, and the INSAT system is now one of the largest constellations of 
communication satellites in the Asia-Pacific. From the early 2000s onwards, India 
also began launching the GSAT series of smaller communications satellites.199  
   In relation to remote sensing or earth observation, since it became operational in 
1988, the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellite programme has made significant 
progress in building and operating indigenous remote sensing satellites that provide 
images of multiple resolutions used for various applications, such as management of 
earth, water, ocean resources, and disaster monitoring. As a result, today India 
operates one of the largest networks of remote sensing satellites. Key remote satellite 
series include: the IRS-1, IRS-P, Cartosat, Resourcesat, Radar Imaging Satellite 
(Risat) and Oceansat.200  
   To reduce its dependence on foreign navigation satellite systems and to support 
various applications, India has also completed the deployment of its own regional 
navigation system, known as the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System 
                                                
199 On the development of the INSAT programme, see Rao (2014: 145-58); and Sankar (2007: 36-46).  
200 For an overview of the IRS programme, see Rao (2014: 123-44); and Sankar 2007: 179-239). 
 
 
229 
(IRNSS), consisting of seven satellites. When it is operational, the IRNSS will offer a 
positional accuracy of better than 20m and two types of services – an open service for 
civilian use and a restricted one with encrypted signals.201 ISRO launched the first 
satellite of the series, IRNSS-1A in July 2013 and the seventh satellite, IRNSS-1G in 
April 2016. The point to make here is that the IRNSS can also be seen as a reflection 
of India’s postcolonial techno-nationalist project. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
proudly noted after the launch of the seventh IRNSS satellite ‘We are now one of five 
countries with our own navigational system. Today we are free of dependence on 
other countries for navigation’ (Bhat, 2016).  
   Meanwhile, in its quest for self-reliance, India has made great strides in building a 
series of operational satellite launch vehicles since the successful launch of the 
Satellite Launch Vehicle -3 (SLV-3) in 1980 and the first developmental flight of the 
Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV) in 1987. The ASLV programme proved 
to be a ‘technological bridge’, as it paved the way towards the design and 
development of the more powerful operational launch vehicles, the Polar Satellite 
Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) 
(Raj, 2000: 73; Rao and Radhakrishnan, 2012: 84-97).202 
   The first PSLV was successfully launched in October 1994 and provided India with 
the capability to put its remote sensing satellites (a 1,000 kg payload) to a 800-900 km 
altitude orbit. As Raj (2000: 231) notes, this breakthrough brought to reality 
Sarabhai’s dream of building satellites indigenously and having the capacity to launch 
them. The PSLV has four stages using both liquid and solid propulsion stages, with 
the second stage being based on the Viking liquid engine, acquired from France (Raj, 
2000: 191-8; Baskaran, 2001: 159). Thanks to its reliability, the PSLV has been in 
service for more than twenty years.203     
   The GSLV was intended to launch communications satellites to the geostationary 
orbit. To this end, the two stages of the PSLV could be replaced with a cryogenic 
engine. Although the first steps in cryogenics were taken in the 1970s under Sarabhai, 
ISRO began considering more systematically how to develop a cryogenic engine one 
decade later. As part of this effort, ISRO opted for purchasing this technology from 
                                                
201 ISRO, IRNSS Programme, http://www.isro.gov.in/irnss-programme. 
202 On the development and technical details of India’s satellite launch vehicles, see, for example, Raj 
(2000: 125-272); Rao and Radhakrishnan (2012); Suresh (2008); and Suresh (2015). 
203 On this point, see ISRO, Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle, http://www.isro.gov.in/launchers/pslv. 
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abroad. In exploring this possibility, there were negotiations with the United States, 
France and Japan, but these did not yield results largely because of considerations 
relating to restrictions imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 
which had been established in 1987. Consequently, ISRO turned to Glavkosmos for 
help and in 1991 the two sides reached a deal for the supply of two cryogenic stages 
as well as technology transfer for the GSLV (Raj, 2000: 234-43; Rao 2014: 179-82).  
   However, given that the Agni missile, which was launched in 1989, had used the 
first stage of the SLV-3, the United States was concerned that the supply of Russian 
cryogenic technology could be used to build a long-range ballistic missile for 
delivering nuclear weapons. Therefore, in 1992, the United States imposed sanctions 
against the Indian and the Russian space agencies over the deal. This placed enormous 
pressure on the Russian side to cancel the agreement and led to the renegotiation of 
the contract in 1993. Under the new agreement, Russia would now provide to India 
only completed cryogenic engines in order to withhold the further transfer of 
cryogenic technology (Moltz, 2012: 121-2; Raj, 2000: 243-9; Rao, 2014: 182-8). In 
turn, ISRO was forced to develop the technology indigenously. According to UR Rao 
(2014: 185), this was ‘truly a blessing in disguise’, as it propelled ISRO towards self-
reliance in all critical areas of space technology. The controversy over the cryogenic 
engine deal also made the Indian public aware of the difficulties involved in building 
strategic technologies and galvanised further support for the space and missile 
programmes (Baskaran, 2001: 162). In the end, in May 2003, the first GSLV was 
successfully launched using the Russian engine and, after overcoming several 
technical hurdles, in January 2014, the first GSLV D5 (Mark 2 version), powered by 
an indigenously built cryogenic engine, successfully put a communications satellite in 
orbit (T.S. Subramanian, 2014; Suresh, 2015: 923). 
 
 
Space Exploration  
 
Indian’s First Lunar Mission: Chandrayaan -1 
 
Like China, India’s first lunar mission owes much to the initiative of scientists, who 
began discussing this possibility in the late 1990s (Chakravarty, 2000). On 11 May 
1999, Krishnaswamy Kasturirangan, the then chairman of ISRO, announced for the 
first time the idea of an Indian lunar mission during a lecture he gave, entitled ‘India’s 
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Space Odyssey’, on the occasion of celebrating the first National Technology Day. 
The day had assumed symbolic importance as it was marking the first anniversary of 
Pockhran II, a reference to the five nuclear bomb test explosions that India had 
conducted at the Pockhran Test Range one year before (Bagla and Menon, 2008: 5-6, 
82-3; Kasturirangan, 2008: xii).  
   The announcement attracted much attention in the media and became a subject of 
heated debate about the merits of an Indian lunar mission. Opponents questioned why 
India should pursue a lunar mission more than thirty decades after the Apollo 11 
mission. According to HS Mukunda, professor at the Indian Institute of Science 
(IISc), a lunar mission would be ‘the stupidest thing to do. What others did 30 years 
ago, we are trying to do now. It won’t bring the country any technical benefit’ 
(Chengappa, 2000). Yet, most of the critics argued that a lunar mission would mark a 
significant departure from India’s traditional emphasis on space applications without 
bringing any tangible socio-economic benefits (Chakravarty, 2000). For example, 
Manoj Joshi, the political editor of the Times of India, argued that India as a poor 
country with high illiteracy rates would be better off leaving lunar missions to the 
Americans and the Europeans. Instead the focus should be on the use of space 
technology for development or national security (Joshi, 2001). In a rather similar 
fashion, V Rajamani, professor at the School of Environmental Sciences, Jawaharlal 
Nehru University, suggested that funds for the lunar mission ought to be spent on a 
project for socio-economic development, like water utilisation (Srikanth, 2003). In 
other words, the bulk of criticisms echoed the familiar question of why India as a 
developing country should harbour ambitions in space.  
   To offset these criticisms, the ISRO leadership embarked upon a process of 
consultation and engagement with the political leadership, the scientific community, 
academia, and the public. To this end, the first step was a symposium organised at the 
sixty-fifth annual meeting of the Indian Academy of Sciences entitled ‘An Indian 
Case for Going to the Moon’ in October 1999. Then, in February 2000, the 
Astronautical Society of India (ASI) held a meeting to discuss the lunar mission 
proposal in order to elicit recommendations from the scientific community. In 
September 2001, ISRO created a National Lunar Mission Task Force, which prepared 
a report that provided an assessment of the feasibility of the mission and defined its 
objectives. In 2003, a national committee headed by MGK Menon and consisting of a 
hundred leading scientists from various fields related to space exploration met in 
 
 
232 
Bangalore to review the report of the Task Force (Bagla and Menon, 2008: 86-9; 
Kasturirangan, 2008: xiv-xvi; Kasturirangan, 2006: 197). The committee unanimously 
recommended that India should pursue the mission, especially given the renewed 
international interest in lunar exploration since the early 2000s (Datta and 
Chakravarty, 2008: 19-20). Subsequently, in May 2003, the Parliamentary Review 
Committee gave its green light to the lunar mission, which was approved by the 
cabinet in November 2003 (Bagla and Menon, 2008: 89).204 On 15 August 2003, 
India’s Independence Day, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee formally announced 
the country’s plan for a lunar mission.205  
   Three aspects of ISRO’s successful push for the lunar project were especially 
noteworthy. First, it appears that the resurgence of international interest in lunar 
missions of the early 2000s has had an important impact on the national committee’s 
final recommendations (Bagla and Menon, 2008: 89, 84). By that time, all of the key 
space powers had announced plans for lunar missions (United States, Russia, China, 
ESA, and Japan). Second, unlike China, India’s lunar mission was opened to 
international cooperation. As a result, apart from indigenous payloads, Chandrayaan -
1 carried payloads from NASA, British, German and Swedish research institutes 
(through ESA), and Bulgaria (Datta and Chakravarty, 2008: 22-3). As Moltz (2012: 
132) points out, this move contributed to establishing ties with leading international 
space programmes and highlighted further the scientific value of the mission. Thus, it 
helped to dispel most of the criticisms within the scientific community and generated 
further public support for Chandrayaan -1.  
   Third, in many ways, the justification for the mission also reflected the enduring 
influence of a composite postcolonial techno-nationalist ideology. As was the case 
with earlier efforts, this involved embracing a justification for the programme based 
on the belief that India has little chance other than pursuing a lunar mission precisely 
because it is a developing country. In response to the opponents of the lunar mission 
who argued that a country mired in poverty should first focus on dealing with its 
many terrestrial problems, Kasturirangan said ‘it is not a question of whether we can 
                                                
204 It was also decided that the following institutions would be involved with the mission: the Physical 
Research Laboratory, the National Physical Laboratory, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research 
and the Indian Institute of Astrophysics (Bagla and Menon, 2008: 89). 
205 Notably, according to Kasturirangan (2008: xvii), while ISRO had initially identified the mission as 
Chandrayaan, which means ‘Moon vehicle’ in Sanskrit, the prime minister decided to announce it as 
Chandrayaan -1 because he believed that India’s lunar endeavour should not be confined to a ‘single-
shot’ mission. 
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afford it, it’s whether we can afford to ignore it.’ Referring to the relatively low 
budget for the lunar mission (roughly $80 million), he added that ‘the returns, in terms 
of the science…the technology, inspiration, stature, prospects for international 
cooperation…are immense’ (Singh, 2008). Indeed, a repeating theme underlining 
Kasturirangan’s justification for a lunar mission was the many benefits that India 
could accrue from such a high-prestige programme, including national pride and 
international prestige. In his words: ‘as a motivator, it will electrify the nation… If we 
go ahead, it will demonstrate to the world that India is capable of taking up a complex 
mission that is at the cutting edge of space. The spin-offs for us are going to be many’ 
(Chengappa, 2000).  
   Elsewhere, Kasturirangan (2008: xix, emphasis added) noted that ‘cost-effective 
missions like Chandrayaan-1 could create the necessary credentials both in terms of 
technology capability and the ability to play a unique scientific role, that in turn will 
enable India to play its rightful role in the Comity of Nations in the most exciting area 
of human exploration. Not surprisingly, the political leadership also shared this 
postcolonial techno-nationalist rationale. In 2006, the then Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh defended the lunar mission by saying:  
 
We have to walk on two legs, to deal with the fundamental problems of 
development and at the same time set our sights sufficiently high so we can operate 
on the frontiers of science and technology…In the increasingly globalised world we 
live in, a base of scientific and technical knowledge has emerged as a critical 
determinant of the wealth and status of nations and it is that which drives us to 
programmes of this type’ (Johnson, 2006).  
 
   It was in this context that India’s first lunar mission picked up steam. Eventually, on 
22 October 2008, India launched its first lunar probe, Chandrayaan -1, designed to 
map the lunar surface. Given that the mission was launched roughly one year after 
Japan (Selene) and China (Chang’e 1) had deployed their lunar probes, the mission 
attracted considerable worldwide attention and contributed further to the notion of an 
Asian space race.206 Despite the fact that Chandrayaan-1 encountered technical 
difficulties and had to be terminated ten months after it was launched, it was 
described by ISRO as a complete success (Bagla, 2009). Shortly after, data received 
from instruments carried on the Chandrayaan-1 mission confirmed evidence of water 
                                                
206 For example, see Singh (2008); Ramesh (2008); and Page (2008).  
 
 
234 
on the Moon (Pidd, 2009). ISRO is currently working on a follow-up lunar mission, 
Chandrayaan-2 (Nair, 2015).  
 
The Mars Orbiter Mission (MOM) 
     
The success of India’s first lunar mission increased ISRO’s confidence in space 
exploration and provided a crucial impetus for other missions of this type. Therefore, 
after the lunar mission, ISRO saw a mission to Mars as the next logical step, like most 
of the space-faring countries had opted for it in the past (Laxman, 2014: 72). More 
specifically, in 2007, soon after China and Russia had signed an agreement for their 
joint mission to Mars, G Madhavan Nair, the then ISRO chairman, announced that 
ISRO was studying a proposal on a mission to the Red Planet, but he rejected the 
view that this was part of an attempt not to be left behind in the ‘race for Mars’ (Press 
Trust of India, 2007a).  
   The idea of a Mars mission resurfaced after the launch of Chandrayaan-1. In 2010, 
Koppillil Radhakrishnan, who had succeeded Nair as chairman of ISRO in 2009, 
revitalised the plan for India’s first interplanetary mission to the Red Planet by taking 
a series of initiatives. These included engaging in dialogue with the scientific 
community, authorising feasibility studies, and increasing interactions with the 
political leadership (Bagla and Menon, 2014: 49). As part of this effort, in 2010, 
ISRO formed a group of scientists, called the Indian Mars Mission Study Team, to 
conduct a feasibility study of such a mission. In its report, the team pointed to the 
growing number of space-faring countries participating in the exploration of Mars and 
recommended that a Mars mission would help India to ‘have a strong say globally in 
the scientific, technological, and strategic circles’. Considering that Mars and the 
Earth come closer to each other about every 26 months, the report also suggested that 
there would be three windows of opportunity for a Mars mission, the first of which 
would be in November 2013 (Laxman, 2014: 70-1).   
   Nevertheless, what is noteworthy is that India’s plan for a mission to the Red Planet 
was given added momentum as a consequence of the unsuccessful Russian-Chinese 
Phobos-Grunt Mars mission in November 2011. We do know now that a few weeks 
later the Space Commission convened a meeting in New Delhi and decided to go 
ahead with the mission during the November 2013 launch window opportunity. This 
would offer India a chance to reach the Red Planet ahead of China. According to 
 
 
235 
Bagla and Menon (2014: 47-9), this ‘race mentality’ is also illustrated by the fact that 
the Indian government never received the Chandrayaan team in a formal ceremony. 
Given that these ceremonies are usually held for less important satellite launches, this 
is seen as an indication that former Prime Minister Singh and other members of the 
government felt irritated because India was beaten by China in the Asian Moon race. 
Hence, it appears that these political and geopolitical considerations placed additional 
pressure on ISRO to undertake a Mars mission within a remarkably short time frame 
(Bagla and Menon 2014: 47-9). 
   That said, the decision was also influenced by other factors. First, while the loss of 
the Chinese Mars orbiter boosted India’s own Mars effort, the failure of the Russian 
component had the effect of delaying Russia’s participation in India’s second lunar 
mission, Chandrayaan-2.207 As a result, India had little option but to move forward 
with a different mission. Meanwhile, ISRO was facing one of the most serious crises 
in its history due to a corruption scandal that involved Antrix, the commercial arm of 
ISRO, and an Indian private company, Devas Multimedia, created by former ISRO 
employees.208 In this regard, going to Mars could also help to restore the reputation of 
ISRO, which was severely damaged by the controversial deal (Bagla and Menon, 
2014: 40, 48). Moreover, a high-visibility mission could generate national pride and 
more interest in ISRO’s commercial space services and contribute to the perception of 
India as an emerging great power (Lele, 2014: 18; The Economist, 2014; S. 
Subramanian, 2014).   
   On 15 August 2012, during his address to the nation on the occasion of India’s 
sixty-sixth Independence Day, Prime Minister Singh formally announced that India 
would launch a $100 million spacecraft to Mars to collect scientific information, 
possibly in November 2013 (Laxman, 2014: 38-9). Thus, the spacecraft had to be 
developed and completed in a record time of 15 months, which meant that, unlike 
Chandrayaan-1, there was no time to establish collaborative projects with foreign 
partners (Bagla and Menon, 2014: 53). The Mars Orbiter Mission (MOM), also called 
Mangalyaan (meaning ‘Mars craft’ in Hindi), eventually lifted off on 5 November 
2013, with the aim to study the surface and mineral composition of the planet and 
search for methane. It was successfully put into orbit around Mars on 24 September 
                                                
207 The agreement between Russia and India was signed in 2007. Since the failure of the Phobos-Grunt 
Mars mission, India has decided to undertake its second lunar mission on its own in 2018.  
208 Madhavan Nair, who was chairman of ISRO when the deal between the two companies was 
finalised, was banned from holding any government post due to his alleged involvement.   
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2014. This made India the first country to reach Mars in its maiden attempt and only 
the third country to do so after Russia and the United States. Budgeted at $74 million, 
MOM was also the cheapest Mars mission ever, costing a tenth of NASA’s Maven 
orbiter and less than the Hollywood film ‘Gravity’, as Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi famously noted (Amos, 2014).   
   Consequently, MOM attracted worldwide attention and was seen as a victory for 
India in the unfolding Asian space race.209 But, as we might expect, there were mixed 
views about the merits of the mission (Joseph, 2013). Once again, there were critics 
who argued that such a mission was a luxury that a poor and developing country, like 
India, could not afford. For instance, according to Jean Drèze, a development 
economist, the Mars mission did not make sense given the large number of people 
affected by malnutrition and inadequate access to sanitation. ‘It seems to be part of 
the Indian elite’s delusional quest for superpower status’ he noted (Mallet, 2012). 
Priyamvada Gopal (2014), a professor at Cambridge University and expert in 
postcolonial literature, argued that space exploration as a source of knowledge should 
not be ‘the preserve of the rich west’, but she also questioned the value of the mission 
on the grounds that it was embedded in the language of ‘national “heroism”’ and 
‘technological “might”’. Gopal (2014) also suggested that MOM should serve as a 
touchtone for a national debate in India about the ways in which science and 
technology can be best utilised to accommodate the ‘widest interests of its people’. 
   To be sure, the scientific value of MOM was questionable, given that it hosted only 
five payloads and would last only six months (S. Subramanian, 2014; Wall 2014). In 
this regard, one of the most notable oppositions to the mission came from Nair, the 
former ISRO chairman, who questioned the scientific objective of the mission as well 
as its national and international impact. Paradoxically, though, his criticism was based 
on the view that ISRO should participate in the space race with a human spaceflight 
mission. In his words, ‘That’s where the big gap is. The United States space shuttle 
has failed and they don’t have a launch vehicle…China went to the extent of creating 
a mini (space) station. So, in that race India is lagging behind and unless we give a 
major thrust to an Indian manned mission, I think we will be left behind’ (Press Trust 
of India, 2012a). In a sense, Nair’s view is not surprising considering that a human 
spaceflight programme was his pet project. Indeed, it was during his chairmanship 
                                                
209 See, inter alia, Hume (2013); Agence France-Presse (2014); and Wall (2014). 
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that ISRO proposed a plan for a human spaceflight programme in 2006. One year 
later, ISRO announced its plans to launch its first human spaceflight mission in 2016 
and to send an astronaut to the moon by 2020 (Press Trust of India, 2007b).210 
   Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the scientific and political elites have 
largely justified the mission along techno-nationalist lines. In this vein, a few months 
after the successful launch of India’s Mars mission, Shashi Tharoor, the Minister of 
State for Human Resource Development, described the Indian Space Research 
Organisation (ISRO) as the new temple of modern India ‘like Nehru said dams are the 
temples of modern India’ (Press Trust of India, 2014a).  This captures nicely the 
continuing legacy of Nehruvian postcolonial techno-nationalism that signifies techno-
social and techno-political ‘big projects’ as celebrations of India’s modernity. 
   As far as the scientific merit of the mission is concerned, Radhakrishnan 
acknowledged that the principal objective of MOM was to demonstrate that India 
possesses the technology to reach Mars, but he also noted that its successful 
implementation ‘established our ability to collaborate with any country (on such 
missions) as equals’ (T. A. Johnson, 2014b). The then chairman of ISRO also pointed 
out that, ‘Certainly the Mars mission is going to create a great sense of pride and 
achievement and it also going to improve our position in the international community’ 
(Radhakrishnan, 2014: xi). Another revealing example of postcolonial techno-
nationalist thinking was the justification provided by Ambassador Shivshankar 
Menon, a former National Security Advisor, who was involved in the reviewing 
process of the mission. According to the ambassador, ‘We have heard these 
arguments since the 1960s, about India being a poor country not needing or affording 
a space programme. If we can’t dare to dream big it would leave us as “hewers of 
wood and drawers of water!”. India is today too big to be just living on the fringes of 
high technology’ (Bagla and Menon, 2014: 57-8; Bagla, 2012).   
   Equally importantly, in his address on the successful insertion of India’s Mars 
Orbiter Mission into the Red Planet’s orbit, the current Prime Minister of India, 
Narendra Modi (2014), highlighted some of the key themes associated with 
postcolonial techno-nationalism. The elated prime minister noted that with this 
‘spectacular success, ISRO joins an elite group of only three other agencies 
                                                
210  In 2014, ISRO launched an experiment test vehicle, the Crew Module Atmospheric Re-entry 
Experiment (CARE) as a first step towards developing critical spaceflight capabilities, but the 
government has not formally approved a human spaceflight programme yet (Bagla 2016).  
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worldwide, to have successfully reached the red planet’, and hailed the fact that the 
spacecraft was built indigenously ‘in a pan-Indian effort’. He also congratulated the 
Indian scientists for having developed ‘self-reliance across critical domains’ and 
described the space programme as ‘a shining example of what we are capable of as a 
nation’.211 Notably, underpinning his speech was also a sense of ‘civilisational 
exceptionalism’. Referring to how India has contributed to the world’s knowledge of 
the cosmos in the past, he urged modern India to continue its leading role as the ‘Guru 
of the world’ (Jagad-guru Bharat) (Modi, 2014).  
   In the context of examining the developments highlighted above, it is useful to 
make a number of interlinked observations. First, it is clear that one of the most 
important features of India’s space programme is its shifting focus on highly visible 
space projects, like the lunar and Mars missions, which seems to be at odds with its 
traditional conceptualisation of space utilisation for the promotion of socio-economic 
development. However, as the preceding discussion suggests, these high-prestige 
projects can be seen as an embedded practice of India’s postcolonial identity that 
signifies national techno-social and techno-political projects as markers of power, 
status, and modernity in international society. In other words, there is more continuity 
than change in Indian space policy that reflects the resilience and plasticity of the 
Indian variant of postcolonial techno-nationalism.  
   A second, but related, observation is that India has never been shy about its desire to 
acquire the status of a great power and, thus, these recent plans are partly a response 
to its growing capabilities. What has changed since the early phases of the Indian 
space programme is that India now has the necessary economic and technical means 
to negotiate the meaning of its space effort and, thus, to appropriate the political and 
cultural significance attributed to space technology by other members of the 
international space society. In their account of India’s moon programme, Indian 
journalists Bagla and Menon (2008: 13) capture this important dimension nicely when 
they note that ‘India’s entry into the elite lunar club of the world is a triumph; keeping 
the membership will be the real trial by fire’. This can also be said about India’s other 
space activities and programmes.  
                                                
211 It is worth noting that the crucial support that NASA’S deep space tracking system provided to 
MOM was usually downplayed in Indian media reports and official statements.   
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   Third, and consequently, this new emphasis on high-prestige space missions should 
be seen more as a continuity of the postcolonial project in the sense that the lunar and 
Mars missions can always be signified as indicators of India’s ethical modernity as 
well as an expression of its ‘civilisational exceptionalism’. In other words, every 
technological achievement in space by India, even if it has been achieved before by 
another space-faring country, can be constructed and represented as an expression of 
the unique qualities of its postcolonial identity. Put differently, achieving postcolonial 
modernity never goes away and thus its quest can always be activated to signify more 
ambitious space projects as part of the state’s postcolonial project of modernity. 
Again, this points to the importance of postcolonial techno-nationalism as a complex 
and composite ideology that now allows India to associate its space programme with 
the shared practices and understandings of leading members of international space 
society.  
 
Space Militarisation  
 
Indian strategists have been well aware of the increasing role of space-based assets as 
force multipliers that enhance the effectiveness of terrestrial combat forces since the 
first Gulf War, but the main focus of India’s space programme has been on the 
civilian applications of space technology (Gopalaswamy and Kampani, 2014: 40). 
Yet, although India’s official policy continues to place importance on the peaceful 
uses of space and the principle of non-weaponisation, a number of recent 
developments suggest that it has become more interested in the military uses of space, 
including ASAT weapons.212 This reorientation has become especially relevant 
following China’s successful anti-satellite test (ASAT) in 2007, which appears to 
have prompted a reconsideration of India’s traditional approach towards the 
militarisation and weaponisation of space (Pant and Gopalaswamy, 2008b: 69; 
Rajagopalalan, 2011; Sachdeva, 2013: 315).     
   This change in Indian strategic thinking has been evident in a series of statements 
by senior military and DRDO officials, following the 2007 Chinese test and the 2008 
US satellite interception, which indicated the intention of using India’s missile 
                                                
212 On India’s increasing interest in the military uses of space, see, for example Gopalaswamy and 
Wang (2010); Rajagopalan (2011); and Paracha (2013). 
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defence system to develop an ASAT capability (Samson, 2011: 427). For example, in 
February 2008, APJ Abdul Kalam told reporters on the sidelines of a conference 
sponsored by DRDO that India has the ability ‘to intercept and destroy any spatial 
object or debris in a radius of 200 km. We will definitely do that if it endangers Indian 
territory’. On the same occasion, VK Saraswat, the then Chief Controller, R&D 
(Missiles and Strategic Systems) at the DRDO, agreed with Kalam, albeit with 
somewhat less certainty: ‘It is just a matter of time before we could place the 
necessary wherewithal to meet such requirements’ (Brown 2010). In January 2010, 
Saraswat, who had now become the director general of DRDO and the scientific 
advisor to the President, announced during the 97th Indian Science Congress that 
India had begun working on an ASAT capability (Brown 2010). A few days later, Air 
Chief Marshal PV Naik pointed to China as the key driver behind India’s effort in an 
ASAT weapons system, when he highlighted the increasing vulnerability of India’s 
satellites ‘because our neighbourhood possesses one’ (Kerur, 2010). Since then, 
Saraswat has made several statements that suggest India’s continuing interest in an 
ASAT capability. For instance, in April 2012, shortly after the successful test of a 
long-range intercontinental ballistic (ICBM), Agni-V, the senior official stated that the 
test ‘ushered in fantastic opportunities in, say, building ASAT weapons’. However, he 
was quick to stress that the DRDO is ‘only talking about having the capability’, as 
India does not seek the weaponisation of space and the government has not approved 
an ASAT programme yet (Pandit, 2012).  
   Certainly, India’s intention to acquire an ASAT capability has been clearly 
exacerbated by concerns about China’s growing power in space. But this does not 
mean that there is a compelling strategic rationale for India to develop and deploy 
kinetic energy ASAT weapons of the type China conducted in 2007 as a means of 
deterrence against space weapons. As Gopalaswamy and Kampani (2014) show, this 
is because, among other reasons, India lacks the necessary Space Situational 
Awareness (SSA) capabilities to identify with confidence whether interference with 
its space assets was intentional or unintentional. Equally importantly, deploying 
ASAT weapons would increase the risk of generating space debris, which, in turn, 
would pose a threat to its own space assets and to those of third parties, making India 
an international pariah. Rather, a focus on means of interference that have temporary 
or reversible effects, such as spoofing, jamming, and blinding of satellites with lasers, 
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would form a more effective and credible Indian strategy of deterrence in space 
(Gopalaswamy and Kampani 2014).  
   Given the limited strategic value of an ASAT system, additional factors help to 
explain India’s growing interest in exploring ASAT capabilities. More specifically, 
some analysts have pointed out that these ASAT plans reflect India’s bitter experience 
with the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which established an unequal 
nuclear order based on the distinction between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. 
Because India conducted its first nuclear test after the treaty came into force, it was 
not recognised as a nuclear weapons state and remained outside the exclusive ‘nuclear 
club’. Therefore, some Indian strategists believe that India should test ASAT weapons 
now in order to avoid possible restrains imposed by any future international 
agreement banning ASATs (Samson, 2010; Gopalaswamy and Wang, 2010: 232). It 
has also been argued that this interest in ASAT systems is partly driven by DRDO’s 
bureaucratic interests and an effort to restore its image, especially given that, in sharp 
contrast to ISRO, DRDO has a poor reputation for developing good quality and 
reliable weapons (Gopalaswamy and Wang, 2010: 232).   
   There are two other plausible interrelated explanations. It is likely that Indian 
national security planners have assumed the inevitability of the weaponisation of 
space, so they have moved on with acquiring ASAT capabilities to provide the Indian 
government with the future option to deploy ASAT weapons if deemed necessary. 
This is not dissimilar to the way in which India pursued its nuclear policy before its 
decision to go nuclear (Gopalaswamy and Kampani, 2014: 54). Equally importantly, 
it is also plausible to argue that India’s military-industrial establishment, the ‘strategic 
enclave’, is pursuing the development of an ASAT capability without explicit political 
authorisation in the hope of putting pressure on the political leadership to approve the 
programme. In other words, this may constitute another case of ‘the technological tail 
wagging the political dog’ (Gopalaswamy and Kampani, 2014: 55).  
   Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that there is no evidence to suggest that 
India has crossed the threshold of developing operational ASAT weapons and it is not 
likely that this would happen in the near future. In fact, the political leadership and 
ISRO have stressed India’s policy stance against the weaponisation of space. Shortly 
after the Chinese ASAT test, the Minister of External Affairs Pranab Muckherjee 
stated in the upper house of the Indian parliament that the Indian government ‘will 
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continue to be closely engaged with the multilateral efforts towards keeping outer 
space free of weapons’ (cited in Rajagopalalan, 2011: 367).  
   In a somewhat similar fashion, soon after the Chinese test, the then ISRO chairman, 
G Madhavan Nair, noted that although India has ‘a number of rockets which can 
achieve the same results’, the use of outer space for peaceful purposes remains the 
philosophy that underpins its space endeavour (Singh, 2007). What the ISRO 
leadership believes does matter, especially given that it has historically exercised 
more influence on the development and implementation of India’s space programme 
than DRDO. But whether the pressure from military and DRDO officials will 
translate into a genuine change in India’s space policy stance against the 
weaponisation of space remains to be seen.  
    
 
Current Military Capabilities 
 
Despite the fact that the intention to build ASAT capabilities is still controversial and 
debatable, it is clear that India has recently become more interested in the military 
uses of space. This has been evident in the establishment of the Integrated Space Cell, 
which was announced in June 2010. The ‘Space Cell’ functions under the command 
of the Integrated Defence Services (IDS) Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence as 
a unified body that integrates the three services of the Indian Armed Forces (army, 
navy, and air force), the Department of Space, and ISRO. It is aimed to provide a 
more efficient use of India’s space assets for military space activities by improving 
cross-agency coordination between all key agencies concerned with space operations 
and applications (Rajagopalan and John, 2014: 15-6).  
   Another obvious manifestation of India’s growing emphasis on military space 
capabilities is the shift from utilising dual-use satellites to dedicated military satellites 
(Lele, 2011: 383). This transition was marked with the launch of India’s first military 
communications satellite under the command of the Indian Navy, the GSAT-
7/INSAT-4F, in August 2013. The satellite is a key step in enhancing India’s 
maritime security and intelligence gathering in the Indian Ocean region (Pandit, 
2013).  
   However, India still depends on dual-use satellites for its military activities. For 
instance, in 2001, ISRO launched the Technology Experiment Satellite (TES) that 
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offers a one-meter resolution. According to the then ISRO chairman, K. 
Kasturirangan, the satellite was intended for ‘civilian use consistent with our security 
concerns’ (quoted in Pant and Lele, 2010: 50). Since then, India has launched a series 
of high resolution satellites with military applications, such as the CARTOSAT and 
RISAT satellite series (Lele, 2011: 384; Moltz, 2012: 128; Rajagopalan and John 
2014: 20-1).213 The recent deployment of the IRNSS navigation satellite system is 
also expected to be an important force multiplier for the Indian military.  
   In lieu of a conclusion, three additional points are worth making here. First, while 
India’s shifting focus on the use of space for security and military purposes can be 
seen as a response to China’s increasing military space power, other traditional and 
non-traditional security challenges have been important in shaping the militarisation 
of India’s space programme, including Pakistan, border surveillance, anti-terrorism 
activities, and human security considerations.  
   Second, this militarisation trend can also be seen as a response to the policies and 
practices of other space-faring participants that see space as a force multiplier. On the 
one hand, Indian strategists feel that India should invest in developing certain military 
capabilities now, otherwise it risks lagging far behind in the military uses of space. On 
the other hand, as indicated above, India’s restraint from deploying ASAT capabilities 
can partly be attributed to its willingness to comply with emerging norms and 
practices related to the peaceful uses of space and space sustainability. That these 
tensions are currently at the centre of India’s space programme is no coincidence, 
given the wider normative tensions between the militarisation and weaponisation of 
space enmeshed in the ever evolving normative and social structure of international 
space society. As Chandrashekar (2011: 448) observes, it is unlikely that India will 
attempt to deploy ASAT systems in the near future, as this would signify a significant 
departure from the current normative regime of using space for peaceful purposes. 
Still, much will depend on the policies and actions of Beijing and Washington 
(Chandrashekar, 2011: 450).  
   Third, and related to the previous point, it is useful to remember that military space 
capabilities are also seen as part of what constitutes a modern state that aspires to be 
recognised as a great power in international space society. What is remarkable, 
                                                
213 Notably, in 2009 India launched the first satellite of the RISAT series that carried an all-weather 
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) acquired from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), whereas the second 
RISAT satellite, which was launched in 2012, uses indigenously built SAR technology (Rajagopalan 
and John, 2014: 20-1).  
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perhaps, in this regard, is how reluctant the Indian decision-makers have been in 
enhancing the military and security uses of space, when compared to the capabilities 
already developed by other space powers, and despite ongoing calls from strategists 
and policy-makers to do so. The very fact that India has not articulated a military 
space policy also serves to illustrate how the normative discourse within India about 
its unique path to space utilisation still resonates well among decision-makers.  
    
Space Diplomacy  
 
As noted in chapter 5, India was an early and active participant in the establishment of 
the legal principles that underpin the current space regime. The two key pillars of its 
space diplomacy have been an emphasis on the peaceful uses of space and multilateral 
approaches to arms control in space. These continue to shape its space diplomacy 
today. Therefore, the United Nations and affiliated forums, such as the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD), have been favoured by India. In this regard, India has supported several 
initiatives related to space arms control within the UN system strongly opposing the 
weaponisation of space. For instance, in 1998, India, together with Brazil, called for 
re-starting the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 
(PAROS) with the principal goal of negotiating a ban on ASAT weapons and ‘rules of 
the road’ for the use of satellites (Wolter, 2006: 67).  
   More broadly, in the 1990s, India remained adhered to its tradition policy stance 
against the weaponisation of space and voiced its concerns about the US plans for 
missile defence, which Indian policy-makers saw as a first step in this direction. In 
1997, during a debate on the upper house of the Indian Parliament on US space 
technology, the then Minister of State for External Affairs, Salim Iqbal Sherwani, 
noted that, although the Indian government was cognisant that US space activities 
involve the use of laser-based systems, ‘India’s stand against use of anti-satellite 
(ASAT) weapons for prevention of arms race in outer space has been articulated in 
the relevant fora such as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. India has also 
proposed negotiations for an international treaty to ban anti-satellite (ASAT) 
weapons’ (cited in Rajagopalan, 2011: 360). Then, in 2000, commenting on the US 
missile defence, the then Minister for External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, stated: ‘We 
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have consistently held a view that opposes the militarization of outer space…We 
cannot support this development’ (cited in Tellis, 2006 125).  
   Nonetheless, by the early 2000s, it was evident that there was a somewhat tentative 
shift in the thinking of Indian policy-makers from a traditional strong opposition to 
missile defence systems and the weaponisation of space to an ambivalent stance 
towards the George W Bush administration’s deployment of a national missile 
defence (NMD). This change was partly because of India’s interest in ballistic missile 
defence (BMD) as a response to national security threats emanating from China and 
Pakistan and partly as a consequence of a growing recognition in New Delhi that the 
time was ripe for improving relations with the United States as the sole superpower 
(Tellis, 2006: 126).  
   Yet, given that this shift attracted considerable domestic criticism, the Indian 
government soon backtracked to its position against the militarisation of space. 
Despite recent pressure from key military and defence constituencies on its traditional 
position against the weaponisation of space, especially after the 2007 Chinese ASAT 
test, India’s formal position on the issue of space weaponisation and militarisation has 
not changed (Rajagopalan, 2011: 362, 367). Crucially, however, India has not 
articulated an official national space policy to date (Rajagopalan, 2015).    
   Beyond its support for multilateral approaches to space arms control within the UN 
system, India continues to play an active role in a number of international 
organisations and forums, including the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), 
the International Astronautical Federation (IAF), the Space Frequency Coordination 
Group (SFCG), the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), the 
intergovernmental Group on Earth Observations (GEO), the International Charter on 
‘Space and Major Disasters’, the UN Platform for Space-based Information for 
Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER), and the International 
Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG). India has also been a member of the 
Inter Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) (Department of Space, 2015: 
128-9, Jayaraj, 2004: 105).  
   As for bilateral space cooperation, India has entered into cooperative arrangements 
with more than 30 countries, including key space-faring countries, such as Russia, 
France, the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and several 
developing countries (Department of Space, 2015: 126, Press Trust of India, 2014c). 
In terms of regional cooperation, since 1995, India is hosting the UN affiliated Centre 
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for Space and Science Technology Education in Asia and Pacific (CSSTEAP), which 
supports education programmes focused on the use of space technology for social and 
economic development.214 India is also participating in the Sentinel Asia initiative of 
the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) that supports disaster 
management in the Asia-Pacific region (Department of Space, 2015: 128).215  
   What should be added is that there is now increasing recognition in New Delhi, 
under the Modi leadership, that space diplomacy can play a vital role in promoting 
India’s broader foreign policy, national security, and commercial objectives. In this 
light, in 2015, for the first time a foreign secretary was made a member of the Space 
Commission, which remains the highest policy-making body in the country 
responsible for issues related to space.216 Given India’s growing presence on the high 
frontier, it is believed that this reconstitution of the Space Commission will help to 
outline a space policy that is more attentive to India’s commercial and national 
security needs (Rajagopalan, 2015). This move is also indicative of India’s unease 
with China’s growing ties with South Asian countries and points to the close ties 
between space diplomacy and the balance of power. It is to India’s engagement with 
the latter institution of the international space society that I now turn.  
 
Balance of Power 
 
India’s growing emphasis on the military uses of space can be seen as a sort of limited 
adversarial balancing driven principally by China. But New Delhi is also concerned 
about the impact of China’s growing profile in space on broader regional security 
dynamics. For example, India is paying close attention to China’s increasing space 
cooperation with Pakistan and its security implications.217 Beyond Pakistan, New 
Delhi is also worried about recent developments with regards to space that are 
indicative of Beijing’s gaining foothold in India’s neighbourhood. More concretely, in 
                                                
214 Centre for Space and Science Technology Education in Asia and Pacific (CSSTEAP), Background, 
http://www.cssteap.org/background. 
215 For more information on the initiative, see Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, Sentinel-
Asia: Disaster Management Support System in the Asia-Pacific Region, 
https://www.aprsaf.org/initiatives/sentinel_asia/. 
216 The 10-member Space Commission is consisted of the Secretary of the Department of Space, who is 
also the Chairman of ISRO, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, the 
National Security Advisor, the Expenditure Secretary and prominent space scientists and experts. See, 
Department of Space, Space Commission, http://dos.gov.in/space-commission. 
217 On space cooperation between China and Pakistan, see Ali (2011).  
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2012 Sri Lanka launched its first communications satellite from China, which was 
carried out through a partnership between the Sri Lankan SupremeSAT (Pvt) and the 
China Great Wall Industry Corp. According to analyst Brahma Chellaney, growing 
space ties between China and Sri Lanka strengthen the impression that Colombo is 
moving closer to Beijing and this ‘sends a message to India that a country in its own 
backyard is cozying up with China’ (Reuters, 2012). Meanwhile, China has entered 
into a cooperative agreement with Myanmar on remote sensing satellite data sharing, 
has shared satellite images with Bangladesh, and is exploring the possibility of 
launching satellites for Nepal and the Maldives (Kasturi, 2013).  
   Against this backdrop, there is a growing perception in New Delhi that a more 
active space strategy is needed. A series of reports issued by the principal foreign 
intelligence agency of India, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), have 
highlighted that India ought to have been more interested in helping Sri Lanka and the 
Maldives to launch their first satellites, instead of allowing China to augment its 
interests and image (Dikshit and Joshi, 2013). Consequently, the Prime Minister’s 
Office has also urged ISRO to formulate a proactive strategy to counter China’s 
influence.	   But as one ISRO official lamented ‘quite simply, we just don’t have the 
kind of resources and budget the Chinese do’ (Kasturi, 2013). However, in 2014, 
Prime Minister Modi asked ISRO to develop a satellite to be used by the member 
countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (Press 
Trust of India, 2014b). Clearly, this can partly be seen as a response to China’s 
growing space ties with India’s South Asian neighbours.  
   As we saw in Chapter 6, there is also an important interplay between regional and 
global security dynamics shaped principally by the role of the United States in East 
Asia and the Sino-US relationship. India’s strategic posture in general and its space 
policy in particular are increasingly determined by this ever evolving strategic 
environment. This has been evident in the remarkable improvement of Indo-US 
relations over the past fifteen years, after years of alienation. It is not necessary to 
embrace the so-called ‘democratic peace theory’ to recognise that shared democratic 
values have brought the two countries closer. But as many have noted, this growing 
strategic partnership has also been influenced by balance of power considerations, as 
the United States aspires to help India emerge as a regional great power and as a 
counterweight to China (Twining, 2014: 19-20, 22-3). Of course, the most noteworthy 
aspect of this process has been the United States-India civil nuclear agreement that 
 
 
248 
provided India with de facto recognition as a nuclear weapons state (NWS) (Narlikar, 
2011:	  1615). 218  
   In addition to the US-India nuclear deal, another important development in this 
regard was the announcement of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in 
2004 in which the United States and India committed to enhance cooperation in key 
areas of high technology, including civilian nuclear energy and civilian space 
activities. To facilitate this process, the United States eased its restrictions on the 
export of dual use high technology to India (Vadlamudi, 2005; Correll, 2006). This 
paved the way for the subsequent collaboration between NASA and ISRO in the 
Chandrayaan-1 lunar mission (Moltz, 2012: 123).  
   Another important indication of the redefinition of their relationship has been the 
first Indo-US Space Security Dialogue in March 2015, which is driven by mutual 
concerns about China’s growing military space capabilities (Press Trust of India, 
2015). As part of this bilateral dialogue, there are discussions about extending 
cooperation on SSA and collision avoidance and the use of space for maritime 
awareness (Rose, 2015; the White House, 2014). Meanwhile, since 2010, the United 
States and India have been holding the annual India-USA Civil Space Joint Working 
Group, which reviews bilateral space cooperation, and, more recently, in 2014, they 
established the ISRO-NASA Mars Working Group. Cooperation also includes the 
microwave remote sensing satellite ‘NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar’ 
(NISAR) and sharing earth observation data (Department of Space, 2015: 126-7; the 
White House 2014).  
   In parallel with the deepening of space cooperation between New Delhi and 
Washington, space ties have been established between India and key US allies in the 
Asia-Pacific. In 2008, ISRO and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) 
signed an agreement to extend their cooperation in the field of disaster monitoring 
(Brown, 2008) and, in 2012 India signed a memorandum of understanding with 
Australia on civil space cooperation (Press Trust of India, 2012b). Then, in 2015 India 
and South Korea identified several areas of bilateral space cooperation, including 
lunar exploration, satellite navigation, and space science and application as part of 
their ‘special strategic partnership’ (Press Information Bureau, 2015). 
                                                
218 On the politics of the US-India nuclear deal, see Mistry (2014).  
 
 
249 
   But despite the closer bilateral ties highlighted above, India has not formed an 
alliance with the United States yet and it is more likely that it will remain unwilling to 
do so in the near future. So far, it seems that India’s traditional emphasis on 
preserving its strategic autonomy has dictated a cautious approach to its engagement 
with the United States and its Asia-Pacific allies. Thus, for now, New Delhi is hesitant 
to be closely associated with Washington in what might be seen as an overt attempt to 
constrain Beijing.  
   Indeed, in 2014, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to New Delhi, a memorandum 
of understanding was signed between ISRO and the China National Space 
Administration (CNSA) that encourages bilateral space cooperation, including 
‘research and development of scientific experiment satellites, remote sensing satellites 
and communications satellites’. Clearly, it is too early to say what form this 
cooperation might take. But we need to be careful not to overestimate the impact of 
this agreement on Sino-Indian space relations, especially given that, although a 
‘framework agreement’ was signed between Beijing and New Delhi in 2006, no 
significant steps were taken towards bilateral cooperation (Jayaraman, 2014). But 
while the recent Sino-Indian agreement points to a mutual recognition that both 
countries have a vested interest in fostering space cooperation, the most general point 
to make is that India feels increasingly compelled to respond to China’s rise in space 
by pursuing a space policy that encompasses elements of balancing behaviour.  
 
 
Great Power Management 
 
Certainly, India’s pursuit of high-prestige space exploration missions has been part of 
its quest for great power status. In October 2015, reflecting on India’s recent 
accomplishments in space, including its lunar and Mars missions, the Permanent 
Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador DB 
Venkastesh Varma (2015) noted that ‘India is a major space faring nation’. True, high 
visibility space achievements have highlighted India’s rise as a space power. For 
example, a report issued recently by the Beijing Institute of Space Science and 
Technology Information, which is affiliated to the China Academy of Space 
Technology (CAST), assessed that India is one of the five major space powers, 
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mentioning its Mars mission as a key breakthrough in its space capabilities (Xinhua, 
2015).219   
   Be that as it may, the process of being recognised as a great space power is often 
complex and multifaceted. In what follows, it will be argued that, although India is a 
full-fledged member of international space society as well as an emerging space 
power, it makes more sense to see India as a great space power in the making rather 
than as an established one.220 More specifically, it is clear that India has engaged with 
the process of maintaining and consolidating international space order as a 
responsible member of international space society. As indicated above, India is party 
to all key international treaties governing space and it has been supportive of efforts to 
prevent an arms race in race. As a participant in the Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC), it has also played a constructive role in drafting the 
2007 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. Further, India has backed all of the key UN 
initiatives with regards to space sustainability, including the UNCOPUOS Working 
Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities and the UN Group 
of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures 
in Outer Space Activities (TCBMs) (Varma, 2015).  
   In terms of responsibilities, as a developing country, India has taken significant 
steps in addressing the needs of developing countries and promoting a more equitable 
order in space. A key contribution is this regard has been hosting the UN affiliated 
CSSTEAP. It is also worth noting that the development of the ‘SAARC satellite’ has 
been framed along these lines. In his announcement of the project, Prime Minister 
Modi emphasised that the ‘SAARC satellite’ is ‘a gift from India’ in order to benefit 
the ‘development of all the countries in the region’	  (Press Trust of India, 2014b). In 
his words, ‘India is rooted in the age old ethos of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the 
world is one family). India’s space programme is driven by the vision of service to 
humankind and not by the desire for power. We must therefore share the fruits of our 
technological advancement with those who do not have the expertise, and our 
neighbours in particular’ (T.A. Johnson, 2014a). Equally, under the regional 
                                                
219 According to the report (Xinhua, 2015), the ranking order is as follows: United States, Russia, 
Japan, China, and India. It is striking, perhaps, that a Chinese report considers that China’s space power 
follows behind Japan. But it is likely that the CAST’s report is primarily aimed at a domestic audience 
and is intended to garner further public support for the Chinese space programme by playing the ‘Japan 
card’.   
220 On the general point that India is a great power in the making rather than an established great power, 
see Narlikar (2011).  
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cooperative mechanism of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP), India has provided satellite-based technical support to Sri Lanka 
related to drought monitoring. Likewise, India participates in the COSPAS-SARSAT 
international system through which it offers search and rescue support to India’s 
neighbouring countries (Department of Space, 2015: 128). 
   In light of the developments highlighted above, a number of points are worth 
emphasising here. First, India has not sought to challenge the current international 
space order. Instead, it has taken part in maintaining it. In fact, India has come a long 
way from its ‘third worldism’ and its emphasis on state sovereignty on issues 
concerning the governance of space in the 1970s and the 1980s (Mohan, 2010: 137-
8). By way of illustration, it is useful to remember that India, along with other 
developing countries, initially opposed the use of direct broadcasting from satellites to 
other countries on the grounds that it constituted a violation of territorial sovereignty 
(Mohan, 2013: 31). In contrast, today it seems that Indian thinking about global 
governance issues is shifting from a focus ‘on equity and justice to order and stability’ 
(Mohan 2010: 141-2). As Mohan (2010: 141) points out, this shift reflects India’s 
adaption to ‘the logic of major power status’. 
   Second, and related to the previous point, there is a growing recognition that India, 
as an emerging space power, should have a hand in shaping and maintaining 
international space order. As Frank A. Rose (2015), the Assistant Secretary of the 
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at the US State Department 
has noted: ‘As established space-faring nations, India and the United States should 
work together to clearly and publicly define what behavior the international 
community should find both acceptable and unacceptable’. In doing so, Rose (2015) 
also called India to take a leadership role in multilateral fora in order to shape, 
together with the United States, norms of responsible behaviour in space. However, 
implicit in this statement is that India has not taken that role yet. Crucially, in addition 
to external pressure, especially from the United States, that encourages India to 
contribute to international space order, there is also a growing recognition within the 
country that India should be more proactive in engaging with the process of shaping 
norms and rules in space.221  
                                                
221 For example, this was one of the underling themes that emerged during the ORF Kalpana Chawla 
Annual Space Policy Dialogue (Asian News International, 2016).  
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   This leads to the third point to make. For all the debates about its rise as a great 
space power, it appears that India has been somewhat punching below its weight. 
Despite external and domestic pressure to assume a leadership role in its engagement 
with institutional elements of international space order that is commensurate with its 
rising profile in space, India has generally been reluctant to get involved in efforts to 
shape rules pertaining to space governance.222 Indeed, while India has been careful 
not to undermine key norms that underpin order in space, unlike China, in recent 
years it has not taken any initiatives concerning arms control in space. It should also 
be noted that, much to its disappointment, India was not invited to participate in the 
UN GGE on TCBMs. According to Ambassador Varma (2015) ‘it is unfortunate that 
a major space faring country like India was not included in the GGE on 
TCBMS…This is one example of how a decision to keep India out was actually a loss 
to the GGE’. But although it is plain that India’s participation in the GGE would 
provide further legitimacy to its mandate, perhaps, India’s exclusion serves to 
highlight that it is still somewhat early to describe it as a great space power.  
   Fourth, another important issue here concerns India’s limited approach to what the 
provision of goods involves. In examining India’s rise as a responsible great power, 
Narlikar (2011) makes a helpful distinction between global public goods and club 
goods. With the risk of oversimplification, whereas public goods are usually 
associated with great powers and their willingness to set the agenda and preserve 
order, club goods are usually associated with rising (and regional) powers that are 
more inclined to supply certain goods targeted to a smaller contingency (Narlikar 
2011: 1608-9). So far, India has been more willing to provide specific club goods 
rather than global public goods. What follows from this is that India is clearly a rising 
power, but it remains largely hesitant about assuming great power responsibilities that 
would signify its status as an established great power (Narlikar 2011, Narlikar 2013). 
This important insight is also relevant to the question of whether India is a great space 
power. As far as international space order is concerned, it is possible to say that the 
provision of goods to developing countries is a key aspect of what great power 
responsibilities involve, but a mere focus on supporting developing countries through 
the supply of club goods is not enough to render India a great space power.  
                                                
222 On this point, see, inter alia, Gopalaswamy and Kampani (2011); and Moltz (2012: 134).   
 
 
253 
   Therefore, the most general point to make is that, although India is willing to supply 
certain goods, which are largely confined to developing countries, it has generally 
been reluctant to take a leadership role in shaping and reinforcing international space 
order that would be in accordance with an established great power. It remains to be 
seen whether it will assume a more proactive engagement with influencing 
international space order, but, among other factors, the quest for strategic autonomy 
embedded in its postcolonial identity suggests that this will be a slow process.  
 
The Space Market  
     
In 1991, the Indian government under PV Narasimha Rao introduced a series of major 
reforms aimed at fostering India’s integration with the global economy. As part of this 
effort, the Department of Space established the Antrix Corporation Limited in 1992, 
ISRO’s commercial wing, and since then India has expanded its commercial activities 
in the global market of space products and services (Moltz, 2012: 120-1). The launch 
of ISRO’s 100th space mission of putting two satellites in orbit has been illustrative of 
Indian’s effort to commercialise its space programme in that none of the satellites 
onboard the flight was Indian (one was the French SPOT-6 satellite and the other one 
the micro satellite PROITERES developed by the Osaka Institute of Technology) (the 
Indian Express, 2012).  
   In 1999, the successful launch of South Korea’s Kitsat-3 and Germany’s Tubsat on 
a PSLV-C2 rocket marked the beginning of India’s involvement in the commercial 
launch business. From 1999 onwards, ISRO has launched 74 international customer 
satellites from 20 countries using the PSLV launch vehicle.223 Only between 2013 and 
2015, India launched 28 foreign satellites carried on the PSLV that generated $101 
million in revenues (de Selding, 2016). What should be noted is that, although most of 
the flights carried small satellites into orbit due to the limitations of the PSLV, it is 
expected that the recent successful flights of the more powerful GSLV launcher will 
help India to capture a bigger share of the global space market. As part of the ‘make 
in India’ initiative, ISRO has also called for a bigger role of the private space sector in 
the space programme that could push India’s further integration into the global space 
market (Press Trust of India, 2016).  
                                                
223 Antrix, Launch Services, http://www.antrix.gov.in/business/launch-services. 
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Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter has shown the ways in which the ever evolving and dynamic structure of 
international space society has had a constitutive impact on India from 1990 to 2016. 
It has also assessed India’s contribution to the maintenance of international space 
order. A couple of points flow from this discussion. First, certainly, one of the key 
features of India’s space programme has been its new emphasis on highly visible 
space projects, such as the lunar and Mars missions, which seems to be at odds with 
its traditional focus on the use of space for socio-economic benefits. However, as this 
chapter has demonstrated, there is more continuity than change in India’s space 
endeavour, which has been manifested in the continuing and powerful influence of 
postcolonial techno-nationalism on key Indian space projects. Seen in this light, 
India’s recent interest in high visibility space projects constitutes an embedded 
practice of its postcolonial identity that still signifies highly visible technological 
projects as markers of power, status, and modernity. Therefore, the analytical 
framework put forward in this study is attentive to the salience of history in a 
postcolonial context and how this still influences the nexus between the state, 
modernity, and technology.  
   Second, it is clear that India’s decision to accelerate the militarisation of its space 
programme has been a reaction to the emergence of new security challenges, the most 
important of which is China. Yet, this shift in India’s space outlook is also indicative 
of the ‘socialising’ effects of the wider militarisation trend in international space 
society. But it is also useful to recognise that the militarisation of India’s space 
programme can also be seen as an expression of postcolonial techno-nationalism in 
the sense that military space capabilities assume symbolic importance as markers of 
the state’s great power status and modernity. At the same time, however, it appears 
that Indian policy-makers are still imbued with a sense of civilisational 
exceptionalism that emphasises India’s normative commitment to the peaceful uses of 
space for civilian and socio-economic purposes. So far, this has constrained an overt 
and systemic militarisation, not to mention weaponisation, of the space programme.  
   Third, it is plain that India has emerged as a major space actor in a number of areas, 
including space exploration, military space capabilities, and commercial activities. 
But while India is an emerging space power as well as responsible member in 
international space society, it is not a great space power yet. As we saw, since 1990, 
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India has been engaged with the process of maintaining and consolidating 
international space order by supporting the prevention of an arms race in space and 
opposing the weaponisation of space. It has also played a constructive role in 
engaging with the norm of space sustainability. Moreover, it has made important 
contributions to international space order by providing goods to developing countries. 
Consequently, there is also increasing recognition among established great powers 
that India today should have a say in managing international space society. 
Nevertheless, India appears rather reluctant to assume the burden of sharing great 
power responsibilities that are in accordance with its growing profile in space, at least 
for now.   
   Whatever we may think about the efficacy and the goals of India’s space 
programme, an analysis of India’s engagement with the primary institutions of 
international space society offers a useful way of trying to capture a wider array of 
forces and pressures that shape India as an important space actor. Equally important, 
it also helps to highlight how India takes part in the process of facilitating the 
construction and maintenance of international space order.  
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Conclusions  
 
 The main aim of this thesis is to investigate what, if anything, can the English School 
theory tell us about the international politics of space generally and about the cases of 
China and India as rising space actors in particular. In addressing this question, the 
central argument of thesis has been twofold. First, using the English School theory as 
an analytical lens through which to look at space, this thesis pays attention to the 
existence of international order in space, which is established by rules, norms, and 
practices shared among space-faring states. This argument is developed by illustrating 
the ways in which there is an international society at the sectoral level represented by 
space with a distinct international social structure. This is manifested in how its 
primary institutions are differentiated from such institutions at the global level (war, 
law, sovereignty, diplomacy, balance of power, great power management, market, 
environmental stewardship) in a historical and comparative perspective. This thesis 
also suggests that there are good reasons for including techno-nationalism as a 
distinctive primary institution of international space society. A focus on the distinct 
institutions of international space society helps to highlight their constitutive impact 
on China and India as space actors and what is accepted as legitimate patterns of 
space activity.  
   Second, the thesis argues that the space programmes of China and India have been 
informed by a certain variant of techno-nationalism in a postcolonial context, what I 
call ‘postcolonial techno-nationalism’, which is based on the development of space 
technology as a normative marker of the state’s power, status, and modernity. 
Building on the English School concept of the standard of civilisation and drawing on 
key ideas from historical and sociological studies on science and technology, this 
thesis highlights how this enduring influence of postcolonial techno-nationalism 
reflects the operation of technological advancement as an informal standard of 
civilisation during the expansion of the European international society of states in the 
nineteenth century. Therefore, the concept of techno-nationalism elucidates how 
historically embedded conceptions and practices associated with the role of 
technology in international society continue to inform contemporary ideas, meanings, 
practices, and norms in international space society. Consequently, by highlighting the 
importance of history, this thesis offers an alternative and valuable approach to the 
study of the international politics of space that emphasises historical depth.  
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Main Findings and Contributions 
 
By way of summary, it is useful to restate the main findings of this thesis and to 
assess its contributions to our understanding of the international politics of space. The 
most important contribution of this thesis is the conceptualisation of space as 
international society that offers a number of possible insights. First, relating space to 
international society helps to highlight the complex and dynamic social constitution of 
international space order with an emphasis on institutional practices and historical 
depth. In this regard, a focus on the distinct primary institutions of international space 
society offers a wide range of analytical tools to examine how international space 
order is produced, maintained, negotiated, and contested in a historical and 
comparative context. Thus, by defining space in a societal perspective an international 
society approach also illustrates the importance of shared norms, institutions, rules, 
and identities among space-faring participants. Consequently, this thesis makes a 
timely contribution to debates about the growing militarisation of space by stressing 
that there is nothing inevitable about space weaponisation, given that space activities 
and practices are what the members of international space society make of them.   
   Second, using the cases of China and India, the framework of international space 
society suggests that it is necessary to recognise how China and India as space actors 
are social constructs within international space order. Therefore, focusing only on 
China or India and their specific military and civilian space activities is not enough in 
order to make sense of the plethora of structural, institutional, and historical factors 
that shape their behaviour in space. In other words, their rise as space powers is 
contingent on their interaction with a dynamic, complex, and evolving international 
space order. In this light, framing space as international society also sheds a revealing 
light on how China and India have engaged with the process of maintaining and 
shaping order over the last decades. This is a valuable insight, not the least because it 
emphasises that international space society is a two-way street that not only shapes its 
members, but is also shaped by them. 
   Third, and consequently, by defining space power in societal terms, the framework 
of international space society sets an innovative and alternative benchmark against 
which to assess China and India as rising space powers. More specifically, focusing 
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on what the role and responsibilities of great space powers involve, this thesis has 
argued that China’s rise as a great space power has had both negative and positive 
implications so far. Yet, as was discussed in Chapter 6, recently, there is evidence to 
suggest that it is more willing to play a more active role in contributing to the 
maintenance of space order by assuming the burden of sharing great power 
responsibilities, which are in accordance with its growing power in international space 
society. At the same time, China is increasingly recognised as a great space power. 
Equally, this thesis shows how India has emerged as a key space power in a number 
of areas of space activities. But given its reluctance to accept great power 
responsibilities, it is not an established great power yet, at least for now. In this light, 
this thesis also makes an important contribution to wider debates about how to 
conceptualise and understand space power.  
   Fourth, while acknowledging the role of technology and the physical qualities of the 
space environment as material-context factors that influence the primary institutions 
of international space society, by defining space in a societal perspective, this thesis 
problematises the very idea of outer space and its demarcation from terrestrial 
politics. As was discussed in Chapter 2, a sectoral approach that pays attention to the 
distinct social structure of space activities as a ‘social whole’ offers valuable insights 
into the concept of space security by transcending the existing three dimensional 
framework (outer space for security, security in outer space, security from outer 
space). This opens up the possibility of bringing both terrestrial and non-terrestrial 
dimensions of space activities together in a more holistic and finely tuned 
understanding of space security.  
   Fifth, one of the most important findings of this thesis is that history matters and the 
particular interest of China and India in developing highly visible space projects can 
be explained largely in light of their earlier encounters and formative experiences. As 
we saw, the enduring influence of postcolonial techno-nationalism that has informed 
the pursuit of China and India’s space programmes as symbols of the state’s power, 
status, and modernity can be largely understood as a reflection of how technological 
advancement was constituted as an informal standard of civilisation during the 
expansion of the European international society in the nineteenth century. Based on 
technological advancement as a key measure of the level of a given civilisation, China 
and India were usually seen as ‘uncivilised’ by the ‘civilised’ and technologically 
advanced European powers. Significantly, despite the fact that the discourse of racial 
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and civilisational hierarchies became less prominent in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, technological advancement continues to establish distinctions between 
outsiders and insiders. Thus, it is necessary to recognise the relationship between 
being space-faring and being modern and how the advent of the Space Age signified a 
new condition of demarcating insiders and outsiders and how this compelled Chinese 
and Indian elites to pursue space programmes from early on. This point has become 
more relevant today, given China and India’s rise in international society and their 
quest for great power status.  
   While the main focus of this thesis is empirical rather than theoretical, it also offers 
pay-offs for English School scholars and science and technology specialists. More 
specifically, for English School scholars, this thesis provides the straightforward 
concept of sectoral international societies by extending the English School theory to 
the study of international society at the sectoral level. As was noted in the 
Introduction, by bringing technology and the English School theory, a sectoral 
approach adds a third dimension to the study of international society that transcends 
the global and regional levels. Equally, a sectoral approach opens up new avenues for 
bridging the English School with International Security Studies as the example of 
space security illustrates. It also offers a new way of relating the English School with 
global governance, including space governance.  
   In relation to science and technology specialists, this thesis offers the more refined 
concept of postcolonial techno-nationalism that highlights how history and identity 
still inform highly visible technological projects as markers of the state’s power, 
status, and modernity. Indeed, one of the key questions is how China’s space 
programme made significant progress and produced remarkable achievements amid a 
period of political and social turmoil and limited financial resources. Most analyses 
tend to focus on the reasons why China decided to develop certain space capabilities 
and how it used them once they were available. But what has happened in the 
meantime rarely attracts scholarly attention. However, postcolonial techno-
nationalism, as a composite, but influential ideology, helps to illustrate how the 
Chinese space programme was justified and implemented successfully. Likewise, the 
case of India sheds a revealing light on how a postcolonial techno-nationalist 
understanding of space technology has informed the pursuit of the Indian space 
programme since its inception.  
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   Moreover, as we have seen, key works on the history and politics of China’s 
strategic weapons programme have highlighted techno-nationalism as a useful 
concept. But most of these analyses have rather downplayed how China’s techno-
nationalism has been influenced by its formative encounter and experience with the 
expanding European society of states. On the other hand, while important works on 
the history and politics of India’s nuclear programme have emphasised the enduring 
influence of its colonial experience, it is striking, perhaps, that techno-nationalism has 
been largely neglected in the relevant literature. Equally, most analyses of China and 
India’s space programmes remain somewhat descriptive and ahistorical. In this light, 
the concept of postcolonial techno-nationalism can be used to tell the story of other 
highly visible technological projects by elucidating the crucial relationship between 
civilisation, modernity, and technology in a postcolonial context.   
       
Concluding Remarks  
 
It is important to recognise here that, in many ways, the conceptual framework of 
international space society remains underdeveloped. This is not surprising, given that 
this thesis has attempted to move English School theory into terra incognita. As 
Chapters 6 and 7 have shown, the concept works well, but much work remains to be 
done. Therefore, it is useful to say briefly something about some key issues that need 
attention and further elaboration. First, as was discussed in Chapter 2, my intention is 
not to offer a comprehensive and definite account of what may be included as a 
primary institution in international space society, but there is scope for examining 
other candidates for status as primary institutions, beginning with hegemony. This 
also involves a more detailed analysis of how the primary institutions of international 
space society relate to each other and how international space society interacts with 
international society at the global level. Second, it is clear that the cases of other space 
actors can help to enrich the concept of international space society, including 
transnational space actors. Despite the fact that my analysis calls attention to the 
pivotal role of scientists and engineers as agents of international space society, 
arguably, more needs to be done in terms of highlighting the interplay between the 
interstate, transnational, and interhuman domains in international space society. Third, 
while my focus here is on using international society as an analytical central idea, this 
thesis hints at the question of whether international space society exists in ontological 
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terms. This is definitely an important question that is worth exploring elsewhere.  
More broadly, it is also worth considering other sectoral international societies, 
including the nuclear and cyber international societies, and what can international 
societies at the sectoral level tell us about international society at the global and 
regional levels. 
   All in all, although the conceptual framework provided in this thesis remains 
incomplete, conceptualising an international space society offers a new way of 
thinking about the complex dynamics of the international politics of space. Focusing 
on China and India’s engagement with international space order, this thesis also offers 
valuable insights about China and India as emerging space powers and members in 
international space society.  
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